BRITISH  POLICY  AND  OPINION  DURING 
THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 


DORA  NEILL  RAYMOND,  A.  M. 

Sometime  University  Fellow  at  the   University  of  lex'x* 

and  Schiff  Fellow  in  Political  Seiche 

at  Columbia  University 


;...    . 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THF.  REQUIREMENTS 

FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

IN  THE 

Faculty  of  Political  Science 
Columbia  University 


NEW  YORK 
1921 


BRITISH  POLICY  AND  OPINION  DURING 
THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 


DORA  NEILL  RAYMOND,  A.  M. 

Sometime   University  Fellow  at  the    University  of  Texas 

and  Schiff  Fellow  in  Political  Science 

at  Columbia  University 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 

FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

IN  THE 

Faculty  of  Political  Science 
Columbia  University 


NEW  YORK 

1921 


Copyright,  1921 

BY 

DORA  NEILL  RAYMOND 


gXGW*^G,E 


K 


(La 

MY   FATHER 

WHOM  IT  USED  TO  PLEASE  TO  SAY,  "  TOGETHER  SOME  DAY  WE  WILL 

WHITE  A  HISTORY,"  I  DEDICATE,  WITH  DEEP  AFFECTION,  THIS 

DISSERTATION  ON  A  SINGLE  PHASE  OF  A  GREAT  WAR 

HENRY  HART  NEILL,  B.  A.,  LL.D. 
1848-1911 


4C 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction:  Great  Britain,  1870      11 

CHAPTER  I 
British  Relations  with  France  and  Germany,  1860-1870        ....      17 

CHAPTER  II 
France  under  Parliamentary  Government 37 

CHAPTER  III 
British  Negotiations  preceding  the  Declaration  of  War 51 

CHAPTER  IV 
The  Responsibility  for  the  Declaration  of  War 67 

CHAPTER  V 
Publication  of  the  Draft  Treaty 87 

CHAPTER  VI 
Formation  of  the  League  of  Neutrals  107 

CHAPTER  VII 
The  Downfall  of  the  Empire  127 

CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Reception  of  the  Republic 153 

CHAPTER  IX 
Abortive  Peace  Negotiations .       ........        172 

CHAPTER  X 
War  a  Outrance        194 

7]  7 


g  CONTENTS  [8 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  XI 
A  Moon  of  Treaties  and  an  Eclipse 215 

CHAPTER  XII 

A  Stroke  from  the  Bear 23i 

CHAPTER  XIII 
Anarchic  December.    .       25° 

CHAPTER  XIV 
"  Peace  at  any  Price" 284 

CHAPTER  XV 
The  Armistice 3"> 

CHAPTER  XVI 
The  Negotiation  of  the  Preliminaries 333 

CHAPTER  XVII 

Lenten  Meditations. 358 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Treaty  of  Frankfort.    .       383 

Bibliography 406 

Index 413 


FOREWORD 

This  study  is  the  development  of  a  master's  thesis  written 
at  the  University  of  Texas  under  Professor  Thad  Weed 
Riker.  The  author  takes  this  opportunity  of  thanking  him 
for  his  help  at  that  time  and  for  his  suggestion  of  a  sub- 
ject that  has  afforded  her  sustained  interest  and  enjoy- 
ment. She  wishes  to  acknowledge  very  gratefully  the  as- 
sistance of  Professor  Charles  Downer  Hazen,  under  whose 
guidance  the  research  was  conducted  for  two  years  at 
Columbia.  Through  his  introduction  she  was  enabled  to 
use  the  very  excellent  collection  of  British  periodicals  and 
newspapers  in  the  Boston  Athenaeum  and  was  incidentally 
given  the  pleasure  of  working  in  the  most  delightful  library 
it  has  been  her  privilege  to  enter.  The  burden  of  proof 
reading  has  fallen  to  Professor  Carlton  Hayes,  whose  skill- 
ful care  in  this  particular  the  author  much  appreciates. 

Though  examination  has  been  made  of  the  files  of  the 
New  York  and  the  Boston  Public  Libraries,  the  Library  of 
Congress,  and  the  Libraries  of  Columbia,  Harvard,  and 
the  University  of  Texas,  the  author  is  aware  that  much  in- 
teresting material  on  the  subject  remains  untouched  across 
the  Atlantic.  That  valuable  collection  of  extracts  from 
the  British  Press  which  is  entitled  Public  Opinion  has  been 
extensively  drawn  upon  to  supply  the  lack  of  papers  not 
available  in  this  country.  Biographies  and  memoirs  of  the 
period  are  constantly  making  their  appearance  and,  barring 
the  adoption  of  the  loose-leaf  system  of  certain  encyclo- 
paedias, it  would  not  be  possible,  even  in  England,  to  make 
the  work  definitive. 

91  9 


IO  FOREWORD  [IO 

Finally,  the  author  wishes  very  sincerely  to  thank  Pro- 
fessor William  Archibald  Dunning  for  having  permitted 
her  to  write  the  dissertation  under  his  supervision  after 
Professor  Hazen  had  been  called  to  Strasburg.  Professor 
Dunning' s  marginal  comments  and  annotations  have  been 
so  interesting,  and,  at  times,  so  humorous  that  she  regrets 
that  it  is  not  permissible  to  retain  them  with  the  text.  The 
unconscious  criticism  that  has  been  supplied  by  the  super- 
iority of  his  own  work  cannot  be  so  erased  and  the  author 
hopes  she  may  still  profit  by  it. 


INTRODUCTION 
England,  1870 

England,  in  the  summer  of  1870,  may  be  described  not 
inaptly  by  phrases  which  at  that  time  might  have  described 
her  Queen, — a  lady  who  had  attained  to  that  age  when  com- 
fort is  more  to  be  esteemed  than  glory,  and  the  quiet  of 
Balmoral  to  any  royal  progress,  even  though  it  emulate  the 
French  Eugenie's  journeyings  in  Egypt.  A  lady,  however, 
not  to  be  pitied  or  ignored, — one  who  caused  her  physician 
small  anxiety  and  was  herself  undismayed  by  any  vaporous 
fears  of  age  or  death.  There  was,  too,  a  dignity  about  her 
that  commanded  respect, — the  respect  accorded  to  power 
which  has  been  used  greatly  in  times  past  and  may  again 
be  used  on  provocation.  The  Queen,  it  was  said,  might 
sometimes  be  unmindful  of  the  talk  about  her,  but  she  was 
found  to  be  alert  always  to  whatever  had  to  do  with  her 
brother,  the  Duke  of  Coburg ;  her  cousin,  King  of  Hanover ; 
her  uncle,  Leopold  of  Belgium;  her  daughter,  the  Crown 
Princess  of  Prussia,  her  daughter-in-law,  the*  erstwhile 
Princess  of  Denmark;  and  most  of  all,  her  son,  who  was 
to  rule  dominions  on  the  Seven  Seas.  Victoria,  then,  might 
choose  to  ride  behind  plump  ponies  in  the  low-swung  car- 
riage that  bears  her  name,  but  diplomatists  and  their  masters 
could  not  forget  that  the  drowsy  widow  tmder  the  tilted 
little  sunshade  was  a  queen  and  that  the  sunshade  could  be 
discarded  for  a  sceptre. 

England,  be  it  said,  was  like  her  Queen, — plump,  and 

pacific,  yet  powerful  withal.     In  this  summer  of  1870,  her 

policy  was  controlled  by  disciples  of  the  Manchester  School : 

gentlemen  who  preferred  congresses  to  wars,  and  rejoiced 

11]  11 


I2        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [I2 

more  at  the  conclusion  of  a  commercial  treaty  or  a  guaran- 
tee of  free  trade  than  the  acquisition  of  new  territory. 
The  days  of  "  bluster  and  blunder  "  were  believed  to  be  well 
passed.  Palmerston  had  died  five  years  before,  and  Russell 
was  in  retirement.  Reduction  in  armament  was  operating 
very  favorably  on  the  budget.  A  cotton  market  gone  astray 
had  come  to  be  as  much  a  matter  of  concern  as  a  stray 
Britisher,  clamorous  of  his  citizenship.  That  echo  of  the 
Government,  the  Times,  once  called  the  "  Thunderer,"  had 
donned  slippers  and  dressing  jacket  and  become  querulous 
and  homiletic. 

First  of  her  public  men  was  Gladstone,  who  for  two  years 
had  been  prime  minister.  Very  much  interested  in  the 
difficulties  of  Ireland  was  Gladstone.  One  of  his  greatest 
qualities,  the  only  one  in  which  he  claimed  to  excel  his 
rivals,  was  concentration.  When  it  is  considered  that  his 
interest  was  already  deeply  engaged  elsewhere  and  that  in 
character  and  manner  he  was  wholly  antithetic  to  his  French 
neighbours,  it  may  be  understood  how  it  happens  that  in  his 
excellent  biography  in  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica  no  men- 
tion is  made  of  the  war  which  during  his  premiership  was 
waged  beyond  the  "  streak  of  silver  sea," — a  great  war 
whose  issue  was  of  vast  importance  to>  England. 

His  Foreign  Secretary  was  the  patient,  and  polite,  and 
very  pliant,  Lord  Granville.  This  Lord  Granville  spoke 
French  like  a  Parisian.  He  could  appreciate  French  wit 
and  treasure  a  bon  mot  so  carefully  that  it  would  lose  noth- 
ing of  its  gallic  sparkle  when  it  reappeared  in  an  after-din- 
ner speech.  But  the  French  of  that  radical  young  advocate, 
Gambetta,  left  him  cold.  Nor  can  one  fancy  that  the  splen- 
did verve  of  the  Song  of  Roland  would  have  been  to  him  a 
compensation  for  its  gory  fright  fulness.  He  has  been 
called  the  great  pacificator  of  politics.  Men  said,  in  the 
winter  of  1870,  that  he  led  England  through  the  valley  of 
humiliation  that  he  might  gain  that  title. 


I3]  INTRODUCTION  1 3 

Perhaps  the  most  powerful  personality  in  the  Cabinet  was 
that  of  the  Quaker,  John  Bright.  He  was  in  ill-health  at 
this  time  and  absented  himself  from  most  of  the  meetings, 
but  he  wielded,  none  the  less,  a  strong  influence  over  his1 
associates.  For  many  years  he  had  been  consistently  favor- 
able towards  France,  believing  as  he  did  that  Napoleon's 
friendship  for  England  was  the  one  "fixed  point  in  his 
otherwise  erratic  schemes."  He  rejoiced  at  the  renewal  of 
the  Commercial  Treaty  between  the  two  countries;  wrote 
an  occasional  strong  letter  to  Gladstone  or  Granville  when 
he  feared  they  might  swerve  from  neutrality;  disregarded 
the  critical  press  that  urged  his  retirement;  took  his  medi- 
cines regularly;  and  when  the  war  was  over  and  done  with 
could  boast,  as  did  the  Abbe  Sieyes  after  a  more  turbulent 
epoch,  that  he  had  lived. 

Robert  Lowe  was  'Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.  In  a 
"  Cabinet  of  Reform  and  Retrenchment  "  his  business  was  to 
see  that  hostility  to  the  former  was  balanced  by  gratitude 
for  the  latter.  Reductions  in  the  Navy  had  greatly  assisted 
him  in  the  preparation  of  a  popular  budget.  It  needed  only 
peace  to  justify  a  continuation  of  his  work.  Messrs.  Card- 
well  and  Childers  were  respectively  War  Secretary  and  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty.  At  this  time  these  positions  were 
regarded  as  secondary  and  no  extensive  inquiry  had  been 
made  as  to  these  gentlemen's  ability  to  fill  them. 

Disraeli  was  the  leader  of  the  Opposition.  He  had  not 
yet  found  himself,  and  was  regarded  as  a  weather  cock  by 
those  Conservatives  who  could  not  understand  how  he  had 
followed  Bright  in  his  desire  for  reduced  naval  armaments 
and,  for  the  sake  of  office,  embraced  the  Reform  Bill  of  the 
Liberals.  He,  himself,  was  somewhat  sceptical  of  the  wis- 
dom of  his  course  in  those  proceedings  and  yet  reluctant  to 
be  completely  out  of  gear  with  the  well- jointed  times.  He 
did  not  wish  to  be  classed  with  the  brilliant  Sir  Henry 
Bulwer. 


I4        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         fl4 

Good  European  that  Sir  Henry  was,  and  servant  of 
Great  Britain  in  the  days  of  Palmerston  and  Russell,  it  was 
believed  that  he  did  not  know  a  hawk  from  a  handsaw 
where  commercial  interests  were  involved.  The  young  men 
even  of  his  own  party  looked  upon  him  as  a  superannuated 
diplomat.  Of  his  pattern,  too,  was  Sir  Robert  Morier 
whose  finest  days  were  yet  to  come.  He  was  ripe  now  for 
his  high  destiny,  but  he  found  himself  a  charge  d'affaires  at 
Darmstadt  while  his  country  was  served  in  the  Continental 
capitals  by  men,  who,  though  his  inferiors  in  diplomacy, 
were  regarded  by  the  home  Government  as  of  sterling 
safety.  In  Paris  there  was  that  punctilious  bachelor,  Lord 
Lyons;  in  Madrid.  Mr.  Layard,  the  envoy  extraordinary, 
dreamed  of  Babylon  and  Nineveh,  while  Prim  and  the 
agents  of  Bismarck  conspired  to  place  a  Hohenzollern  on 
the  Spanish  throne;  Lord  Augustus  Loftus  showed  himself 
more  alert  at  Berlin;  but  in  St.  Petersburg,  Sir  Andrew 
Buchanan  could  be  disregarded  with  impunity. 

Quite  outside  the  pale  of  officialdom,  and  yet  still  vividly 
associated  in  the  memory  of  his  contemporaries  with  British 
foreign  policy,  was  that  old  attache  of  Stratford  Canning's, 
and  most  picturesque  of  diplomats,  David  Urquhart.  He 
was  still  thundering  against  Russia  and  urging  the  sedulous 
study  of  international  law.  Absolutely  and  proudly  op- 
posed to  the  current  of  his  time,  he  sought  to  redirect  it  in 
the  Diplomatic  Review,  a  periodical  so  scholarly  and  of  a 
bias  so  vigorous  and  pronounced  as  to  make  it  a  thing  unique 
of  its  kind.  But  "  Urquhartism  "  was  dying.  The  talents 
of  the  editor,  reinforced  by  contributions  from  Karl  Marx 
and  a  small  group  of  followers,  could  not  save  the  slim 
review  from  dropping  from  a  monthy  to  a  quarterly,  sup- 
ported by  a  steadily  dwindling  list  of  subscribers.  Those 
who  could  understand  its  style  were  those  most  certain  to 
poohpooh  its  ideas.     Urquhart,  they  said,  was  a  good  sort 


1$]  INTRODUCTION  1 5 

to  have  introduced  the  Turkish  bath  into  England,  but  Jove, 
man,  the  fellow  had  gone  to  seed  utterly  with  his  eternal 
drivel  against  Russia  and  his  harpings  on  the  courtesies  of 
nations.     He  was  "  touched." 

Much  more  intelligible,  though  also  somewhat  unBritish 
in  its  viewpoint,  was  that  group  of  Oxford  men  that  had 
followed  the  teachings  of  Auguste  Comte.  The  Positi- 
vists  had  a  disconcerting  way  of  analyzing  governmental! 
policies  not  on  the  basis  of  their  effect  on  the  industry  of 
Manchester,  and  Leeds,  and  Birmingham,  but  of  their  effect 
on  the  populace  as  a  whole.  They  were  felt  to  be  danger- 
ous. Professor  Beesly,  with  his  reputation  for  scholarly 
attainment,  could  not  be  denied  a  hearing.  The  eloquent 
young  Frederic  Harrison  made  an  opponent  even  more 
alarming.  The  whole  school  showed  a  disconcerting  tend- 
ency to  affiliate  with  the  working  men,  and  to  dignify  by  their 
approbation  the  speeches  of  George  Odger  and  others  whom 
the  press  was  in  the  habit  of  deriding.  It  was  believed  that 
they  might  even  have  some  ideas  in  common  with  that 
atheistical  young  republican,  Charles  Bradlaugh. 

Others  there  were  in  the  cast, — "  lords,  ladies,  and  atten- 
dants,"— to  say  nothing  of  the  mob,  which  though  it  be  kept 
off  stage  ever  so  successfully  for  most  of  the  evening  has  a 
way,  when  once  it  gains  the  boards,  of  diverting  either 
tragedy  or  comedy  from  its  own  proper  ending.  To  speak 
severally  of  the  supernumeraries  would  be  to  name  many 
who  in  other  dramas  have  a  higher  place.  But  here  they 
can  be  grouped  together  as  having  exercised  no  very  ap- 
preciable influence  on  a  formation  of  policy  or  opinion 
at  the  time  we  are  to  describe. 

Certainly,  that  doughty  Scotchman,  Thomas,  Carlyle, 
would  cavil  at  seeing  his  name  in  pica.  But  so  it  deserves 
to  be,  if  only  as  retribution  for  his  own  faults  of  classifica- 
tion.   For  he  ranged  all  humankind  into  two  columns.    Man 


lf>        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [^ 

was  either  exalted  as  a  hero  or  impaled  as  a  knave, — a 
method  not  so  convincing  as  it  was  simple.  The  public  tired 
of  Carlylogiums  on  Prussia,  Bismarck,  and  the  brave  and 
pious  German  soldier. 

Other  more  worthy  historians,  somewhat  too  busy  writ- 
ing history  to  help  to  make  it,  were  the  gentle,  humorous 
John  Richard  Green;  that  staunch  admirer  of  things  Ger- 
man, Freeman;  the  stately  Lord  Acton;  and  Sir  Alexander 
Malet,  late  Minister  Plenipotentiary  at  Frankfort,  whose 
recently  published  history,  had  it  been  widely  and  imme- 
diately read,  would  have  well  prepared  the  British  for  what 
was  to  come.  Ruskin  philosophized  on  the  enchained  se- 
quence of  events;  John  Stuart  Mill  set  forth  his  ideas  on 
the  worth  and  durability  of  treaties ;  the  poets,  Browning 
and  Buchanan,  tested  their  powers  at  analyzing  the 
character  of  the  third  Napoleon ;  Swinburne  celebrated  the 
new  Republic  in  an  ode  of  "  a  thousand  lines  and  not  a 
single  idea."  A  host  of  eager  young  war  correspondents 
sent  back  reports  all  hot  from  camp  and  field.  And  John 
Morley  and  other  cf  the  reviewers  strove  to  boil  all  down  to 
a  potable  draught  of  wisdom  for  the  quarterlies. 

The  shifting,  multicolored  mob  nocked  to  the  Alhambra 
to  hear  the  Marseillaise;  and  to  the  wax  works  of  Madame 
Tussaud,  where  Bismarck  frowned  in  effigy ;  it  lit  its  torches 
under  Nelson's  monument  and  gathered  in  Hyde  Park,  and 
all  the  sainted  halls  of  London,  to  resolve  and  demonstrate. 
We  must  not  linger  so  long  in  Downing  Street  and  at  the 
news  stalls  and  print  shops,  that  we  miss  the  flare  of  torches 
through  the  fog,  the  sight  of  bobbing  Phrygian  caps  and 
upflung  arms,  the  raucous  sound  of  voices  hoarsened  by 
night  shouting.  Nothing  must  be  lost  if  we  are  to  know 
of  that  public  opinion,  which  Huxley  called  the  chaos  of 
popular  prejudice. 


CHAPTER  I 

British  Relations  with  France  and  Prussia, 
i  860- i  870 

anglo-french  relations  from  i860  to  187o 

To  appreciate  the  viewpoint  the  Islanders  had  of  the 
events  of  the  War  of  1870,  it  is  necessary  to  see  them 
against  the  background  of  the  past  relationships  of  Great 
Britain  with  the  two  belligerents.  For  past  events  as  well 
as  future  have  the  character  of  contributing  to  the  chiaros- 
curo of  the  present.  It  was  no  single  act  of  the  French 
Emperor,  be  sure,  that  caused  the  calm  Poet  Laureate  to 
shake  his  long  ambrosial  locks  and  exclaim  as  pettishly  as 
any  young  subaltern : 1 

"  True  that  we  have  got  such  a  faithful  ally, 
That  only  the  devil  can  tell  what  he  means." 

And  that  made  his  apprehensions  to  be  so  generally  shared 
by  his  fellows. 

Although,  during  the  decade  preceding  the  Franco-Prus- 
sion  War,  England  often  acted  in  conjunction  with  her  old 
ally  of  the  Crimea,  her  attitude  toward  the  foreign  policy  of 
France  was  always  distrustful.  This  was  not  unnatural 
when  it  is  remembered  that  the  period  opens  on  the  Emper- 
or's acquisition  of  Nice  and  Savoy, — an  aggravating  coda  to 
a  treaty  which  even  the  moderate  friends  of  Italy  had  ad- 
judged unsatisfactory,  almost  treacherous.  Though  Napo- 
leon III  had  acquiesced   in  Lord  John   Russell's   famous 

1  Alfred  Tennyson,  The  Works  of  (Hallam  edition,  N.  Y.,  1916)  ; 
Riflemen  Form,  p.  866. 

17]  17 


j8        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [t8 

dispatch  of  January  17,  i860,  thereby  giving  pledge  not  to 
intervene  in  Italian  affairs  by  force  of  arms  nor  to  lengthen 
unduly  the  occupation  of  Rome  by  his  soldiery,1  dissatisfac- 
tion in  England  was  still  keen.  The  London  Times  des- 
cribed the  Emperor  as  "  universally  declared  to  be  a  man 
without  loyalty  or  good  faith."  2  It  cautioned  the  neigh- 
bors of  France  to  extreme  watchfulness.  On  the  occasion 
of  his  meeting  with  the  German  rulers  at  Baden  Baden,  it 
described  his  arrival  as  the  entrance  of  a  sportsman  into 
a  well  stocked  preserve.  The  "  bustling  birds "  were 
warned  that  he  came,  probably,  to  bag  the  Palatinate,  which 
he  desired  for  the  "  rectification "  of  his  boundary.3  His 
proposed  occupation  of  Chablis  and  Faucigny,  the  Swiss 
districts  of  Savoy,  was  declared  to  be  inspired  not  so  much  by 
a  wish  for  territory  as  for  the  securing  of  a  passageway  for 
his  armies  into  neutralized  Switzerland.4  Prussia  was  urged 
to  assume  leadership :  to  compose  her  internal  differences,  to 
put  money  in  her  purse,  and  to  increase  her  army.5  More, 
the  Times  suggested  that  that  sense  of  security  felt  by  France 
from  her  gain  of  two  provinces  separated  from  her  by  the 
highest  mountains,  might  well  dispose  Prussia  to  attempt 
to  gain  two  provinces  separated  from  German  territory  by 
one  of  the  widest  rivers  in  Europe.6  Small  wonder  that 
the  Moniteur  protested  at  the  nervous  shiverings  of  the 
neighbours  of  France, — among  whom  she  included  England.1 
It  was  matter  for  rejoicing  to  Gladstone  that  the  Com- 

1  Fitzmaurice,  Edmond  George  Petty,  Life  of  Lord  Granville   (Lon- 
don, 1005),  vol.  i,  pp.  368-369. 
'  The  Times,  London,  Apr.  3,  i860. 
1  Ibid.,  June  16,  i860. 
*  Ibid.,  Apr.  17,  i860. 

5  Ibid.,  Apr.  4,  6,  13,  May  5,  i860. 

6  Ibid.,  June  2,  i860. 

7  Ibid.,  June  2,  i860. 


I9]  RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  PRUSSIA  jg 

mercial  treaty,  concluded  with  France  that  year,  served  as 
a  check  to  "  needless  alarms  and  fancies,"  to  "  tendencies 
towards  convulsion  and  confusion." 1  John  Bright  and 
certain  other  members  of  the  House  of  Commons  burned 
for  a  further  application  of  the  principles  of  the  Manchester 
School.  They  urged  a  concert  with  the  French  Government 
for  the  mutual  reduction  of  the  British  and  French  navies 
But  against  this  the  opposition  of  Palmerston  was  insur- 
mountable. 

In  1861  Great  Britain  associated  herself  with  France  and 
Spain  in  a  joint  invasion  of  Mexico  for  the  collection  of 
debts  due  their  subjects.  But  in  the  next  year  she  with- 
drew from  the  expedition  and  further  showed  her  diver- 
gence from  the  Emperor's  American  policy  by  refusing  to 
support  his  offer  of  mediation  between  the  Federals  and 
Confederates.2     Her  decision  was  justified  by  the  future. 

Not  so  sound  was  the  rejection  of  cooperation  in  the  mat- 
ter of  intervening  in  Polish  affairs.  In  1863,  the  conscrip- 
tion by  the  Russian  viceroy  of  two  thousand  young  Poles 
was  believed  by  Napoleon  III  to  justify  the  calling  of  a 
congress  for  a  consideration  of  the  entire  question.  The 
British  government  chose  to  content  itself,  and  to  discontent 
Russia,  by  giving  platonic  and  ineffectual  advice  to  that 
Government,  the  while  Prussia  won  the  Tsar  by  an  attitude 
of  cordial  sympathy.3  Queen  Victoria's  fear  that  Napoleon 
intended,  through  an  alliance  with  Austria  and  the  aid  of 
Italian  armies,  to  resuscitate  Poland  by  dissecting  Prussia, 
quite  overwhelmed  her  discretion.4     Not  only  was  Russian 

1  John  Morley,  Life  of  Wm.  Ewart  Gladstone  (N.  Y.,  191 1),  vol.  i, 
p.  638. 

2  Annual  Register,  1863,  vol.  cv,  pp.  4,  7,  9,  125,  308-309. 

8  J.  A.  R.  Marriott,  England  Since  Waterloo  (London,  1911),  p.  321; 
Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  446-447. 

4  Disraeli  to  Mrs.  Bridges  Williams,  W.  F.  Monypenny  and  G.  E. 
Buckle,  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli  (N.  Y.,  1910-1920),  vol.  iv,  p.  34a 


20       BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR        [2o 

hostility  incurred  but  the  good  understanding  with  France 
was  diminished.  It  would  still  further  have  dwindled,  had 
the  French  Emperor  known  that  those  English  statesmen, 
who  had  dissociated  themselves  from  his  disastrous  Mexican 
policy,  were  gloating  at  difficulties  which  they  believed 
would  save  Belgium  and  the  Palatinate  from  his  rapacity. 
The  Manchester  group,  however,  still  showed  themselves 
friendly  and  arranged  to  cooperate  with  him  in  measures 
concerning  the  cotton  question.1 

In  1864  the  tables  were  turned.  The  matter  of  the  dis- 
posal of  the  duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein  was  a  nearer 
concern  of  England  than  of  France,  though  the  latter  was? 
equally  associated  with  her  and  the  other  five  Powers  that 
had  guaranteed  the  King  of  Denmark  in  their  possession  by 
the  London  Protocol.  Palmerston  and  Russell, — always 
proponents  of  the  "  strong  policy," — were  willing  to  go  any 
lengths  to  preserve  the.  strategically  important  duchies  from 
falling  under  the  dominance  of  Austria  or  Prussia.  Napo- 
leon, still  embroiled  in  Mexico,  would  resort  to  nothing 
more  drastic  than  a  congress, — which  it  was  found  impos- 
sible to  assemble.2  The  Conference,  convened  in  London, 
after  the  fortune  of  the  war  was  already  decided,  had  no 
positive  effect  on  the  fate  of  the  duchies.  But  the  admission 
during  its  sessions  that  England  was  without  allies  and 
unable  to  act  alone  had  the  negative  effect  of  lowering 
British  prestige  abroad  and  the  influence  of  the  Ministry  at 
home.3  The  creation  by  France  of  a  friendly  ally  in  Mexico 
for  the  Confederacy,  thought  Lord  John  Russell,  might  so 
strengthen  the  South  as  to  make  a  Federal  invasion  of 

1  Sir  Thos.  Newton,  Lord  Lyons,  A  Record  of  British  Diplomacy 
(N.  Y.,  1913),  vol.  i,  pp.  115-116. 

1  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  450-472 ;  Monypenny  and  Buckle, 
op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  343-345. 

1  Monypenny  and  Buckle,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  346. 


2i ]  RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  PRUSSIA  2I 

Canada  impracticable.1  But  this  was  but  a  shred  of  com- 
fort for  the  loss  of  the  strong  European  ally  then  so  greatly- 
needed. 

In  1866  France  was  allowed  the  empty  honor  of  assisting 
in  negotiating  a  truce  that  led  to  the  treaty  ending  the  war 
of  Austria  and  Prussia, — a  treaty  which  gave  notice  to  the 
world  that  France  had  lost  in  Mexico  the  hegemony  of 
Europe.  Impotence  to  direct  on  the  Continent  was  more 
galling  than  the  undisguised  defeat  abroad.  The  many 
British  who  looked  on  the  French  Emperor  as  a  theatrical 
manager,  holding  his  place  only  through  his  ability  to  stage 
a  striking  success  at  more  or  less  regular  intervals,  were  a- 
tiptoe  to  see  with  what  new  piece  his  people  were  to  be  re- 
galed, and  very  sure  that  the  performance  would  be  one  to 
merit  censure.  Belgium,  Luxemburg,  and  Rhenish  Bavaria 
were  each  rumored  to  be  the  intended  victims  of  the  tragedy, 
and  not  without  reason.  Some  one  of  these,  it  was  be- 
lieved, had  surely  been  held  out  as  bait  to  ensure  French 
neutrality  during  the  recent  war.  The  bristling  questions 
were  which,  and  how  and  when  France  was  to  make  the 
acquisition.  Publicly,  her  policy  was  blameless.  In  August 
of  1866,  Napoleon  declared,  in  a  letter  meant  not  alone  for 
the  recipient,  that  the  true  interest  of  France  was  not  the 
acquisition  of  territory  but  rather  the  giving  of  such  assist- 
ance to  Germany  as  would  enable  her  to  constitute  herself 
after  a  fashion  favorable  to  French  and  European  interests.2 
The  letter  failed  of  its  purpose.  Disquieting  rumours  of 
intrigue  continued,  and  on  the  last  day  of  the  year  we  find 
Disraeli  uneasy  over  a  proposition,  said  to  have  emanated 
from  Bismarck  and  found  favor  in  the  French  ministry,  that 
France  acquire  Belgium  as  the  quid  pro  quo  of  allowing 
Prussia  to  absorb  the  states  of  south  Germany.8 

1  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  133. 

1  Benedetti,  Ma  Mission  en  Prusse  (London,  1913),  p.  182. 

1  Monypenny  and  Buckle,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  69. 


22        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR        [22 

England,  however,  kept  the  distrust  of  the  French  fore- 
ign policy  well  localized  and,  while  keeping  a  crowded  eye 
on  her  possible  intrigue  in  Central  Europe,  cooperated  with 
her  in  the  East  to  secure  Turkey's  recognition  of  a  Hohen- 
zollern  prince  as  hereditary  ruler  of  the  new  Rumania. L 
She  was  temperate,  too,  in  her  remonstrance  at  the  new 
French  garrison  which  occupied  Rome  after  the  attack  of 
the  Italian  volunteers.2  Prussia,  who  was  not  so,  would 
have  laid  the  onus  of  discontent  on  England  but  Napoleon 
was  not  deceived  and  showed  no  ill  will  toward  his  old  ally.3 

It  was  something  of  a  relief  to  the  turbid  situation  when 
a  plan  for  French  compensation  came  to  the  surface  and  could 
be  officially  discussed.  In  April  of  1867,  the  King  of  the 
Netherlands  was  found  to  have  given  a  contingent  consent  to 
Napoleon's  purchase  from  him  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lux- 
emburg. His  consent  was  qualified  because  the  possession  of 
the  duchy  had  been  guaranteed  to  him  in  1839  by  the  Great 
Powers  and  their  acquiescence  was  necessary  for  its  dis- 
posal.4 Russia  expressed  her  willingness  to  the  transfer, 
— bought,  England  believed,  by  the  French  proposal  to 
hasten  the  dissolution  of  Turkey  by  a  cession  of  Crete  to 
Greece.6  The  matter  in  its  entirety  was  displeasing  to 
England.  She  had  no  wish  to  see  Belgium  become  a 
French  enclave  nor  to  see  Russia  advance  even  indirectly  to- 
ward Constantinople.  Prussia  also  expressed  emphatic 
disapproval  of  the  proposed  purchase  by  France  of  Luxem- 
burg.    She  made  her  disapproval  more  noteworthy  by  re- 

1  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  i53-T56. 

'Lyons  to  Stanley,  Paris,  Jan.  16,  1868,  ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  186. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  pp.  183-184. 

*  Stanley  to  Lyons,  London,  Apr.  4,  1867,  ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  168;  Mony- 
penny  and  Buckle,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  469-471 ;  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i, 
p.  168. 

*  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  163-170,  180,  209. 


23]  RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  PRUSSIA  23 

vealing  at  the  same  time  the  defensive  military  treaties  she 
had  made  with  the  South  German  States  at  the  close  of  the 
late  war.  The  matter  was  settled  at  a  conference  of  the 
great  Powers  in  London.  France,  though  absolutely  denied 
the  acquisition  of  Luxemburg,  seems  to  have  left  the 
Conference  with  greater  satisfaction  than  either  Prussia  or 
England, — a  fact  which  would  make  it  appear  that  it  was 
not  so  much  territory  as  a  preservation  of  prestige  and  a 
guarantee  against  further  Prussian  encroachments  that  she 
desired.  To  Victoria  and  certain  of  the  English  diplomats 
the  collective  guarantee  accorded  the  neutrality  of  Luxem- 
burg seemed  not  so  strong  as  circumstance  might  demand. 
It  was  believed  France  would  be  aggressive  and  disposed  to 
•violate  international  agreements  and  an  unequivocal  attitude 
of  Great  Britain  in  such  a  contingency  was  needed  as  a 
deterrent.1  Prussia  was  unhappy  at  being  obliged  to  re- 
move her  garrisons  and  at  having  to  sign  a  treaty  with 
France  instead  of  against  her.  A  solution  by  war  might 
have  proven  more  favorable.  She  was  well  prepared  and 
she  knew  that  her  rival  was  not.2  It  was  something,  how- 
ever, for  Prussian  satisfaction  to  have  drawn  from  France 
in  the  early  stage  of  the  negotiations,  the  admission  that  the 
question  of  possessing  Luxemburg  involved  the  existence 
of  the  Napoleonic  dynasty.  The  London  Conference  and 
its  deference  to  French  amour  propre  had  modified  the 
failure  of  the  Emperor's  project.  But  a  state  whose 
dynasty  could  survive  a  rebuff  only  by  the  assistance  of  a 
European  congress,  was  temptingly  vulnerable. 

England,  too,  was  apprized  of  the  weakness  of  the  nation 
which  she  had  been  regarding  as  a  bogey.  The  French 
Ambassador  told  his  British  confrere  in  Berlin  that  the 
reason  France  could  not  permit  the  formation  of  a  German 


1  Monypenny  and  Buckle,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  472. 

2  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  169. 


24        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [24 

Empire  was  that  it  would  make  the  position  of  the  Emperor 
untenable.1  The  British  Ambassador  in  Paris  was  assured 
by  the  Foreign  Minister,  who  spoke  with  even  more  author- 
ity, that  it  was  not  aggrandizement  France  wished  but  se- 
curity for  the  future.2  France,  it  would  appear,  would  mis- 
behave only  if  she  were  frightened,  and  the  task  of  England 
was  either  to  preserve  the  status  quo  or  to  convince  France 
that  a  united  Germany  would  oppose  no  real  danger  to  her 
freedom  and  prestige.  The  compliance  of  the  present  at- 
titude of  France  was  encouraging.  She  had  accepted  the 
decision  of  the  London  Conference  with  real  happiness,  and 
according  to  the  Emperor,  who  had  been  looked  on  as  the 
chief  offender  in  the  matter,  was  eager  to  settle  the  Roman 
question  also  by  conference.31 

When  in  the  next  year,  1868,  France  was  alarmed  at  the 
rumour  that  Prussia  was  on  the  point  of  annexing  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Baden,  she  turned  again  to  England.  She  would 
have  had  her  advise  Prussia  of  the  disfavor  with  which  such 
a  step  would  be  regarded  in  Paris.  The  attitude  of  France 
was  that  any  annexation  of  territory  south  of  the  Main 
would  be  as  much  an  act  of  aggression  and  conquest  on  the 
part  of  Prussia  as  on  her  own  part.  England  refused  to 
give  the  desired  advice  to  Prussia,  but  France  on  this  special 
point  received  reassurance  from  Prince  Napoleon  after  his 
visit  to  Berlin  in  the  spring.  The  Prince  reported  that  there 
was  no  present  intention  of  increasing  the  area  of  the  North 
German  Confederacy  by  annexation  but  that  the  principle 
was  one  Prussia  was  prepared  to  maintain.  He  reported, 
also,  that  nowhere  else,  save  in  the  United  States,  were 
foreign  governments  held  in  such  indifference.     Prussia,  he 

1  Morley,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  319. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  320. 

*  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  178-180. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  pp.  194-196. 


25]  RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  PRUSSIA  25 

said,  was  fast  carrying  out  her  plans  and  war,  were  it  to  be 
made,  should  be  declared  this  year  or  not  at  all.1  Lord 
Lyons,  however,  informed  his  Government  that  he  believed 
the  Emperor  was  sincerely  anxious  to  preserve  peace.2  His 
opinion  seems  to  have  been  justified,  for  the  critical  period 
was  allowed  to  elapse. 

With  the  New  Year,  there  came  a  recrudescence  of  alarm 
in  England.  In  January  the  King  of  Belgium,  in  a  letter 
to  Victoria,  expressed  a  fear  that  France,  by  a  customs  con- 
vention or  by  purchase  through  a  French  company  of  the 
Luxemburg  railway,  would  attempt  to  gain  a  footing  in  Bel- 
gium. He  was  at  once  assured  by  the  Queen  that  any 
proceedings  which  seemed  to  threaten  the  independence  or 
integrity  of  Belgium  would  bring  England  at  once  into  the 
field.3  At  this  time  the  Prussian  ambassador  in  London 
(von  Bernstorff)  thought  it  opportune  to  inform  Gladstone 
and  Clarendon  that,  though  his  Government  was  not  willing 
to  defend  Belgium  single-handed,  it  would  willingly  make 
terms  with  England  to  join  in  her  defense.4  At  a  later 
time  Bismarck  reverted  to  this  episode  and  assured  Claren- 
don that  it  was  only  this  offer  of  support  and  the  disapproval 
of  a  single  French  minister  that  had  prevented  an  occupa- 
tion of  Belgium  from  taking  place.1  However  real  the 
danger  may  have  been,  England,  it  seems,  did  not  think  it 
necessary  to  contract  the  alliance.  In  view  of  the  existing 
guarantee  of  neutrality  to  which  France  was  signatory  and 
the  officially  correct  attitude  of  her  Government,  such  an 
effort  at  reinsurance  on  England's  part  would  certainly  have 
been  regarded  as  a  slap  in  the  face.  Belgium  was  more 
affected  by  the  Prussian  warning,  and  passed  an  act  to  for- 

1  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  192-193. 

2  Lyons  to  Stanley,  Paris,  March  27,  1868,  ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  192. 
'Ibid.,  vol.  i,  pp.  211-213. 

*  Clarendon  to  Lyons,  Apr.  19,  1868,  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  218. 


26        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [26 

bid  the  granting  of  concessions  to  railroads  without  govern- 
mental consent.1  The  act  was  regarded  in  France  as  hav- 
ing been  instigated  by  Bismarck.  M.  de  Lavalette  declared 
that  after  this  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  French  Govern- 
ment to  have  any  friendship  for  the  Belgian  Ministry.2  No 
hostility  was  shown  toward  the  attitude  of  England  in  the 
matter,  since  the  Queen's  declaration  had  been  merely  a 
reassertion  of  her  already  avowed  policy,  and  was  made 
not  to  the  Emperor  but  to  the  uneasy  king  of  the  neutral 
country. 

It  remains  to  speak  of  another  railway  which  was  the  sub- 
ject of  debate  in  the  French  Chamber  a  month  before  the 
war's  outbreak.  This  road,  which  the  Swiss  designed  to 
traverse  their  republic  and  pierce  the  Alps  by  the  St.  Gothard 
Pass,  had  been  promised  subsidies  by  Prussia,  Baden,  and 
Italy,  to  whom  it  would  afford  communication.3  The  Op- 
position, led  by  Jules  Ferry,  made  an  attempt  to  discredit 
the  Ministry  by  declaring  the  project  a  menace  to  France. 
The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that  the  Govern- 
ment was  perfectly  at  ease  in  the  matter:  Switzerland  had 
given  repeated  assurance  that  she  would  maintain  her 
neutrality,  and  by  the  convention  of  Berne  foreign  troops 
were  barred  from  transport.4  It  was  an  attitude  that  must 
have  delighted  the  British  Ministry, — adhering  as  they  did 
to  the  Manchester  tenets  and  regarding  railways  from 
the  standpoint  rather  of  commerce  than  of  strategy.  The 
debate  was  satisfactory,  also,  in  having  given  the  Ministry 
an  opportunity  to  allay  any  suspicion  that  France  was  medi- 
tating revenge  on  Prussia.     M.  Jules  Ferry  had  been  called 

1  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  211. 

*  Lyons  to  Clarendon,  Paris,  Feb.  16,  1869,  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p. 
214. 

3  Times,  June  15th  and  16th,  1870;  Spectator,  June  18,  1870. 

4  Times,  June  21,  1870;  Manchester  Guardian,  June  22,  1870. 


2j]  RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  PRUSSIA  27 

to  order  when  he  attacked  the  Government  for  having  per- 
mitted Sadowa.  The  Due  de  Gramont,  with  the  explicit 
approval  of  Napoleon,  had  embraced  the  opportunity  to 
declare  that  the  peace  of  Europe  was  never  more  assured.1 
Surely,  when  the  leader  of  the  constitutional  majority  in 
France  showed  himself  to  be  pacific  and  received  the  con- 
gratulations of  the  Emperor  for  so  doing,  the  danger  of 
a  coup  in  foreign  affairs  could  'be  pronounced  illusory. 

ANGLO  PRUSSIAN  RELATIONS  FROM  i860  TO  187O 

In  strong  contrast  to  the  distrust  meted  out  to  France 
by  Great  Britain  in  i860  was  the  encouraging  and  almost 
maternal  regard  she  showed  toward  the  evolution  of  Ger- 
many.    She  was  eager  for  its  speedy  unification. 

The  belief  was,  as  the  Times  phrased  it,  that  such  a  un- 
ification was  very  much  to  British  interest,  an  object  of 
great  and  immediate  importance.  Germany  was  regarded 
as  "  the  natural  friend  of  all  who  wish  to  hold  in  peace 
what  they  honestly  possess  and  prudently  use  ....  the 
natural  impediment  of  all  who  would  convulse  the  world  for 
the  hope  of  gaining  by  confusion."  England,  said  the 
Times,  was  in  the  position  of  a  stout  gentleman  who  knows 
that  there  are  pickpockets  near,  and  who  sees  the  police 
quarrelling  among  themselves.2  A  great  Central  Power 
would  do  much  to  preserve  that  balance  in  the  Continental 
system  which  was  the  anxious  care  of  Great  Britain.  It 
would  check  the  aggressions  of  both  France  and  Russia  and 
prevent  the  necessity  of  England's  doing  police  duty  to  pro- 
tect the  smaller  states.  It  was  a  matter  of  concern,  of  course, 
which  of  the  Germanies  should  determine  the  character  of 
the  future  Germany.  In  this  regard  British  statesmen  natur- 
ally looked  to  Prussia  to  assume  the  leadership.     The  mem- 

1  Times,  June  22,  1870. 

2  Ibid.,  Apr.  13,  i860. 


28        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [2g 

ory  of  her  part  in  the  final  defeat  of  Napoleon  was  still 
green.  The  beginning  of  the  decade  found  her  with  a 
well  filled  exchequer,  a  military  system  of  great  potentiality 
and  a  government  possessed,  seemingly,  of  liberal  tenden- 
cies. Baden,  like  Austria,  had  sacrificed  the  love  of  her 
people  for  the  protection  of  the  Ultramontane.  Prussia 
had  not  made  such  a  mistake  and  she  had  matched  her 
tolerance  in  religious  matters  with  a  regard  for  constitutional 
forms  well  pleasing  to  the  English.  When,  in  i860,  the  Bund 
sought  to  uphold  the  elector  of  Hesse  Cassel  in  replacing 
the  liberal  constitution  of  1831  with  a  more  reactionary  one, 
it  was  Prussia  that  had  dissented.1  Her  minister  declared 
that  the  question  of  the  constitution  of  Electoral  Hesse  was 
the  question  of  the  constitution  of  Germany.  Prussia, 
therefore,  reserved  the  right  to  adhere  to  her  point  of  view 
and  pursue  such  a  policy  as  her  honor  and  power  might 
demand.2  England  rejoiced  at  this  manifestation  of  ten- 
dencies so  like  her  own.  The  Prussian  state,  over  which 
some  day  would  reign  a  British  princess,  promised  to  be  a 
congenial  and  valuable  ally  for  the  future.  Already  she 
was  associating  herself  with  England  to  prevent  French 
aggression  in  the  neutralized  districts  of  Savoy. 

In  1 86 1  William  was  crowned  King  of  Prussia,  thereby 
bringing  Victoria's  daughter,  the  wife  of  Prince  Frederick, 
within  a  step  of  the  throne.  The  next  year  Bismarck  was 
called  to  undertake  the  conduct  of  the  Prussian  Government. 
The  importance  of  the  latter  event  far  outweighed  that  of 
the  former.  The  liberal  Germany  of  which  Victoria  and  the 
Prince  Consort  had  dreamed  and  which  all  England  had 
been  eager  to  welcome  as  an  ally  was  not  soon  to  come  into 
being.     British  statesmen  remembered  that  it  was  Bismarck, 

1  Times,  Apr.  2nd  and  3rd,  i860. 

2  Ibid.,  Apr.  21,  i860. 


2g]  RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  PRUSSIA  29 

who  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War  had  successfully  used 
his  influence  in  preventing  Prussia  from  associating  her- 
self with  the  Western  Powers.  He  had  made  no  secret 
of  his  hostility  toward  them  nor  of  his  wish  for  an  alliance 
with  Russia.  M.  de  Moustier,  the  French  Ambassador,  had 
threatened  that  his  conduct  of  Prussian  policy  would  bring 
him  to  Jena.  The  retort  was  prompt  and  disconcerting. 
"  Why  not  to  Waterloo?  "  had  said  Bismarck.1  Here  was  a 
diplomat  to  be  reckoned  with, — one  who  played  the  game 
with  a  boldness  that  seemed  to  scorn  the  finesse  that  really 
it  concealed.  He  had  been  in  London  shortly  before  the 
King  called  him  to  power  and  had  outlined  his  plans  to 
Disraeli :  "  I  shall  soon  be  compelled  to  undertake  the  con- 
duct of  the  Prussian  Government.  My  first  care  will  be  to 
reorganize  the  army,  with  or  without  the  help  of  the  Land- 
tag ....  As  soon  as  the  army  shall  have  been  brought 
into  such  a  condition  as  to  inspire  respect,  I  shall  seize  the 
first  best  pretext  to  declare  war  against  Austria,  dissolve 
the  German  Diet,  subdue  the  minor  states,  and  give  national 
unity  to  Germany  with  Prussian  leadership.  I  have  come 
here  to  say  this  to  the  Queen's  Ministers." 2 

Only  strength  of  power  or  innocence  of  purpose  could 
justify  such  an  orgy  of  candor.  The  British,  though  they 
might  approve  the  end  in  view,  could  not  have  been  expected 
to  approve  the  means  Bismarck  detailed  for  its  accomplish- 
ment. It  appeared,  then,  that  this  Prussian  quite  disre- 
garded the  matter  of  their  opinion.  "  Take  care  of  that 
man!  "  warned  Disraeli,  "  He  means  what  he  says!  " 

"  The  first  best  pretext  to  declare  war  on  Austria  "  being 
overlong  in  making  its  appearance,  Bismarck,  himself,  set 
about  creating  it  by  a  war,  which  with  Austria  as  an  ally, 
should  result  in  a  peace  which  would  make  Austria  an  op- 

1  George  Hooper,  The  Campaign  of  Sedan  (London,  1914). 
*  Monypenny  and  Buckle,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  341. 


30        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [30 

ponent  in  the  division  of  the  spoils.  The  more  or  less  in- 
nocent victim  of  the  tortuous  proceeding  was  Denmark, 
whose  duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein  were  marked 
out  as  the  spoils.  It  could  not  be  expected  that  the  quar- 
rel would  remain  wholly  a  neighbourhood  affair.  Among  the 
signatories  that  had  confirmed,  though  not  guaranteed,  the 
King  of  Denmark  in  his  administration  of  the  Elbe  duchiesl 
were  France,  Russia,  and  Great  Britain.  France,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  at  this  time  too  deeply  embroiled  in  Mexico  to  do 
more  than  try  to  assemble  a  congress.  Russia  was  exper- 
iencing difficulties  with  the  Poles  and  had  been  fortified  by 
sympathy  and  even  offers  of  assistance  from  Prussia.  It 
was  from  Great  Britain  that  Denmark  expected  assistance, 
not  only  because  that  country  was  more  able  to  give  it  but 
because  her  interests  were  more  nearly  involved.  Lord 
Palmerston  believed  it  undeniable  that  at  the  base  of  the 
German  design  was  the  wish  for  a  fleet,  and  a  harbor  for 
that  fleet  at  Kiel.1  The  prospect  of  a  naval  rival  in  the 
Baltic,  and  perhaps  elsewhere,  was  one  to  cause  reflection. 
The  Queen  was  interested  in  the  matter  more  because  it 
involved  the  principle  of  legitimacy,  and  because  the  Prin- 
cess of  Wales  was  the  daughter  of  the  King  of  Denmark. 
Victoria  would  have  had  the  duchies  awarded  to  their  legi- 
timate ruler  and  the  King  of  Denmark  compensated  by  a 
Swedish  marriage,  which,  by  uniting  his  kingdom  with 
Norway  and  Sweden,  would  form  a  strong  northern  barrier 
against  Russia.3 

At  first  Great  Britain  took  a  high  tone  in  the  matter. 
Denmark,  however,  showed  herself  as  stubborn  to  her 
friend  as  to  her  foes.  Prussia  was  recalcitrant.  Nothing 
could  be  done  without  her,  said  Lord  Granville,  "  and  she 
will  never  consent  to  anything  which  does  not  give  her  more 

1  Marriott,  op.  cit.,  p.  327. 

1  Memorandum  to  Granville,  Fitzmaurictf,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  456. 


3i  ]  RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  PRUSSIA  3I 

preponderance  than  the  Southern  States  will  admit."  l  It 
became  apparent  that  British  bluster  would  not  suffice  and 
it  was  not  possible  to  bring  more  than  that  to  bear.  The 
warlike  policy  of  Palmerston  and  Russell  was  not  popular 
even  in  the  Cabinet  and  was  strongly  opposed  by  the  Queen. 
Nor  were  the  British  people  eager  to  embark  in  a  war  with- 
out allies.  But  the  Prime  Minister  had  made  a  statement 
before  Parliament  that  made  retreat  difficult.  He  had 
threatened  that,  were  Denmark  attacked,  it  would  not  be 
that  country  only  with  whom  the  aggressors  would  have  to 
contend.2  It  was  hard  to  sink  from  such  an  octave  to  the 
querulous  half-tone  of  a  conference.  The  nation  was  jar- 
red with  consciousness  of  the  humiliating  position  into 
which  she  had  been  led  by  what  Derby  called  Palmerston' si 
policy  of  "  muddle  and  meddle."  Only  the  Lords  saved  the 
Ministry  from  going  under. 

A  more  important  consequence  was  the  distrust  of  Prus- 
sia caused  by  her  secession  from  the  London  Protocol,  and 
her  acquisition  of  Lauenburg  and  the  command  of  Kiel  by 
the  Gastein  Convention.  The  Queen  spoke  for  the  nation 
when  she  informed  Lord  Granville  of  her  wish  that  Prussia 
should  at  least  be  made  aware  of  what  she  and  her  Govern- 
ment, and  every  honest  man  in  Europe,  must  think  of  the 
unblushing  violation  of  every  assurance  and  pledge  that 
had  been  given.3 

In  the  ensuing  quarrel  between  victorious  Prussia  and 
Austria  that  culminated  in  the  Seven  Week's  War  of  1866, 
the  Queen  offered  her  mediation.  Bismarck  refused  it 
brusquely.*     He  had  not  manufactured  his  "  pretext "  for 

1  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  450. 
1  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  452. 

s  General  Gray  to  Granville,  Aug.  24,  1864,  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  voL 
i,  p.  476. 
4  Marriott,  op.  cit.,  p.  327. 


32        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [32 

the  purpose  of  seeing  it  dissolved.  And  so  another  war 
was  waged  without  benefit  of  England.  The  provisions  of 
the  Peace  of  Prague  greatly  augmented  the  Queen's  chagrin. 
She  saw  the  extinction  of  the  kingdom  of  her  cousin  of 
Hanover,  the  diminution  of  the  powers  of  her  son-in-law 
of  Hesse,  and  the  humiliation  of  her  son's  father-in-law  of 
Denmark.  For  these  visitations  on  her  kin  and  her  next 
to  kin,  the  Queen  blamed  the  lordly  Bismarck. 

This  peace,  regarded  unfavorably  in  England  and  with 
hostility  in  France,  was  followed  by  a  nervous  period  in 
which  the  British  watched  with  narrowed  eyes  for  some  coup 
on  the  part  of  Napoleon  to  recompense  him  for  Prussia's 
accessions.  The  air  was  somewhat  clarified,  as  we  have 
seen,  when  Great  Britain  by  the  sessions  of  the  London  Con- 
ference of  1867  contrived  to  send  France  away  at  once 
satisfied  and  empty-handed.  After  the  fiasco  of  the  Confer- 
ence of  1864,  she  had  been  astonished  at  her  own  success. 
At  Paris  the  feeling  of  gratitude  to  England  was  reported  to 
be  both  general  and  strong.1  The  time  seemed  propitious 
for  efforts  which  might  result  in  something  more  than  the 
elimination  of  a  present  difficulty.  No  one  was  better  fitted 
for  this  delicate  task  of  mediation  than  Lord  Clarendon. 
More  often  than  any  other  diplomat,  he  had  represented  his 
country  in  important  negotiations  and  ceremonies  abroad. 
He  was  familiar  with  the  whole  field  of  European  diplo- 
macy, and  was  regarded  as  a  personal  friend  by  the  royal 
families  of  France,  Spain,  and  Prussia.  His  devotion  tof 
pacific  principles  was  sincere,  but  so  discreet  that  he  could 
be  trusted  to  urge  his  viewsi  earnestly  and  even  persistently 
but  never  fanatically  nor  obtrusively.  He  held  no  brief  for 
either  of  the  rival  courts.  Both  were  aware  that  his  friend- 
ship for  the  one  was  matched  by  his  friendship  for  the 
other. 

1  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  169. 


33]  RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  PRUSSIA  33 

The  interviews  of  1868  with  the  King  and  Queen  of  Prus- 
sia, and  General  Moltke,  were  satisfactory  in  the  assurance 
given  Clarendon  that  Prussia  would  be  careful  not  to  give 
offence  and  very  slow  to  take  it.  Even  so,  however,  King 
William  was  not  sure  how  long  peace  could  be  maintained. 
But  he  promised  that,  should  war  be  precipitated,  Prussia 
would  so  act  as  to  make  it  manifest  that  France  was  the  un- 
provoked aggressor.1  No  one  could  foresee  when  dynastic 
interests  might  induce  Napoleon  to  resort  to  war  in  order 
to  smother  internal  discontent.  It  was  this  uncertainty  that 
kept  the  nations  armed  to  the  teeth.  Napoleon  listened  to 
Clarendon's  report  of  the  interviews  "  with  evident  satis- 
faction." At  its  conclusion,  he  suggested  a  collective  con- 
firmation by  Europe  of  the  treaty  of  Prague.  This  would 
assure  Prussia  of  her  gains  and  do  much  to  restore  public 
confidence.  A  diminution  of  armaments  would  be  a  logical 
sequence.  He  would  have  had  England  take  the  initiative 
in  summoning  a  congress  for  this  purpose.2 

It  was  apparent  that  the  rulers  of  France  and  Prussia 
were  not  like-minded  as  to  the  cause  of  European  unrest, — 
the  one  believing  it  a  consequence  of  the  distrust  engen- 
dered by  the  latter's  gains  in  her  war  with  Austria,  the  other 
believing  it  a  consequence  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  means 
the  French  Emperor  might  take  to  preserve  his  dynasty. 
But  the  divergence  of  their  analysis  was  not  alarming  if 
both  were  sincere  in  the  desire  they  expressed  for  peace. 
A  subsequent  interview  with  the  Prussian  Crown  Prince 
afforded  Clarendon  even  more  encouragement.  Frederick 
William  was  eager  to  see  his  country's  army  reduced  to 
something  more  like  a  peace  footing.  He  believed  that  in  a 
year  or  so  his  father  would  be  forced  to  such  a  reduction 
by  discontent  at  the  burden  of  taxation.3 

1  Lyons  to  Stanley,  Oct.  13,  1868,  ibid.,  vol.  i,  pp.  202,  203. 
'  Lyons  to  Stanley,  Oct.  20,  1868,  ibid.,  vol.  i,  pp.  204-205. 
8  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  pp.  208-209. 


34        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [34 

In  France  the  need  to  placate  the  voters  by  disarmament 
was  very  strong  by  1870.  Three  years  before,  Napoleon  had 
told  Bismarck,  according  to  the  latter's  account,  that  there 
were  but  two  courses  open  to  him :  war  or  the  granting  of 
more  internal  liberty.1  In  January  of  1870,  Napoleon  called 
Ollivier  to  power  and  from  that  time  on  the  drift  was 
toward  a  parliamentary  form  of  government.  It  was  a 
necessary  corollary  that  an  effort  should  be  made  toward 
disarmament.  To  prevent  power  from  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  urban  socialists,  the  agricultural  population 
had  to  be  won  over  by  a  diminished  call  for  recruits.  Be- 
fore the  expiration  of  the  first  month  of  its  existence,  the 
Ollivier  Ministry,  with  the  Emperor's  consent,  approached 
England  in  the  hope  of  gaining  through  her  a  confidential 
agreement  with  Prussia  on  disarmament.  It  was  necessary 
that  the  negotiations  be  conducted  secretly,  for  France,  hav- 
ing lately  suffered  a  loss  of  prestige,  could  not  brave  a  re- 
buff.2 

Lord  Clarendon  accepted  the  task  and  in  a  letter  laid  the 
proposition  informally  before  Bismarck.  The  Chancellor 
gave  it  no  encouragement.  He  reminded  the  Englishman  of 
his  country's  position  between  the  great  military  powers, — > 
any  two  of  which  might  ally  themselves  against  her;  he 
reverted  to  French  aggression  in  times  past;  hinted  at  her 
present  hunger  for  rectifications,  and  the  aid  that  an  armed 
Prussia  might  be  to  England  were  those  desires  to  lead  to 
sins  against  Belgium.  It  would  be  impossible,  said  Bismarck, 
to  modify  a  military  system  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  tradi- 
tions of  his  country.  He  dared  not  even  mention  the  mat- 
ter to  the  King,  who  would  regard  the  proposal,  were  it 
made  by  France,  as  a  ruse,  and,  were  it  made  by  England,  as 
the  act  of  a  poor  friend.     He  begged,  also,  that  Clarendon 

1  Loftus  to  Garendon,  Feb.  5,  1870,  Newton,  op.  tit.,  vol.  i,  p.  255. 
*  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  245. 


35]  RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  PRUSSIA  35 

say  nothing  of  the  matter  at  Paris  since  the  refusal  if  known 
there  would  make  things  dangerous.1 

The  negotiations,  so  inauspiciously  begun  in  February, 
were  continued  into  March,  but  at  no  time  did  the  Chancel- 
lor swerve  from  his  attitude  of  negation.  His  arguments 
made  an  unpleasant  impression  on  the  British  statesmen. 
They  believed  the  danger  he  alleged  from  France  to  be  il- 
lusory. Gladstone  was  vexed  that  he  so  ignored  the 
Ministry's  reduction  in  the  naval  estimates  as  to  point  his 
finger  at  Great  Britain  as  a  fellow  believer  in  large  arma- 
ments.2 Clarendon  thought  him  hypocritical  in  his  pre- 
tence that  the  King  would  be  seriously  offended  at  the  pro- 
posal. For  he  knew  that  the  King  had  actually  said  only  a 
little  while  since  that  he  would  disarm  if  other  Powers  would 
do  so.3  Lord  Loftus,  who  was  in  personal  communication 
with  Bismarck  at  Berlin,  advised  that  the  negotiations  be 
discontinued.  Nothing  more  had  been  achieved  than  a 
promise  that  the  question  would  be  referred  to  Parliament 
in  a  year  or  so.4 

The  decision  of  the  French  Foreign  Minister  to  persevere 
in  his  plan  after  having  been  apprized  that  he  could  hope  for 
nothing  similar  from  Prussia,  made  Bismarck's  conduct  ap- 
pear yet  more  sinister.5  Clarendon,  knowing  of  the  re- 
duction  that  had  been  planned  and  the  disappointment  that 
it  must  now,  perforce,  be  limited,  expressed  his  opinion  of 
the  failure  of  the  negotiations  very  clearly.  Some  day 
that  which  he  knew  would  be  known  by  all,  and  then,  he 

1  Loftus  to  Clarendon,  Berlin,  Feb.  5,  1870,  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i, 
pp.  254-256. 

1  Gladstone  to  Clarendon,  Feb.  7th  and  Apr.  9th,  1870,  Morley,  op. 
cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  332. 

J  Clarendon  to  Lyons,  March  12,  1870,  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  26d. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  275. 

s  Lyons  to  Clarendon,  Feb.  11,  1870,  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  258. 


36       BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR        [36 

said,  upon  Prussia  would  rest  the  responsibility  not  only  of 
maintaining  so  large  a  force  herself,  but  of  compelling 
other  countries  reluctantly  to  do  the  same.1 

On  the  26th  of  May,  the  King,  in  closing  the  German 
Parliament,  announced  that  the  military  organization  of 
the  Confederacy  was  at  last  complete,  and  "  of  an  im- 
portance in  harmony  with  the  just  demands  of  the  German 
nation."  One  of  the  British  papers  suggested  that  this 
should  have  been  spoken  to  the  accompaniment  of  the 
softly  played  air,  "  Our  freeborn  German  Rhine." 

Those  diplomats  who  had  been  negotiating  with  Bis- 
marck must  have  read  the  comment  with  something  of 
approval. 

In  the  second  week  of  June,  Lord  Clarendon  wrote  to 
the  British  Ambassador  at  Paris  of  a  meeting  of  the  Tsar 
and  the  King  of  Prussia  at  Ems.  He  suspected  that  they 
occupied  themselves  with  a  discussion  of  a  more  somplete  uni- 
fication of  Germany, — beginning  with  the  incorparation  of 
Baden.8  It  was  one  of  his  last  acts  of  service  to  the  British 
Foreign  Office.  His  death  occurred  in  this  same  month, — 
a  time  when  of  all  others  his  ministrations  were  most 
needed. 

It  may  have  been  only  a  brusque  way  of  paying  a  com- 
pliment ;  it  may  have  been  a  real  admission  of  the  superior- 
ity of  the  Englishman's  diplomacy  to  his  own  strategy,  that 
caused  Bismarck  to  say  to  Clarendon's  daughter,  on  a  later 
visit  to  London :  "  Madam,  nothing  ever  gave  me  so  much 
pleasure  as  your  father's  death."  4 

1  Clarendon  to  Loftus,  March  9,  1870,  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  270. 
*  Spectator,  May  28,  1870. 
■  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  293. 

*Lord   Algernon   Freeman-Mitford   Redesdale,    Memories    (London, 
1915),  vol.  ii,  pp.  525-526. 


CHAPTER  II 
France  under  Parliamentary  Government 

In  addressing  the  assembled  Diplomatic  Body  on  New 
Year's  day  of  1870,  Napoleon  III  expressed  his  satisfaction 
at  the  "  good  relations  existing  between  France  and  for- 
eign powers,"  and  announced  his  happiness  at  having  arrived 
at  that  point  where,  like  a  tired  traveller  after  a  long  journey, 
he  could  relieve  himself  of  a  portion  of  his  burden  and  so 
gain  fresh  strength  to  continue  his  course.1  Two  days  later 
he  officially  received  his  new  premier,  M.  Ollivier,  who  was 
to  conduct  France  from  an  autocratic  to  a  constitutional 
regime. 

The  new  Minister,  it  was  believed  in  England,  had  been 
wisely  chosen  as  one  who  would  work  with  equal  honesty  to 
the  people  and  devotion  to  the  Empire.  Vanity  Fair,  ac- 
cording him  a  place  in  its  gallery  of  notables,  depicted  him 
as  a  black-garbed,  pigeon-toed  gentleman  with  an  amiable 
expression,  hands  clasped  in  front  of  him.  The  serio-com'ic 
portrait  ludicrously  represented  the  British  idea  of  his  diffi- 
culties. He  was  to  tend  with  equal  care  the  business  of  his 
master,  the  Emperor,  and  his  master,  the  Corps  Legislatif, 
the  while  he  kept  his  own  hands  locked;  one  foot  was  to  in- 
cline toward  the  imperial  pathway  and  the  other  towards  the 
broad  highway  of  parliamentary  responsibility.  "  The  most 
useful  and  necessary  qualities  a  politician  can  have,"  M. 
Ollivier  was  quoted  as  saying,  "  is  a  readiness  to  be  consid- 
ered foolish  or  vulgarly  ambitious  when  that  is  calculated 

1  Spectator,  Jan.  8,  1870. 
37]  37 


38        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [38 

to  promote  the  success  of  a  long  meditated  plan."  The  wish 
was  expressed  that,  since  the  gentleman  had  already  been 
adjudged  both  foolish  and  ambitious*.,  he  might  now  be  suc- 
cessful.1 Lord  Lyons,  though  foreseeing  difficulties  with 
the  extremists,  wrote  hopefully  of  the  outlook,  and  reported 
that  already  the  Empress,  who  had  long  been  antagonistic, 
professed  to  see  great  good  in  parliamentary  government.2 

In  the  first  two  weeks  of  its  existence,  the  new  Ministry 
reaped  golden  opinions.  Almost  immediately,  it  had  dis- 
missed the  extravagant  but  competent  Baron  Haussmann, 
who  for  seventeen  years  had  labored  at  the  rebuilding  of 
Paris,  and  was  a  favorite  with  the  Emperor;  it  had  dis- 
missed, also,  some  twenty  "  devoted "  prefects,  and  served 
warning  on  the  others  not  to  interfere  in  elections.  It  had 
shown  its  liberal  tendencies  by  passing  measures  to  ensure  the 
greater  freedom  of  the  press  and  by  frankly  and  promptly 
answering  its  interpellators.3  England  rejoiced  at  the  re- 
newal of  the  Commercial  Treaty  of  i860,4  and  it  might  be 
hoped  that  Prussia  felt  satisfaction  at  the  expressed  wish  of 
the  French  for  a  one-fourth  reduction  of  the  conscription. 

But  on  the  very  day  that  the  Corps  Legislatif  had  met  to 
inaugurate  the  new  Ministry,  an  event  occurred  which  was 
provocative  of  great  difficulty  in  the  founding  of  a  liberal 
and  pacific  empire.  Prince  Pierre  Bonaparte  shot  to  death 
the  unarmed  Victor  Noir  who  brought  to  him  a  duelling 
challenge  of  M.  Rochefort.  It  cannot  be  thought  that  so 
slight  a  thing, — the  killing  of  an  obscure  journalist  by  a  dis- 
inherited cousin  of  the  Emperor, — was  more  than  the  spark 
that  fired  already  smouldering  embers.      But  the  inciting 

1  Vanity  Fair,  Jan.  15,  1870.  The  serio-comic  portrait  of  Ollivier  is 
by  "  Ape  "  (Pellegrini). 

1  Newton,  Lord  Lyons,  vol.  i,  pp.  244-245. 
'Spectator,  Jan.  8th  and  15th,  1870. 
4  Annual  Register,  1870,  vol.  cxii,  p.  3. 


39]    FRANCE  UNDER  PARLIAMENTARY  GOVERNMENT    39 

brutality  of  the  murder;  the  fervid  eloquence  of  M.  Roche- 
fort  (which  he  exerted  in  his  paper,  before  the  Belleville 
mob,  and  in  the  House  of  Deputies)  ;  and  the  bungling  of 
the  frightened  police  and  the  judiciary,  all  served  to  provoke 
to  extremity  the  hatred  of  Paris  for  the  existing  regime. 
The  fifty  thousand,  who  accompanied  the  funeral  cortege, 
would  have  taken  the  corpse  to  the  City  had  not  M.  Roche- 
fort, — himself  alarmed  at  the  tempest  his  eloquence  had 
helped  to  raise, — dissuaded  them  from  the  attempt.  On  the 
arrest  of  M.  Rochefort,  the  excitement  was  greatly  height- 
ened. There  was  rioting  for  three  nights  in  Paris :  erection 
of  barricades,  the  proclamation  of  a  republic,  cries  of 
death  and  destruction  to  the  Bonapartes, — all  the  well  known 
harbingers  of  a  change  of  government  in  France.  On  this 
occasion,  however,  the  Empire  had  no  difficulty  in  main- 
taining itself.  But  it  had  glimpsed  the  awful  hatred  of 
those  to  whom  it  was  extending  liberty  and  some  degree  of 
power,  and  drew  back,  frightened.  It  had  been  made  to 
resort  to  the  old  paraphernalia  of  imperialism :  seizure  of 
papers,  arrest  of  their  editors,  the  ranging  of  the  military 
against  the  populace.  And  once  the  pendulum  had  swung 
back,  there  came  a  retarding  in  its  next  swing  forward.1 

In  the  latter  part  of  February,  a  notable  interpellation  was 
introduced  by  Jules  Favre.  He  claimed  that  the  Ministry 
had  not  yet  given  due  assurance  that  the  country  governed. 
It  had  caused  bloodshed  in  Paris ;  it  had  arrested  four  hun- 
dred and  fifty  citizens,  who  were,  for  the  most  part,  in- 
offensive; it  had  not  reorganized  the  National  Guard;  and,  in 
short,  had  made  no  substantial  change  from  the  old  system 
of  personal  government.  Furthermore,  he  declared  that  the 
Opposition  would  not  be  satisfied  until  the  Chamber,  which 
had  been  elected  under  the  old  system  of  governmental  inter- 

1  Annual  Register,  1870,  vol.  cxii,  pp.  128,  131 ;  Redesdale,  op.  cit.,  vol. 
ii,  p.  527;  Spectator,  Jan.  15,  1870;  Saturday  Review,  Jan.  15,  1870. 


40        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [4q 

ference,  had  been  superseded  by  one  more  honestly  repre- 
sentative. He  was  answered  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Count  Daru,  in  whom  of  all  the  Cabinet,  the  Left 
had  the  greatest  confidence.  His  refutation  of  the  leading 
charges  was  so  convincing  that  the  Government  received  a 
gratifying  vote  of  confidence,  in  which  it  was  supported  by 
many  of  the  Opposition.1 

It  was  unfortunate  that  the  accord  among  the  Ministers, 
of  which  Count  Daru  had  boasted  at  this  time,  was  so  soon 
shaken.  The  trouble  came  from)  beyond  the  mountains, — 
a  disagreement  as  to  the  course  the  French  should  pursue  in 
view  of  the  Ecumenical  Council's  desire  to  proclaim  the  doc- 
trine of  papal  infallibility.  Count  Daru's  advice  that 
France  send  an  envoy  to  protest  against  such  proceedings 
was  opposed  by  the  head  of  the  Ministry.  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  this  matter,  the  culmination  of  which  was  over- 
shadowed by  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  was  sufficiently 
grave  to  have  justified  Count  Daru's  recommendation.  He 
argued  that  the  new  Catholic  pretensions  would  give  fresh 
armis  to  the  revolutionary  party  and  vastly  weaken  the  Con- 
servative influence  of  the  Church  by  introducing  a  schism 
among  its  members.2 

Overruled  in  this,  and  sure  that  the  forces  of  socialism 
and  revolution  would  now  receive  new  impetus,  he  showed 
no  inclination  to  try  by  foreign  war  to  turn  the  hootings  of 
the  Belleville  mob  into  a  shout  of  patriotism.  Late  in  March, 
he  gave  out  a  significant  interview  on  French  foreign  policy 
which  was  published  in  the  leading  German  papers.  He 
declared  his  policy  toward  Germany  to  be  above  all  a  policy 
of  peace,  and,  as  an  earnest  of  his  sincerity,  gave  news  of  the 
contemplated  reduction  of  the  army,  and  of  the  Ministry's 

1  Spectator,  Feb.  26,  1870.     The  vote  was  236  to  18. 
*  Ibid.,  March  5,  1870. 


4i ]     FRANCE  UNDER  PARLIAMENTARY  GOVERNMENT    4I 

resolution  never  to  declare  war  except  with  the  consent  of 
the  Corps  Legislatif.1 

It  is  matter  for  regret  that  this  astute  and  pacific  Minister 
was  destined,  like  Clarendon,,  not  to  be  on  the  political  stage 
when  the  last  efforts  were  made  to<  thwart  Bismarck's  in- 
trigue for  war.  The  rift,  which  had  appeared  between  him- 
self and  Ollivier  in  the  conduct  of  French  policy  toward  the 
question  of  papal  infallibility,  was  hopelessly  widened  by 
his  refusal  to  follow  the  Premier  in  upholding  Napoleon's 
use  of  the  plebiscite.  M.  Rouher's  obstructionist  tactics  to- 
wards the  Government's  reforming  bills  were  answered  by 
the  Emperor's  decision  to  adopt  at  once  all  the  reforms  re- 
quired by  constitutional  government,  and,  by  submitting  to 
the  people  a  scnatus  cotisidtum  embodying  them,  to  gain  for 
France  through  popular  support  of  imperial  reform1,  those 
benefits  which  the  extreme  Left  seemed  eager  to  bring  about 
by  a  revolution  precipitated  by  the  socialists.2  To  Count 
Daru,  but  lately  won  over  to  the  support  of  the  Emperor, 
this  reversion  to  the  plebiscite, — even  though  it  were  used  to 
inaugurate  liberal  reforms, — seemed  a  reversion  to  a  policy 
which  he  could  not  support.  In  April,  the  Government  ac- 
cepted his  resignation.3 

The  momentous  plebiscite  was  submitted  at  a  time  of  great 
industrial  unrest.  The  ten  thousand  workmen  at  the  iron 
and  steel  foundries  and  factories  at  Creuzot,  of  which  M. 
Schneider,  President  of  the  Corps  Legislatif,  was  owner,  had 
abandoned  work  for  a  time  in  January,  again  in  March,  and 
now  once  more  were  in  a  state  of  ferment;  the  iron  workers 
of  Fourchambualt  in  the  Department  of  the  Loire  had  stopped 
work;  and  placards  posted  in  Paris  and  other  industrial  cen- 

1  News  of  the  World,  March  27,  1870. 
1  Spectator,  March  26,  1870. 
*  Ibid.,  Apr.  16,  1870. 


42        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [42 

tres  called  for  a  general  strike  of  workmen  throughout  the 
Empire.  This  intense  unrest  was  connected  in  some  way, 
which  the  authorities  could  not  trace,  with  foreign  agencies.1 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  Bismarck,  at  a  later  time,  boasted  that 
he  had  so  ordered  matters  in  Italy  that,  had  that  country 
chosen  to  aid  France  in  the  coming  war,  she  would  have  been 
incapacitated  by  the  outbreak  of  serious  disorders,2  it  would 
seem  that  an  interesting  topic  of  investigation  might  be  the 
question  of  Bismarck's  connection  with  the  strikes  in  the 
French  munition  plants, — strikes  which  not  only  embar- 
rassed France  in  her  new  domestic  policy,  but  retarded  the 
manufacture  of  implements  of  war,  and,  perhaps,  played  a 
part  in  inclining  the  President  of  the  Corps  Legislatif,  to  a 
declaration  of  war,  which  would  not  only  be  profitable  to  his 
industry  but  could  be  counted  upon  to  still  disaffection  into 
a  quiet  concentration  on  the  patriotic  manufacture  of  arms 
"  pour  la  patrie." 

However  this  may  have  been,  the  industrial  unrest  preva- 
lent at  the  time  of  the  plebiscite  went  far  towards  giving 
the  Emperor  that  great  majority  which  would  enable  him  to 
boast  of  popular  approval  in  support  of  his  future  actions. 
The  peasants  were  alarmed  by  the  fear  of  civil  war  or  the 
enforcement  on  the  Government  of  the  strange  doctrines 
preached  by  the  artisans  of  the  cities.  They  believed  those 
who  told  them  that  to  vote  "yes"  to  the  plebiscite, — to  support 
the  Emperor — was  to  vote  for  peace.  The  Government  was 
able  to  press  its  arguments  the  more  effectively  by  the  dis- 
covery of  a  vicious  plot  against  the  Emperor's  life.  It  had 
been  concocted  by  one  Beaury,  a  young  deserter  from  the 
army,  who  had  affiliations  with  some  of  the  prominent  agi- 
tators of  Paris.     The  official  press,  on  the  exposure  of  the 

'Newton,   op.   cit.,  vol.   i,  p.  280;  Spectator,   Apr.   16,  1870;  Annual 
Register,  vol.  cxii,  p.  134. 

1  Malet  to  Lyons,  Sept.  17,  1870,  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  321. 


43]    FRANCE  UNDER  PARLIAMENTARY  GOVERNMENT    43 

plot,  claimed  that  every  "  no"  to  the  plebiscite  meant  approval 
of  assassination  and  anarchy,  and  on  this  ground  those  who 
subscribed  funds  for  agitation  against  it  were  arrested.1 

France,  therefore,  when  it  was  asked  to  reckon  the  cost 
of  a  Napoleon,  found  that  it  was  still  not  too  dear  to  pay. 
Even  though  Napoleon  might  not  be  sincere  in  all  his 
promises,  he  was  old,  and  ill,  and  the  Prince  Imperial  was 
very  young.  Neither  could  be  expected  to  hinder  the  de- 
velopment of  that  constitutionalism  which  was  to  give  se- 
curity for  the  future.  The  Emperor  was  supported  by 
rather  more  than  the  expected  majority.  But  in  analysis  the 
vote  appeared  not  so  reassuring  as  in  toto.  Not  only  Paris, 
but  all  of  the  larger  cities  had  strikingly  availed  themselves 
of  this  opportunity  to  show  their  disaffection.  More  serious 
still,  the  army  unexpectedly  marred  its  record  of  loyalty  by 
the  returning  of  fifty-thousand  noes.2 

There  are  two  distinct  versions  of  the  effect  this  adverse 
minority  from  the  military  had  on  Napoleon.  The  first 
comes  from  Lord  Redesdale's  report  of  a  conversation  he 
had  with  a  Frenchman, — friend  of  the  Emperor  and  his 
former  Minister,  but  of  a  somewhat  dubious  reputation  as 
to  honesty.  The  other  comes  directly  from  another  friend 
of  the  Emperor,  and  former  ambassador  to  France  from 
England.  The  Due  de  Persigny  says  that  Napoleon  told  him 
in  the  late  spring  that  it  was  apparent  that  there  remained 
for  him  but  two  alternatives  :  the  sternest  repression  at  home, 
or  war  abroad.  Thereupon,  Persigny,  on  the  Emperor's 
suggestion,  undertook  to  see  whether  it  were  possible  to  form 
a  ministry  on  the  programme  of  the  absolute  suppression  of 
political  agitation.      Two  days  later,  when  he  returned  to 

1  Spectator,  May  7,  1870;  Annual  Register,  vol.  cxii,  p.  143. 

1  As  Punch  expressed  it,  "  The  Army  turned  up  its  noes."  Vide, 
Saturday  Review,  June  4,  1870;  Spectator,  May  14,  1870;  Annual  Reg- 
ister, 1870,  vol.  cxii,  p.  143. 


44        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [44 

render  his  report  to  the  Emperor,  he  was  kept  waiting  in  the 
antechamber  while  Napoleon  gave  audience  to  Marshal  Le- 
boeuf,  and  on  his  admittance,  he  says  that  he  saved  the 
Emperor  embarrassment  by  assuming  that  it  was  useless  to 
revert  to  the  matter  of  their  former  conversation.  Where- 
upon, he  was  politely  dismissed  with  the  Emperor's  admis- 
sion that  he  had,  indeed,  changed  his  mind.  In  accordance 
with  the  new  attitude,  the  Ministry  was  reformed  with 
"  devoted  "  adherents  of  the  Emperor,  so  that  M.  Ollivier 
was  left  the  only  Liberal  in  his  own  cabinet,  and  the  real 
direction  of  policy  fell  to  the  Minister  of  War,  Marshal 
Leboeuf,  and  the  new  Foreign  Secretary,  the  Due  de 
Gramont.1 

The  other  report  comes  from  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury, 
who  had  an  intimate  conversation  with  the  Emperor  on  May 
the  nineteenth,  two  days  before  the  news  of  the  formation  of 
the  new  Ministry  appeared  in  the  British  papers.  To  him, 
Napoleon  admitted  his  disappointment  at  the  returns  from 
the  army,  but  explained  that  the  adverse  votes  had  been  cast 
in  certain  special  barracks),  where  the  officers  were  unpopular 
and  the  recruits  numerous.  He  was  gratified  that  the  min- 
ority was  overweighted  by  the  three  hundred  thousand  sol- 
diers, who  had  voted  for  him.  The  numbers  surprised  the 
Englishman.  He  told  Napoleon  that  he  had  supposed  the 
army  to  number  nearer  six  hundred  thousand.  To  quote 
directly :  the  Emperor  "  gave  no  reply,  but  looked  suddenly 
very  grave  and  absent.  He  observed  later  that  Europe  ap- 
peared to  be  tranquil,  and  it  was  evident  to  me  that  at  that 
moment  he  had  no  idea  of  the  coming  hurricane.  ...  I  feel 
sure  that  not  a  thought  of  the  impending  idea  of  a  Hohen- 
zollern  being  a  candidate  for  the  Spanish  throne  had  crossed 
his  mind,  .  .  .   He  was  no  longer  the  same  man  of  sanguine 

1  Redesdale,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  528. 


45]    FRANCE  UNDER  PARLIAMENTARY  GOVERNMENT    45 

energy  and  self  reliance,  and  had  grown  prematurely  old 
and  broken."  1  Surely,  this  is  not  the  picture  of  a  monarch 
who  has  but  lately  closeted  himself  with  a  Marshal  of  France 
to  conspire  for  the  making  of  a  foreign  war. 

It  would  seem,  rather,  that  the  Emperor  intended  to  re- 
gain approval  by  gentler  means.  In  a  letter  addressed  to 
Marshal  Canrobert,  Napoleon  requested  him  to  assure  the 
generals,  officers,  and  privates  under  his  command  that  the 
Emperor's  confidence  in  them  had  never  been  shaken,  and  to 
congratulate  General  Lebrun  on  the  admirable  firmness  that 
he  and  his  troops  had  shown  in  the  suppression  of  the  riots 
following  the  plebiscite.2 

As  to  the  character  and  intentions  of  the  new  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  it  is  true  that  M.  de  Gramont  was 
reported  as  hostile  to  Prussia  and  overfriendly  to  Austria, 
at  whose  capital  he  had  lately  represented  France.  But, 
certainly,  at  first  he  showed  himself  inclined  to  continue 
the  pacific  policy  of  his  predecessor.  He  completed  the 
arrangements  for  the  reduction  of  the  army  which  were 
to  be  presented  to  the  Legislative  Body  late  in  June;  he 
satisfied  the  Ambassador  of  Prussia,  Baron  Werther,  as  to  his 
pacific  intentions  toward  that  country ;  s  and  so  late  as  the 
last  day  of  June,  it  was  reported  in  the  British  press  that 
the  Government  had  agreed  to  the  sale  of  a  number  of  the 
horses  belonging  to  the  French  army  because  the  drought 
had  made  exorbitant  the  cost  of  their  upkeep.4  It  is  prob- 
able that  Bismarck's  manipulations  would  still  have  been  suc- 

1  James  Howard  Harris,  Third  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  Memoirs  of  an 
ex-Minister   (London,  1884),  vol.  ii,  pp.  414-415. 
*  Annual  Register,  1870,  vol.  cxii,  p.  18. 

3  Ibid.,  1870,  vol.  cxii,  p.  148. 

4  Illustrated  London  News,  June  30,  1870.  A  third  of  the  French 
regular  Army  was  absent  on  leave,  says  Thos.  W.  Evans,  The  Second 
French  Empire  (N.  Y.,  1905),  p.  200. 


46        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [46 

cess ful  in  exacting  the  forthcoming  declaration  of  war  from 
France  had  Daru  continued  in  office.  But,  assuredly,  he 
would  have  had  to  contend  against  a  Minister  more  tactful 
and  more  highly  regarded  abroad  than  was  de  Gramont. 
And  it  is  probable  that  the  policy  of  France  in  the  negoti- 
ations preliminary  to  the  War's  outbreak  would  have  been 
so  managed  as  to  have  won  for  her  from  the  Neutrals  a 
cordial  sympathy  rather  than  distrust  and  indifference. 

The  drought,  which  occasioned  the  sale  of  the  army 
horses,  was,  in  June,  having  more  serious  consequences.  It 
brought  suffering  and  discontent  not  only  to  the  rural  popu- 
lation that  saw  their  crops  a  failure,  but  to  the  cities  where 
there  was  a  great  advance  in  the  price  of  food.  Paris,  es- 
pecially, suffered.  The  heat  intensified  the  ravages  of  the 
prevalent  smallpox  epidemic,  and  the  abandonment  by  the 
Government  of  the  building  programme  of  Baron  Hauss- 
mann  threw  great  numbers  of  men  out  of  work.  Moreover, 
the  city  authorities  added  fuel  to  the  flame  by  refusing  to  pay 
the  sums  already  due  the  builders.1  Another  disturbing 
factor  was  the  Government's  prosecution  of  the  Interna- 
tional Society  of  Workmen,  thirty-eight  of  whose  members 
had  been  brought  to  trial.  It  was  accused  of  fomenting 
strikes,  agitating  for  a  democratic  and  social  republic,  caus- 
ing the  riots  that  followed  the  taking  of  the  plebiscite,  and 
abetting  those  who  planned  the  assassination  of  the 
Emperor.2 

If  there  was  gloom  in  the  cities  and  the  country,  there 
was  gloom  also  at  the  Tuileries.  Late  investigations  in  the 
conspiracy  of  Beaury  disclosed  a  widespread  plot  that, 
initiated  in  a  conclave  in  London,  had  been  carried  further 
by  seditious  letters  and  pamphlets  in  Paris,  and  whose  pur- 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  June  7,  1870;  News  of  the  World,  June  12, 
1870. 

*  Spectator,  July  2,  1870. 


47 ]     FRANCE  UNDER  PARLIAMENTARY  GOVERNMENT    47 

pose  was  fully  revealed  by  the  discovery  of  a  great  number 
of  explosive  bombs,  many  of  which  were  still  ready  to 
function.1  An  attack  of  rheumatic  gout,  from  which  the 
Emperor  was  suffering,  was  certainly  in  no  manner  alleviated 
by  such  news  as  this  from  his  police.  He  was  being  con- 
tinually hectored  by  former  political  friends  who  were  eager 
to  regain  their  former  places  and  scornful  of  the  present 
Government.  He  was  irritated,  too,  by  the  critical  attitude 
of  doubt  with  which  his  efforts  at  liberalism  were  discussed 
in  English  editorials.  Lord  Lyons  expressed  the  wish  that 
his  countrymen  would  somewhat  modify  their  tone  in  view 
of  the  recently  renewed  Commercial  Treaty  and  the  un- 
happy effect  that  constant  criticism  might  have  upon  the 
Emperor.2 

It  was  this  prickly  time  that  the  exiled  princes  of  the 
House  of  Orleans  selected  to  petition  for  a  return  to  France. 
Their  request  presented  the  Government  with  a  disagreeable 
dilemma.  To  accede  meant  to  admit  to  discontented  France 
four  popular  princes  around  each  of  whom  there  might 
centre  plots  against  the  existing  Government.  To  refuse 
meant  to  acknowledge  weakness,  and  to  receive  the  oppro- 
brium not  only  of  enemies,  but  of  those  who  believed  in 
the  new  pretensions  to  liberalism.  These  new  adherents  of 
Napoleon  would  look  for  an  act  of  justice  from  a  ruler,  who, 
himself  long  an  exile,  had  but  recently  been  confirmed  in 
his  tenure  of  power  by  a  large  vote  of  confidence.  The 
Government  decided  to  oppose  the  return  on  the  ground  that, 
no  matter  how  innocent  the  princes  might  be  of  intrigue, 
their  presence  in  France  would  breed  sedition,  and  that  the 
plebiscite  had  been  a  direct  appeal  to  the  Emperor  to  main- 
tain domestic  peace. 

The  correspondent  of  the  Tunes  reported  that,  irrespec- 

1  Times,  June  25,  1870;  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  285. 
*  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  200. 


48        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR        [48 

tive  of  the  Government's  desire  to  base  its  refusal  on  the 
late  vote  of  the  people,  public  opinion  was  strongly  in  favor 
of  permitting  the  return.1  The  Ministry,  however,  was  up- 
held by  a  large  majority  in  the  Corps  Legislatif,  though  the 
honors  of  the  debate  went  to  the  Opposition.  M.  Estancelin, 
gave  them  warning  that  their  action  would  justify  the  taunt 
that  if  they  did  not  dare  to  be  just  it  was  because  they  felt 
they  were  net  strong.2  It  is  never  a  happy  day  for  a  Min- 
istry when  its  adversaries  can  launch  against  it  an  accusa- 
tion so  quotable. 

This  affair,  which  extended  into  July,  was  followed  by  a 
libellous  attack  on  the  Emperor  by  the  editor  of  the  Figaro, 
who,  hitherto,  had  been  his  staunch  supporter.  The  charge 
was  that  Lord  Clarendon  had  lent  to  Louis  Napoleon,  before 
his  accession  to  power,  some  twenty  thousand  pounds  and, 
postponing  the  payment  of  interest  at  the  time  when  the 
principal  was  returned,  had  later  demanded,  and  been 
granted,  the  Treaty  of  Commerce  in  full  payment.3  The 
story  showed  itself  false  at  once  to  those  who'  had  any 
knowledge  of  the  character  of  Clarendon  or  of  the  negotiat- 
ing of  the  treaty.  But  free  trade  had  become  unpopular,  due 
more  to  conditions  brought  about  by  the  drought  and  inter- 
mittent strikes  than  to  any  defect  proper  to  itself,  and  many 
seized  on  this  gossip  the  better  to  declaim  against  the  treaty. 
The  effort  to  punish  the  editor  further  aggravated  the  of- 
fense by  causing  him  to  publish,  in  the  most  widely  circulated 
journal  of  France,  a  lurid  description  of  various  episodes  of 
Napoleon's  pre-imperial  career.  On  the  ninth  of  July  the 
Paris  correspondent  of  the  London  Graphic  reported  that 
editors  of  the  Reveil,  the  Marseillaise,  the  Avenir  National, 
the  Rappel,  the  Steele,  and  the  Parlement  had  also  incurred 

1  Times,  June  25,  1870. 

'  Ibid.,  July  4,  1870;  Illustrated  London  News,  July  7,  1870. 

*  Times,  July  6,  1870;  Spectator,  July  9,  1870. 


49]     FRANCE  UNDER  PARLIAMENTARY  GOVERNMENT    49 

the  disfavour  of  the  Government,  and  were  under  sentences 
of  fine  and  imprisonment  for  various  sins  of  omission  and 
commission. 

It  was  in  these  early  July  days,  made  hectic,  as  we  have 
seen,  by  drought,  and  heat,  and  pestilence ;  the  unrest  of  the 
cities ;  and  the  doubt  and  distrust  of  the  country ;  by  overt 
and  covert  attacks  on  the  jaded  Emperor  at  home;  and 
intrigue  and  criticism  abroad, — it  was  in  these  days  that  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  launched  his  bill  for  the  re- 
duction by  ten  thousand  of  the  army  contingent  for  1870.1 
The  bill  was  the  outcome  of  that  plan  of  Count  Daru's  which 
had  enlisted  Clarendon's  efforts  to  obtain  some  similar  action 
on  the  part  of  Prussia.  It  was  the  first  step  in  a  reduction 
which  it  was  hoped  could  be  made  more  drastic  year  by  year, 
so  that  in  the  final  period  of  the  life  of  the  third  Napoleon, 
he  might  justify  his  assertion:  "  L' Empire  c'est  la  paix." 

The  bill  was  opposed  by  those  radicals  who  professed 
themselves  eager  to  do  away  with  the  whole  existing  army 
system,  which  they  dubbed  irksome,  and  costly,  and  provo- 
cative of  war.  To  have  followed  them  in  their  opposition 
to  this  reduction,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  sufficiently 
drastic,  would  have  been  to  make  an  advance  that  France  was 
no  more  willing  than  her  neighbours  to  make.  The  radicals, 
themselves,  had  they  been  in  power,  might  have  been  willing 
to  postpone  disarmament  until  there  was  a  greater  degree  of 
amity  and  understanding  between  nations.  It  was  opposed, 
also,  by  such  men  as  the  deputy,  Latour,  late  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  who,  during  his  career  had  represented 
France  both  at  Vienna  and  Berlin, — men  who  saw  in  modern 
diplomacy  reason  rather  for  the  enlargement  than  the  aboli- 
tion of  armies.  He  based  his  argument  on  the  growing 
military  power  of  Prussia  and  the  necessity  that  France 

1  Times,  July  I,  1870. 


50        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [g0 

maintain  her  position,  and  insist  upon  the  observance  of  the 
Treaty  of  Prague.  The  Government  was  fortunate  in  the 
debate  in  having  the  support  of  M.  Thiers,  usually  its 
opponent.  This  able  statesman  contended  that  the  bill  would 
give  an  assurance  of  the  Government's  pacific  tendencies  and, 
at  the  same  time,  so  far  maintain  its  strength  as  to  dissuade 
foreign  Powers  from  disregarding  its  wishes.  He  was  con- 
tent to  wish  for  peace,  and  to  adopt  that  course  which  would 
manifest  his  desire,  and  help  to  realize  it.  The  Premier 
went  further.  During  the  debate  on  the  St.  Gothard  rail- 
way late  in  June,  the  Foreign  Minister  had  asserted  that 
the  Government  had  no  uneasiness  and  that  peace  was 
assured.1 

M.  Ollivier  reaffirmed  this  confidence  in  a  statement  that 
the  grim  war,  declared  within  a  fortnight,  mocked  to  the 
echo:  "  The  Government  has  no  uneasiness  whatever,"  said 
M.  Ollivier.  "At  no  epoch  was  the  peace  of  Europe  more 
assured.     Irritating  questions  nowhere  exist."  2 

1  Times,  June  21,  1870. 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  July  2,  1870;  Times,  July  1,  1870.  Two  days 
after  the  debate,  the  Emperor  expressed  to  Prince  Metternich  his 
confidence  that  the  peace  of  Europe  was  secure  and  that  he  would  be 
able  to  transmit  his  crown  to  his  son.  Vide,  Reginald  Lucas,  Lord 
Glenesk  and  the  Morning  Post  (London,  1910),  p.  237. 


CHAPTER  III 

British  Negotiations  Preceding  the  Declaration 
of  War 

During  the  doldrums  of  the  first  week  in  July  of  1870,  it 
seemed  peace  brooded  over  all  the  capitals  of  Europe.  M. 
Ollivier,  as  we  have  seen,  inaugurated  the  month  with 
a  grave  assurance  to  the  French  Chamber  that  the  time  was 
one  of  peculiar  serenity,  and  that  there  was  apparent  no 
difficulty  of  disturbing  imminence.  Diplomatists  were  glad 
to  make  his  words  a  summer  text  and  gratefully  close  their 
portfolios  and  go  vacationing.  A  calm  almost  sabbatical 
enwrapped  the  darkened  embassies.  In  Paris,  the  Cham- 
bers were  still  sitting,  but  it  was  supposed  the  most  im- 
portant business  was  well  finished  with  the  disposal  of  the 
St.  Gothard  affair  and  the  passing  of  the  bill  to  reduce  con- 
scription. The  Emperor  was  preparing  to  go  to  Vichy  for 
the  waters.1  Mr.  Washburne,  the  United  States'Minister  to 
France,  was  leaving  for  Carlsbad  with  the  happy  reflec- 
tion that  he  availed  himself  of  a  time  unusually  propitious.1 
In  Berlin  Herr  von  Thile  was  left  in  charge,  while  his 
King  sought  recreation  at  Ems  and  the  Chancellor  buried 
himself  on  his  estates.  The  great  houses  of  London,  in- 
cluding the  French  embassy,  were  dark,  though  Parliament 
was  still  in  languid  session.  Lord  Granville  had  but  lately 
acceded  to  the  office  of  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  left 

1  Gentleman's  Annual,  1830,  "  The  Story  of  the  War,"  pp.  1  et  seq. 
1 E.   B.  Washburne,    The  Franco-German  War  and  Insurrection  of 
the  Commune  (Exec.  Doc.  no.  24,  Washington,  D.  C,  1878),  p.  I. 
5i]  51 


52        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [52 

vacant  by  Clarendon's  death.  On  the  fifth  of  July,  the 
veteran  Under  Secretary,  Mr.  Hammond,  congratulated  him 
on  his  having  assumed  his  duties  during  the  greatest  lull  in 
the  Foreign  Office  he  remembered.1  Tempo  lente  e  suave, 
truly,  but  already,  pianissimo,  could  be  heard  the  strain  that 
was  to  swell  to  the  crescendo  of  war ! 

From  the  time  that  the  Bourbon,  Isabella,  had  been  forced 
to  leave  her  castles  in  Spain,  the  provisional  government 
had  hawked  her  throne  from  England  to  Italy,  and  saw  it 
still  unoccupied.  Most  persistently  it  had  been  offered  to 
young  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 
brother  of  the  new  ruler  of  Rumania,  a  member  of  the 
reigning  house  of  Prussia,  and  an  officer  in  the  Prussian 
army.  He  had  twice  declined  its  acceptance,  but,  in  July, 
it  became  known  to  the  French  Minister  at  Madrid  that 
Marshal  Prim  was  in  receipt  of  a  third  response  that  was 
favorable.2  The  news  was  received  in  Paris  with  the  dis- 
pleasure that  is  felt  at  the  reopening  of  a  disagreeable  ques- 
tion that  was  supposed  to  have  been  settled.  When  rumours 
of  the  candidacy  had  reached  the  French  Ministry  a  year 
before,  Count  Benedetti  had  been  instructed  to  inform  the 
Prussian  Government  of  the  dissatisfaction  with  which 
such  a  choice  would  be  regarded  in  France.  He  had  at 
that  time  been  assured  by  Herr  von  Thile  on  his  honour  that 
the  Prince  was  not,  and  could  not  seriously  become,  a  can- 
didate for  the  Spanish  crown.3 

The  recrudescence  of  the  question  persuaded  the  Emperor 
that  it  was  a  matter  which,  considering  the  uneasy  rela- 

1  Granville  to  Russell,  July  7,  1870,  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Gran- 
ville, vol.  ii,  p.  33. 

2Comte  Maurice  Fleury,  Memoirs  of  the  Empress  Eugenie  (N.  Y., 
1920),  vol.  ii,  chap,  vii,  passim. 

3  Quotation  from  Due  de  Gramont's  Circular  to  the  Diplomatic 
Agents  of  the  Empire  in  a  dispatch  of  Layard's,  Madrid1,  July  25,  1870, 
British  State  Papers  for  1870,  Foreign  Office  Series,  vol.  lxx,  p.  42. 


53]  BRITISH  NEGOTIATIONS  53 

tions  existing  between  France  and  Prussia  since  Sadowa, 
must  be  handled  with  firmness  and  circumspection.  In  the 
absence  of  his  Ambassador  from  London,  he  commissioned 
Baron  Rothschild  to  transmit  the  disquieting  news  of  the 
candidacy  to  Gladstone,  and  to  represent  to  him  the  displeas- 
ure felt  in  France  and  urge  the  British  Government  to  do 
what  it  could  to  prevent  its  aggravation.1 

On  the  next  day,  July  the  sixth,  France  was  again  ^re- 
presented in  England,  and  M.  de  Lavalette  called  on  Lord 
Granville  to  give  official  repetition  to  the  informal  message.2 
The  British  Government,  until  this  time,  professedly  had 
been  in  ignorance  of  the  project.  Earl  Granville  expressed 
himself  as  not  surprised  at  the  unfavorable  reception  it  had 
received  in  France,  though  he  could  not  share  the  French 
estimate  of  its  importance,  and  regretted  that  Gramont  had 
spoken  in  strong  terms  to  Baron  Werther,  the  Prussian  Am- 
bassador. He  readily  promised  to  use  what  influence  he 
could,  both  with  Spain  and  Prussia,  to  persuade  them  to  the 
abandonment  of  the  project.3 

The  despatches  which  he  forthwith  sent  to  the  British  re- 
presentatives in  Berlin  and  Madrid  are  models  of  diploma- 
tic correspondence.  Lord  Loftus  is  informed  that  the 
British  Government  cannot  believe  that  an  offer  so  secretly 
conducted  can  have  received  the  sanction  of  King  William. 
The  British  Ambassador  to  Prussia  is  to  remind  that  Power 
of  the  present  sensitiveness  of  opinion  in  France  to  Prus- 
sian aggrandisement  and  the  occasion  this  opportunity  of- 
fers to  exhibit  a  friendliness  and  forbearance  that  would  in- 

1  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone  (N.  Y.,  1911),  vol.  ii,  p.  325;  Hunt  and 
Poole,  Political  History  of  England  (N.  Y.,  1 905-1915),  vol.  xii,  p. 
261 ;  Sir  Spencer  Walpole,  History  of  Twenty-five  Years  (N.  Y.,  1904- 
1908),  vol.  ii,  p.  482. 

1  Newton,  Lord  Lyons,  vol.  i,  p.  295. 

•Granville  to  Lyons,  July  6,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers  for  1870,  For- 
eign Office,  vol  lxx,  p.  2. 


54        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [54 

volve  no  sacrifice.  He  is  to  urge  as  his  main  argument, 
however,  the  interest  of  Spain  in  the  matter — the  difficulties 
that  she  might  encounter  should  she  select  a  dynasty  so 
hateful  to  the  neighboring  French.1  The  despatch  sent  to 
Mr.  Layard  at  Madrid  after  the  Spanish  Minister  had  called 
to  announce  the  choice  of  his  Government,  embodies  a 
sigh  for  Lord  Clarendon,  who  had  understood  Spain  so  well 
and  been  so  highly  regarded  there.  It  makes  no  pretence 
to  dictate  to  Spain  her  choice  of  king,  but  for  "  prudential 
reasons  "  urges  that  she  look  further.2 

On  the  day  that  Lord  Granville  despatched  his  propitia- 
tory message  to  Prussia,  M.  de  Gramont,  having  received  no 
reply  to  his  representations  at  Berlin  and  Madrid,  complica- 
ted the  task  of  mediation  by  declaring  in  the  Corps  Legislatif 
that  the  advancement  of  the  Hohenzollern  prince  could  have 
no  end  but  war.3  The  vehemence  of  the  speech  surprised  the 
British  Ambassador  who  had  discussed  the  matter  only  the 
day  before  with  M.  Ollivier  and  found  him  firm  but  not  bel- 
licose. The  speech  was  complained  of  to  Lord  Lyons  by 
the  Prussian  Charge  a" Affaires,  who  was  acting  in  Baron 
Werther's  absence.  Though  making  no  defence  for  the 
precipitateness  of  Gramont's  declaration,  the  British  Ambas- 
sador, nevertheless,  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  had  the 
entire  approval  of  the  French  nation  and  that  it  was,  ac- 
cordingly, the  King  of  Prussia,  rather  than  the  Emperor, 
who  could  with  dignity  and  honor  put  an  end  to  the  affair.* 

1  Granville  to  Lyons,  July  6,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers  for  1870,  vol. 
lxx,  p.  3. 

2  Despatches  of  Granville  to  Layard,  July  7th  and  8th,  1870,  Brit. 
State  Papers  for  1870,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  5-10. 

s  " L'avenemcnt  du  Prince  de  Hohenzollern  c'est  la  guerre"  Newton, 
op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  296;  Gentleman's  Annual  for  1870,  "Story  of  the 
War,"  pp.  1  et  seq. 

*  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  7,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxx, 
pp.  7-8. 


55]  BRITISH  NEGOTIATIONS  55 

To  his  chief,  he  wrote  even  more  frankly  of  the  inflamed 
state  of  French  opinion.  He  believed  the  Ministry  was  no 
more  than  making  an  attempt  to  gain  popularity  by  ener- 
getically voicing  the  feeling  of  the  nation,  but  that  they  were 
really  desirous  of  settling  the  affair  by  diplomacy.1  One 
must  remember  the  lean  years  France  had  recently  been 
through  and  the  dubious  position  of  her  Emperor  and  his 
Ministry  to  understand  those  "  faults  and  follies,"  which 
Gladstone  with  the  overemphasis  of  oratory  accused  of 
being  "  without  parallel  in  the  history  of  nations."  2 

To  French  insistence,  Prussia  opposed  an  attitude  of 
obdurate  resistance.  Her  Ambassador  at  London,  Count 
Bernstorff,  maintained  to  Lord  Granville  that  the  matter 
was  not  one  which  concerned  North  Germany,  but  that  if 
France  chose  to  make  war  his  country  was  prepared  to  de- 
fend itself.3  The  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  re- 
presented Russia's  attitude  to  be  identic  in  attaching  no 
responsibility  to  Prussia  for  the  election  of  a  Hohenzollern 
to  the  Spanish  throne.4  It  is  lamentable  that  Gladstone's) 
Cabinet  was  not  better  informed  of  the  extent  and  ramifica- 
tions of  the  negotiations  preceding  the  election.5  Had 
Downing  Street  even  known  that  the  candidature  had  been 
the  subject  of  discussion  between  the  Prussian  King,  his 
Chancellor,  and  von  Moltke,  Lord  Granville  might  have 

1  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  7,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  5-7. 

2  Morley,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  327. 

1  Hunt  and  Poole,  op.  cit.,  p.  261. 

*  Sir  A.  Buchanan  to  Granville,  July  9,  1870;  Brit.  State  Papers  for 
1870,  vol.  lxx,  p.  49. 

5  On  Feb.  27,  1870,  Bismarck  drew  up  a  confidential  report  in  which 
he  strongly  favoured  the  candidature.  On  March  15,  a  council  was 
held  to  discuss  the  matter  at  which  there  were  present  Moltke,  Roon, 
Thile.  Bismarck,  Prince  Anthony,  and  Leopold.  Moltke  on  this  occa- 
sion let  it  be  known  that  Prussia  was  in  a  condition  to  combat  Napo- 
leon's   disapproval.      Prince  Leopold,    however,    refused    to   become   a 


56        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [56 

succeeded  in  puncturing  the  cool  armor  of  unconcern  which 
so  aggravated  France  and  so  persistently  repelled  the  con- 
ciliating efforts  of  the  British.  It  would  seem,  too,  that  the 
information  that  Lord  Lyons  supplied  was  not  so  complete 
as  it  should  have  been.  He  was  deceived  by  the  belliger- 
ent tone  of  certain  press  articles  and  by  the  warlike  attitude 
of  the  Parisians  into  thinking  that  there  existed  a  burning, 
national  desire  for  revenge  on  Prussia.1  At  a  time  when 
the  French  Emperor  was  heartily  wishing  that  the  perturbed 
deputies  and  ministers  "  would  fellow  the  sage  practice  of  the 
American  Indians  and  keep  their  mouths  shut,"  when  the 
Empress  was  urging  Isabella  to  use  her  influence  to  pre- 
vent the  accession  of  so  unwelcome  a  successor,  and  Bis- 
marck was  rinding  it  necessary  to  keep  Dr.  Busch  constantly 
employed  in  writing  anonymous  articles  that  would  incite 
the  French,  it  was  believed  in  Downing  Street  that  impetus 
to  the  quarrel  came  from  France  rather  than  from  Prussia. 
On  the  tenth  of  the  month,  matters  were  somewhat  bet- 
tered by  Gramont's  interview  with  Lord  Lyons,  in  which  he 
gave  the  British  a  basis  for  mediation.  The  French  demand 
for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Prince's  candidature,  which 
Rothschild  had  earlier  communicated  to  Gladstone  as  the 
sine  qua  non  of  the  negotiations,  remained  the  same,  but 
it  appeared  now  that  the  French  advanced  the  demand  with 
more  of  reason.     Benedetti, — the  Minister  sent  to  ascertain 

candidate.  In  April,  Bismarck  sent  agents  to  Spain  on  a  secret  mis- 
sion. At  the  end  of  May  Leopold  was  won  over  to  the  project,  largely 
through  the  efforts  of  the  Crown  Prince.  The  next  month  Salazar,  at 
Bismarck's  suggestion,  came  to  Sigmaringen  to  negotiate  with  Leo- 
pold's father  in  order  to  come  to  a  final  agreement.  The  young 
Prince  had  only  yielded  a  consent  contingent  on  the  Royal  approval. 
"  After  a  hard  struggle,"  King  William  agreed  to  the  project  on  June 
21.  Fleury,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  chap,  vii ;  Grant  Robertson,  Bismarck  (Lon- 
don, 1018),  pp.  265-267. 
1  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  297. 


57]  BRITISH  NEGOTIATIONS  57 

the  attitude  of  Prussia  in  the  matter, — had  been  unable  to  in- 
terview Bismarck,  and  disliking  in  an  affair  of  such  gravity 
to  negotiate  solely  with  an  Under  Secretary,  who  could  only 
offer  to  his  objections  the  parrot-like  repetition  that  the  af- 
fair was  not  germane  to  the  Government,  had  gone  directly 
to  the  King  at  Ems.  The  result  was,  Gramont  told  Lyons, 
that  the  King  had  admitted  having  given  his  consent.  He 
now  promised  to  confer  with  Prince  Leopold  and  give  a 
definitive  answer  to  France  when  he  had  done  so.  This 
admission  and  agreement,  M.  Gramont  believed,  removed 
the  ambiguity  of  the  affair,  making  it  distinctly  one  between 
France  and  the  King  of  Prussia.  Gramont  assured  Lord 
Lyons  that  if  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  should  now,  on 
the  advice  of  the  King,  withdraw  his  acceptance,  the  whole 
affair  would  be  at  an  end.  The  British  Ministers  decided 
to  ask  the  Queen  to  write  confidentially  advising  the  Prince's 
withdrawal.  France,  meanwhile,  deferred  any  ostensible 
preparations  for  war.1 

On  the  morning  of  the  eleventh,  Gramont  informed  Lord 
Lyons  that,  as  yet,  no  answer  had  been  received  from  King 
William,  but  that  his  Government  would  wait  another  day, 
although  the  Corps  Legislatif  was  restive  under  the  delay 
and  the  Ministry  was  becoming  most  unpopular.2 

At  two  p.  m.  the  following  day,  Lord  Lyons  telegraphed 
that  an  answer  had  been  received  from  the  King  of  Prussia. 
It  was  a  demand  for  time  made  on  the  surprising  admission 
that  that  most  important  princeling,  Leopold  of  Hohen- 
zollern-Sigmaringen,  was  not  to  be  found.3  Later  in  the 
day,  a  more  extended  answer   was   received.     In  it  His 

1  Morley,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  327;  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  10, 
1870,  Brit.  State  Papers  for  1870,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  16-17. 

1  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  12,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  18-19. 

1  Ernest  Hartley  Coleridge,  Life  and  Correspondence  of  John  Duke, 
Lord  Coleridge,  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  England  (London,  1904),  vol.  ii, 
p.  172.    The  telegram  does  not  appear  in  the  British  State  Papers. 


58        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR        [58 

Majesty  disclaimed  all  connection  with  the  offer  of  the 
Spanish  crown  to  his  kinsman  and  declined  to  advise  him  to 
withdraw  his  acceptance.  However,  the  father  of  the  elusive 
Prince  sent  a  copy  of  the  telegram  which  he  had  despatched 
to  Marshal  Prim,  declaring  that  his  son's  candidature 
wras  at  an  end.1  M.  de  Gramont  regretted  that  the  King  had 
not  only  not  given  the  definitive  answer  he  had  promised 
but  had  now  distinctly  refused  to  advise  the  Prince  in  the  mat- 
ter and  had  reverted  to  his  attitude  that  a  distinction  should 
be  drawn  between  himself  as  King  of  Prussia  and  as  head 
of  the  family  of  Hohenzollern.  The  Prince  himself  was  of 
age  and  it  was  not  known  that  he  entertained  such  regard 
for  his  father's  wishes  as  to  induce  him  to  prefer  filial 
obedience  to  submission  to  any  future  prompting  of  the 
Prussian  King  or  his  Chancellor. 

Lord  Lyons  seems  to  have  had  no  patience  with  these 
French  misgivings.  He  believed,  and  said  so,  that  the 
demand  of  France  had  been  fulfilled  and  that  it  was  her  duty 
now  to  fulfil  her  own  promise  to  the  British  Government 
and  consider  the  matter  ended.  He  warned  France  that 
insistence  on  a  matter  of  form  would  be  regarded  as  cul- 
pable, by  all  of  Europe,  whereas  Prussia,  were  she  pushed  to 
war,  would  gain  sympathy  as  fighting  in  self-defence  and 
could  expect  to  rally  all  Germany  to  her  support.2  Granville 
approved  Lord  Lyons'  despatch,  and  himself  used  the  same 
arguments  to  the  French  Ambassador.     On  the  following 

1  On  the  morning  of  July  12,  when  Napoleon  had  received  news  of 
Prince  Anthony's  telegram  to  Prim,  he  said  to  the  Italian  Ambassador, 
Count  Nigra :  "  This  dispatch  .  .  .  means  peace.  I  have  requested  you 
to  come  here  for  the  purpose  of  having  you  tell  the  news  to  your  Gov- 
ernment. ...  I  know  very  well  that  public  opinion  is  so  excited  that  it 
would  have  preferred  war.  But  this  renunciation  is  a  satisfactory  solu- 
tion and  disposes,  at  least  for  the  present,  of  every  pretext  for  hostil- 
ities."    Thos.  W.  Evans,   The  Second  French  Empire. 

1  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  12,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxx,  pp. 
20-21. 


59j  BRITISH  NEGOTIATIONS  59 

day  he  telegraphed  that  Lord  Lyons  should  make  represen- 
tations, before  the  French  Council  assembled,  of  the  im- 
mense responsibility  that  the  British  Government  would 
charge  to  France  if  she  sought  to  enlarge  the  grounds  of  the 
quarrel  by  declining  to  accept  the  Prince's  withdrawal.1  It 
may  be  that  the  severity  of  Granville's  telegram  was  due 
not  only  to  the  exigency  of  the  situation  but  to  irritation  be- 
cause M.  de  Gramont,  in  his  speech  to  the  Deputies  on  the 
eleventh,  had  declared  that  up  to  that  time  all  the  European 
Cabinets  appeared  to  admit  the  legitimacy  of  French  com- 
plaints,2 a  point  that  was  made  the  subject  of  a  despatch  to 
Lord  Lyons  the  same  day3  and  of  subsequent  objections 
from  Parliament.4 

Certainly  this  day,  the  thirteenth,  was  one  of  distinct 
ill  omen  for  France.  In  Paris,  M.  de  Gramont  was  in 
receipt  of  a  telegram  from  the  French  Minister  to  Russia 
which  advised  him  that  when  the  Emperor  Alexander  had 
begged  King  William  to  order  the  Prince's  withdrawal,  the 
Prussian  monarch  had  refused  and  accompanied  his  refusal 
with  no  single  word  of  explanation.5  He  was  also  in  re- 
ceipt of  a  most  extraordinary  telegram  from  Stuttgart 
which  stated  that  the  Wurttemberg  Government  had  been 
informed  that  Lord  Granville  had  said  France  would  at- 
tack Prussia  immediately  by  sea  and  by  land  without  a 
declaration  of  war  were  her  demands  refused.  The  Wurt- 
temberg  Government    had    received    the    information    via 

1  Substance  of  telegram  from  Granville  to  Lyons,  July  14,  1870,  Brit. 
State  Papers,  vol.  lxx,  p.  37. 

2  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  vol.  ii,  p.  35 ;  Morley,  op.  cit., 
vol.  ii,  p.  328;  Brit.  State  Papers  for  1870,  vol.  lxx,  p.  26. 

.    3  Brit.  State  Papers  for  1870,  vol.  lxx,  p.  22. 

*  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  July  14th  and  July  18th,  1870,  pp. 
225  and  370.     Russell  and  Horsman  were  the  interpolators. 

*  Lyons  to  Granville,  July  13,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxx,  p.  26. 


60        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [60 

Berlin  and,  as  well  as  Lord  Lyons  could  remember,  from  the 
Prussian  Government.1  From  Vienna,  the  French  agent 
transmitted  Count  Beust's  warning  against  pushing  matters 
to  extremities.  The  state  of  feeling  in  the  South  German 
states,  which  he  believed  himself  peculiarly  able  to  gage, 
was  not  one  of  sympathy  to  France  in  the  present  matter.2 
In  view  of  these  developments,  France  was  eager  for  such 
a  definitive  termination  of  the  affair  as  could  come  only  if 
his  Prussian  Majesty  would  forbid  Prince  Leopold  from 
altering  at  any  future  time  his  present  decision.  Gramont 
assured  Lyons  that  if  England  could  succeed  in  obtain- 
ing this  agreement  from  the  King,  he  would  give  a 
written  assurance  that  for  his  Government  the  incident 
would  be  terminated.3  Lord  Lyons  forwarded  the  re- 
quest,4 and  reported  that  the  impression  prevailed  on  the 
night  of  the  thirteenth  that  it  was  yet  possible  to  preserve 
peace.  The  language  of  the  Cabinet  was  more  pacific.  It 
was  understood  that  the  renunciation  of  the  prince  had  come 
to  confirm  that  received  from  his  father,  and  the  Spanish 
Government  had  formally  declared  to  the  Government  of 
France  that  the  candidature  was  at  an  end.5 

It  would  seem  from  an  interview  of  Lord  Loftus  with 
Bismarck  on  this  fateful  thirteenth  that  the  tempest  clouds 
blew  now  from  the  north.1  The  day  before,  the  Prussian 
Chancellor  had  left  Varzin  to  go  to  the  King  at  Ems,  but, 

1  Lyons  to  Granville,  July  18,  1870,  ibid.,  he.  cit. 

a  Bloomfield  to  Granville,  Vienna,  July  13,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  pp. 
50-51. 

'Morley,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  330. 

4  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  13,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxx, 
26. 

•  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  14,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  p.  35. 

6  At  a  Cabinet  Council,  held  on  the  13th,  the  Emperor  gained  the 
Ministry's  consent  to  his  proposal  to  submit  the  subject  of  the  contro- 
versy to  arbitration.     Evans,  op.  cit.,  p.  164. 


6l]  BRITISH  NEGOTIATIONS  6l 

stopping  at  Berlin,  he  was  met  by  telegrams  from  his  royal 
master  that  so  displeased  him  that  he  sent  Marshal  Eulen- 
burg  to  the  King  instead,  and  himself  remained  in  the 
capital,  half  resolved  to  resign  his  post.  He  was  disposed 
now  to  admit  a  mighty  concern  in  a  matter  which,  hitherto, 
he  had  permitted  the  King  to  deal  with  in  the  capacity  of 
head  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern.  When,  then,  the 
British  Ambassador  congratulated  him  on  the  solution 
which  apparently  was  reached,  Count  Bismarck  demurred. 
He  told  Lord  Loftus  that  the  "  extreme  moderation  evinced 
by  the  King  of  Prussia  under  the  menacing  tone  of  the 
French  Government  and  the  courteous  reception  by  His 
Majesty  of  Count  Benedetti  at  Ems,  after  the  severe  lang- 
uage held  to  Prussia  both  officially  and  in  the  French  press  " 
was  producing  general  indignation.  He  mentioned  various 
telegrams  which  he  had  received  that  morning  confirmative 
of  such  dissatisfaction.  He,  then,  expressed  a  wish  that  the 
British  Government  would  officially  declare  its  satisfaction 
at  the  solution  of  the  question  by  the  "  spontaneous  act  of 
Prince  Leopold,"  and  bear  public  testimony  to  the  calm 
and  moderation  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  his  Govern- 
ment, and  the  German  Press.1  May  it  be  observed  that 
this  request  to  Great  Britain  was  rather  extraordinary  in 
that  it  asked  official  commendation  for  an  act  which  the 
Prussian  King  and  his  Government  had  repeatedly  declared 
to  be  wholly  unofficial  and  committed  by  the  King  only  in 
his  personality  as  head  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern? 
However,  the  distinction  is  one  so  subtle  that,  were  it  not 
that  the  offender  was  the  clear-headed  Bismarck,  it  is  not 
surprising  to  find  it  occasioning  confusion  to  the  very 
Government  that  avowed  it.  The  Count  went  further  and 
demanded  that  the  solution  of   this  purely   family  affair 

1  Loftus  to  Granville,  Berlin,  July  13,   1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol. 
lxx,  pp.  32-33 ;  Hunt  and  Poole,  op.  cit.,  p.  262. 


62        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [62 

should  be  publicly  acknowledged  by  France  to  the  European 
Powers  and  that  France  should  promise  to  raise  no  further 
claims  in  the  matter  and  disavow,  or  satisfactorily  explain, 
the  menacing  language  of  the  Due  de  Gramont.  Under 
the  existing  circumstances,  it  was  impossible,  the  Chancellor 
said,  for  him  to  receive  the  French  Ambassador,  and  were 
the  conditions  he  had  just  outlined  not  fulfilled,  "  Prussia 
would  be  obliged  to  seek  explanations  from  France."  The 
British  Ambassador,  who  had  begun  the  interview  with  con- 
gratulations, hastened  off  to  write  his  chief  that,  were  the 
French  Government  not  induced  to  appease  enraged  Prus- 
sia, war  would  be  inevitable. 

His  despatch  did  not  reach  Granville  until  the  fifteenth. 
Had  it  come  a  day  earlier,  Her  Majesty's  Government 
would  have  been  saved  from  the  rebuff  it  encountered  by 
so  far  acceding  to  Gramont's  request  of  the  thirteenth  as  to 
ask  that  the  dually  constituted  William  of  Hohenzollern 
would  confirm  the  Prince's  withdrawal  by  an  expression  of 
approval.1  Before  the  deferential  British  request  reached 
Prussia  and  Count  Bismarck  had  time  to  express  regret  at 
receiving  a  proposal  of  so  impossible  a  nature  as  to  preclude 
him  from  presenting  it  to  King  William,2  an  episode  took 
place  which  totally  changed  the  state  of  feeling  in  the 
French  capital. 

On  the  morning  of  the  fourteenth,  the  hopes  of 
Ollivier  were  dispelled  by  a  startling  telegram  from  the 
Charge  d'Aif aires  at  Berlin.  It  stated  that  an  article 
had  appeared  in  the  Prussian  Ministerial  organ,  the  North 
German  Gazette,  to  the  effect  that  the  "  French  Ambassador 
had  requested  the  King  to  promise  never  to  allow  a  Hohen- 
zollern to  be  a  candidate  for  the  throne  of  Spain,  that  His 

1  Granville  to  Lyons.  July  14,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxx,  p.  28. 

2  Granville  to  Loftus,  July  15,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  p.  30. 


63]  BRITISH  NEGOTIATIONS  63 

Majesty  had,  thereupon,  refused  to  receive  the  Ambassador 
and  sent  him  word  by  an  Aide-de-Camp  that  he  had 
nothing  more  to  say  to  him."  The  French  Government, 
alarmed  at  news  so  much  more  disquieting  than  that  sent 
by  Count  Benedetti,  himself,1  nevertheless,  prevented  it 
from  becoming  generally  known  and  made  no  communica- 
tion on  the  subject  to  the  Corps  Legislatif  and  the  Senate 
in  their  sessions  of  that  day.  Lord  Lyons,  however,  who 
was  still  dutifully  urging  moderation  and  caution,  expressed 
great  fear  that  when  the  evening  papers  copied  the  article  of 
the  North  German  Gazette,  the  anger  of  the  populace  might 
precipitate  the  Government  into  declaring  war.2  The  solu- 
tion of  this  family  affair  had,  in  a  way,  been  withdrawn  from 
the  competency  of  the  Ministry  and  laid  before  the  high 
tribunal  of  the  people. a 

By  evening,  it  was  known  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay  that  the 
Prussian  Government  had  given  endorsement  and  further 
publicity  to  the  article  by  telegraphing  it  to  all  its  embassies 
throughout  the  Continent.  Its  communication  to  Baron 
Werther,  the  conciliatory  ambassador  to  Paris,  was  ac- 
companied by  instructions  to  leave  his  post  at  once.     The 

1  Lyon's  report  of  interview  with  Gramont,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  p.  40. 

*  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  14,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  35-36.  A 
special  supplement  of  the  Nord  Deutsche  Zeitung,  containing  the 
famous  Ems  telegram  that  had  been  edited  by  Bismarck,  was  distrib- 
uted gratis  on  the  streets  of  Berlin  on  July  13,  1870,  according  to  a 
letter  of  the  Berlin  correspondent  of  the  Times. 

*  It  can  be  a  matter  of  interest  more  to  the  metaphysician  or  to  the 
psychologist  than  th  historian,  that  two  or  three  days  after  the  pub- 
lication of  the  inflammatory  account  of  the  first  interview  of  King 
William  with  Benedetti,  the  aide-de-camp  reported  that  his  master,  who 
as  the  Prussian  King  was  a  Dr.  Jekyll,  who  really  knew  nothing  of  the 
nefarious  Spanish  business,  and  as  head  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern 
was  a  Mr.  Hyde,  who  persisted  in  consenting  to  the  project,  had  agreed 
at  Ems  to  withdraw  his  consent  "  in  the  same  sense  and  to  the  same 
extent  it  had  been  given."  Granville  to  Loftus,  July  19,  1870;  ibid., 
vol.  70,  p.  60. 


64        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [64 

Emperor  returned  from  St.  Cloud  and  held  a  council  at  the 
Tuileries.  The  indefatigable  Lord  Lyons  for  the  first  time 
found  it  impossible  to  communicate  directly  with  the  Due 
de  Gramont,  and  could  extract  no  comforting1  reassurance 
from  the  head  of  his  Cabinet.1 

The  next  day,  July  the  fifteenth,  the  reserves  were  called 
out  and  the  Government,  after  reviewing  the  negotiations,  de- 
clared before  the  Chambers  that  further  attempts  at  con- 
ciliation were  impossible.  It  laid  especial  emphasis  on  the 
fact  that  the  King  of  Prussia  had  announced  to  the  French 
Ambassador  that  he  would  not  receive  him,  and  that  the 
Prussian  Government  had  communicated  this  decision  to  the 
Cabinets  of  Europe,  and  instructed  Baron  Werther  to 
demand  his  passports.2  These  points  were  stressed  again 
in  an  interview  which  the  Due  de  Gramont  had  with  Lord 
Lyons  later  in  the  day.  Prussia,  said  the  French  Minister, 
had  deliberately  insulted  France  by  declaring  to  the  public 
that  the  King  had  affronted  Count  Benedetti.  She  had 
shown  herself  eager  to  take  credit  with  the  people  of  Ger- 
many for  having  acted  with  haughtiness  and  discourtesy, 
and  had  seen  fit  to  telegraph  the  news  of  the  affront  to  the 
Prussian  agents  throughout  Europe.  The  matter  was  the 
more  provocative,  said  the  Duke,  since  the  French  Govern- 
ment was  aware  that  its  Minister  had  not  been  treated  with 
such  rough  discourtesy  as  Prussia  had  boasted.  It  was  the 
boast  and  not  the  episode  itself  which  was  the  "  gravamen 
of  the  offense."  It  constituted  an  insult  which  had  made 
it  impossible  for  France  further  to  avail  herself  of  the 
good  offices  of  Great  Britain.  He  expressed  the  hope  that 
that  Government  might  not  be  so  wedded  to  the  doctrine  of 
peace  as  to  refuse  sympathy  to  an  old  ally,  who  was  about 
to  commence  hostilities,  and  he  assured  Lord  Lyons  that,  in 

1  Ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  p.  39. 

2  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  15,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  36-37. 


65]  BRITISH  NEGOTIATIONS  65 

regard  to  Belgium  (ever  "England's  funny-bone"),  the 
French  Government  had  already  spontaneously  given  it  as- 
surance that  its  neutrality  would  be  regarded  as  a  funda- 
mental principle.1 

The  British  Ambassador  believed  that  no  diminution  of 
friendly  feeling  would  take  place  but  that,  at  the  same  time, 
chagrin  would  be  felt  that  France  had  not  contented  herself 
with  the  simple  withdrawal  of  the  pretensions  of  Prince 
Leopold.  One  further  effort  was  made  by  Lord  Granville 
even  at  this  eleventh  hour.  In  identic  notes  to  France  and 
Prussia  he  urged  those  countries  to  avail  themselves  of  the 
Twenty-third  Protocol  of  the  Conference  of  Paris  of  1856.2 
Its  provisions  were  recognized  as  offering  a  dignified  man- 
ner in  which  aggrieved  nations  might  submit  to  mediation 
those  questions  which,  otherwise,  would  lead  to  war.3  The 
Government  of  France  declined  to  resort  to  the  Protocol  on 
the  ground  that  the  difficulty  between  herself  and  Prussia 
was  one  involving  national  dignity  and  so  had  been  re- 
served from  its  provisions.*  The  Prussian  Government 
based  its  refusal  on  the  fact  that  since  France  had  taken  the 
initiative  in  the  direction  of  war,  it  would  be  unbecoming, 
and  even  impossible  because  of  the  national  excitement,  for 
Prussia  to  take  the  initiative  in  negotiating  for  peace.6 

The  appeal  to  the  Protocol  had  been,  indeed,  but 
formal.     The  events  of  the  thirteenth  of  July  had  success- 

1  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  15,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  39-40. 

'  Granville  to  Lyons,  July  15,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  p.  35.  On  July  17th 
Loftus,  in  compliance  with  instructions,  was  still  urging  the  Protocol 
at  Berlin. 

1  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  18,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  p.  64. 

*  Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  19,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  58. 

4  Bismarck  to  Loftus,  July  18,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  p.  68;  Loftus,  in 
a  despatch  of  the  same  date,  states  that  addresses  were  pouring  in  from 
all  parts  of  the  country  expressing  loyalty  to  the  King  and  a  readiness 
to  incur  any  sacrifice  for  the  honor  and  protection  of  the  country. 


66        BRITISH  POUCY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [66 

fully  nullified  any  efforts  at  mediation.  The  article  in  the 
North  Gentian  Gazette  and  the  publicity  given  it  by  Prussia 
had  convinced  France  that  it  was  the  intention  of  Bismarck 
to  make  the  "  family  matter"  a  pretext  for  belligerency. 

On  the  nineteenth  of  July,  the  French  Charge  d' Affaires 
at  Berlin  delivered  the  declaration  that  his  Government 
was  sure  the  Prussian  Chancellor  had  angled  for. 


CHAPTER  IV 
Responsibility  for  the  Declaration  of  War 

Diplomacy  is  somewhat  like  the  American  game  of  stud 
poker  where  one  card  is  always  held  back.  Even  for  those 
who  sit  in  at  the  green  table  there  is  an  element  of  uncer- 
tainty, but  for  those  who  watch  from  afar  there  i&  ev«« 
greater  certainty  of  uncertainty.  It  is  often  ludicrous  to 
hear  them  expending  their  efforts  at  wit  or  wisdom  in  pro- 
nouncing judgments  on  situations  which  they  totally  misap- 
prehend. The  candidature  of  Prince  Leopold  for  the  Span- 
ish throne,  made  known  by  Madrid  despatches  of  July  the 
third,  was  a  complete  surprise  in  London.  Both  Conservative 
and  Liberal  papers  condemned  the  secrecy  and  the  quixotic 
audacity  of  the  Spanish  negotiations  that  had  led  to  his 
selection  by  the  Cortes,  and  there  was  no  thought  of  blam- 
ing France  for  her  disinclination  to  see  herself  thorned  on 
either  side  by  a  Hohenzollern.  Berlin  despatches  in  an- 
nouncing the  Prince's  acceptance  of  the  offer,  made  bold 
to  report  the  nomination  as  being  regarded  favorably 
in  England.1  This  the  Times  at  once  denied.2  It  criticized, 
however,  the  imperious  tone  with  which  France  interposed 
in  the  petty  intrigue  of  princes.  It  was  an  American-cousin 
way  of  demanding  the  mustard  at  the  point  of  a  revolver.8 

For  the  most  part,  even  those  journals  that  thought 
French  interests  would  be  endangered  by  the  "  Jack-in-the- 

1  Quoted  in  Correspondence  du  Nord-Est. 
*  Times,  July  7,  1870. 
8  Ibid.,  July  12,  1870. 

6;]  57 


68        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [68 

Box  "  affair  believed  no  war  would  result.  "  Louis  Napo- 
leon," said  the  Daily  News,  discounting  the  "  fantastic  and 
passionate  lucubrations  "  of  the  independent  French  jour- 
nals, "  Louis  Napoleon,  no  doubt,  will  think  it  best  to  bow 
to  the  fait  accompli  and  make  the  best  of  it 1  ...  .  Even 
if  it  should  cause  a  civil  war  in  Spain,  it  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  disturb  the  peace  of  Europe."  3  Said  the  Man- 
chester Guardian, 

France  will  accept  the  election  and  Prussia  will  disclaim  any 
hostility  or  disrespect.  The  Emperor  would  prefer  a  Hohenzol- 
lern  to  the  Duke  of  Montpensier,  who  might  be  expected  to  aid 
Orleanist  intrigue,  and  as  for  the  French  people,  they  have  already 
endured,  with  a  bad  grace  indeed,  aggrandizements  of  Prussia 
upon  a  great  scale,  and  they  will  not  be  very  seriously  embittered 
by  the  thought  that  a  younger  branch  of  the  house  of  Hohenzol- 
lern  has  obtained  royalty  in  Spain.8 

The  London  Graphic  declared  French  interests  in  no  way 
threatened,  and,  contenting  itself  with  a  brief  mention  of 
the  affair,  expended  much  space  in  describing  the  camp 
being  held  at  Wimbledon,  and  discussing  Disraeli's  recently 
published  Lotlvair." 

When,  however,  the  candidacy  received  no  check  from  the 
clearly  expressed  disapproval  of  France,  it  began  to  be 
thought  that  Spain  must  have  had  some  assurance  of  Prus- 
sian support  to  show  herself  persistent.  The  Times  de-> 
clared  the  crux  of  the  question  to  be  the  share  Count  Bis- 
marck had  had  in  the  nomination  and  noted  that,  though  the 
Prussian  papers  were  in  tone  very  temperate,  they  forbore 
to  advise  their  Government  to  extinguish  the  affair  by  dis- 

1  Daily  News,  July  15,  1870. 
1  Ibid.,  July  6,  1870. 

*  Manchester  Guardian,  July  6,  1870. 

*  London  Graphic,  July  9,  1870. 


69]      RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  WAR        69 

suading  Prince  Leopold.1  The  Telegraph,  very  early  in  the 
controversy,  described  him  as  the  "  nominee  of  the  Count 
and  probably  his  obedient  servant." 2  The  Globe  and 
Traveller  urged  the  Prussian  Government  to  take  immediate 
steps  to  procure  the  rejection  of  the  Spanish  offer.3  And 
the  Spectator  avowed  that  since  General  Prim  was  no  fool 
he  must  have  known  how  his  project  would  be  regarded  in 
Paris  and  Berlin,  and  been  ready  to  resort  to  arms  if  neces- 
sary.4 It  was  an  Irish  paper  that  most  luxuriated  in  im- 
plicating and  imprecating  Prussia :  "  Prim  and  Bismarck 
have  tricked,  deceived,  and  outwitted  Napoleon,"  says  the 
Nation,  "  have  menaced,  defied,  and  humiliated  France."  8 

On  July  12,  a  week  after  the  affair  had  begun  to  arouse 
general  comment,  telegrams  reached  London  giving  news 
of  an  imperious  ultimatum  just  sent  by  France  to  Prussia. 
A  serious  panic  took  place  on  the  Stock  Exchange.  Some 
relief  was  felt  when,  that  afternoon,  news  was  received  of 
the  Prince's  withdrawal.  But  as  the  reports  from  France 
continued  to  be  discouraging,  fresh  excitement  set  in.'  This 
pocket-book  disaster  and  the  receipt  of  the  circular  sent  out 
by  Spain  disclaiming  any  responsibility  of  Prussia  in  her 
action,  induced  a  more  nervous  attitude  toward  the  affair. 
Its  base  was  seen  to  have  widened  and,  in  this,  France  was 
believed  to  be  the  offender.  From  then  on  the  tone  of  the 
press  became  less  sympathetic.  The  Times  urged  the  Em- 
peror to  consult  the  wishes  of  his  eight  million  subjects  be- 
fore he  allowed  himself  to  be  carried  away  by  the  clamorous 

1  Times,  July  12,  1870. 

*  Daily  Telegraph,  July  7,  1870. 

1  Globe  and  Traveller,  July  8,  1870. 

*  Spectator,  July  9,  1870. 

5  Nation  (Belfast),  July  9,  1870. 

6  Telegraph,  July  12,  1870. 


j0        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [y0 

politicians  of  the  boulevards,1  The  Standard,  heretofore 
very  sensitive  to  the  French  view  of  the  matter,  suspected 
that  the  rumoured  ultimatum  concerned  itself  with  even 
more  than  the  immediate  question.2  And  the  Telegraph, 
also  reckoned  as  a  partisan  of  France,  chronicled  the  gossip 
as  to  the  Prince's  withdrawal  on  the  fourteenth  with  the 
fear  that,  were  it  true,  only  a  temporary  suspension  of  the 
convulsion  would  be  effected.  Small  wonder  that  the  Siecle 
took  alarm  at  the  uneasy  tone  of  the  British  press  and  urged 
the  French  Government  to  moderation.5 

While  the  London  papers  thus  expressed  alarm,  their 
Paris  correspondents  were  preparing  despatches  that  would 
have  gone  far  to  steady  confidence.  Rumours  of  the 
episode  at  Ems — the  "  garden  scene,"  as  some  one  later  dub- 
bed it, — followed  so  hot  upon  the  news  of  the  Prince's  renun- 
ciation that,  in  some  cases,  the  pacific  despatches  were 
never  sent.  In  instances  where  they  were  transmitted  and 
given  credence  by  London  editors,  there  occurred  the  pheno- 
menon of  British  papers  appearing  with  tidings  of  peace 
after  the  French  Chambers  had  already  given  their  decision 
for  war.  It  was  like  a  rainbow  seen  dimly  through  a  blind- 
ing storm.  The  correspondent  of  the  London  Graphic 
wrote,  on  the  thirteenth,  that  in  Paris  funds  had  gone  up, 
and  the  general  opinion  was  in  favour  of  peace.  In  the 
same  envelope  he  enfolded  another  dispatch  saying  that 
even  as  he  wrote  thus  hopefully  there  was  taking  place  in  the 
Kursaal  that  famous  interview,  the  report  of  which  roused 
the  Parisians  to  fury.  The  laconic  telegram  from  Ems 
(which  England  was  not  to  know  for  years  had  been 
maliciously  edited  by  Bismarck)    appeared   in  the  North 

1  Times,  July  13,  1870. 
8  Standard,  July  13,  1870. 

*  Times,  July  15,   1870  (letter  from  Paris  Correspondent,  dated  July 
14). 


7I]      RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  WAR        yi 

German  Gazette  on  the  morning  of  the  fourteenth,  and  was 
at  once  sent  by  the  Reuter  Agency  to  London.  At  the  same 
time  there  came  from  Berlin  correspondents  news  of  the 
massed  crowds  that  assembled  in  front  of  the  palace  to  cheer 
their  ruler  and  beg  that  he  lead  them  to  the  Rhine.1 

Editorial  comment  fully  approved  the  indignation  of  the 
Prussians.     The  Times  declared  that  it  could  no  longer  be 
doubted  that  it  was  the  fault  of  the  French  that  further  nego- 
tiations were  almost  impossible,  that  nothing  could  justify 
the  deliberate  provocation  with  which  the  discourtesy  of 
Spain  had  been  fastened  upon  Prussia.2     The  Daily  Tele- 
graph blamed  France  for  having  spoken  "  the   fatal  last 
word  that  precedes  a  conflict  of  which  none  can  estimate 
the  results."     It  believed  that  the  Envoy's  intrusion  on  the 
royal  promenade  had  not  been  without  malice  prepense. 
However,  consideration  was  given  to  the  singular  prompt- 
ness with  which  the  King  resented  the  rudeness,  and  the 
immediate  publicity  his  Government  had  given  the  incident. 
Conviction  that  France  was  wholly  to  blame  for  the  unfor- 
tunate termination  of  the  quarrel  was  weakened  by  reports 
from  French  sources  that  a  circular  had  been  sent  to  Prus- 
sian representatives  abroad,  which  confirmed  the  affront  of- 
fered to  M.  Benedetti,  and  declared  the  King  to  have  re- 
stored   to    Prince    Leopold   the    liberty    of    accepting   the 
Spanish  crown.     The  issuing  of  such  statements  after  M. 
Ollivier's  organ,  the  Constitutionnel,  had  recorded  the  accep- 
tance of  the  withdrawal,  the  Telegraph  believed,  made  Prus- 
sia culpable  with  France.3   The  rumoured  circular,  however, 
received  no  general  comment  in  the  English  press.    Another 
of  the  papers,  that,  like  the  Telegraph,  condemned  France 
with  manifest  reluctance  was  the  Tory  Globe.     For  while 

1  Times,  July  15,  1870. 

*  Ibid.,  July  15,  1870. 

8  Telegraph,  July  16,  1870. 


72        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [y2 

admitting  that,  "  if  the  accounts  have  not  been  exaggerated, 
it  is  impossible  in  the  interests  of  truth  and  justice  to  say 
that  war  has  not  been  provoked  by  the  French  Govern- 
ment," it  warned  its  readers  that  Prussian  conduct  in  times 
past  had  been  equally  precipitate  and  extravagant. 

The  morning  that  chronicled  the  momentous  breach  of 
etiquette  at  Ems  heralded  a  day  rife  with  rumours  of  the 
mounting  excitement  at  Paris  and  Berlin.  The  later  papers 
carried  the  news  of  the  French  Government's  declaration  to 
the  Chambers  which  practically  removed  all  hope  of  peace. 
That  afternoon,  Disraeli,  rising  in  a  hushed  and  breathless 
House  of  Commons,  inquired  of  the  Prime  Minister 
whether  or  not  the  news  the  members  had  just  been  so 
anxiously  reading  were  true,  whether  war  had  been  made 
inevitable.  Gladstone  could  give  no  further  reassurance 
than  that  negotiations  were  not  yet  broken  off.  It  must 
have  been  an  uncomfortable  session  for  the  Prime  Minister. 
No  one  more  than  he  enjoyed  the  attitude  of  righteous  con- 
demnation and  could  so  revel  in  the  prolix  splendour  of  in- 
dignation. It  must  have  been  galling  to  sit  fettered  by  the 
chains  of  office  and  hear  the  Disraelian  thunder  against  the 
French  monarch  who  so  wantonly  disturbed  the  peace  of 
Europe  because  he  believed  his  own  armament  to  be  in  better 
condition  than  his  neighbour's,  the  description  of  the  virtu- 
ous, enlightened  age,  which  such  impious  levity  flouted,  and 
the  sonorous  prophecy  that  this  sovereign  would  be  punished 
by  a  more  powerful  force  than  any  military  army, — "  the 
outraged  opinion  of  an  enlightened  world."  Gladstone 
could  only  assume  an  attitude  of  f  orebearance  and  give  brief 
assurance  that  the  Government  had  made  efforts  at  media- 
tion and  in  this  last  extremity  had  appealed  to  the  Protocol 
of  1856.1 

'Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  series,  vol.  cciii,  pp.  346-347; 
Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  vol.  ii,  p.  335 ;  Hunt  and  Poole,  Political 
History  of  England,  p.  262. 


73 ]      RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  WAR        73 

When  the  Prime  Minister  and  his  doughty  opponent  had 
seated  themselves,  the  impression  prevailed  that  both  were 
of  the  opinion  that  Napoleon  should  be,  in  some  way,  casti- 
gated, but  that,  whereas  the  one  had  done  no  more  than  try 
to  reason  with  him  and  finally  urge  that  he  submit  his  quar- 
rel to  more  temperate  heads,  the  other  was  crtain  that,  had 
he  been  in  office,  something — no  one  knew  exactly  what — 
but  something  much  more  effective  would  have  been  done 
about  it.  In  justice  to  France  and  the  attitude  of  neutrality 
the  Government  had  decided  on,  it  would  seem  that  Glad- 
stone should  have  given  some  brief  account  of  the  progress 
of  the  negotiations  that  had  been  so  assiduously  and  even 
so  hopefully  continued  up  to  this  time  by  the  French  and 
the  British.  It  may  have  been  that  his  extreme  reticence 
was  due  to  the  impression  made  on  him  by  the  German  ac- 
counts of  the  bearding  of  the  aged  King  at  Ems.  Cer- 
tainly, his  appreciation  of  French  claims  appears  to  have 
been  dulled  to  extinction.  Granville,  in  his  reply  to  in- 
terrogations in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  same  subject, 
was  no  more  communicative.1  So  late  as  the  twenty-first, 
when  the  Government  was  still  withholding  information  as 
to  the  negotiations,  the  Globe  commented  on  its  action  as 
"  a  mystery  most  profound,"  and  urged  that  the  facts  be 
laid  before  the  public  without  further  delay. 

But  irrespective  of  paucity  or  authenticity  of  inform- 
ation, the  Fourth  Estate  adjured  the  restraint  of  the  Lords 
and  Commons  and  was  clamorous  in  its  criticism  of  France 
and  profuse  in  its  speculations  as  to  the  causes  of  her  in- 
iquity. It  was  a  finer  thing  to  read  the  papers  than  to  at- 
tend the  sessions.  For  a  few  days  it  seemed  the  Times 
was  reviving  its  old  title  of  the  "Thunderer."  Vide  the 
leader  of  the  sixteenth :  "  The  greatest  national  crime  that 
we  have  had  the  pain  of  recording  in  these  columns  since  the 

1  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciii,  p.  35. 


74        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [74 

days  of  the  First  French  Empire  has  been  consummated. 
War  is  declared — an  unjust  but  premeditated  war.  This 
dire  calamity,  which  overwhelms  Europe  with  dismay,  is, 
it  is  now  too  clear,  the  act  of  one  man  in  France.  It  is  the 
ultimate  result  of  personal  rule."  The  Times  itself,  how- 
ever, was  not  so  dismayed  that  it  could  not  see  the  ultimate 
end  of  the  war  to  be  the  conquest  by  France  of  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine,  or  the  acquisition  by  Prussia  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  and  that  the  failure  of  Napoleon's  dynastic  ambi- 
tions would  result  should  the  latter  take  place. 

The  Economist,  immensely  perturbed  at  the  heavy  fall  in 
all  description  of  securities,  characterized  the  French  decla- 
ration of  war  as  "  one  of  those  awful  events  which  brings 
comment  to  a  stand,"  and,  then,  straightway  disproved  its 
own  judgment  by  a  lengthy  description  of  the  French  greed 
for  prestige  and  the  Emperor's  ambition  that  had  directed 
Count  Benedetti  "  to  ask  for  more."  l  The  Spectator, 
showing  the  same  vehement  detestation  of  Napoleon  which 
distinguished  the  Times,  bewailed  the  fact  that  "  Europe 
must  pass  through  a  year,  perhaps  years  of  misery,  in  order 
that  one  single  man  may  secure  the  career  and  position  of 
one  single  child."  It  believed  it  to  have  been  the  recent 
adverse  vote  of  a  minority  of  the  soldiery  that  induced 
Napoleon,  "  by  a  series  of  insults  almost  without  precedent 
in  diplomacy,"  to  force  Germany  to  war.2  The  Pall  Mall 
Gazette  and  the  Manchester  Guardian  3  both  ironically  con- 
gratulated Napoleon  for  the  modus  operandi  with  which  he 
had  brought  Prussia  to  agree  to  a  foregone  decision.  The 
Daily  News  with  a  sententiousness  equal  to  the  Times,  de- 
clared that  in  the  court  of  history  the  action  of  France  would 
be  rated  as  a  crime — a  crime  against  civilization,  against 

1  Economist,  July  16,  1870. 
*  Spectator,  July  16,  1870. 
'Issues  of  July  16,  1870. 


7e]      RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  WAR        75 

humanity,  as  well  as  against  the  peace  and  good  order  of 
the  world.1  The  Weekly  Scotsman,  not  to  be  outdone  in 
indignation  by  its  English  contemporaries,  but  somewhat 
muddled  as  to  the  facts,  delivered  a  scathing  sermon  on 
this  "  war  for  the  sake  of  war  "  brought  on  after  "  the  pro- 
posal of  a  proposal  was  withdrawn  by  those  having  national 
authority  over  the  proposed  to  be  proposed  Prince."  : 

The  amount  of  violent  abuse  in  both  the  Liberal  and  Con- 
servative journals  of  the  British  press,  and  more  especially 
that  in  the  Times,  which  was  regarded  as,  in  some  manner, 
inspired  by  the  Government,  greatly  irritated  the  French. 
Had  they  wished,  they  could  have  pointed  to  the  fact  that 
even  on  the  sixteenth  when  British  condemnation  was  at  its 
hottest,  the  reports  of  correspondents  writing  from  Paris  had 
induced  several  papers  to  discount  later  tidings  and  believe 
the  war  cloud  to  have  passed.  The  Illustrated  London  News 
of  the  sixteenth  dared  to  rejoice,  though  timorously,   at 
the  "  unexpectedly  pacific  tone  which  the  affair  of  the  week 
has  happily  taken."     The  Examiner  recorded  the  fact  that 
Prussia  had  thought  it  prudent  to  give  way  and  hoped  things 
would  stay  as  they  were  and  the  King  of  three  hundred 
legions  not  change  his  mind,  nor  the  heir  of  the  conqueror 
of  Jena  take  a  fancy  to  avenge  Leipsic.3     The  slow-moving 
Queen,  on  the  same  date,  expressed  belief  that  the  resigna- 
tion of  the  Prince's  candidature  would  be  the  means  of 
averting  war — "  at  least  on  the  present  issue ; "  and  the 
priestly    Tablet,   with   like   reservations   as   to   the   future 
lengths  to  which  France  might  be  driven  by  her  desire  to 
see  Prussia  eat  humble  pie,  hoped  that  "  the  danger  of  war, 
which  overhung  Europe  for  the  last  week,  is  for  a  time  dis- 
pelled." 

1  Daily  News,  July  16,  1870. 

*  Weekly  Scotsman  and  Caledonian  Mercury,  July  22,  1870. 

*  Examiner  and  London  Review,  July  16,  1870. 


76        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [76 

Between  the  extremes  of  denunciation  against  France  for 
having  occasioned  the  war  and  these  misinformed  pratings 
of  the  difficulty's  pacific  solution,  were  those  papers  that, 
acknowledging  war's  advent,  still  forbore  to  lay  its  blame 
on  France,  and  in  some  case  showed  a  willingness  wholly 
to  exonerate  her.  M.  de  Lesseps,  at  this  time  visiting  Eng- 
land on  the  invitation  of  the  Liverpool  merchants,  may  have 
found  congenial  reading  in  the  Court  Journal,  that,  basing1 
its  argument  on  Berlin  accounts  of  the  King's  affront  to  M. 
Benedetti  and  the  restoration  to  Leopold  of  freedom  of 
action  in  the  Spanish  affair,  asserted  that  the  declaration  of 
war  came  from  the  ruler  of  Prussia  and  thei  offense  was  his.1 
The  Northern  Whig  may  have  rejoiced  the  distinguished 
visitor  with  its  appreciation  of  Napoleon's  friendship  for 
England  and  its  doubts  as  to  British  comfort,  should  Europe 
fall  under  the  domination  of  Bismarck-ruled  Prussia.2 

But  for  truly  soul-satisfying  endorsement  M.  de  Lesseps 
should  have  shipped  himself  to  John  Bull's  other  island. 
Certainly  nowhere  could  there  have  been  found  on  July  the 
sixteenth  anyone  more  French  than  an  Irishman.  The 
Weekly  Freeman  commended  the  bold  Minister,  who  looked 
facts  squarely  in  the  eye  and  delivered  his  ultimatum  to  a 
King,  who  with  his  Chancellor,  was  "  privy  to  every  step  of 
the  negotiations  with  Prim."  The  Nation  flouted  the 
British  papers  for  their  mischievous  abuse  of  France  and 
urged,  with  a  logic  that  only  an  Irishman  could  follow,  that 
this  was  preeminently  a  time  for  the  "  repeal  of  the  Union." 
Only  Saunders',  a  Protestant  parjer  largely  without  honour 
in  its  own  country,  blamed  Napoleon  for  this  fresh  proof  of 
his  country's  enslavement  to  military  glory  and  his  own  will- 
ingness to  upset  the  balance  of  power  to  give  ambition  scope.* 

1  Court  Journal  and  Fashionable  Gazette,  July  16,  1870. 

1  Northern  Whig,  July  19,  1870. 

3  Saunders's  News-letter  and  Daily  Advertiser,  Dublin,  July  16,   1870. 


77]      RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  WAR        jj 

The  hearty  approval  with  which  the  Irish  press  greeted  the 
decision  for  war  gathered  momentum  from  each  groan  of 
censure  from  the  Times  and  News.  Did  the  British  papers 
denounce  M.  Rouher's  indiscreet  avowal  that  Napoleon  had 
occupied  four  waiting  years  in  the  perfecting  of  armament 
and  the  organization  of  his  country,  the  Irish  papers  re- 
joiced that  he  must,  then,  be  in  excellent  fighting  trim.  Did 
the  British  express  amazement  at  M.  Ollivier's  announce- 
ment that  he  entered  upon  the  war  with  a  light  heart,  the 
Irish  applauded  a  blithe  spirit  so  like  their  own. 

As  the  Spectator  put  it,  in  commenting  on  this  ebullient 
sympathy  which  other  journals  were  deriding:  "What  with 
his  Catholicism,  his  Celtic  blood,  and  history,  the  genuine 
Irishman  feels  himself  a  younger  brother  of  the  Frenchman 
and  intrinsically  detests  the  sceptical,  rigid,  and  unsympa- 
thetic Teuton."  1  It  must  be  confessed  that,  for  the  most 
part,  there  was  little  demand  for  analysis  of  diplomatic 
documents  or  circumstantial  details  by  the  men  of  the  sham- 
rock. But  there  was  a  sincerity  and  abandon  about  their 
sympathy  that  was  infectious.  As  John  Mitchel  put  it, 
"  Everybody  is  taking  part  in  the  general  struggle :  We  take 
part  instantly,  frankly,  and  zealously — for  France."2 

On  the  evening  of  the  nineteenth,  partly  as  a  demonstra- 
tion against  the  alleged  false  representations  of  British 
opinion  issuing  hourly  from  the  London  press,  the  Irish  of 
Dublin,  to  the  number  of  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand,  as- 
sembled in  front  of  the  French  Consulate.  The  police  were 
competent  to  testify  that  there  was  nothing  laboured  or  arti- 
ficial about  this  demonstration.  There  were  some  ten  or  a 
dozen  bands  which  alternated  the  Marseillaise  with  Irish 
melodies.     There  was  a  fight  with  the  police  over  a  French 

1  Spectator,  July  23,  1870. 

'John  Mitchel,  Ireland,  France,  and  Prussia  (Dublin,  1918),  editorial 
from  the  Irish  Citizen. 


78        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [78 

tricolour  that  had  been  wreathed  with  strips  of  green  and 
orange;  there  were  speeches  that  recalled  the  glorious  ex- 
ploits of  the  Sarsfield  Brigade  and  the  deeds  of  German  hire- 
lings in  Ireland  in  '98,  and  ended  by  assuring  France  that 
if  she  gave  the  word  thousands  of  Irish  would  come  to  her 
aid, — each  very  eager  to  kill  his  Hessian.  The  crowds, 
then,  peacefully  dispersed  with  the  pleasant  confidence  that 
they  had  heartened  all  of  France  and  had  displeased  the 
Protestant  editor  of  Saunders' } 

It  made  scant  difference  to  them  that  in  London  that 
night  the  printers  were  setting  up  the  Queen's  proclamation 
of  neutrality.  Its  publication  was  the  signal  for  the  Times 
dutifully  to  moderate  its  tone.  The  Thunderer  declared 
with  virtuous  rectitude,  that  war  being  now  inevitable  and 
the  primary  dispute  a  matter  of  history,  its  editorial  policy 
so  far  as  duty  allowed  would  be  neutral.  In  an  effort 
at  retrospective  justice,  its  editorials  for  the  twentieth 
mentioned  the  existence  of  a  plot  between  Bismarck  and 
Prim  simultaneously  to  attack  France  north  and  south, 
which,  it  hazarded,  might  have  been  the  cause  of  Benedetti's 
insistence.  A  new  version  of  the  Ems  episode  stated  that  the 
envoy  "  happened  "  to  meet  the  King  in  the  Kursaal  Gar- 
dens, and  that  the  King,  himself,  began  the  interview  by 
placing  in  Benedetti's  hands  a  newspaper  account  of  Leo- 
pold's renunciation.  On  another  page  its  Paris  correspon- 
dent reported  that  Ollivier  was  actually  drawing  up  a  pacific 
statement  to  the  Chambers  when  he  received  the  Prussian 
account  of  the  famous  interview. 

But  an  impression  intensely  condemnatory  of  France 
could  not  materially  be  modified  by  these  tardy  addenda. 
The  press,  for  the  most  part,  refused  to  wriggle  into  the 

'Alfred  Duquet,  Ireland  and  France  (Dublin,  1916),  intro.,  pp.  xi- 
xiii;  Nation,  July  23,  1870;  Tablet,  July  23,  1870;  Saunders's,  July  25, 
1870. 


79]      RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  WAR         79 

strait  jacket  of  neutrality  and  its  tone  continued  to  sicken 
men  like  George  Meredith,  who  laid  small  stress  on  the 
princely  peccadillo  that  initiated  a  struggle  which  was  now  to 
be  regarded  as  one  between  two  nations.1     The  German 
residents  of  London  in  public  meeting  assembled  did  no 
more  than  an  act  of  justice  when,  a  day  after  the  proclama- 
tion of  neutrality,  they  thanked  the  English  press  for  the 
almost  unanimous  sympathy  it  was  affording  Prussia.2     It 
miffht  be  that  Mr.  Brooks  would  deliver  no  more  sermons  in 
St.  James'  Chapel  praising  King  William  and  his  nation,3 
and  that  the  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  had  set  about  com- 
posing a  "strictly  neutral  and  heartily  pacific"  prayer;4 
but,  as  the  Spectator  frankly  acknowledged,  the  English 
middle  class  was  dead  against  the  Emperor,  and  the  only 
true  neutral  was  the  working  man,  who  branded  Napoleon  a 
fiend,  and  William  of   Prussia,   a   fool.5     It  was  because 
England  was  essentially  not  neutral  in  her   feelings  that 
officials  made  such  a  grandiose  parade  of  her  neutrality,  with 
something  of  the  notion,  perhaps,  that  a  double  negative 
would  obscure  an  affirmative.     Chambers  of  Commerce  in 
large  cities  hastened  to  pass  resolutions  commending  a  rig- 
orous silence  as  to  the  merits  of  the  quarrel,  and  a  member 
of  Parliament  rose  in  his  place  to  warn  journalists  against 
making  excursions  outside  the  neutral  pale.6     The  British 
Government  consented  to  take  over  the  care  of  French  in- 

1  George  Meredith,  Letters  of  (N.  Y.,  1912),  vol.  i,  pp.  208-211,  cor- 
respondence with  his  son  and  John  Morley. 

1  Times,  July  21. 

1  This  sermon  of  the  Rev.  Stopford  Brooks  was  criticized  by  Saun- 
ders's,  July  25,  1870. 

*  Doubt  of  the  puissance  of  Prussian  amis  made  it  difficult  for  the 
British  to  use  this  prayer,  since  it  asked  the  Almighty  to  inspire  the 
vanquished  with  submission.    Spectator,  Aug.  13,  1870. 

5  Ibid.,  July  23,  1870. 

*  Fortnightly  Review,  "  France  and  Germany,"  vol.  xiv,  pp.  36-37. 


80       BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR        [80 

terests  in  Germany  and  received  appropriate  thanks,1  but  the 
French  were  aware  of  the  British  attitude  and  impatient  of 
it.  A  caricature  map  of  Europe,  very  popular  in  Paris, 
figured  England  as  a  fussy,  nervous  old  lady,  turning  her 
back  on  Europe  in  a  nutter  of  alarm,  shocked  and  grieved 
at  her  neghbours  having  fallen  to  blows.  A  breeze  from 
across  the  Channel  blows  the  poor  dame's  petticoats  through 
her  legs,  and  almost  lifts  her  off  her  feet,  while  she  struggles 
with  her  bonnet  and  an  enormous  umbrella.2 

France  was  desirous  to  attract  dame  England's  attention 
to  other  difficulties  than  these  of  her  own.  To  fill,  in  some 
manner,  the  gap  occasioned  by  the  Government's  withhold- 
ing of  the  official  documents,  the  Comte  de  Gramont  sent  to 
neutral  England  on  the  twenty-first  a  circular  explanatory 
of  the  French  course  of  action.  The  circular  referred  to 
assurances  given  a  year  before  by  the  Prussian  Under  Secre- 
tary, von  Thile,  that  Leopold  would  never  seriously  become 
a  candidate  for  the  Spanish  throne,  and  to  the  Emperor's 
impression  that,  irrespective  of  this,  negotiations  to  that 
end  had  for  some  time  been  carried  on  under  Bismarck's 
direction.  In  discussing  the  much  mooted  encounter  on 
the  Kursaal  promenade,  it  declared  that  the  King  was  ad- 
dressed only  because  Bismarck  had  made  himself  inacces- 
sible. The  Prussian  answer  to  the  circular  evaded  de- 
tails, confining  itself  to  a  dignified  denial  that  the  candidacy 
had  been  discussed  by  Prussian  officials  and  Benedetti 
after  they  had  become  aware  of  the  Spanish  offer. 
This,  as  the  Standard  and  the  Morning  Post  pointed  out, 
was  in  no  way  a  refutation  of  Benedetti's  statement  as 
to  what  had  happened  in  1869.  At  that  time,  the  papers" 
said,  the  crown  had  not  been  formally  offered  but  assurances 

1  Granville  to  Lyons,  July  21,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxx,  pp. 
68-60. 
1  Described  in  Saturday  Reinetv  of  May  27,  1871. 


8!]      RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  WAR        8 1 

had  been  given  that  would  preclude  such  an  eventuality. 
These  had  not  been  observed,  since  by  the  King's  admission, 
the  candidacy  had  received  royal  consent  after  consultation 
with  Bismarck.1 

The  circular  had  no  very  apparent  influence  on  British 
opinion.     The  Kinglake  Napoleon,  which  to  most  Islanders 
was  the  true  one,  was  not  a  man  to  have  been  outplayed  in 
diplomacy  by  a  rough  Prussian,  who,  it  was  thought,  knew 
little  but  the  berserker  methods  of  blood  and  iron.     As  the 
Globe  complained,2  the  press  continued  its  onesided  policy 
in  regard  to  the  war,  printing  much  nonsense  in  support 
thereof.     Napoleon,  it  was  declared,  like  Alexander,  had 
been   jealous   that    there   might   appear   two   suns    in   the 
heavens.3    The  fifty  thousand  "  noes  "  of  the  army  in  the  re- 
cent plebiscite  had  set  him  on  the  quest  for  Prussian  blood, 
and  with  a  fe,  fi,  fo,  fum  he  had  smelled  it  in  this  affair  of 
the    Hohenzollern    princeling.     The    impression    remained 
that,  as  the  Saturday  Review  phrased  it.  Napoleon,  on  the 
slenderest  provocation,  had  committed  one  of  the  greatest 
of  crimes,*  and  that  France  had  disgraced  herself  by  sub- 
mitting   to    the    will    of    this    "  wretched    man."     Papers 
like  the  Morning  Advertiser  and  the  canny  Scotsman,  that 
reviewed  Prussia's  conduct  toward  Denmark  and  Austria 
unfavorably,  regretted  that,  were  she  punished  for  past  of- 
fenses, it  must  be  at  the  hands  of  an  impious  adversary.5    A 
respectable  minority,  comprising  the  Standard,  the  Globe, 
the  widely  read  Telegraph,  the  Tablet,  Lloyd's  Weekly,  and 
News  of  the  World,  could  only  buffet  hopelessly  against  the 
tide. 

1  Issues  of  July  25,  1870. 
1  Globe  of  July  25,  1870. 
3  Illustrated  London  News,  July  23,  1870. 

*  Saturday  Reviezv,  July  23,  1870. 

*  Issues  of  July  23,  1870. 


82        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [82 

It  has  been  said  with  reason  that  if  a  lie  be  allowed 
twenty-four  hours  start  nothing  can  catch  it.  It  is  not 
surprising,  then,  that  when  the  official  correspondence  was 
laid  before  Parliament,  almost  a  fortnight  after  the  Ems 
episode,  it  had  scarcely  more  influence  than  the  Gramont 
circular,  and,  indeed,  by  many  of  the  journals  was  com- 
pletely ignored.  Events  of  the  week  before  last  could  not 
compete  in  interest  with  other  very  startling  news,  which 
we  shall  see  was  astutely  laid  before  the  public  on  the  day 
before  the  documents  were  made  available.  It  is  doubtful, 
even,  whether  members  of  Parliament  occupied  themselves 
very  much  with  despatches  that  ten  days  before  would  have 
had  a  very  vivid  interest.  Earl  Russell  was  certainly 
drawing  his  information  from  other  sources  when  he  laid 
himself  open  to  the  Earb  of  Malmesbury's  correction  by 
asserting  that  Benedetti  had  declined  discussion  with  Bis- 
marck and  insisted  on  dealing  directly  with  the  King.1 
Lord  Granville,  in  acknowledging  that  much  turned  on  the 
misreading  of  the  Ems  incident,  rigorously  forebore  to  in- 
timate by  which  side  the  misreading  had  been  contrived.2 
Documents  that  in  a  court  of  law  could  not  but  have  proven 
valuable  to  French  interests  received  substantially  no 
analysis  by  the  leaders  of  Parliament. 

Nor  was  the  public  more  discriminating.  It  was  equally 
pleased  with  Charles  Lever,  who  described  Napoleon  as  a 
second  Sir  Lucien  O'Trigger,3  and  with  Mrs.  Malaprop,  who 
misquoted  Lever  and  called  the  Emperor  Sir  Lucien  In- 
triguer. Lord  Lyons  complained  to  Granville  of  a  dis- 
position on  the  part  of  the  public  to  "  attribute  everything 
to  deep  laid  plots  and  schemes,"  which  induced  them  to 

1  Session  of  July  28,  1870,  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciii,  p.  1061. 

*  Session  of  July  28,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  cciii,  p.  1054. 

8  Lever,  O'Dozvd  Papers,  Blacktuood's,  Sept.,  1870,  vol.  cviii,  p.  360. 


83]       RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  WAR        83 

suppose  the  war  a  foregone  conclusion.  This,  he  was  sure, 
was  not  true  in  the  case  of  France.  Even  at  the  last 
moment,  he  claimed,  she  would  have  left  the  door  open  to  the 
mediation  of  a  congress,  had  it  not  been  for  the  appearance 
of  the  momentous  article  in  the  North  German  Gazette.1 
The  press  verdict  on  the  Official  Correspondence  was  that 
Granville  had  played  a  role  eminently  dignified  but  some- 
what useless.  French  partisans  blamed  his  severity,  when 
after  the  dubious  withdrawal  of  the  Prince,  he  had  charged 
the  French  Government  with  the  "  tremendous  respon- 
sibility of  insisting  on  a  mere  point  of  form." 2  They 
pointed  to  Bismarck's  unrebuked  refusal  to  submit  to  the 
King,  Granville's  memorandum  to  Bernstroff,  which  had 
aimed  at  effecting  a  settlement  injurious  to  the  dignity  of 
neither  country.3 

The  French  Journal  Ofhciel  of  July  the  thirty-first  gave 
the  close  analysis  of  the  British  Blue  Book  that  the  London 
papers  omitted,  and  urged  that,  should  its  interpretation  be 
considered  biased,  the  doubter  should  resort  to  the  docu- 
ments themselves.4  It  cannot  be  believed  that  this  advice 
caused  the  pages  to  be  ruffled  very  considerably.  Even  the 
leisurely  contributors  to  the  magazines  were  offenders  on 
the  score  of  heedlessness.  There  occurs  no  newspaper 
article  so  absolutely  contemptuous  of  the  facts  set  forth  in 
the  Blue  Book  as  a  discussion  appearing  in  Fraser's  for 
August,  which  denied  that  the  war  was  preceded  by  "  any 
correspondence,  demands,  or  ultimatum,"  whatsoever.5     In 

1  Lyons  to  Granville,  July  31,  1870. 
1  Daily  Telegraph,  July  28,  1870. 

*  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  July  28,  1870;  Manchester  Guardian,  July  28,  1870. 
4  Translation  of  extracts  from  Journal  Ofhciel,  Brit.  State  Papers  for 

1870,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  59-61. 

*  Fraser's  New  Series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  266  et  seq.,  "The  Causes  of  the 
War." 


84       BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR        [84 

Blackwood's  Magazine  for  the  next  month,  Charles  Lever 
hits  off  ludicrously  the  persistent  belief  in  French  intrigue 
by  a  dialogue  between  Napoleon  and  his  Foreign  Minister. 

"  Better  than  all  that,"  whispered  M.  de  Gramont.  "  There's  a 
forty-ninth  cousin  of  the  King  wishes  to  be  King  of  Spain.  Prim 
told  it  to  a  lady  who  knows  the  Prince  Carlo  de  Bourbon,  who 
told  it  to  the  Duke  of  Lucca,  who  told  it  to  me." 

"  Admirable,  nothing  could  be  better,"  muttered  his  Majesty, 
and  between  his  teeth,  went  on,  "  honour  of  France,  integrity  of 
our  Empire,  inordinate  ambition,  and  throne  of  Charles  V !  I'd 
like  to  see  an  English  dispatch  reply  to  that !"  * 

It  was  not  until  the  war  was  well  lost  by  the  Emperor,  and 
Paris  was  besieged,  that  it  began  to  be  believed  that  the 
whispering  and  muttering  might  have  been  on  the  Prussian 
side.  The  Times,  on  the  last  day  of  December,  speaks  of 
the  candidature  as  a  pretext  which  had  been  for  some  time 
kept  in  reserve,  perhaps  with  the  malicious  connivance  of 
the  North  German  Chancellor.  The  annual  supplement  to 
the  Gentleman's  Magazine,  published  also  in  December, 
gives  a  fairly  comprehensive  history  of  the  affair  on  the 
Spanish  side,  mentioning  Seiior  Ranees'  visit  to  Berlin  in 
March  of  1869  and  his  interview  with  Bismarck;  the  subse- 
quent assurance  given  by  von  Thile  to  Benedetti  in  the  same 
month;  the  Dusseldorf  negotiations  of  Sefior  Salazar  with 
Prince  Leopold  in  February  of  1870,  and  the  Spaniard's  dis- 
creet admission  that  Prussia  had  not  interfered  with  the 
affair.  The  reviewer  hazards  the  conjecture  that,  though 
history  was  not  explicit  on  the  spring  and  summer  negotia- 
tions of  1870,  "hardly  anything  less  than  the  consciousness 
that  the  army  of  the  North  German  Confederation  was  on  his 
side,  could  have  sustained  General  Prim  in  the  daring  posi- 
tion he  persisted  in  when  he  maintained  his  advocacy  of 
Prince  Leopold,  in  spite  of  French  objections."     He  be- 

1  O'Dowd  Papers,  Blackwood's,  vol.  cviii,  p.  353. 


85]      RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  WAR        85 

lieved  that  Bismarck  knew  both  of  the  offer  and  its  accep- 
tance, though  the  King  was  wilfully  left  in  ignorance.1 

Even  to  this  day  the  affair  wears  still  its  cloak  of 
mystery.  Bernhardi's  memoirs  significantly  omit  the  in- 
teresting chapter  that  should  have  dealt  with  the  secret  mis- 
sion he  undertook  to  Spain  at  Bismarck's  behest,  and  the 
memoirs  of  Bismarck,  Moltke,  and  Roon  are  no  more  com- 
municative on  the  subject.  Lord  Acton,  who,  it  is  said, 
knew  the  banker  through  whom  the  transaction  was  effected, 
is  authority  for  the  statement  that  a  large  sum  of  Prussian 
bonds  were  transferred  to  Madrid  while  the  Cortes  was  dis- 
cussing the  question  of  the  Spanish  succession.2 

As  to  the  "  gravamen  of  the  offence," — the  inflammatory 
version  of  the  telegram  from  Ems  and  its  immediate  pub- 
lication,— Bismarck,  himself,  has  long  since  admitted — 
even  boasted — that  by  clever  excisions  of  the  King's  des- 
patch he  had  converted,  as  Moltke  put  it,  a  summons  to  a 
parley  into  a  fanfare,  and  by  the  personally  conducted  and 
widespread  publicity  given  the  edited  telegram  had  waved  a 
"red  flag  before  the  Gallic  bull."  But  his  admission  was 
reserved  for  the  nineties.  Nor  did  the  French  Minister 
publish  his  version  of  the  affair  in  time  to  influence  British 
opinion  during  the  conduct  of  the  war.a 

Something  of  direct  connivance,  however,  was  sus- 
pected in  England  after  Prussia's  victories  had  proven  her 
preparedness.  David  Urquhart  and  more  than  one  of  his 
followers,  writing  in  pamphlets,  and  in  the  Diplomatic  Re- 
view, and  the  Anglo-American  Times,  noted  with  mistrust 
the  justification  Bismarck  gave  when,  on  second  thought,  he 

1  "  Story  of  the  War,"  Gentleman's  Annual  for  1870,  pp.  1  et  seq. 

'Acton,  Historical  Essays  and  Studies  (London,  1907),  p.  204;  Lady 
John  Russell,  A  Memoir,  pp.  228-229;  Marriott,  England  Since  Water- 
loo, p.  423- 

'Comte  Vincent  Benedetti,  Ma  mission  en  Prusse,  Paris,  Oct.,  1871. 


86        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [86 

accepted  a  modicum  of  the  applause  and  congratulations  of 
the  Prussian  soldiery.  "  Gentlemen,"  he  said,  "  I  have 
done  nothing  to  obtain  the  success  ....  but  wait  for  a 
moment — I  have  done  one  thing.  I  have  so  acted  that  the 
Southern  States  of  Germany  have  aided  us  with  all  their 
power." 1  Urquhart  and  his  disciples  beclouded  their 
analyses  and  conjectures  with  much  ado  about  Russia's 
share  in  the  negotiations.  Many  thought  that  they  did  but 
bespatter  Prussia  in  their  efforts  to  paint  Russia  with  a 
more  lavish  blackness.  It  resulted  that  their  revelations 
were  glossed  over  by  the  British  public.  Only  when  they 
reappeared  so  late  as  March,  1871,  (all  too  late  to  be  of 
practical  advantage  to  France)  and  were  strengthened  by  a 
searching  analysis  of  the  Official  Correspondence,  did  they 
receive  due  weight.  The  discussion  of  "  Scrutator,"  in  a 
pamphlet  entitled,  Who  is  Responsible  for  the  War,2  aroused 
widespread  attention.  By  the  Germans,  he  was  believed 
to  have  been  either  Gladstone,  himself,  or  someone  speaking 
for  him.3  British  reviewers  described  him  as  a  well  known 
advocate  of  Gladstone's  ecclesiastical  policy.4  The  semi- 
official quality  and  the  brilliance  of  the  writer's  argument 
caused  credence  to  be  given  to  his  account  of  the  war's  con- 
triving. "  The  Chancellor  published  in  his  own  organ," 
says  "  Scrutator,"  "  and  communicated  to  the  Governments 
of  Europe,  an  incident  which  never  took  place,  but  which 
had  the  immediate  effect  of  precipitating  war." 

1  Issues  respectively  of  Jan.  2,  1871.  and  Nov.  19,  1870. 
'The  pamphlet  was  the  outcome  of   a  controversy  waged  between 
"  Scrutator  "  and  Prof.  Max  Muller  in  the  Times. 
*  North  German  Correspondent,  quoted  in  John  Bull,  March  25,  1871. 
4  He  was  believed  by  some  to  have  been  Count  Gasparin. 


CHAPTER  V 
Publication  of  the  Draft  Treaty 

That  much  of  British  sympathy  was  diverted  from 
France  at  the  war's  inception  was  due  not  to  any  evaluation 
of  the  merits  of  her  case,  nor  to  the  connection  existing  be- 
tween the  Prussian  and  English  Royal  families,  nor  to  a 
revival  of  the  traditional  hatred  of  France  nor  indiscri- 
minate fear  of  her  aggrandizement,  but  to  a  very  tender 
regard  for  the  little  country  of  Belgium,  whose  great  port 
of  Antwerp,  were  it  possessed  by  any  but  a  neutral  Power, 
would  sorely  menace  the  safety  of  John  Bull's  tight  little 
island.1  It  was  feared  that  during  the  course  of  the  war 
the  security  guaranteed  Belgium  by  the  Treaties  of  183 1, 
1839  would  be  endangered  by  French  aggression,  and 
that,  in  the  event  of  Prussian  defeat,  it  would  become  neces- 
sary for  England  to  form  a  second  line  of  European  de- 
fence against  an  unscrupulous  France. 

On  July  the  fifteenth,  M.  de  Gramont  had  made  the 
spontaneous  declaration  to  Belgium  that,  should  war  take 
place,  the  Government  would  continue  to  respect  her 
neutrality.2  News  of  this  had  been  duly  communicated  to 
the  British  Ministry  by  Lord  Lyons,  but  before  it  was 
received  Gladstone,  already,  had  sent  enquiries  to  his  Min- 
ister of  War  as  to  the  readiness  with  which  England  could 
send  twenty  thousand  men  to  Antwerp.3     It  was  only  a  far 

1  Spectator,  July  23,  1870. 

2  British  State  Papers  for  1870,  Foreign  Series,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  40-41. 

1  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  vol.  ii,  p.  339-  Sir  Robert  Morier  claims 
that  England  went  so  far  as  to  discuss  with  other  Governments  the 
feasibility  of  her  sending  troops  to  Antwerp. 

87]  87 


88        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [88 

outlook,  however,  he  told  Cardwell  in  a  later  communica- 
tion, which  brought  into  view  the  possibility  of  having  to 
send  such  an  expedition.1  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  French 
Ambassador  became  so  much  alarmed  at  rumours  of  these 
military  considerations  as  to  report  to  his  Government  that 
they  had  been  the  subject  of  discussion  in  the  Cabinet,  and 
to  remark,  in  passing,  that  a  British  occupation  of  Antwerp 
would  be  a  strange  way  of  showing  respect  for  Belgian 
neutrality.2 

One  can  imagine,  then,  what  discomfort  was  felt  by 
Gladstone  and  Granville  when,  shortly  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war,  the  Prussian  Ambassador,  von  Bernstorff,  in- 
formed them  of  a  treaty  drafted  in  the  handwriting  of 
M.  Benedetti  which  provided  for  the  absorption  of  Belgium 
by  France.3  While  the  British  Ministers  had  the  matter 
under  advisement,  the  Ambassador  entrusted  the  treaty  to 
Baron  Krause,  who  on  the  night  of  July  the  twenty- fourth 
carried  it  to  the  rooms  of  the  editor  of  the  Times  at  Ser- 
jeant's Inn.4  Mr.  Delane  was  selected  by  Count  Bismarck 
to  be  the  bearer  of  its  ill-tidings  not  only  because  he  con- 
trolled the  most  influential  of  London  journals  but  because 
he  was  believed  to  have  an  intense  dislike  of  the  French 
Emperor.  This  aversion,  which,  the  Standard  claimed, 
grew  out  of  Napoleon's  refusal  to  aid  the  Times  in  a  trade 

1  Morley,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p. 

'Lyons  to  Granville,  Paris,  July  19,  1870,  Newton,  Lord  Lyons,  vol. 
i,  pp.  301-302. 

*  Morley,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  340. 

*Cook,  Delane  of  the  Times  (London,  1915),  pp.  226-227;  Count 
Andreas  Bernstorff,  Second  Secretary  to  the  Prussian  Embassay,  claims 
that  it  was  he  who  carried  the  Draft  Treaty  to  Delane  at  the  Times 
office,  The  Bernstorff  Papers,  Dr.  Karl  Ringhoffer,  Life  of  Count  Al- 
brecht  von  Bernstorff  (London,  1008),  vol.  ii,  pp.  275-276;  in  Hunt 
and  Poole,  op.  cit.,  it  is  said  that  Bismarck  gave  the  Draft  Treaty  to 
the  Berlin  correspondent  of  the  Times,  vol.  ii,  p.  263. 


89]  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  89 

speculation,1  had  lately  been  intensified  by  the  decision  of 
the  French  that  no  newspaper  correspondents  might  ac- 
company their  armies,2  and  by  their  recent  arrest  of  one  of 
the  Times'  men  who  had  made  a  soldier  drunk  at  Metz  to 
worm  from  him  forbidden  information.3  Baron  Krause 
knew  that  he  would  unfold  his  tale  to  willing  ears.  The 
document  he  had  to  show  was  undated.  He  supplied  the 
information  that  its  date  was  1866.  It  was  unsigned,  but 
he  assured  the  editor  that  the  handwriting  was  that  of  the 
nefarious  envoy  who  had  conducted  himself  so  shabbily  at 
Ems.  Delane  read,  copied,  and  published  at  once.4  Not 
only  did  he  stand  sponsor  for  the  anonymous  treaty  which 
had  been  left  on  his  doorstep  but  he  accepted  in  toto  all  that 
the  bearer  told  him  of  its  origin  and  history.  His  editorial 
of  the  twenty-fifth  succeeded  in  exciting  almost  more  of 
alarm  than  did  the  treaty  itself :  "  We  might  easily  deduce 
from  internal  evidence,"  says  this  astute  editor,  "  if  we 
were  not  otherwise  assured  of  the  truth,  that  the  proposed 
Treaty  was  submitted  to  Prussia  by  France  as  a  basis  for 

1  Standard,  July  26,  1870;  Anglo-American  Times,  Aug.  6,  1870. 

'Globe  and  Traveller,  July  28,  1870.  Felix  Whitehurst,  when  he 
attempted  to  gain  the  Emperor's  permission  for  Dr.  Russell  to  go  to 
the  front,  met  with  a  courteous  but  positive  refusal.  Napoleon  re- 
marked that  Gortchakoff  had  told  him  that  during  the  war  in  the 
Crimea,  the  War  Office  at  St.  Petersburg  was  always  perfectly  au 
courant  with  what  was  going  on  at  British  headquarters  through  the 
brilliant  communications  forwarded  to  the  Times  by  this  same  Dr. 
Russell.  Life  and  Adventures  of  George  Augustus  Sola  (N.  Y.,  1895), 
vol.  ii,  p.  154.  The  French  refusal  caused  the  British  Government  tem- 
porarily to  deny  permission  to  Capt.  Hozier,  another  of  the  Times' 
correspondents,  to  start  for  the  Prussian  Army.  Delane,  indignant  at 
such  careful  neutrality,  wrote  to  Dasent  that  the  Ministry  were  mean- 
spirited  and  white-livered.  Dasent,  John  Delane  (N.  Y.,  1908),  vol.  ii, 
pp.  266-268. 

1  Tablet,  July  28,  1870. 

*  Times,  July  25,  1870.  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  vol.  ii, 
pp.  39-40. 


9q        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [go 

the  removal  of  all  difficulties  that  threatened  to  interrupt 
peace  between  them  ...  It  was  rejected,  but  unless  we 
are  misinformed,  and  speaking  with  all  reserve  on  a  sub- 
ject of  such  importance  we  are  satisfied  that  our  informa- 
tion is  correct, — the  Treaty  has  been  again  offered  as  a  con- 
dition of  peace.  The  suggestion  has  not  been  favourably- 
received." 

The  editorial  of  the  accommodating  Delane  gave  more 
eclat  to  the  Treaty's  publication  in  London  than  it  enjoyed 
in  its  own  country.  It  appeared  in  Berlin  on  the  same  day 
with  no  such  addition  of  authoritative  assurances.  But  even 
without  the  sauce  of  editorial  comment,  it  was  sure  to  prove 
a  provoking  tidbit.1  Its  terms  provided  that  the  North 
German  Confederation  and  all  acquisitions  by  Prussia  be 
recognized  by  the  Emperor;  that  the  King  of  Prussia  con- 
sent to  the  acquisition  of  Luxemburg  by  France;  that  the 
Emperor  agree  to  a  more  intimate  union  of  the  govern- 
ments of  North  and  South  Germany;  that  the  King  of 
Prussia  consent  to  a  French  invasion  of  Belgium,  and  join 
with  the  Emperor  in  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance, 
and  in  giving  a  reciprocal  guarantee  of  his  dominions. 

One  can  imagine  that  Paterfamilias  in  reading  the  news 
of  this  Monday  morning  saw  trouble  ahead  and  did  not 
linger  for  a  second  cup  of  coffee  before  setting  out  for  the 
City.  If  it  so  happened  that  he  met  on  the  way  one  of  his 
neighbours  who  was  a  reader  of  the  Daily  Telegraph  an 
interesting  dialogue  must  have  taken  place.  The  neighbour 
would  have  been  keen  on  discussing  an  interview  that  his 
paper  carried  between  the  Emperor  and  two  Englishmen 
in  Paris.2  Napoleon  had  spoken  very  frankly  in  his  effort 
to  get  his  case  before  the  British.  He  told  them  he  had 
been  sure  he  could  so  handle  the  controversy  as  to  make 

1  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  vol.  cciii,  col.  955. 
1  Daily  Telegraph,  July  25,  1870. 


Oi]  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  91 

peace  certain,  but  "  France  had  slipped  out  of  his  hand." 
He  had  thought  that  to  present  his  position  clearly  as  to 
the  Hohenzollern  candidature  was  the  best  means  of  avert- 
ing the  war  that  he  knew  himself  not  prepared  for.  He 
reverted  to  the  difficulties  he  had  been  facing  ever  since 
Bismarck,  in  1866,  had  refused  to  reward  his  friendly 
neutrality  by  permitting  him  to  acquire  Luxemburg  and 
certain  small  towns  which  menaced  his  frontier.  And  then 
he  amazed  his  interviewers  by  saying  that  Bismarck  had 
qualified  his  refusal  by  enquiring  of  M.  Benedetti  what 
quid  pro  quo  would  satisfy  France  were  Prussia  to  annex 
Holland, — an  enquiry  that  brought  a  threat  of  war  from  the 
French  envoy  and  terminated  the  interview. 

If  the  neighbour  chanced  to  be  a  person  of  importance 
and  knew  some  of  the  secrets  of  the  British  Foreign  Office, 
he  may  have  remembered  that,  in  1865,  the  Danish  Minister 
told  the  British  Ambassador  to  his  country  that  Bismarck 
had  communicated  to  him  this  same  wish  to  acquire  Hol- 
land,— a  country  which,  he  said,  attracted  Prussia  not  only 
because  of  her  coast-line  but  because  of  her  colonies.  France, 
Bismarck    had    said,    could    then    take    Belgium,— "  since 
a  guarantee  was  in  these  days  of  little  value."  l     It  cannot 
be  supposed  that  Paterfamilias,  whose  digestion  was  still 
disturbed  by  the  news  in  his  own  paper,  allowed  his  neigh- 
bour to  unburden  himself  of  many  of  his  fears  and  surmises 
before  he  quite  astonished  him  by  pointing  out  the  more 
startling  revelations  in  the  Times.     Napoleon  had  reported 
a    conversation,    which   had    admittedly    been    terminated. 
Prussia  had  communicated  a  treaty,  which  she  claimed  had 
been  urged  on  her  very  recently  with  the  effect  of  precipitat- 
ing the  present  war.     Small  wonder  that,  as  the  Scotsman 
complained,  the  British  almost  wholly  disregarded  the  state- 
ment of  Napoleon. 

1  Morley,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  320. 


c 


92        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [g2 

It  is  our  business  to  heed  the  voice  of  the  pack,  so,  like 
Paterfamilias,  we  will  clutch  the  Times  closer  and  plunge 
down  into  the  City.  The  stock  market,  a  ready  barometer 
of  public  opinion,  was  in  dire  confusion.  Consols  were 
especially  unsteady.  At  least  six  members  of  the  Exchange 
faced  positive  ruin.  The  day's  parliamentary  session  was 
barren  of  relief.  News  came  that  Gladstone  had  said  noth- 
ing to  clarify  the  situation, — had  contented  himself  with 
the  climactic  declaration  that  the  document  was  of  a  nature 
to  excite  attention  and  even  astonishment,: — one  whosd 
character  was  such  that  it  might  be  deemed  incredible.1 

Lord  Granville,  on  the  day  following,  laid  before  the 
Lords  the  official  correspondence  that  preceded  the  war. 
Prussia's  astutely  timed  publication  of  the  Treaty  made 
these  documents  about  as  interesting  as  the  dusty  papers 
of  a  neglected  wastebasket.  The  Honorable  Members  were 
immensely  more  interested  in  the  report  he  gave  of  a  con- 
versation he  had  just  had  with  the  French  Ambassador. 
M.  de  Lavalette  admitted  that  the  document  all  were  dis- 
cussing had,  indeed,  been  written  by  Benedetti,  but  claimed 
it  had  originated  with  Bismarck.  So  far  as  France  was 
concerned  the  Treaty  was  only  a  souvenir  of  an  incident 
long  closed.  He  reminded  Granville  that  his  country  had 
assured  Belgium  before  the  war's  outbreak  that  her  neutral- 
ity would  be  respected,  and  had  communicated  this  decla- 
ration to  Lord  Lyons.2  That  Ambassador,  on  the  day 
Lord  Granville  was  making  this  report  in  Parliament,  re- 
ceived renewed  assurances  from  Gramont,  who  told  him 
Bismarck  had  not  only  prepared  the  Treaty  but  had  offered 
that,  in  case  France  feared  the  odium  of  occupying  Belgium, 
Prussia  would  undertake  the  occupation  and  then  retire  in 
apparent   deference   to  her   remonstrances.     Lord    Lyons! 

1  Session  of  July  25,  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciii,  p.  885. 
*  Ibid.,  vol.  cciii,  pp.  925-926. 


93]  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  93 

was  of  the  opinion  that  the  Times  was  misinformed  when 
it  claimed  the  Treaty  had  been  the  basis  of  recent  discus- 
sion.1 

The  statement  of  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  Parliament 
greatly  pleased  the  Standard,  which  had  warned  its  Con- 
servative readers  that  very  morning  against  giving  credit 
to  what  seemed  "  a  poor  squib — the  work  of  some  English- 
man unaccustomed  to  the  employment  of  the  French  lang- 
uage " — a  something  its  rival  had  published  to  add  fuel  to  a 
flame  already  blazing  and  to  lure  England  into  hostilities 
against  France.2  Somewhat  to  cool  this  flame  it  reprinted 
a  series  of  gossipy  sketches  that  had  appeared  in  its  columns 
in  August  of  1866,  detailing  such  schemes  as  we  heard  our 
friend  of  the  Telegraph  striving  to  communicate  to  Pater- 
familias on  the  day  the  Treaty  was  published.3  The  Morn- 
ing Post  joined  the  Standard  in  denouncing  its  powerful 
contemporary's  attempt  to  damage  France  by  such  dubious 
means.  It  pointed  out  that  the  King  of  Prussia  was  set 
forth  in  the  Treaty  as  the  first  contracting  party,  and  that 
according  to  diplomatic  usage  this  alone  was  proof  of  its 
Prussian  origin.4  But  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  Record 
was  just  when  it  characterized  the  Morning  Post  as  "  not- 
oriously French." 

The  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  guileless  of  such  favouritism, 
more  nearly  expressed  the  popular  opinion  when  it  com- 
plained that  "during  the  entire  period  within  which  this 
proposal  must  have  been  made,  England  has  been  on  terms 
of  cordial  friendship  with  the  French  nation.  It  is  start- 
ling to  find  that  all  this  time  the  French  Government  was 
contemplating  an  enterprise  which  England  could  not  have 

1  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  303-304. 

2  Issue  of  July  26,  1870. 

3  Issue  of  July  27,  1870. 
*  Record,  July  26,  1870. 


94        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [94 

suffered  to  go  unopposed  without  sacrificing  her  dignity 
and  putting  her  future  independence  in  peril."  *  Saunders', 
trying  hard  to  transplant  this  British  attitude  on  the  stub- 
born soil  of  Ireland,  declared  that  the  document  precluded 
any  further  trust  in  France,  and,  whereas  the  editor  of 
Pall  Mall  had  advocated  armed  neutrality,  Saunders'  im- 
proved upon  his  ardour  by  advocating  "  positive  hostility." : 

The  Daily  News,  however,  which  had  been  as  zealously 
critical  of  France  as  these  two  of  its  contemporaries,  was 
not  so  sure  that  the  revelation  reacted  solely  to  her  dis- 
credit. It  observed  that  a  rogue  does  not  go  straight  to 
an  honest  man  and  propose  that  he  become  his  accomplice.9 
This  was  the  view,  too,  of  the  Evening  Mail*  and  of  the 
Record,  that  modified  the  metaphor  by  describing  the  intri- 
guers as  two  burglars  sitting  down  beforehand  to  arrange 
how  a  profitable  robbery  might  be  committed  with  impunity.5 

The  Manchester  Examiner,  likewise,  concluded  that  the  in- 
dex fingers  of  two  hands  would  be  needed  to  point  the  guilty 
man.  It  believed  Count  Bismarck  had  done  his  cause  no 
good  by  showing  himself  to  be  more  versed  in  the  wiles  and 
guile  of  diplomacy  than  had  been  thought.6  Its  rival  the 
Manchester  Guardian  pointed  both  fingers,  too,  and  wagged 
its  head  at  the  British  Foreign  Office  that  had  been  deceived 
into  confidence  while  Napoleon  and  Count  Bismarck  quietly 
discussed  how  best  to  make  Holland,  a  Prussian,  and  Bel- 
gium, a  French,  province.7  It  was  the  morning  after  the 
Treaty  appeared  that  John  Stuart  Mill  expressed  his  com- 

1  Issue  of  July  25,  1870. 

1  Issue  of  July  27,  1870. 

*  Issue  of  July  26,  1870. 

4  Issue  of  July  26,  1870. 

1  Issue  of  July  27,  1870. 

8  Issue  of  July  27,  1870. 

7  Issue  of  July  26,  1870. 


gt]  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  95 

plete  approval  of  a  demonstration  Sir  Charles  Dilke  and 
others  of  the  Liberals  were  sponsoring.  He  hoped  they 
would  take  this  opportunity  of  assuring  Prussia  that  Great 
Britain  considered  her  as  defending  her  own  and  the  liberty 
of  Europe,  and  that  she,  herself,  recognized  her  obligations 
to  Belgium,  and  was  convinced  that,  were  France  victori- 
ous, she  would,  in  her  turn,  be  attacked  as  the  "  fourth  of 
the  Great  Powers  that  fought  at  Waterloo."  * 

On  the  morning  of  the  twenty-seventh,  the  Times  pub- 
lished a  letter  of  M.  Emile  Ollivier's  which  categorically 
denied  the  portentous  claim  that  any  recent  negotiations  had 
taken  place  on  the  basis  of  the  notorious  Treaty.2  Some- 
what later,  the  Foreign  Office  published  a  slender  sheaf  of 
documents  dealing  with  the  matter.3  For  scandal  mongers 
in  diplomacy  this  second  Blue  Book  was  most  interesting. 
The  musty  acorn  of  a  rejected  treaty  had  produced  a  whole 
forest  of  phantom,  but  very  shady,  negotiations  for  the 
parcelling  out  of  those  smaller  European  states  that  were 
Great  Britain's  particular  care.  Not  to  enter  too  deeply 
into  its  bosky  recesses,  it  will  suffice  to  say  that  Prussia 
and  France  were  equally  voluble  and  recriminatory.  Each 
claimed  to  have  valiantly  withstood  the  assiduous  tempta- 
tions of  the  other — Bismarck  keeping  the  guilty  secrets 
"  for  the  sake  of  peace,"  4 — even  though  he  saw  England 
beguiled  by  the  French  into  proposing  a  disarmament  which 
was  intended  to  make  possible  these  nefarious  schemes. 
Though  accommodatingly  vocative,  the  Chancellor  was  not 
always  consistent.  For  instance,  after  instructing  his 
agent,  Baron  Krause,  to  give  the  Treaty's  date  as  1866,5  he 

1  Mill  to  Henry  Fawcett,  July  26,  1870,  Letters  of  John  Stuart  Mill 
(London,  1010),  vol.  ii,  pp.  266-267. 
'  Vide  also.  Standard,  July  28,  1870. 
s  Brit.  State  Papers  of  1870,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  47-71. 

*  Bismarck's  telegram  to  Bernstorff,  July  28,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  p.  40.. 
•'•  Supra,  p.  89. 


96       BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR        [96 

instructed  Bernstorff  to  give  the  date  to  Granville  as  1867; 1 
and  though  writing  his  Ambassador  that  Benedetti,  "  of  his 
own  accord,"  amended  Article  II,2  he  himself  told  Lord 
Loftus  that  the  amendment  to  this  article  was  directly  due 
to  his  own  suggestion.3  What  really  interested  the  British 
was  his  claim  that  if  the  publication  of  the  Treaty  had  not 
taken  place,  France  would  have  proposed  to  Prussia  after 
the  completion  of  their  preparations  for  war  that  they  unite 
their  armies  against  unarmed  Europe  for  the  carrying  out 
of  the  Benedetti  programme.4  The  Treaty  had  been  shown 
to  Lord  Loftus.  It  was  soon  to  be  photographed  and 
published  in  the  Graphic5  so  that  all  who  wished  might 
read,  mark,  learn,  and  inwardly  digest.  But  were  it  only 
one  of  those  dead  drafts, — ghosts  of  dark  plans  that  died 
aborning,  which  Morier  claimed  haunted  the  cupboards  of 
all  the  Foreign  Offices,  it  was  not  worth  inspection.  Only 
Count  Bismarck's  statement  gave  it  interest  and  vitality.  The 
veracity  of  the  Prussian  Minister  became  a  matter  of  eager 
interest.  Gramont's  circular  to  the  French  agents  abroad 
gave  the  same  absolute  denial  to  his  claims  that  Ollivier 
had  sent  the  Times.*     The  press  advanced  its  judgment  for 

1  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxx,  p.  41. 

*  Bismarck  to  Bernstorff,  July  29,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  67-69. 
1  Loftus  to  Granville,  July  30,  1870,  ibid.,  lxx,  p.  70. 

*  Bismarck  to  Bernstorff,  July  29,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxx,  p.  69. 
5  Supplement  to  issue  of  Aug.  20,  1870. 

*  Dated,  Aug.  4,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxx,  pp.  88-90 ;  for  Bene- 
detti's  account  of  the  affair,  vide  Ma  mission  en  Prusse.  The  French 
instructions  to  Benedetti  in  regard  to  the  negotiations  of  1866-1867,  it 
is  claimed,  were  discovered  and  acquired  by  the  Germans  in  Cercay,  M. 
Rouher's  chateau,  during  the  War  of  1870.  The  collection  is  said  to 
have  included  the  original  of  the  famous  Draft  Treaty,  annotated  by  the 
Emperor  himself.  To  provide  against  the  intervention  of  England, 
Antwerp  was  to  have  been  declared  a  free  city.  Vide  George  Hooper, 
Campaign  of  Sedan.  The  recent  Treaty  of  Versailles  provides  that 
the  papers  be  returned  to  France. 


97]  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  97 

the  guidance  of  the  public.  The  Daily  Telegraph  thought 
from  the  evidence  in  the  case  one  might  assign  the  role  of 
Satan,  with  equal  propriety,  to  either  of  the  dark  actors  in 
the  late  drama; 1  Once  a  Week  saw  the  Treaty  as  the  work 
of  two  armed  pickpockets;2  the  Quarterly  Review  with 
more  circumspection  observed,  none  the  less,  that  Bis- 
marck's past  record  did  not  exclude  him  from  the  Rogues' 
fraternity;3  while  Judy,  in  biblical  vein,  suggested  that 
these  plots  to  gobble  up  the  little  nations  reminded  her  of 
Aaron's  rod  that  swallowed  up  all  the  other  rods.  She 
warned  the  author  of  the  scheme  to  take  care  that  his  little 
essay  in  the  rod  business  did  not  turn  out  badly  for  his 
own  back.4  The  Manchester  Guardian  commended  Bis- 
marck for  having  so  wisely  followed  the  advice  of  a  lawyer 
to  an  inconstant  lover  and  made  most  violent  promises  but 
communicated  them  only  to  the  air.5  The  Northern  Whig 
contrasted  his  loquacity  with  the  reticence  of  the  Duke  of 
Marlborough  on  the  occasion  of  an  unworthy  offer  that  had 
been  made  to  him.  The  example  of  the  great  Duke  should 
have  been  followed.  If  the  proposals  were  so  dishonorable 
as  Bismarck  and  his  Government  now  claimed,  how  came 
they  for  four  years  to  be  repeated  ? 6  The  Court  Journal 
believed  the  French  version  of  the  affair  and  frankly  hoped 
the  previous  kindly  feelings  for  Prussia  would  be  changed 
to  cynical  distrust.7 

To  the  Spectator,6  it  seemed  that,  although  Bismarck  was 

1  Issue  of  July  30,  1870. 
*  Issue  of  Aug.  6,  1870. 
1  Issue  of  Oct.,  1870. 
*Aug.  3,  1870. 
5  Issue  of  Aug.  2,  1870. 
•Issue  of  July  30,  1870. 
'Issue  of  July  30,  1870. 
8  Issue  of  July  30,  1870. 


98        BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR         [q8 

blameable  for  secrecy,  it  was  France  that  had  been  guilty 
of  "  an  almost  matchless  perfidy."  The  Economist,  like- 
wise ignoring  French  denials,  believed  that  the  rejection  of 
the  Treaty  and  not  the  Hohenzollern  candidature  was  the 
true  cause  of  the  war.1  Judy  had  proclaimed  Prince  Leo- 
pold the  "  lion  of  the  season."  He  had  sunk  to  a  puppet, 
and  now  was  only  a  makeshift.  The  London  Graphic  saw 
an  argument  for  Prussian  righteousness  in  the  fact  that  the 
Treaty  was  so  clearly  favourable  to  France.2  The  Telegraph 
thought  the  flaw  of  secrecy  should  be  overlooked  since 
Prussia  was  too  weakened  after  the  Austrian  war  to  have 
opposed  France  with  decision.3 

The  Illustrated  London  News  stands  out  with  equal 
clearness  from  the  critics  of  both  France  and  Prussia.  It 
took  the  unique  position  that  neither  had  yielded  to  tempta- 
tion to  any  greater  extent  than  would  have  "  England  or  any 
other  European  Power  in  the  same  circumstances."  It 
was  the  foe  of  excessive  armaments.  They  produced  an 
assurance  of  strength  that  induced  nations  to  gratify  their 
desires, — no  matter  how  savage  such  desires  might  be. 
What  a  nation  could  do,  it  would  readily  find  justification 
for  doing.* 

Its  opinion  was  unique  not  only  in  that  it  pointed  to 
its  own  country  as  capable  of  similar  dark  traffickings,  but 
that  it  raised  its  voice  at  this  time  against  national  arma- 
ments. Its  contemporaries  were  vociferous  in  urging  Britan- 
nia into  armor.  The  Manchester  Guardian  represents  John 
Bull  as  saying  to  a  protesting  Bismarck :  "  Well,  I'm  sure  I 
don't  know.     Nap  says  he  wrote  that  letter  at  your  dicta- 

1  Issue  of  July  30,  1870. 
'Issue  of  July  30,  1870. 
8  Issue  of  Aug.  20,  1870. 
*  Issue  of  Aug.  18,  1870. 


99]  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  99 

tion.  I'll  tell  you  there's  been  queer  dealings  between  you 
two  fellows  of  which  I  don't  half  know  yet.  It  seems  to 
me  you're  two  big  thieving  blackguards ;  not  a  pin  to  choose 
between  you,  and  that  the  best  thing  for  me  to  do  is  to 
look  after  my  own  goods  and  chattels."  l  Punch  won  an 
approving  smile  when  he  turned  the  matter  into  verse : 

"  Bismarck  against  Napoleon  !    Who  the  odds  will  give  or  take, 
Which  of  the  two  more  lightly  his  faith  will  bind  or  break? 
'  Arcades  ambo — blackguards  both  !'  says  John  Bull's  low'ring  eye 
As  he  puts  his  trust  in  Providence — and  keeps  his  powder  dry."  2 

Those  who  enjoyed  the  ramifications  into  iniquity  with 
which  Fraser's  Magazine*  occupied  itself  to  the  disparage- 
ment of  France,  and  the  long-winded  accusatory  letters  that 
found  space  in  the  Times,  regretted  that  the  journals  briefly 
agreed  to  disagree  on  the  apportionment  of  guilt  and  set 
about  congratulating  themselves  on  the  unanimity  of  their 
agreement  to  force  dame  England  to  discard  her  coal- 
scuttle bonnet  and  crinolines  for  a  suit  of  shining  armour. 
When  energy  can  be  expended  in  action  words  become  few. 
The  Annual  Register  marvelled  at  the  "  rapidity  with  which 
the  story  of  the  secret  treaty  was  assigned  to  oblivion."  * 

Perhaps  its  demise  was  hastened  by  the  keen  shafts  of 
wit  of  the  jokesters.  Charles  Lever  in  his  O'Dowd  papers 
satirizes  the  Billingsgate  attitude  of  the  disputants  in  this 
fashion  : 

I'll  show  the  Belgians  what  you  did  by  them,  says  Bismarck;  and 
I'll  show  the  Dutch  what  a  pleasant  destiny  was  to  have  been 
theirs,  replied  the  Duke  de  Gramont.  Will  you  have  the  face 
to  deny  that  you  did  not  mean  to  annex  part  of   Piedmont  and 

1  Issue  of  Aug.  3,  1870. 

*  Aug.  6,  1870. 

8  Cf.  The  War,  appearing  in  the  Sept.  issue. 

*  Annual  Register  for  1S70,  vol.  cxii,  p.  95. 


IOo      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [iqo 

the  Maritime  Alps?  asks  Bismarck.  Will  you  kindly  furnish  the 
Florentine  Government  with  the  military  report  from  the  staff 
officers  of  the  Italian  army  when  they  were  your  allies?  Did  you, 
or  did  you  not  offer  us  300,000  men  in  the  war  against  Austria?  x 

Judy  provoked  merriment  by  stating  the  revelations  of 
the  week  in  an  amusing  chronology : 

Aug.,  1870.  Monday — Count  Bismarck  publishes  a  draft  treaty, 
in  Count  Benedetti's  handwriting,  proposing  the  annexation  of 
Belgium  by  France.  (N.  B.  Benedetti's  pen  wiper  and  pocket 
handkerchief  marked  with  the  Imperial  arms,  and  left  behind 
him,  can  be  seen  at  the  Berlin  Foreign  Office,  as  evidence  that 
Bismarck  was  the  lamb  and  Count  Benedetti  the  wolf  in  this 
transaction.) 

Tuesday  —  Bismarck  publishes  another  secret  treaty,  in  which 
France  proposes  to  annex  Austria,  Russia,  Spain,  Portugal,  Italy, 
and  a  few  other  countries,  and  allows  Prussia  to  take  the  coast 
of  Greenland  as  an  equivalent.  (Refused  with  virtuous  indig- 
nation.) 

Wednesday — A  third  document  published  at  Berlin  showing  a 
proposal  of  France  to  annex  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans, 
and  the  Gulf  Stream,  and  the  Papal  States;  offering  the  Pope  a 
kiosque  and  the  privilege  of  selling  newspapers  in  the  Paris 
boulevards. 

Thursday — Bismarck  prints  another  secret  proposal  that  France 
should  seize  Europe,  Asia,  Africa,  and  Australia,  and  Bismarck, 
Great  Britain  (if  he  could  persuade  the  people  there  to  let  him 
have  it).     Rejected  with  dignity. 

Friday — The  German  Official  Gazette  contains  a  further  secret 
treaty,  under  which  the  French  agree  to  take  Paris,  and  the  Prus- 
sians to  march  on  Berlin.     (Temporized  with.) 

Saturday — Further  revelations.  French  prepared  to  annex  the 
Eastern  and  Western  Hemispheres,  allowing  Prussia  to  take  the 
North  and  South  Poles.      (Rejected  immediately.) 

Sunday — Spent  by  Bismarck  at  the  Berlin  Foreign  Office,  rum- 
maging up  a  lot  more  revelations  for  next  week.2 

1  Blackwood's,  Sept.,  1870. 

'  Bismarck's  Diplomatic  Revelations,  in  issue  of  Aug.  31,  1870. 


IOI]  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  IOi 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  cotton-wool  Government  that 
had  been  conducting  its  retrenchments  largely  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  army  and  navy  felt  themselves  forced  to  a 
right-about-face.  Gladstone  had  been  striving  for  a  secure 
neutrality, — one  which  would  manifest  "  unequivocal  friend- 
liness "  to  each  belligerent.1  The  Draft  Treaty  and  its  rev- 
elations made  it  apparent  that  the  only  secure  neutrality 
was  an  armed  one,  and  that  the  attitude  of  the  mutual 
friend  had  better  be  exchanged  for  that  of  a  potential 
disciplinarian.  John  Bright  was  ill,  but  his  brother, 
Jacob,  spoke  for  him  in  opposition  to  the  idea  that 
England  should  arm  herself  for  the  defence  of  another, — 
even  though  that  other  was  a  nation  whose  neutrality  she 
had  guaranteed.2  He,  himself,  wrote  to  Gladstone,  censur- 
ing his  backsliding  from  Manchester  principles,  and  even 
intimating  that  such  dereliction  might  induce  his  resigna- 
tion.3 But  the  Quaker  brothers  were  in  a  hopeless  minor- 
ity. Only  seven  members  in  the  House  of  Commons 
voted  against  furnishing  the  means  for  additional  land 
forces.  The  Government  was  strengthened  by  a  vote  of 
credit  to  the  amount  of  £  2,000,000  for  the  supporting 
of  British  neutrality  and  the  discharging  of  any  obli- 
gation that  might  devolve  on  it.  It  cannot  be  claimed  that 
the  Government  had  shown  any  enthusiasm  in  the  alacrity 
with  which  it  had  to  respond  to  the  popular  demand. 
Mr.  Gladstone  was  described  as  lukewarm,  and  almost  hor- 
rified at  the  term  "  armed  neutrality."  4 

The  honours  of  the  debate  went  to  Mr.  Bernal  Osborne 
and  to  Disraeli.  The  first  sneered  at  a  Foreign  Office  that 
had  allowed  "  the  most  material  event  that  ever  happened 

1  Annual  Register,  vol.  cxii,  p.  100. 

*  Spectator,  Aug.  13. 

3  Macaulay  Trevelyan,  Life  of  John  Bright  (London,  1913),  p.  417. 

*  Annual  Register,  cxii,  pp.  100-102. 


I02      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [102 

in  the  history  of  diplomacy  "  to  be  learned  from  the  columns 
of  the  Times.  He  was  impatient  of  the  position  of  entire 
nullity  which  her  powerful  neighbours  had  assigned  to 
England  and  welcomed  Disraeli's  advocacy  of  armed  neu- 
trality.1 "  There  are  vast  ambitions  abroad  in  Europe," 
Disraeli  warned  the  uneasy  Prime  Minister.  "This  is  no 
time  to  be  weak."  British  neutrality  should  be  "  assured," 
— dowered  with  such  strength  that  it  could  make  itself 
respected.  A  cordial  understanding  with  Russia,  he  be- 
lieved, would  do  much  to  strengthen  England  against  that 
time  when  it  might  be  necessary  to  counsel  the  belligerents 
and  bring  them  to  peace.2 

Disraeli's  words  and  those  of  other  speakers  in  the  House 
suggested  the  belief  that  it  was  France  who  needed  chiding 
and  would  later  need  counselling.3  This  attitude  was  re- 
gretted by  Sir  Henry  Bulwer,  who  counted  the  years  of  his 
friendship  for  France  with  the  same  tally  that  he  counted 
the  years  of  his  life.  He  made  no  effort  to  exculpate  her 
for  having  provoked  the  present  conflict,  but  he  expressed 
fear  that  she  might  be  the  victim  of  her  own  rash  enterprise. 
And,  reminding  her  critics  that  she  had  been  the  firm  ally 
of  Great  Britain  on  the  field  of  battle  and  at  the  great 
councils  of  Europe,  expressed  his  hope  that  when  occasion 
came  for  friendly  mediation,  they  would  "arrest  the  hor- 
rors of  war  in  a  country  so  eminent  in  the  arts  of  peace,  and 
save  from  the  still  greater  horrors  of  tumult  and  revolution 
a  capital  that  is  the  pride  and  ornament  of  the  whole 
world."4 

1  Annual  Register,  vol.  cxii,  p.  103. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  cxii,  pp.  98-100;  Weekly  Freeman's  Journal  Aug.  6,  1870 ; 
Daily  News,  Aug.  3,  1870 ;  Buckle,  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  vol.  v. 
pp.  126  et  seq. 

3  Speeches  of  Messrs.  Taylor,  White  and  Beaumont,  session  of  Aug. 
10,  1870,  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciii,  col'ns  1741,  1782,  1784,  respectively. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  cciii,  col'ns  1780-1781. 


I03]  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  103 

In  the  House  of  Lords,  the  debates  were  not  so  vivid, 
partly  because  Lord  Granville  had  proven  more  amenable 
to  public  opinion  than  had  the  Prime  Minister.  When  Earl 
Russell  urged  that  the  Government  should  declare  openly 
and  explicitly  the  intention  to  be  true  to  their  treaties  and 
faithful  to  their  engagements,  he  was  assured  that  nothing 
would  prevent  a  scrupulous  adherence  to  the  Government's 
intentions  whenever  they  had  been  clearly  intimated.1  So 
aroused  was  public  opinion  that  had  the  Ministry  not  shown 
itself  determined  to  ensure  respect  for  Belgium,  it  was  be- 
lieved, it  could  not  have  lasted  till  the  end  of  the  session.2 

Gladstone  had  given  his  endorsement  to  a  new  treaty  of 
guarantee  with  much  greater  willingness  than  he  had  shown 
in  the  matter  of  increasing  British  armaments.  On  the 
thirtieth  of  July,  the  Cabinet  met  and  decided  to  propose 
for  the  signature  of  France  and  Prussia  identic  treaties  pro- 
viding that  in  the  event  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutra- 
lity by  either  of  the  two,  Great  Britain  would  cooperate 
with  the  other  for  its  defence,  with  the  stipulation  that  such 
action  should  not  involve  her  in  the  general  war.  The 
British  Government,  in  proposing  these  engagements, 
carefully  refrained  from  any  mention  of  the  Draft  Treaty  or 
of  subsequent  revelations,  and  based  its  proposal  on  the 
fact  that  both  Emperor  and  King,  in  the  assurances  they 
had  recently  given  in  regard  to  Belgium,  had  made  reserva- 
tions in  the  event  of  one  or  the  other  failing  to  respect  the 
neutrality  both  had  guaranteed.  These  conditional  assur- 
ances, wrote  Lord  Granville,  seemed  to  indicate  that  the 
declaration  of  each  was  incomplete.  The  new  treaty  was 
recommended  as  a  means  of  removing  the  general  anxiety 
"  which  at  present  not  unnaturally  disturbs  the  minds  of 

1  Annual  Register,  vol.  cxii,  p.  105. 

1  St.  Paul's  Magazine,   Sept.,  1870,  The  English  Aspect  of  the   War, 
pp.  562  et  seq.;  Hunt  and  Poole,  op.  cit.,  vol.  xii,  p.  263. 


IQ4      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [104 

neutral  Powers."  1  Prussia  gave  her  signature  on  the  ninth 
and  that  of  France  was  obtained  two  days  later.  The  latter 
acquiesced  with  something  of  reluctance.  She  regarded  the 
request  for  new  assurances  as  impugning  the  honesty  of  the 
spontaneous  declaration  she  had  given  Belgium  shortly 
before  the  declaration  of  war.  It  seemed  to  her  at  least 
a  partial  triumph  for  Bismarck.2  Austria  and  Russia,  sig- 
natories of  the  Treaties  of  1831,  and  '39,  declined  England's 
request  to  sign  the  present  one,  due  to  an  objection  to  its 
provision  for  coercive  measures.  They  thought  it  would 
be  impossible  to  embark  on  a  war  to  protect  Belgium  that 
would  not  widen  out  into  a  participation  in  the  general  hos- 
tilities.3 

The  treaty  had  its  critics  at  home  who'  made  the  same 
objection.  Lord  Cairns  was  one  of  these.4  Their  view 
was  stated  in  the  press  by  the  Globe  and  Traveller.6  Other 
of  its  critics  were  Bernal  Osborne,  who  dubbed  it  a  "  child- 
ish perpetuation  of  diplomatic  folly,"  and  Sir  Robert 
Morier,  who  called  it  a  document  "  monstrously  absurd  in 
which,  with  an  ingenuity  worthy  of  a  better  cause,  England 
endeavours  to  make  each  belligerent  believe  that  she  ia 
really  only  distrustful  of  the  other,  and  in  which  she  en- 
gages not  to  use  her  fleet,  which  is  the  only  help  any  one 
cares  about,  and  to  employ  her  army  only,  which  frightens 
Continentals  about  as  much  as  an  old  horse  pistol  of  the 
last  century." 6 

In  Ireland,  the  jealous  care  of  Belgium,  to  which  the  new* 

1  Granville  to  Lyons,  July  30,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxx,  p.  55. 
*Ibid.,  vol.  lxxx,  pp.  56  et  seq.;  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  41. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  lxxi,  pp.  14-15. 

*  Annual  Register,  vol.  cxii,  p.  107. 
1  Issue  of  Aug.  9,  1870. 

^Memoirs  and   Letters   of   the   Hon.   Sir  Robert  Morier    (London, 
1911),  vol.  ii,  pp.  206-208. 


I0e]  PUBLICATION  OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  105 

treaty  bore  witness,  was  matter  for  derision.  The  Nation 
criticized  the  inconsistence  of  a  Power  that  enslaved  Ire- 
land, but  fostered  Belgium,  and  while  guaranteeing  the 
freedom  of  one  nationality,  perpetuated  the  subjection  of 
another.1  The  pictures  in  Fun,  representing  England  as 
coming  to  the  rescue  of  those  Babes  in  the  Woods,  Holland 
and  Belgium,  whom  the  two  wicked  uncles  were  fighting 
over ;  or  in  the  guise  of  a  benevolent  bull-dog  that  slept  with 
one  eye  open  the  better  to  guard  little  dog,  Belgium,  while 
France  and  Prussia  fought  behind  the  kennel,2  gained  only 
a  wry  smile  from  Patrick. 

On  the  whole,  however,  the  treaty  received  a  hearty  wel- 
come. The  Peers  showed  their  content  by  almost  im-i 
mediately  dropping  the  debate  on  foreign  affairs.  It  wasi 
believed  necessary  by  careful  diplomatists  who  remembered 
the  terms  of  the  two  previous  arrangements  for  Belgian 
neutrality.  The  Treaty  of  1839  specifically  based  itself  on 
the  first  twenty-four  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  1831.  But 
the  guarantee  of  the  execution  of  the  latter  was  contained 
in  its  twenty-fifth  Article.  Therefore  the  later  treaty, 
which  supplanted  its  predecessor,  though  containing  a  state- 
ment of  Belgian  neutrality  in  the  Seventh  Article  of  its 
Annex,  had  no  specific  guarantee  for  its  execution.5  The 
Spectator  found  cause  for  rejoicing,  not  that  a  faulty  treaty 
had  been  supplanted  by  a  more  distinct  pronouncement  but 
because  it  believed  the  newer  an  engagement  was  the  more 
forceful  was  it.  "  '39  is  a  long  while  ago,"  it  argued,  "  and 
we  have  guaranteed  many  things  in  our  history  which  from 
effluxion  of  time  or  change  of  circumstances,  or  modifica- 
tions in  opinion,  we  certainly  should  make  no  effort  to  se- 

1  The  Nation,  Aug.  6,  1870. 
1  Issue  of  Aug.  13,  1870. 

1  Daily  News,  issue  of  Aug.  6,  1870;  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by 
Treaty,  vol.  ii,  pp.  881  et  seq.,  996  et  seq. 


io6      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [106 

cure."  x  It  was  suggesting  a  dangerous  doctrine,  and  one 
which  was  to  be  turned  against  England  herself  by  Russia 
in  only  a  few  months.  Paterfamilias  had  more  the  at- 
titude of  the  Daily  Telegraph,  and  regarded  the  new  treaty 
not  as  replacing  engagements  worn  thin  by  time,  but  as  reaf- 
firming them,  and  giving  recognition  to  a  bond  which  Eng- 
land's neighbours  had  considered  she  regarded  but  lightly.2 
As  Sir  Robert  Morier  said,  he  cherished  "  old  fashioned 
ideas  about  England's  honour  and  such  like  fancies  " 3  and 
delighted  in  a  treaty  which  made  them  manifest  to  the 
world.  And  so  John  Bull  was  all  aglow  with  virtue  at 
having  foiled  the  plots  of  that  "crowned  swindler,  Napo- 
leon "  and  the  "  terrible  German  Chancellor  "  by  a  simple 
affirmation  of  his  own  honourable  intentions, — a  renewal 
of  engagements  which  accorded,  by  happy  chance,  so  splen- 
didly with  his  own  proper  interests.4 

1  Issue  of  Aug.  6,  1870. 

1  Issue  of  Aug.  6,  1870. 

1  Letter  to  Dr.  Faucher,  Sept.  19,  1870,  Morier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp. 
180-181. 

iTen  days  after  the  new  treaty  of  guarantee  was  signed,  the  British 
Government  advised  the  French  to  permit  Prussia  to  transport  the 
wounded  through  Belgium.  On  Aug.  24,  1870,  Borthwick,  the  editor 
of  the  Morning  Post,  published  an  editorial  in  regard  to  this  "  Prus- 
sian intrigue."  He  claimed  that  his  exposure  of  the  motives  behind  the 
project  convinced  Gladstone  and  Granville  of  their  error  in  having 
yielded  to  the  Prussian  proposals  and  caused  them  to  withdraw  their 
sanction  immediately.  The  British  State  Papers  ignore  this  "  triumph  " 
of  the  Post.  Vide,  Reginald  Lucas.  Lord  Glenesk  and  the  Morning 
Post  (London,  1010),  pp.  230-240. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Formation  of  the  League  of  Neutrals 

While  English  tourists  were  scurrying  home  from  the 
war  zone,  and  Gladstone,  in  eloquent  letters  to  his  friends 
and  a  long  speech  at  the  Cobden  Commemoration,  was  ex- 
ercising all  that  skill  at  mingling  philosophy  with  denuncia- 
tion which  the  bonds  of  office  had  restrained  in  Parliament, 
those  of  the  Tories  and  the  old  soldiers  of  the  Crimea,  who 
cherished   for   France   such   love  as   Bulwer  had,   busied 
themselves  with  maps,  and  speculations  as  to  what  course 
the  war  would  take  and  what  allies  France  might  win  for 
Prussia's    undoing.     The    papers,    full    as    they    were    of 
French  and  Prussian  despatches,  were,  in  George  Meredith's 
phrasing,  "  mere  chips  of  dry  biscuit  to  the  devouring  ap- 
petite "  of  these  partisans.1     The  time  that  the  sheets  would 
leave    the    press    could    not    be    stated,    but    telegraphic 
news   was    supplied    by    various    agencies    to    clubs,    and 
reading  rooms,  and  even  to  "private  addresses;"  lectures 
on  the  geography  of  the  war  were  given  to  workmen ;  maps 
at  sixpence  each  found  eager  buyers.     London  was  full  of 
parlour    strategists.     It    is   related   that    one    hostess   was 
greatly  perturbed  at  having  a  guest  who  had  just  seated 
himself   at  her  dinner  table  exclaim  emphatically   to  his 
neighbour,   "I   shall  fall  on  the  right  wing  and  the  left 
flank!"     "Oh,"   said  the  lady,   "then  you   will  want  at 
least  half  a  fowl!" 

1  Letter  to  John  Morley;  Meredith  had  half-decided  to  start  for 
French  headquarters  as  a  correspondent  for  the  Post.  Letters  of 
George  Meredith  (N.  Y„  1900-1912),  vol.  i,  p.  209. 

107]  io7 


io8      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [108 

One  of  the  papers  said  that  a  great  Prussian  squadron 
lay  in  the  Mediterranean,1  and  would  act  as  a  deterrent  to 
Italy,  should  she  wish  to  join  an  old  ally  who  had  gained 
much  for  her  and  might  under  pressure  be  induced  to  cap 
his  work  by  granting  her  her  ancient  capital.2  However, 
should  Count  Beust  swing  Austria  to  the  French  side,  Italy 
would  think  it  better  to  fight  with  Austria  and  France  than 
to  stand  by  and  watch  them  grow  so  strong  from  victory 
that  they  could  punish  her  for  her  abstention.  Austria,  all 
knew,  was  smarting  still  under  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
Prague,  and  only  recently  had  shown  the  hurt  in  speaking 
of  the  "  reckless  selfishness  "  of  Bismarck,  and  the  "  bad 
conscience"  which  his  insistence  on  the  railway  across  St. 
Gothard's  Pass  exhibited.  The  rumour  was  reported  by 
Lord  Lyons  that  Count  Beust,  though  quite  aware  that 
nothing  could  be  hoped  for  from  South  Germany,  still 
trusted  so  much  in  French  strength  that  on  the  day  after 
War's  declaration  he  concluded  an  informal  alliance  with 
France,  promising  her  active  aid  by  the  middle  of  Sep- 
tember, or  somewhat  later  when  the  advent  of  winter  should 
make  it  impossible  for  Russia  to  concentrate  her  forces  for 
active  intervention.3  Some  said  it  was  stipulated  that  France 

1  Spectator,  July  g,  1870.  The  paper  was  in  error  as  to  the  location 
of  the  fleet.  In  the  Bernstorff  Papers  it  is  described  as  having  been 
on  its  way  from  Plymouth  to  Madeira.  It  was  saved  from  capture  by 
a  warning  from  the  Ambassador  himself.  Bernstorff  Papers,  vol.  ii,  p. 
275.  When  Prince  Napoleon  was  sent  to  Italy  in  August,  1870,  he,  it 
is  claimed,  gained  Victor  Emmanuel's  consent  to  ally  himself  with  the 
Emperor  on  the  condition  that  Italy  be  allowed  to  do  as  she  pleased 
in  regard  to  Rome.  The  Emperor  refused  to  be  a  party  to  such  an 
agreement.  His  defeats  and  the  withdrawal  of  his  forces  from  Italy 
made  it  possible  for  that  country  to  occupy  Rome  without  his  consent. 
Fleury,  Memoirs  of  Empress  Eugenie,  vol.  ii,  p.  275. 

1  Times,  June  20,  1870,  extract  from  Neue  Frcie  Presse. 

3  Lyons  to  Granville,  Dec.  31,  1872,  Newton,  Lord  Lyons,  vol.  ii,  pp. 
35-36. 


109]      FORMATION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NEUTRALS        too, 

should  have  a  force  at  that  time  in  Baden.  These  plans 
materializing,  the  advance  on  Berlin  would  be  made  after 
armies  marching  from  the  south  and  west  had  made  a  junc- 
tion. There  were  others  who  regarded  the  Baltic  with 
more  of  interest,  and  believed  Prussia  would  be  invaded  by 
France  from  the  north.1 

Four  days  before  war  was  declared  and  when  the  British 
had  just  made  their  appeal  to  the  Protocol  of  1856,  Lord 
Granville  told  the  Minister  of  the  Netherlands  that  in  the 
event  of  war's  outbreak,  Great  Britain  would  be  neutral, 
and  if  she  offered  advice  to  other  Powers  it  would  be  that 
they  follow  her  example.2  Queen  Sophia  of  the  Nether- 
lands was  German  by  birth  but  strongly  French  in  sympathy, 
and,  on  the  day  that  her  Minister  was  interviewing  Granville, 
was,  herself,  lamenting  the  death  of  Granville's  predeces- 
sor, the  Lord  Clarendon,  whom  so  many  believed  might 
have  succeeded  in  preventing  the  war.  She  found  it  dif- 
ficult even  to  show  herself  civil  to  the  Prussian  Minister 
and  his  British  wife.3  It  was  not  probable  that  a  country 
ruled  by  a  Queen  so  friendly  to  the  French  Court  would  in- 
terfere were  Denmark  to  respond  to  French  solicitations. 
The  Duke  of  Cadore  was  at  Copenhagen,  urging  the  Danes 
to  join  their  fleet  with  that  of  France  and  protect  the  land- 
ing of  troops  that  might  then  march  on  Berlin  from  the 
north.4  There  was  much  speculation  in  England  as  to 
whether  Denmark  would  take  a  step  so  bold.  The  Man- 
chester Guardian  was  of  the  opinion  that,  if  she  did,  Eng- 

1  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  vol.  ii,  p.  42. 

'Granville  to  Vice  Admiral  Harris,  July  15,  1870. 

3  Baroness  de  Bunsen,  In  Three  Legations  (London,  1909),  pp.  335- 
336.  For  the  untimeliness  of  Clarendon's  death,  see  Sir  Spencer  Wal- 
pole,  History  of  Tiuenty-Hve  Years,  vol.  ii,  p.  481 ;  Lucas,  Lord  Glenesk 
■and  the  Morning  Post,  p.  240;  Redesdale,  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  pp.  525-526. 

*  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  42. 


j  IO      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [  i  ia 

land,  at  least,  could  not  blame  her:  "Europe  looked  on 
with  apathy  while  the  spoliation  of  Denmark  was  accom- 
plished in  1864,  and  by  a  righteous  retribution  it  is  now 
involved  in  a  conflict  which  would  probably  never  have 
arisen  if  the  neutral  Powers  had  interfered  to  withstand  the 
first  onset  of  Prussian  ambition.  King  Christian,  ob- 
served the  Guardian,  "  owes  no  gratitude  to  any  of  his  al- 
lies." J 

But  whether  assistance  was  to  come  for  France  from 
the  north  or  south,  none  but  a  few  of  the  British  doubted 
that  Prussia  would  be  the  country  invaded.  The  editor  of 
the  Times  was  ready  to  lay  his  shilling  upon  Casquette 
against  Pumpernickel,2  and  the  ears  of  von  Bernstorff  were 
assailed  in  the  "  most  aristocratic  and  influential  English 
clubs  "  by  praise  of  the  superior  French  valour.3  The  state- 
ment of  M.  Rouher  that  credited  the  Emperor  with  four 
years  of  careful  preparation  was  accepted  at  par  value. 
Not  without  cause,  it  was  thought,  M.  Ollivier  had  said 
that  he  embarked  on  this  enterprise  with  a  "  light  heart."" 
A  Minister  of  War,  whose  confidence  was  such  that  he 
could  vouch  for  the  last  button  on  the  last  gaiter  of  his 
soldier's  accoutrement,  surely,  was  not  to  be  caught  nap- 
ping. Guizot,  in  his  retirement  at  Val  Richer,  assured 
Bishop  Wilberforce  that  he  knew  the  enemy's  campaign 
would  be  to  retreat  and  fight  on  the  defensive.  He  thought 
Denmark  would  join  France  after  her  first  victory  and 
create  a  diversion  from  the  north  that  would  bring  disaster 
to  Prussian  arms.4 

It  is  true  that  Guizot's  rival,  the  veteran  Thiers,  had  de- 

1  Issue  of  Aug.  5,  1870;  see  also  Spectator,  Feb.  4,  1871. 
1  Cook,  Delane  of  the  Times,  p.  280. 

3  Bernstorff,  Im  Kampfe  fin  Prussens  Ehre,  p.  618. 

4  R.  G.  Wilberforce,  Life  of  Bishop  Wilberforce  (London,  1878),. 
vol.  iii,  p.  355. 


UX]      FORMATION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NEUTRALS        1 1 1 

clared  before  casting  his  vote  against  the  war,  that  France 
was  not  yet  ready;  and  that  the  Emperor,  even  more  re- 
cently, had  admitted  as  much  in  the  interview  the  Telegraph 
had  published  on  the  day  of  the  Draft  Treaty's  appearance.1 
Also  the  Prince  Napoleon,  who  was  listened  to  and  dis- 
regarded by  everyone,  had  shown  himself  much  agitated 
by  his  country's  conduct.  He  was  cruising  in  the  Baltic 
when  he  learned  of  the  imminence  of  war  and  determined 
at  once  to  return  "to  Charenton  [the  French  Bedlam]  ;  to 
that  city  of  madmen  which  is  shouting,  to  Berlin!  and 
which  is  called  Paris."  There  was  the  case,  too,  of  the 
Jewish  banker,  who  had  grown  rich  in  the  French  capital 
but  left  it  for  London,  saying  that  it  would  be  surrounded 
in  a  month.  No  one  believed  him.  He  committed  suicide 
before  he  could  forget  the  loss  of  his  ducats  in  satisfaction 
at  his  foresight.  Among  the  military,  the  doubters  were 
General  Ducrot,  who  had  kept  himself  informed  of  what 
was  going  on  across  the  Rhine,  and  Baron  Stoffel,  the 
French  military  attache  at  Berlin  in  1869,  who  knew  more, 
and  had  made  a  remarkable  report  of  his  observations  the 
preceding  August.2  On  Marshal  MacMahon's  authority  it 
can  be  said  that  Baron  Stoffel's  superiors  had  given  no 
credence  to  revelations  that,  when  reprinted  in  '71,  read 
almost  as  though  they  were  a  series  of  reflections  on  what 
had  happened.3 

The  British  were  avid  for  reports  from  their  own 
countrymen  and  newspapers  were  more  than  eager  to  in- 
dulge them.  At  first,  it  had  seemed  the  French  would  al- 
low reporters  to  accompany  them  on  their  "  promenade  to 
Berlin,"  and  many  set  out  for  Metz.     But  soon  official  re- 

1  Supra,  chap,  v,  pp.  90,  91. 

1  Capt.  the  Hon.  D.  Bingham,  Recollections  of  Paris  (London,  1896) r 
vol.  i,  p.  158. 

8  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  it,  p.  50. 


II2      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [  t  i2 

cognition  was  denied  and  some  fared  badly, — which  in  no 
wise  increased  their  sympathy  for  the  French  cause.1 
However,  by  August  the  twelfth  the  Emperor  so  far  modi- 
fied his  rules  as  to  permit  the  presence  of  those  correspon- 
dents on  whom  he  thought  he  could  rely.  Prussia,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  extended  a  really  royal  welcome  to  the 
gentlemen  of  the  Fourth  Estate.  In  Berlin,  Dr.  Russell 
of  the  Times  was  invited  to  the  christening  of  the  baby 
daughter  of  the  Crown  Princess  and,  on  being  presented  to 
the  King  by  the  British  Ambassador,  was  welcomed  as  the 
minister  of  a  very  important  power — that  of  public  opin- 
ion.2 The  continual  favours  showered  on  this  famous  cor- 
respondent, known  to  his  admirers  as  "  Billy  Russell  of  the 
Crimea,"  and  to  those  who  disliked  him  as  "  Bull  Run," 
provided  good  material  for  the  fun  makers,  who  claimed 
that  when  the  gray-coated  Doctor  mounted  his  horse,  it 
was  customary  for  the  gorgeously  uniformed  Crown  Prince 
to  hold  his  stirrup.  He  travelled  de  luxe,  with  secretaries 
and  couriers,  as  befitted  the  representative  of  a  journal  that 
counted  for  more  abroad  than  all  the  British  press  together. 
Special  facilities  were  afforded  him  for  getting  his  re- 
ports to  the  Times  and  the  Army  and  Navy  Gazette.3'  The 
former  paper  was  served,  also,  by  Captain  Hozier,  who  had 
ably  reported  the  Sadowa  campaign,  and  after  delay  again 
received  his  Government's  permission  to  accompany  the 
Prussian  armies.  Others  of  the  foreign  staff  were  Alex- 
ander Inness  Shand,  whose  subsequent  volume  on  the  war 

1  E.  A.  Vizetelly,  My  Days  of  Adventure  (N.  Y.,  1914),  pp.  56-57. 

i  W.  H.  Russell,  My  Diary  During  the  Last  Great  War  (London, 
1874),  p.  30. 

3  Julian  Kune,  Reminiscences  of  an  Octogenarian  Hungarian  Exile 
(Chicago,  1911),  pp.  205-206;  Archibald  Forbes,  Memories  and  Studies 
of  War  and  Peace  (Leipzig,  1871),  pp.  225-226;  Vizetelly,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
183-184. 


j  I3]     FORMATION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NEUTRALS        i 13 

became  popular;  Charles  Austin,  who  wrote  from  Paris; 
Frank  Lawley,  who  contributed  also  to  the  Telegraph,  and 
Mr.  Dallas,  whom  the  Times  shared  with  the  News.  The 
paper's  motto,  John  Bright  complained  in  i860,  was  Omnia 
pro  tempore,  scd  nihil  pro  veritate — which  he  rendered, 
"  Everything  for  the  Times,  but  nothing  for  Truth." 1 
These  men  reported  events  fully  and  accurately,  but  their 
chief  prevented  them  from  effecting  any  change  in  the 
paper's  policy. 

It  was  the  Daily  News  that  plucked  the  highest  laurels 
during  the  war,  and  is  said  to  have  doubled  its  circula- 
tion. The  brightest  star  in  its  constellation  was  Henry 
Labouchere,  whose  ironic  wit  gave  him  a  vogue  surpassing 
any  of  his  competitors.  It  had  the  only  woman  reporter, 
Jessie  White  Mario,  the  widow  of  Garibaldi's  companion 
in  arms  in  the  Liberation  days ;  and  Hilary  Skinner,  one  of 
the  few  who  were  allowed  special  means  of  communication 
by  the  Prussian  Staff ;  Crawford,  who  for  long  had  written 
his  newsletters  at  a  little  cafe  fronting  the  Bourse,  was 
another,  as  was  the  amusing  Archibald  Forbes. 

For  the  Standard,  there  was  the  elderly  but  jaunty  Bower, 
whose  glossy  top  hat  and  buff  waistcoat  were  more  appro- 
priate on  the  boulevards  than  in  the  camp,  and  who  fortun- 
ately found  matter  for  his  pen  without  going  afield.2  In 
Paris,  also,  was  J.  Augustus  O'Shea,  a  good  fellow  of  an 
Irishman,  not  to  be  confused  with  the  gay  and  eccentric  G. 
Augustus  Sala,  who  was  not  a  Bohemian  and  went  to  law 
to  prove  it. 

The  Telegraph  was  popular  also, — so  much  so  that 
since  it  was  always  delivered  late,  newsdealers  in  Rus- 
sell  Square  complained   that   they  lost  the  sale  of  other 

1  Speeches  of  Right  Hon.   John  Bright,   M.   P.    (edited  by  Thorold 
Rogers,  London,  1868),  p.  500. 
'  Vizetelly,  op.  cit.,  p.  37. 


1 14      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [114 

papers  because  many  preferred  to  wait  and  scramble  over 
its  quickly  exhausted  edition.  It  had  a  larger  circulation 
in  London  than  any  of  its  competitors  and  proudly  flaunted 
the  number  of  its  subscribers  in  every  copy.  The  men  who 
helped  to  give  it  popularity  were  Felix  Whitehurst,  who 
saw  everything  through  French  glasses  and  made  his  diary 
speak  with  a  Gallic  accent;  Beatty  Kingston,  "the  best  man 
in  the  world  for  German  news;"1  and  Lord  Adare, — later 
Earl  of  Dunraven,  who  had  with  him,  perhaps  as  guard 
agains  mistakes  in  reporting  a  war  in  which  always  the 
unexpected  happened,  the  famous  mystic,  Douglas  Home, 
Browning's  model  for  Mr.  Sludge,  the  Medium. 

Another  titled  correspondent  was  Sir  Henry  Havelock, 
whose  scrupulosity  in  paying  for  what  he  needed  did  some- 
thing to  dispel  the  peasant's  belief  that  England  was  at 
war  with  France.2  The  Morning  Post  was  sierved  by 
Thomas  Gibson  Bowles,  whose  precisely  parted  hair  and 
trim  moustache  were  the  envy  of  the  younger  correspon- 
dents. There  were,  too,  the  three  Vizetellys,  father  and 
sons,  who  reported  for  a  number  of  papers;  George  T. 
Robinson,  who  got  himself  shut  up  in  Metz  to  his  advan- 
tage and  that  of  the  Manchester  Guardian;  Blanchard 
Jerrold,  whose  knowledge  of  the  French  spy  system  kept 
him  in  terror  for  the  indiscretions  of  his  brethren  of  the 
press;3  Captain  Walker,  former  military  attache  at  the 
British  Legation  in  Berlin;  the  irresponsible  Lewis  Wing- 
field,  a  free  lance,  who  contributed  to  all  and  sundry ;  Jules 
Pilcoq,  who  imperturbably  sketched  battle  scenes  for  the 
Illustrated',  and  Henry  Mayhew,  more  fitted  to  write  on 
economics  than  to  follow  a  campaign. 

1  Bismarck  at  times  accorded  him  very  special  privileges.     See  Forbes, 
op.  cit.,  p.  226. 

*  Kune,  op.  cit.,  p.  205. 

*  Vizetelly,  op.  cit.,  p.  57. 


j  I5]     FORMATION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NEUTRALS        ne 

These  were  some  of  the  many  to  whose  omnipresence  it 
was  due,  as  Sir  Robert  Morier  complained,  that  the  horrors 
of  war  were  microscopically  laid  out  to  jostle  the  toast  and 
muffins  on  every  British  breakfast  table.  With  a  similarity 
to  that  jolly  character  of  Dickens',  who  was  always  draw- 
ing skeletons,  these  gay  gentlemen  contributed  no  jam  for 
John  Bull's  muffins,  and  Punch  and  Judy,  lest  he  should  sup 
full  of  horrors,  tempered  their  dolour  by  creating  a  "  very 
special  cockalorum,"  who  gave  himself  all  the  airs  of  Dr. 
Russell,  and  a  certain  Ally  Sloper,  who  consulted  the  can- 
non for  accurate  information,  and  got  himself  into  all 
sorts  of  escapades  in  his  efforts  to  serve  the  British  public. 
At  one  time  he  ridiculed  the  practice  of  the  other  papers  by 
sending  back  instructions  that  Judy  stick  up  a  paper  outside 
the  shop  with  scareheads  chronicling  the  loss  of  his  famous 
umbrella,  and  later  his  own  disappearance,  together  with 
his  belongings,  "inclusive  of  umbrella  and  white  hat." 
"  The  umbrella  and  hat  are  right  as  ninepence,  you'll  be 
pleased  to  hear,"  wrote  Ally  privately ;  "  but  that  don't  mat- 
ter, stick  it  up  outside  the  shop,  and  it'll  have  'em  beautiful. 
Contradict  everything  next  day,  and  pot  'em  again  the  day 
after."  x 

A  certain  suspicion  that  the  Power  that  would  be  found 
first  ready  for  war  was  the  Power  that  had  meant  war  all 
along,  invested  with  unusual  interest  the  reports  that  were 
sent  back  as  to  the  mobilization  of  the  belligerents.  On  the 
twenty-second  of  July,  the  correspondent  for  Temple  Bar 
wrote  from  Coblentz  that,  though  France  had  about  150,000 
men  at  Chalons,  they  were  not  ready  to  take  the  field  and 
were  backed  by  no  reserves.  He  estimated  that  it  would 
require  at  least  a  fortnight  or  three  weeks  before  they  could 
undertake  a  campaign.  Whereas,  the  Prussians,  he  be- 
lieved, could  assemble  all  their  forces  in  eleven  days.     John 

1  Judy,  Aug.  3,  1870. 


!  !6      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [i  16 

Scott  Russell  had  been  assured  it  would  be  a  matter  of  only 
ten  days.1  Shand,  who  wrote  for  the  Times,  relates  that 
Moltke  lay  smoking  a  cigar  when  his  aide-de-camp  brought 
him  news  of  the  declaration  of  war.  "  I  had  hardly  looked 
for  it  for  a  day  or  two,"  he  said  without  rising — "  Just  have 
the  goodness  to  open  that  drawer."  Within  an  hour  the 
necessary  orders  were  flying  to  his  subordinates  in  all  parts 
of  Germany.2  On  July  the  twenty-third,  English  reporters 
sent  news  that  some  twenty  of  the  actors  of  the  Passion 
Play  at  Ammergau  had  been  called  to  the  colours.  Joseph 
Mair  was  the  name  of  the  peasant  who  played  the  part  of 
Christ.  He  was  a  wood-carver,  well  over  six  feet  in 
height,  "gentle,  modest,  and  deeply  devoted."  With  the 
German  regard  for  efficiency  he  was  permitted  to  wear  his 
long  hair  unshorn  so  that  when  he  was  mustered  out  of  the 
artillery  he  might  resume  his  role,  if  von  Moltke's  calcula- 
tions went  not  awry  and  the  work  of  battle  was  completed 
before  the  year  expired.3 

France,  through  the  lamentable  disorganization  of  her 
own  system,  could  not  but  give  her  enemy  an  excess  of 
the  time  required  for  mobilization.  With  what  clock-like 
precision  it  was  accomplished  is  apparent  from  the  single 
statement  that  nineteen  days  after  it  was  known  war  would 
be  waged,  Germany  commenced  on  French  soil  her  march 
to  Paris.4  It  was  not  until  several  months  later  that  the 
detailed  work  which  had  made  possible  such  speed  and  surety 
became  known  to  the  English.  The  Graphic,  then,  recounted 
the  visit  of  General  von  Moltke  to  France  in  April  of  1868, 

1  John  Scott  Russell,  Into  Versailles  and  Out,  Macmillan's  Mag- 
azine, Feb.,  1871,  pp.  310  et  seQ- 

'A.  I.  Shand,  On  the  Trail  of  the  War  (London,  1870),  pp.  87-88. 

3  Notes  and  Queries,  Fourth  Series,  vol.  vi,  p.  176;  Spectator  and 
Daily  Telegraph,  issues  of  July  23,  1870. 

1  Spectator,  Aug.  6,  1870. 


1 17]      FORMATION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NEUTRALS        ny 

at  which  time  he  had  visited  her  frontiers  and  had  made 
notes  on  the  condition  of  her  defences.1  John  Scott  Russell 
told  the  readers  of  Macmillan's  that  for  several  years  he 
had  noticed  the  organization  of  the  railroads  throughout 
Germany  into  one  military  system.  Each  train,  he  said, 
carried  two  numbers  and  marks, — one  of  which  gave  its 
capacity  in  peace  time  and  the  other  the  use  to  which  it  was 
to  be  put  in  the  event  of  war,  and  how  many  soldiers  or 
how  much  ammunition  it  was  to  carry.  For  four  years 
previous  to  the  war,  he  claimed,  each  man,  and  every 
weapon  was  exactly  placed  on  paper  for  the  march  to 
France.2 

The  fact  that  the  Emperor  at  first  forbade  the  presence 
of  correspondents  with  the  armies  served  to  prevent  the 
British  temporarily  from  discovering  that  their  belief  in 
French  military  preparedness  was  a  delusion.  However, 
the  length  of  time  elapsing  between  the  Emperor's  procla- 
mation to  his  people  on  the  twenty-second  of  July  and  the 
beginning  of  his  campaign  gave  the  more  thoughtful  mat- 
ter for  reflection.  They  wondered  if  the  delay  were  not 
caused  through  some  lack  of  generalship.  It  had  been 
thought  France  was  all  eagerness  to  put  to  the  test  those 
two  machines  that  Disraeli  named  as  the  cause  of  the  war, — 
the  so  much  discussed  chassepot  and  the  mitrailleuse.3. 
Superiority  of  equipment  would  be  necessary  to  counter- 
balance the  presence  of  von  Moltke  on  the  Prussian  side. 
That  the  Emperor  accompanied  his  army  was  regarded  as 
rather  a  detriment  to  France.  It  was  believed  he  belonged 
to  that  second  class  of  rulers  described  by  Machiavelli, 
those  who  were  able  to  accomplish  great  things — by  their 

1  Issue  of  Oct.  22,  1870. 
*  J.  S.  Russell,  op.  cit.,  pp.  310  et  seq. 

8  Lord  Carlingford  to  Lear,   Bath,   Oct.   19,    1870.     Later  Letters  of 
Edward  Lear  (edited  by  Lady  Strachey,  London,  191 1). 


1 18      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [  1 xg 

councillors.  It  was  remembered  how  fearful  British  states- 
men had  been  during  the  Crimea  that  he  would  seek  glory 
in  that  campaign  to  the  embarrassment  of  the  allied 
generals.1  "  There  he  goes,"  said  Sala,  when  at  last  the 
Imperial  forces  got  under  way,  "  There  he  goes,  and  he  has 
forgotten  to  get  himself  a  return  ticket."  His  lack  of  it, 
perhaps,  was  due  not  so  much  to  want  of  foresight  as  to 
inability  to  pay  its  price.  Before  he  became  Emperor  he 
had  advised  France  to  borrow  from  Germany  her  system 
of  military  organization.2  In  1867  he  had  formulated  an 
elaborate  report  to  aid  the  military  commission.  Only  re- 
cently he  had  urged  the  abolition  of  exemptions,  and  the 
adoption  of  the  Remington  breech-loader  that  Metternich 
had  told  him  was  proving  efficient  in  Austria.8  He  was  no 
more  able  as  Emperor  to  accomplish  these  last  innovations 
than  he  had  been  to  accomplish  the  greater  one  when  he  was 
pretender.  He  was  a  sight  to  'rouse  the  laughter  of  the  gods, 
a  Napoleon,  feeble  and  old  before  his  time,  who  had  not  the 
power  to  command  his  generals  nor  the  ability  to  inspire  his 
soldiers.  In  the  vanguard  of  his  army  went  the  Turcos, — 
auxiliaries  unfortunately  accepted  from  the  Arab  chiefs. 
They  were  stationed  in  Baden,  and  whatever  sympathy  had 
been  felt  for  France  in  that  province  rapidly  disappeared. 
Of  all  the  inconceivable  follies  committed  by  the  Emperor, 
Sir  Robert  Morier  thought  this  employment  of  African 
savages    to   fight   the    Germans    was   the    greatest.4     But 

1  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  103. 

2  CEuvres  de  Louis  Napoleon  Bonaparte  (edited  by  C.  E.  Temblaire, 
Paris,  1848),  vol.  iii,  pp.  49  et  seq.;  chap,  vi,  pp.  268  et  scq. 

*  Wickham  Hoffman,  Camp,  Court,  and  Siege,  pp.  142-144. 

4  Morier  to  his  father,  Aug.  3,  1870,  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robert  Morier, 
vol.  ii,  p.  163.  Cf.  also  London  Graphic,  Aug.  27,  1870;  Fraser's  Mag- 
azine, Oct.,  1870.  A  Month  with  the  Belligerents,  N.  S.,  vol.  ii,  pp. 
483  et  scq. 


j  IQ]      FORMATION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NEUTRALS        i  19 

Morier   was    overfond    of    superlatives.     There   were   yet 
other  follies  to  match  this. 

On  the  second  of  August,  Napoleon  attacked  Saarebriick, 
a  town  of  six  thousand  inhabitants  that  the  British  journals 
were  quick  to  inform  their  readers  was  unfortified.1  More- 
over, he  had  the  misfortune  to  be  successful, — which  con- 
firmed the  existing  opinion  of  French  power, — and  to  misuse 
his  success  by  a  needless  destruction  of  the  remains  of  the 
little  town.  The  message  to  the  regent  Empress  that  the 
young  Prince  Imperial,  whom  he  had  with  him,  had  stood 
his  baptism  of  fire  very  bravely,  was  another  blunder.  The 
British  would  not  applaud  the  boy's  pluck  nor  the  temerity 
of  a  father  that  made  such  test  of  it.  Punch  and  the 
Spectator  made  wry  faces  at  the  whole  performance, —  a 
baptism  of  blood,  and  tears,  and  fire,  they  called  it.2  There 
was  a  rumour  in  England,  despite  French  protests  to  the 
contrary,  that  the  fourteen-year-old  boy,  who  was  taken 
out  in  a  special  train  that  morning  to  direct  the  first  mitrail- 
leuse fired  by  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  was  carried  back 
hopelessly  shattered  and  afflicted  with  an  hysterical  malady 
which  made  it  impossible  any  longer  to  exhibit  him  in  public.3 
Paterfamilias  read  of  this  strange  Caesar  chrism  with  ris- 
ing indignation,  and  with  a  sigh  of  relief,  turned  the  page 
to  read  the  simple  address  of  the  Prussian  ruler  to  his 
soldiers.  King  William  had  told  them  at  Saarebriick  that 
he  assumed  command  of  his  forces  to  repel  attack.  As  for 
his  people,  he  assured  the  French  that  they  had  desired,  and 
still  desired,  to  live  at  peace  with  them.     As  for  himself, 

1  Record,  Aug.  8,  1870. 
'Aug.  13,  1870. 

1  Chamber's  Journal,  March  18,  1871,  A  Good  Correspondent,  pp.  169 
et  seq.  Cf.  Edward  Legge,  The  Empress  Eugenie  and  her  Son  (Lon- 
don, 1916),  pp.  59-6o;  Augustin  Filon,  Le  Prince  Imperial  (London, 
I9I3). 


I2o      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [120 

he  warred  against  soldiers,  not  against  citizens,  whose  se- 
curity he  would  respect.1  What  a  contrast  the  British 
thought  him  to  the  cruel  Emperor  with  his  painted  cheeks 
and  trained  mustachios!  What  a  contrast  was  the  Land- 
wehr  to  the  barbarous  Turcos ! 

On  the  morning  of  the  fifth  of  August,  six  or  eight  hours 
before  the  event  was  known  in  Paris,2  the  London  Times1 
printed  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Weissembourg,  where 
some  thousand  Frenchmen  with  their  complement  of  officers 
had  surrendered.  It  was  "  really  a  great  success,"  Charles 
Lever  boasted  in  a  letter  to  Blackwood,  "  I  don't  care  a 
rush  that  the  Prussians  were  in  overwhelming  numbers. 
May  they  always  be  so,  and  may  those  rascally  French  get 
so  palpably,  unmistakably  licked  that  all  their  lying  press 
will  be  unable  to  gloss  over  their  disgrace."  Not  only  were 
numbers  unequal,  but  according  to  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  who 
was  at  this  time  with  the  Crown  Prince  and  as  staunch  an 
admirer  of  his  forces  as  was  the  famous  creator  of  O'Dowd, 
the  battle  was  won  really  by  some  Poles  who  fought  in  the 
centre  against  the  Turcos,  while  hardly  a  German  or 
Frenchman  was  in  sight.  The  Poles  had  cartridges  and 
hymnbooks.  The  savages  were  almost  as  innocent  of  the 
one  as  the  other.3 

This  defeat  and  the  twin  disasters  of  Worth  and  Spich- 
eren,  which  occurred  on  the  same  day,  foreshadowed  the 
fate  of  the  Empire.  The  Standard,  in  its  editorial  of  the 
eighth,  spoke  of  them  as  proof  of  the  genuineness  of  the 
love  of  peace  and  economy  that  had  been  professed  by  the 
Ollivier  Cabinet  on  its  coming  into  power, — a  testimony 

1  Times,  Aug.  4,  1870. 

*  Washburne  to  Fish,  Aug.  8,  1870,  Washburne,  Correspondence  of 
the  Franco-German  War,  pp.  19-20. 

s  Stephen  Gwynn  and  Gertrude  Tuckwell,  Life  of  Rt.  Hon.  Sir 
Charles  Dilke  (N.  Y.,  1917),  vol.  i,  p.  105. 


I2i]      FORMATION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NEUTRALS        I2i 

that  was  at  the  same  time  a  sort  of  swan  song  to  Imperial 
prestige.  It  did  not  believe  the  battles  presaged  disaster 
to  France  itself.  Nor  did  the  Morning  Post  of  that  date, 
nor  the  Guardian,  nor  Spectator.  But  the  Times  was 
lugubrious,   and   the  News  croaked   "  Nevermore." x 

In  Ireland,  where  demonstrations  at  Cork,  Kantuck,  and 
Castlebar2  had  followed  the  great  night  at  Dublin,  it  was 
freely  hinted  that  these  British  papers  were  in  Prussian  pay. 
Their  evil  tidings  were  disbelieved.  There  were  cheers 
for  General  MacMahon,  descendant  of  one  of  the  "  wild 
geese,"  who  had  contrived  to  elude  the  penal  laws  and 
emigrate  to  France.  It  was  calculated  that  600,000  Irish 
had  died  in  the  French  service  in  the  past  century.3  They 
promised  an  Irish  brigade  to  MacMahon  now  if  he  should 
ask  it.4  In  Limerick,  10,000  gathered  at  the  Treaty  Stone 
on  the  day  of  the  battle  of  Worth  to  vaunt  their  sympathy 
for  France.  Katharine  Tynan,  who  was  a  little  girl  at  the 
time,  remembered  how  on  her  way  from  school  she  saw  the 
Irish  school  boys  fighting  the  battles  over  again,  and  seeing 
to  it  that  the  French  had  the  victory,  in  spite  of  all  the  lying 
British  press.  No  one  would  take  the  part  of  the  Prus- 
sians, so  the  boys  had  to  combat  unoccupied  houses, — of 
which  there  were  no  few  in  Ireland,  and  riddle  their  win- 
dows with  stones,  the  while  they  shouted  battle  cries.5 
Young  Quixotes  tilting  at  windmills,  perhaps.  Perhaps, 
torch  bearers,  cherishing  the  fire  some  day  to  melt  their 

1  Issues  of  Aug.  8  and  Aug.  9,  respectively. 

1  Northern  Star  and  Ulster  Observer,   Spectator,   Weekly  Freeman's 
Journal,  issues  of  July  30,  1870. 

*  Spectator,   July  30.     Estimate   based   on  Records   of   French    War 
Office. 

*  Weekly  Freeman's  Journal,  July  30,  1870. 

5  Katharine    Tynan,     Twenty-five     Years'    Reminiscences     (London, 
1013),  pp.  43-44. 


I22      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [122 

chains.     Their  mothers  and  sisters  were  busy  collecting  old 
linen  to  make  charpie  for  the  French  wounded.1 

"It  is  always  safe  to  predict  that  if  one  section  of  Irish- 
men take  to  asseverating  that  anything  is  white,  another 
section  will  therefore  and  forthwith  take  to  asseverating 
furiously,  that  it  is  black,"  said  the  Scotsman.     True  to 
tradition,  across  the  Boyne  there  was  a  fanfare  of  rejoic- 
ing.    For  Protestant  Ireland  favoured  the  Prussians,  and  al- 
ready in  Londonderry  many  had  been  wounded  in  a  demon- 
stration that  for  an  Orangeman  neutrality  was  as  much  an 
anomaly  as  it  was  for  his  Catholic  fellow.2     It  was  thought 
by  the  British  that  these  Protestants  did  well  to  rejoice,  for 
Dublin,  and  Cork,  and  Galway  were  cherishing  the  hope 
that  France,  that  had  often  drawn  the  sword  for  others, 
might  help  her  to  attain  nationality  and  the  enjoyment  of 
free  institutions.3     It  was  a  wild  hope,  the  Times  said,  but 
it  was  discussed,  none  the  less,  by  British  papers.     They  re- 
minded   their   readers    that   Monseigneur   Dupanloup   had 
encouraged  Irish  aspirations  and  accused  Napoleon  of  hav- 
ing shown  more  sympathy  for  them  than  was  correct  for 
an  ally  of  Great  Britain.4     The  Evening  Mail  inveighed 
against  the  Nationalist  press  for  seditiously  hoping  Eng- 
land would  be  embroiled  in  the  Continental  quarrel  to  its 
undoing.5     This  could  not  but  increase  the  British  efforts' 
to  isolate  the  belligerents.     The  little  Island  that  embraced 
the  world  had  the  weakness  of  its  strength.     It  roused  the 
jealousy   of    others,    who   had    similar   anacondic   desires. 
England  had  need  of  caution. 

lC.  E.  Ryan,  With  an  Ambulance  during  the  Franco-German  War 
(N.  Y.,  1896),  p.  1. 

2  Daily  News,  Aug.  4,  15,  1870;  Saunders',  Aug.  1,  1870. 

3  Times,  Aug.  13,  1870. 

*  Daily  News,  July  25,  1870. 
5  Issue  of  Aug.  9,  1870. 


I23J      FORMATION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NEUTRALS       123 

Lord  Granville,  in  advocating  the  new  treaty  guarantee- 
ing Belgium,  had  been  actuated  not  only  by  a  desire  to  se- 
cure the  engagements  to  which  England  was  a  signatory, 
but  by  a  desire  to  localize  the  war.  Thus  the  Government, 
though  renewing  an  entangling  alliance,  believed  itself  still 
acting  in  accordance  with  the  tenets  of  the  Manchester 
School, — as  Gladstone  urged  on  Bright,  who  was  im- 
patient of  the  sensitiveness  for  Belgium's  safety.  Indeed, 
this  desire  to  localize  the  conflict  seems  to  have  been 
the  guiding  principle  of  Granville's  policy.  A  free  field 
for  France  and  Prussia  and  a  packed  grandstand  was  hi9 
motto.  France,  he  believed,  would  prove  the  stronger, 
and  he  wished  to  prevent  any  further  increase  of  the 
odds  that  she  might  gain  by  assistance  from  the  side 
lines.  Not  content  with  bolstering  his  own  country  into  an 
attitude  of  rectilinear  correctness  by  such  means  as  pro- 
claiming her  neutrality  on  the  very  day  of  the  declaration 
of  war;  adjusting  her  armament  to  that  nice  point  which 
would  ensure  respect  and  yet  not  rouse  suspicion;  and  by 
promptly  passing  an  act  to  restrain  the  inordinate  partisan- 
ship of  the  Irish,  he  set  about  the  formation  of  a  league  of 
neutrals.  In  this  he  was  assisted  by  the  victories  of  the 
sixth  of  August.  They  prepared  the  public  for  the  news 
that  Strasbourg  was  besieged,  Fort  Lichtenburg  captured, 
that  the  war,  in  short,  was  to  be  fought  on  French,  not 
Prussian,  soil.  The  French  fleet  had  blockaded  the  north- 
ern ports  of  Germany,  but  the  events  of  early  August 
caused  the  prudent  Danes  to  give  support,  now,  to  their 
Government's  adoption  of  neutrality.  They  caused,  too, 
the  resignation  of  the  Ollivier  Ministry  and  the  appointment 
of  another,  which  an  English  paper  said  even  flattery  would 
be  puzzled  to  salute  with  a  tribute  of  admiration. 

Where  Austria  before  had  been  inclined  to  pledge  al- 
liance, the  present  rumour  was  that  she  would  content  her- 


I24      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [124 

self  with  joining  Italy  in  an  agreement  to  urge  a  peace  that 
would  involve  no  territorial  cession.  A  Berlin  despatch, 
printed  in  the  Times,  claimed  England  had  declined  to  be- 
come a  third  party  to  such  a  compact.1  Press  comment 
says  nothing  of  the  London  visit  of  the  Italian  statesman, 
Marco  Minghetti,  nor  do  the  biographers  of  the  Ministers 
record  it.  But  Count  Beust  asserts  in  his  memoirs  that  it 
was  this  Italian, — an  economist  well  pleasing,  it  may  be 
supposed,  to  Bright  and  Gladstone, — whose  mission  resulted 
in  England's  decision  to  refrain  from  intervention  and  in- 
itiate the  formation  of  a  neutral  league.2  On  the  tenth 
of  August,  the  day  after  General  Montaubon,  Count  de 
Palikao,  was  appointed  premier  of  France,  Lord  Granville 
wrote  Lyons  that  he  had  informed  the  Prussian  Ambas- 
sador of  "  engagements  "  exchanged  between  Italy,  Austria 
and  his  own  Government,  by  which  they  bound  themselves 
not  to  depart  from  neutrality  "without  an  interchange  of 
ideas  and  an  announcement  to  one  another  of  any  change 
of  policy." 3  Austria,  be  it  noticed,  before  entering  into  this 
agreement  had  declared  herself  free  from  any  conflicting 
engagements.  Within  the  week,  Granville  informed  the 
French  Ambassador  of  the  success  of  these  negotiations 
and  his  hope  to  extend  them,4 — the  outcome  not  of  a  formal 
compact  of  nation  with  nation,  but  a  sort  of  "  gentleman's 
agreement,"  formed  by  means  of  letters  between  Ministers. 
It  was  designed,  he  said,  to  take  the  place  of  a  more  formal 
project  for  combined  neutrality  that  several  Powers  had 
advanced  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Though  the 
British  proposals  were  received  favourably,  the  note  send- 

1  Times,  Aug.  13,  1870. 

*  Memoirs  of  Count  Beust  (London,  1887),  vol.  ii,  p.  206. 

3  British  State  Papers  for  1870,  Foreign  Series,  vol.  lxx,  p.  96. 

4  Granville  to  Lyons,  Aug.  6,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxxi,  pp.   11-16;   Fitz- 
maurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  42-43. 


125]      FORMATION  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NEUTRALS        I2e 

ing  was  not  completed  until  the  middle  of  the  succeeding 
month,1  which  makes  it  appear  that  there  might  yet  have 
lingered  some  chance  for  France  to  gain  allies,  had  she  been 
able  to  retrieve  the  August  disasters. 

Rumours  of  the  project  created  the  impression  in  Ger- 
many, Morier  reported  early  in  September,  that  England 
had  taken  the  initiative  in  organizing  the  Powers  for  a  re- 
sistance to  her  exaction  of  territorial  indemnity  when  the 
time  of  peace  should  come.  He  was  reassured  by  Gran- 
ville,2 and  Prussia  made  no  remonstrance.  But  the  French 
regarded  this  " Ligue  dcs  Neutres"  as  especially  inimical 
to  their  interests, — an  effort  to  rob  them  of  intended  allies.3 
There  were  two  reasons  why  France  was  justified  in  her 
complaints.  In  the  first  place,  the  fight  was  not  to  be  one 
between  evenly  matched  combatants.  Lord  Granville's 
estimate  of  the  military  strength  of  France  was  incorrect. 
Furthermore,  it  affected  her  more  harshly  than  it  did  Prus- 
sia, since  her  chances  for  alliance  were  the  better,  not  only 
in  August  when  it  was  believed  she  might  rally  from  defeat, 
and  other  nations  with  grievances  against  Prussia  might 
have  combined  to  strengthen  her,  but  later  when  her  weak- 
ness was  discovered  and  the  severity  of  Prussian  demands 
wakened  the  wish  of  Neutrals  to  spare  her  from  further 
humiliation,  and  themselves  from  future  disaster.  The 
League  resulted,  too,  in  giving  Prussia  assurance  that  no 
concerted  pressure  would  be  used  against  her  should  she 
exact  an  increase  of  territory.  The  strength  of  a  neutral 
lies  in  the  restraining  influence  exerted  on  the  belligerents 
by  the  uncertainty  of  his  future  policy.  The  communica- 
tion to  France  and  Prussia  of  the  perfecting  of  this  laissez 

1  Denmark  was  one  of  the  last  to  enter  the  agreement. 
*  Morier  to  Granville,  Sept.  2,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  pp. 
65-66. 

3  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  43. 


I26      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [126 

faire  project  ensured  them  in  the  indulgence  of  a  do-as-you- 
please  policy,  the  results  of  which  would  be  dependent 
wholly  on  their  own  character.  The  League  has  a  sinister 
appearance,  also,  in  that  it  was  concluded  in  secret,  with- 
out debate  of  Parliament  or  the  press.  If  it  meant  noth- 
ing, it  was  unnecessary.  If  it  meant  anything,  it  should 
not  have  been  formed  by  Great  Britain  without  the  know- 
ledge and  consent  of  Parliament  and  people. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Downfall  of  the  Empire 

Soon  after  his  accession  Napoleon  had  declared,  "  L' Em- 
pire c'est  la  paix."  In  the  middle  of  August,  1870,  the 
French  turned  the  mot  against  themselves  and  with  a  shrug 
and  a  gay  attempt  at  raillery  in  the  midst  of  disaster,  ex- 
claimed, "  Certainement  ce  n'est  pas  la  guerre!  "  1  With  no 
single  French  soldier  left  in  Germany, — except  as  prisoner  * 
with  the  enemy  well  across  the  boundaries;  with  the  reali- 
zation that  General  Le  Boeuf  was  right  when  he  had  boasted 
not  a  button  lacking  from  a  gaiter  for  a  single  French 
soldier, — for  the  very  good  reason  that  not  a  gaiter  was  in 
the  French  equipment,  nor  a  military  map  of  France,  nor 
many  another  necessary  thing;2  with  their  Government 
definitely  apprised  by  the  British  success  at  league-making 
that  they  were  to  continue  without  allies,5  the  French  stub- 
bornly refrained  from  crying  a  peccavimus.  If  the  war  had 
been  furthered  by  Napoleon,  or  Gramont,  or  by  Ollivier,  or 
some  black-garbed  confessor  of  the  Empress,  it  was  conceded 
now  that  it  had  been  adopted  by  the  nation, — that  it  had 
attained  legitimacy.  Napoleon,  submitting  to  the  advice 
of  his  generals,  the  perturbed  Regent,  accepting  an  enforced 
change  of  ministry,  were  become  only  the  sceptered  puppets 
of  their  country. 

1  Spectator,  Sept.  3,  1870,  Letter  of  Paris  correspondent 
*  Weekly  Scotsman,  Aug.  20,  1870. 
3  Supra,  chap,  vi,  p.  125. 

127]  127 


I28      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [I2g 

In  July  the  Council  of  the  Workingmen's  Association  had 
addressed  a  manifesto  to  the  Workers  of  the  World  pro- 
testing against  the  war  as  a  criminal  absurdity  and  declar- 
ing themselves  to  be  the  spokesmen  in  this  opinion  of  all 
the  working  people  of  France.1  They  claimed  that  those 
men  who  had  performed  the  contortions  of  war  in  the 
streets  of  Paris  were  only  the  "band  of  the  ioth  of  De- 
cember" in  a  masquerade  of  workmen's  blouses, — that 
proof  of  this  was  afforded  by  the  fact  that  Pietri,  the 
prefect  of  police,  thought  it  prudent  to  stop  the  "  patriots  " 
because  the  real  workmen  of  the  Faubourg  came  forward 
in  such  force  to  refute  them  that  cries  of  "  Vive  la  guerre!" 
were  drowned  in  cries  of  "  Vive  la  paix!"  The  correspon- 
dent of  the  Standard  had  written,  on  the  sixteenth  of  July, 
that  he  was  convinced  there  was  even  in  Paris  a  strong 
minority  against  the  war;  and  the  representative  of  the 
Evening  Mail  went  so  far  as  to  deny  that  it  was  ever  popu- 
lar. On  the  very  day  that  war  was  formally  declared,  the 
Times  published  the  report  that  Thiers  was  receiving  two 
hundred  letters  a  day  stating  approval  of  his  efforts  to 
preserve  the  peace.  It  believed  that  those  peasant  proprie- 
tors who  had  supported  the  Emperor  in  the  plebiscite  three 
months  before,  had  yielded  their  adherence  because  they 
thought  Napoleon  stood  for  peace.2  Guizot,  in  retirement 
at  Val  Richer,  had  said  to  Bishop  Wilberforce  that  France 
had  such  misgivings  as  to  the  right  of  the  war  that  the 
Government  would  not  dare  exact  an  increase  of  territory.3 
A  merchant  of  Havre  wrote  to  John  Richard  Green  that 
there  was  not  one  of  his  trade  in  that  city  but  hated  the 

1  General  Council  of  the  International  JVorking  Men's  Association 
on  the  War,  a  manifesto  issued  to  the  members  of  the  International 
Working  Men's  Association  in  Europe  and  the  United  States. 

*  Times,  Aug.  30,  1870. 

3  Wilberforce,  Life  of  Bishop  Wilberforce,  vol.  ii,  p.  360.  ' 


12g]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  12g 

war  as  iniquitous;  and  another  correspondent  in  northern 
France  reported  to  Green  that  there  it  was  equally  con- 
demned by  the  workmen.1 

But  the  conscripts  had  answered  the  call  to  the  colors. 
In  the  barracks  the  long  proscribed  Marseillaise  had  been 
distributed  by  the  Government ; 2  it  was  sung  in  all  the 
theatres  of  Paris  by  women  draped  in  the  tricolour.  A 
favourite  tenor  of  the  Opera  Comique  was  forced  to  chant 
it  from  the  top  of  an  omnibus,  halted  in  front  of  the 
Bourse.3  Le  Rhin  of  Alfred  de  Musset  and  the  Chant  du 
Depart  of  Queen  Hortense,  shared  in  its  honors.  Through 
the  cities  the  soldiers  had  gone  marching,  marching,  in 
long  lines  of  splendid  rhythm  to  a  battle-scarred  frontier 
where  waited  an  ancient  foe.  The  tirades  of  Edmond 
About  and  of  the  hot-blooded  Emile  Girardin  were  read 
and  quoted  on  the  boulevard  at  the  hour  of  absinthe,  and 
next  morning  in  the  provinces.4  The  ironic  speeches  of 
Thiers;  the  writings  of  Prevost  Parodol  that  in  days  gone 
'by  had  lashed  the  Emperor  for  having  tolerated  Sadowa; 
the  tradition  of  the  great  Napoleon,  cherished  in  every 
peasant's  cottage  throughout  France,  were  bearing  their 
bitter  fruit.  News  came  of  the  condemnation  of  the 
British  press.  The  French  Ambassador  had  asked  that  it 
be  counteracted  by  some  word  of  sympathy  from  the 
Queen's  Ministers,  but  he  had  found  Granville  "  cold,  very 
cold."!      News  came  of  defeats  and   German  exultation, 

1  Letters  of  J.  R.  Green  (edited  by  Leslie  Stephens,  N.  Y.,  1901),  pp. 
257-258. 
'  Manchester  Guardian,  July  21,  1870. 

1  Mrs.  George  Cornwallis  West,  The  Reminiscences  of  Lady  Randolph 
Churchill  (London,  1908),  pp.  10-20. 

4  Daily  Telegraph,  Sept.  2,  1870;  Manchester  Guardian,  Aug.  18,  1870. 

5  Granville  to   Lyons,    July  21,    1870,   British  State   Papers,    Foreign 
Series,  vol.  lxx;  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  vol.  ii,  p.  39. 


^o      BRITISH  POUCY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [130 

of  the  smug  rejoicing  of  the  British.  "  Tell  those  travel- 
ing Englishmen  who  so  loudly  express  their  pleasure  at 
German  victories  that  they  make  the  position  of  their 
countrymen  in  France  most  difficult,"  wrote  an  expatriate 
at  Boulogne.1  France  felt  that  she  was  alone,  misunder- 
stood, threatened  with  great  danger.  The  bird  of  France 
is  the  coque  de  la  gloire,  says  an  old  ballad,  it  sings  in 
victory,  but  it  sings  yet  more  loudly  in  defeat.  "  The  French 
rabble,"  wrote  a  visiting  Englishman  from  the  capital, 
"  cannot  endure  that  Albion  should  see  them  humiliated. 
They  want  to  have  it  out  on  someone."  2  Somewhere  some- 
thing had  gone  wrong.  It  remained  only  to  fight,  and  that 
with  all  the  strength  they  had,  to  make  the  sun  to  smile 
again.  The  peasants  whispered  of  Bismarck.  They  be- 
lieved his  power  supernal,  and  when  an  early  winter  came 
with  excess  of  cold  and  sleet,  they  said  that,  too,  was  the 
work  of  the  Herr  Chancellor.  Mothers  frightened  their 
children  with  stories  of  the  blond-haired  Uhlans  from 
across  the  Rhine,  and  told  them  of  the  glory  of  France  in 
ancient  wars. 

The  war  loan  of  £30,000,000,  asked  by  the  Government, 
was  supplied  not  by  a  few  Parisian  capitalists  but  by  a 
vast  number  of  creditors  throughout  the  Empire,  who 
showed  by  their  eager  investment  a  strong  resolution  to 
support  the  war  to  a  favorable  conclusion.  M.  Thiers  was 
praised  now  as  the  man  who  had  thrown  round  Paris  a 
splendid  girdle  of  barricades.  After  all,  he  had  resisted 
war  only  because  he  knew  his  country  was  not  ready.  It 
was  felt,  vaguely,  that  fate  had  its  hand  in  this, — that  war 
had  been  inevitable. 

Across  the  Channel  a  strangely  assorted  trinity  specu- 

1  Letter  to  Times,  Aug.  15,  1870. 

3  Times,  July  29,  Aug.  31,  1870.     Cf.  Gabriel  Honotaux,   Contempo- 
rary France  (N.  ¥.,  1903-1009),  vol.  i,  p.  9. 


131]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  I3i 

lated  on  the  chance  of  solving  future  difficulties  by  some 
better  means  than  war.  They  were  a  leader  of  the  labor 
party,1  the  editor  of  the  Banker's  Magazine,  and  a  great 
lady, — the  wife  of  Lord  John  Russell.2  Their  chirpings 
seemed  irrelevant.  The  point  to  be  discussed  was  the  ef- 
fect this  war  would  have  on  England.  Sir  Robert  Morier 
believed  it  would  establish  the  preponderance  of  Germany 
over  Europe  for  centuries  to  come.  He  did  not  wish 
France  to  be  annihilated.  It  could  furnish  an  element  that 
Germany  could  not, — "  lightness,  grace,  form,"  but  it 
should  be  induced  by  defeat  into  a  more  pacific  temper.3 
George  Eliot  recognized  the  war  as  one  between  two 
different  civilizations.  She,  too,  believed  the  world  had 
entered  on  that  better  period,  which  would  be  "  marked  in 
future  histories  and  charts  as  the  '  period  of  German  as- 
cendancy.'"4 The  Earl  of  Lytton  saw  the  Teutons  asl 
glorious,  juvenescent;  France,  rotted  by  lies  in  every  fibre 
till  there  remained  to  her  nothing  but  native  ferocity.5 

The  letter  of  Dr.  Friedrich  Strauss  to  M.  Ernest  Renan 
was  much  discussed  in  August  as  affording  an  authorita- 
tive intimation  of  what  could  be  expected  of  the  great 
nation  new  in  its  ascendancy.  The  writer  was  a  German 
Liberal, — one  of  the  Illuminati,  who  could  fairly  be  heard 
on  the  subject.     His  country  waged  a  war  of  ideas,  he 

1  Edmund  Beales,  Times,  Aug.  29,  1870. 

2  Letter  to  Lady  Dunfermline,  Aug.  24,  1870,  Lady  John  Russell,  a 
Memoir  (edited  by  Desmond  McCarthy,  N.  Y.,  ion),  pp.  220-230; 
Banker's  Magazine,  Sept.,  1870,  Arbitration  of  the  Sword,  vol.  xxx, 
pp.  57  et  seq. 

8  Letters  to  Stockmar  and  Malet,  Aug.,  1870,  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robert 
Morier,  pp.  165-177. 

4  Complete  Works  of  George  Eliot  (Edinburgh,  1878-1885),  vol.  xi 
(Life  and  Letters),  p.  551. 

5  Letter  to  Miss  Farrar,  Personal  and  Literary  Letters  of  Robert, 
First  Earl  of  Lytton  (edited  by  Lady  Betty  Balfour,  N.  Y.,  1006),  vol. 
i,  p.  258. 


I32      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [132 

said, — ideas  that  were  shared  by  University  professors, 
statesmen,  generals,  privates,  and  the  populace  alike.  Not 
through  fault  of  hers  was  Germany  driven  to  prove  her 
right  to  unity  by  ordeal  of  battle.  Once  made  a  united 
nation  she  would  speedily  assert  and  establish  a  well  ordered 
freedom.  In  the  course  of  attaining  her  aspirations,  she 
would  have  to  discipline  France  out  of  her  love  of  glory, 
but  would  leave  her  free,  prosperous,  and  contented,  a  pledge 
for  Europe's  safety.  This  was  a  gilding  with  philosophy 
of  Bismarck's  simple  statement  that  a  victorious  Germany 
would  stabilize  the  equilibrium  of  Europe.1 

Strangely  enough,  it  was  this  very  solicitude  for  the 
safety  of  Europe  that  France  advised  as  its  most  stimulat- 
ing motive  in  the  war.  Its  Government  claimed  specifically 
that  it  fought  to  preserve  the  balance  of  power.  It  was 
hoped  that  Gladstone  would  express  some  opinion  of  these 
rival  claims  instead  of  distributing  in  a  thoroughly  neutral 
manner  equal  condemnation  to  both  sides.  Saunders'  re- 
marked that  in  the  midst  of  the  Prime  Minister's  statesman- 
ship, one  called  to  mind  the  valiant  conduct  of  such  leaders 
as  Canning  and  Palmerston.2  The  Manchester  Guardian 
warned  that  the  time  was  past  for  an  English  Minister  to 
exhaust  his  vocabulary  of  epithets  in  praise  of  a  condition 
of  neutrality.3  "  What  a  master  of  rigamarole  he  is,"  said 
Green,  "  nobody  else  could  make  one  wish  Palmerston  alive 
again  as  Gladdie  is  making  everybody  wish  him  just  now."* 

That  the  wish  was  strong  and  prevalent  was  due  not  so 
much  to  the  belief  that  any  especial  value  would  inhere  in 

1  Times,  Aug.,  passim;  Daily  News,   Sept.  1,   1870;  Saunders',  Sept. 
3.  1870. 

*  Aug.  9,  1870. 

*  Aug.  2,  1870. 

4  Letter  to  E.  A.  Freeman,  Aug.,  1870,  Letters  of  John  Richard 
Green,  p.  257. 


!33]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  ^3 

his  opinion  of  the  relative  merits  of  the  two  belligerents; 
not  that  it  was  thought  he  could  infallibly  determine  to  which 
nation  the  sensitive  balance  of  power  could  best  be  trusted, 
but  because  the  Belgian  controversy  had  created  distrust  of 
German  rectitude,  and  because  the  press  and  public  men  of 
Germany  were  showing  contempt  and  hostility  for  Eng- 
land. Palmerston,  it  was  felt,  would  have  rescued  his 
country  from  the  negative  role  Gladstone  had  trained  her 
to.  If  she  blundered  and  blustered,  or  meddled  and  mud- 
dled, as  Disraeli  said  she  had  under  Palmerston,  she  could 
be  no  more  abused  than  she  was  now.  At  home,  John 
Stuart  Mill  blamed  Gladstone  for  not  having  used  the  navy 
as  a  police  force  to  prevent  the  aggression  of  either  Power.1 
Bismarck  scolded  that  England  had  not  stopped  the  war  at 
the  outset  by  telling  Napoleon  that  if  he  broke  the  peace 
he  would  find  her  ranged  with  Germany  as  ally.2  He  pro- 
fessed to  find  it  mortifying  that  the  British  had  so  readily 
undertaken  the  representation  of  France  in  North  Ger- 
many, and  surprised  Lord  Lyons  by  forthwith  entrusting 
German  interests  in  Paris  to  the  care  of  the  American 
Minister.  These  complaints,  which  seem  to  have  had  their 
beginning  at  the  apex  of  the  German  state,  became  wide- 
spread throughout  the  nation  when  the  official  papers  pub- 
lished news  that  England  was  exporting  horses,  coal,  and 
munitions  of  war  to  Havre.  The  press  contrasted  the 
outspoken  judgment  on  the  "  greatest  crime  the  country 
had  witnessed"  with  the  "aside"  utterances  that  booked 
orders  from  France  and  calculated  the  amount  of  a  ten 
percent  profit.3     It  affirmed  that  while  England  served  Ger- 

1  Mill  to  Sir  Chas.  Dilke,  Sept.  30,  1870,  Letters  of  John  Stuart  Mill. 

2  Bismarck  the  Man  and  the  Statesman  (N.  Y.,  1899),  vol.  ii,  p.  60; 
W.  H.  Russell,  My  Diary  during  the  Last  Great  War  (London,  1874), 
p.  494;  Augustus  Loftus  to  Granville,  July  18,  1870,  Fitzmaurice,  op. 
cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  37-38. 

s  Times,  Sept.  2;  also  in  issue  of  Aug.  30,  1870. 


I34     BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [134 

many  with  a  syllabub  of  praise,  the  solid  pudding  went  to 
France.  Complaints  of  this  "merchantlike  conduct"  of 
her  subjects  were  sent  the  Queen  by  her  daughter,  by  the 
Crown  Prince,  and  even  the  King  of  Prussia,  until  she 
became  deeply  distressed.  After  a  letter  from  the  Duke  of 
Coburg  which  pointed  out  the  dangers  that  would  threaten 
England  were  she  deprived  of  German  friendship,  the 
Queen  asked  Granville  if  it  would  not  be  possible  to  make 
some  public  demonstration  to  convince  the  German  people 
of  the  endeavour  to  preserve  neutrality.2  The  Crown  Prin- 
cess, grieved  that  accusations  of  gross  unfairness  were  con- 
tinually leveled  against  Granville,  sent  for  Bismarck  to  say 
her  say  in  his  defence.  He  would  not  believe  her,  and  said 
with  a  smile,  "  But  his  acts  prove  it."  "  It  will  be  long," 
she  wrote  the  Queen,  "  before  people  believe  England  means 
kindly  and  well  by  Germany."  * 

In  the  British  press,  small  effort  was  made  to  defend 
an  international  practice  admittedly  bad,  but  which  England 
had  certainly  not  inaugurated.  Prussia  was  reminded  that 
she  had  shown  herself  quite  as  bourgeois  in  the  Crimean 
War  when  she  had  sold  arms  to  Russia.  It  was  asked  why 
now  she  addressed  no  complaints  to  America,  who  was  ex- 
ercising the  same  prerogative.4  Judged  by  the  logic  of 
common  sense,  British  conduct  was  wrong  but  by  the  ethics 
of  jurists  and  statesmen,  as  the  Economist  pointed  out,  it 
was  well  within  the  bounds  of  neutrality ; 5  and  the  author- 

1  The  Empress  Frederick,  a  Memoir  (London,  1918),  p.  232. 

*  Col.  Ponsonby  to  Granville,  Aug.  3,  1870,  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol. 
ii,  pp.  38-39. 

3  Crown  Princess  to  Queen  Victoria,  Aug.  9,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  38. 

*  Annual  Register  for  1870,  vol.  cxii,  p.  108.  The  British  Ambassador 
at  Washington  informed  Granville  later  that  America's  export  of  arms 
was  expressly  secured  by  a  treaty  with  Prussia. 

*  Aug.  6,  13,  1870. 


135]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  1^ 

ity  of  the  latter  certainly  had  precedent  in  international  law. 
Correspondents  of  the  Times  quoted  Germany's  own 
jurists,  Bluntschli  and  Heffter,  to  show  that  it  was  not  a 
nation's  duty  to  prohibit  the  export  of  contraband.1  The 
Spectator  warned  that  a  check  of  the  export  of  coal  to 
France  would  be  a  violation  of  treaty  provisions.  The 
most  that  could  be'  done, — and  some  such  course1  was 
advocated  by  the  News,  the  Echo,  and  the  Economist,2 
— would  be  for  the  Government  to  avail  itself  of  the 
Customs  Consolidation  Act  (an  Act  never  resorted  to  ex- 
cept when  England  was  on  the  point  of  becoming  a  belli- 
gerent) for  the  prohibition  of  export  of  munitions;  or  to 
extend  the  provisions  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  to 
"  everything  which  sufficient  authority  shall  decide  to  be 
contraband  of  war."  It  was  pointed  out  by  the  Pall  Mall 
Gazette  that  preventive  action,  truly  to  accord  with  neu- 
trality, should  have  been  taken  before  the  war's  inception, 
and  not  now,  when  circumstances  would  make  such  a  course 
tell  heavily  in  Prussia's  favour.3  Lord  Granville's  cir- 
cular in  answer  to  Bernstorff  was  criticised  because  it  stres- 
sed the  difficulty  of  preventing  contraband  from  reaching 
the  ports  of  belligerents,  rather  than  the  immunity  of  muni- 
cipal regulations  from  foreign  interference,  where  no 
special  treaty  or  generally  accepted  rule  of  conduct  pro- 
vided for  the  contrary.4 

The  tone  of  Count  Bismarck,  even  more  than  his  com- 
plaint, was  considered  extraordinary.  "  What  does  Count 
Bismarck  think  to  gain,"  said  the  Spectator, 

by  calling  Englishmen  old  women  and  taunting  us  with  cowardice 

1  E.  C.  Clark,  Cambridge,  to  Times,  Nov.  4,  1870. 

1  Issues  of  Aug.  1,  6,  1,  respectively. 

'Aug.  1,  1870. 

*  Globe  and  Traveller,  Aug.  24,  1870. 


136      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [^6 

and  prophesying  our  subjection?  .  .  .  Does  he  think  Englishmen 
are  Continentals  to  be  driven  into  a  duel  by  a  few  hard  words? 
...  or  is  he  preparing  a  state  of  feeling  in  Germany  which  will 
enable  him,  when  war  is  over,  to  set  England  at  defiance?  1 

The  Pall  Mall  Gazette  expressed  misgivings,  too,  as  to 
what  the  pother  was  about.  "  If  it  had  been  a  popular  out- 
cry in  the  first  instance  there  would  have  been  no  great 
cause  for  surprise,  but  the  impulse  was  given  from  above. 
It  was  the  inspired  papers  that  started  the  agitation ;  and  it 
was  not  only  started  with  singular  promptitude,  but  with 
exceeding  energy."  2  Later  in  the  month,  with  the  contro- 
versy still  unsettled,  Pall  Mall  was  alarmed  by  an  article 
in  the  Hamburg  Borsenhalle  into  believing  that  the  object 
of  Prussia  was  to  convince  its  people  that  for  the  future 
England  could  be  left  out  of  the  account, — that  she  would 
never  act  vigorously  except  when  her  business  interests 
were  concerned.5 

On  the  twenty-seventh  of  August,  the  announcement  of 
the  Count  de  Palikao  to  the  French  Chambers  that  the  Im- 
perial Government  had  purchased  forty  thousand  rifles 
abroad,  gave  fresh  impetus  to  Prussian  protests,4  and 
aroused  a  number  of  leading  papers  to  denounce  a  policy  so 
contradictory  to  Lord  Granville's  earlier  statement  that 
the  bystander  who  furnishes  fresh  weapons  to  a  disarmed 
combatant  should  not  be  considered  as  a  neutral. 

Already,  in  August  of  1870,  England  was  finding  her 
position  so  prickly  that  the  wish  for  war's  early  conclu- 
sion expressed  in  many  of  her  journals  cannot  be  thought  to 
have  been  wholly  unselfish.  On  the  fall  of  the  Ollivier 
Ministry,  which  followed  within  a  few  days  the  defeats  of 

1  Spectator,  Aug.  6,  1870. 

2  Pall  Mall,  Aug.  1,  1870. 
*  Ibid.,  Aug.  25,  1870. 

4  Daily  News,  Aug.  30,  1870. 


137]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  ^ 

Worth  and  Forbach,  many  editorials  expressed  the  hope 
that  this  might  be  the  prelude  to  the  fall  of  the  dynasty. 
An  enforced  abdication,  it  was  urged,  would  be  considered 
by  Prussia  such  an  acknowledgment  of  wrong-doing, — ■ 
such  a  repudiation  of  the  system  represented  by  Gramont 
and  Benedetti, — that  any  further  desire  to  inflict  punishment 
would  be  extinguished.  The  day  of  Ollivier's  resignation, 
it  was  said  in  the  Telegraph  that 

if  the  Imperial  policy  should  be  condemned  and  confounded  be- 
fore the  incensed  national  feeling  of  Germany,  she,  also,  France, 
be  it  remembered,  is  a  great  and  united  nation,  and  she  will  abide- 
when  dynasties  have  passed  away  and  are  done  with.  This  calam- 
ity is  the  Sovereign's  rather  than  hers,  ...  we  foresee  for  her  a 
better  fortune  than  the  one  of  mere  military  fame  and  personal 
glories.1 

The  Times,  adding  the  weight  of  its  influence  to  the  popu- 
larity of  the  Telegraph  to  hasten  the  fall  of  the  tottering 
dynasty,  advised  that  the  Emperor  return  to  Paris  and  as- 
sist his  country  by  an  abdication.  On  August  the  tenth, 
with  the  smug  assumption  that  its  diagnosis  of  the  disease 
of  France  was  correct  and  its  remedy  the  one  that  would 
be  adopted,  it  proffered  advice  to  England : 

There  is  a  duty  incumbent  upon  us  in  such  a  contingency  (a 
change  of  Government  in  France)  from  which,  difficult  as  it 
would  be  in  execution,  no  Ministry  ought  to  shrink.  Germany  has 
never  made  war  upon  France.  The  Emperor  threw  down  the 
challenge.  .  .  .  With  the  retirement  of  the  challenger  the  battle 
ought  to  close. 

The  editorials  of  succeeding  days  were  in  the  same  key. 
France  was  told  that  she  should  not  expect  to  escape  the 
consequences  of  the  acts  of  her  rulers,  and  Germany  that 
she   might   reasonably   require   some   indemnity   "  for  the 

1  Aug.  9,  1870. 


!38      BRITISH  POUCY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [138 

expenses  of  a  war  she  was  challenged  to  fight."  And  the 
Morning  Advertiser  wailed  that  Napoleonism  had  broken 
down,  and  that  the  Emperor  stayed  with  his  army  only  be- 
cause he  was  too  ill  to  travel  and  too  timorous  to  present 
himself  to  the  people  of  Paris.1 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  readiness  with  which  the  by 
no  means,  decisive  defeats  of  the  French  were  seized  upon 
in  a  neutral  country  by  the  main  organ  of  the  Government 
and  the  most  popular  London  daily,  aroused  the  criticism 
of  their  contemporaries.  "  On  the  Continent,"  said  the 
Manchester  Guardian, 

a  declaration  by  the  Times  is  regarded  as  hardly  less  important 
than  if  it  were  made  by  the  Ministers  of  the  Crown,  and  there  is 
no  saying  what  mischief  may  not  already  have  been  done  by  the 
reckless  and  scandalous  suggestion  that  England  now  expects  the 
downfall  of  the  Napoleonic  dynasty.  ...  If  malcontents  in 
Paris  were  only  waiting  for  some  one  bold  enough  to  speak  of 
"  abdication,"  an  English  journal  should  not  have  pronounced 
the  word.2 

The  Conservative  Standard  expressed  regret  that  news- 
papers "professing  to  speak  for  the  party  which  the  Gov- 
ernment represents — known  to  receive  occasional  inspira- 
tion from  the  Government,  come  forward  to  assure  France 
that  her  safety  lies  in  getting  rid  of  her  sovereign."  Eng- 
land's assurance,  it  believed,  that  the  only  way  to  salvation 
led  through  revolution  would  be  interpreted  as  a  piece  of 
outrageous  impertinence.  It  congratulated  Count  Berns- 
torff  on  having  won  the  Liberal  press  to  such  a  "  scandal- 
ous partisanship." 3  The  Sun  begged  that  the  French  be 
left  to  their  own  counsels, — "  to  urge  upon  them  any  in- 
centive to  a  revolutionary  outbreak  is,  at  a  moment  like 

1  Issue  of  Aug.  10,  1870. 
1  Ibid. 
s  Ibid. 


I3q]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  139 

this,  nothing  less  than  criminal." 1  The  organ  of  the 
Church  of  England,  the  Record,  remonstrated  that  there  was 

neither  wisdom  nor  good  feeling  in  seizing  on  the  moment  of  the 
Emperor's  calamity  ...  to  call  for  his  "  abdication  ".  .  .  .  He 
has  ever  been  to  England  a  loyal  and  steadfast  ally  .  .  .  much 
more  friendly,  both  in  his  avowals  and  his  public  acts,  than  either 
the  old  Bourbons  or  the  Orleanists.2 

"  Tout  pent  se  retablir,"  the  Emperor  had  said  after  the 
defeat  of  Worth.  But  the  victory  that  he  needed  to  re- 
establish the  confidence  of  his  soldiers  and  his  people  and 
to  refute  the  croakings  of  the  Times  and  News,  was  not  to 
be  won.  The  siege  of  Strasburg  was  begun  on  the  tenth  of 
August ;  on  the  next  day  the  Germans  captured  Fort  Lichten- 
burg.  On  the  eighteenth,  the  French  suffered  another  de- 
feat at  Gravelotte,  and  the  following  day  Strasburg  was1 
under  bombardment.  On  the  twenty-ninth,  Marshall  Mac- 
Mahon  was  defeated  at  Beaumont,  and  two  days  later 
Bazaine  failed  to  make  his  way  through  the  forces  investing 
Metz.  All  this  to  a  running  accompaniment  of  verbal  shell 
fire  from  the  Liberal  press  of  neutral  England.  The  Daily 
News,  in  joining  its  sonorous  voice  to  the  Io  Victis,  assured 
France  that  she  was  without  a  ruler, — that  in  Paris  men 
screamed  out  their  conviction  that  no  good  could  be  done 
until  the  country  rid  itself  of  the  Bonapartes.  Napoleon's 
mind,  said  the  News,  had  lost  its  grip, — 

He  is  like  an  enchanter  deserted  by  his  familiar  ...  a  pitiable 
sight  striking  vainly  with  his  broken  sword  at  his  dreadful  antag- 
onist. All  the  Liberal  feeling  of  England  and  Europe  regards 
the  Emperor  as  the  real  cause  of  the  disasters  of  France,  and  be- 
lieves that  the  very  calamities  which  attend  his  fall  may  regen- 
erate the  nation.3 

1  Aug.  11,  1870. 

*  Aug.  10,  1870. 

•  Issues  of  Aug.  17,  20,  1870. 


I4q      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [140 

Judy  added  her  shrill  piping  to  the  chorus,  and  in  thin  verse 
exclaimed : 

"  If  vict'ry  crowns  his  aims,  then  shout  Hurrah ! 
If  conquered?    then  Napoleon  a  bas.'' 1 

Throughout  the  cheap  news  and  tobacco  shops  of  London 
there  were  distributed  in  enormous  quantities  caricatures 
showing  his  Imperial  Majesty  hobbling  on  crutches,  with 
a  hump  on  his  back  in  the  fashion  of  Mr.  Punch,  and  little 
Louis  carried  pick-a-back.2  When  Napoleon's  detractors 
ranged  from  the  Lord  Chief  Justice,  who  rejoiced  at  the 
collapse  of  a  "  militaristic  villain,"  to  the  cockney  cabbies, 
who  bought  these  prints,  those  who  professed  still  to  see 
health  in  his  cause  were  hard  put  to  it  to  defend  him.  Con- 
sidering the  importance  of  the  Times,  the  News,  and  the 
Telegraph,  and  the  comparatively  small  circulation  of  the 
aristocratic  Court  Journal,  this  paper  showed  some  audacity 
in  naming  as  "  small  spiteful  little  birds  "  those  who  had 
"  pounced  upon  the  wounded  eagle,"  and  had  suggested  his 
abdication  as  a  means  of  escape  from  further  humiliation. 
On  behalf  of  the  gentlemen  of  England  it  apologized  for  the 
language  of  a  fraction  of  the  English  press  and  assured  the 
world  that  it  was  "  unindorsed  by  the  best  classes  of 
society."3  The  Liverpool  Albion*  from  a  lower  rung  in 
the  social  ladder,  showed  by  its  criticism  of  the  larger  dail- 
ies, that  Napoleon  could  still  count  friends  among  other  than 
the  denizens  of  Mayfair.  From  beyond  the  English 
boundaries,  the  Weekly  Freeman  and  the  Irish  Nation 
echoed  their  rebukes.     The  papers  of  Ireland  thought  the 

1  Judy,  Aug.  17,  1870. 

'Daily  News,  Aug.  18,  1870. 

*  Court  Journal,  Aug.  20,  1870. 

4  Quoted  in  Evening  Mail,  Dublin,  Aug.  12,  1870. 

1  The  paper's  policy  won  the  commendation  of  the  Irish  Nation. 


I4I]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  141 

abuse  of  Napoleon  had  been  so  prolonged  that,  were  it  really 
not  representative  of  English  feeling,  it  should  receive 
public  repudiation.1 

It  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  discontent  from  a  quarter 
so  little  influential  could  have  done  much  to  temper  the  tone 
of  the  British  press.  But  some  moderation  was  noted  late 
in  the  month,  and  Judy,  at  least,  believed  the  change  was 
due  to  Ireland.     In  her  edition  of  the  thirty-^first  she  says: 

Circumstances  have  made  our  wise  rulers  aware  that  there  is 
danger  in  these  incitements  to  revolution,  and  the  lesson  sought  to 
he  taught  to  the  French  may  be  learnt  nearer  home  —  in  Ireland. 
So  the  word  has  gone  forth  that  the  revolution  game  must  now  be 
abandoned  and  accordingly  the  Ministerial  papers  are  now  en- 
deavoring to  make  their  readers  believe  they  have  never  done  any- 
thing so  naughty  as  to  advise  the  subjects  of  a  sovereign  with 
whom  we  are  on  terms  of  amity  to  dethrone  him.2 

This  change  for  which  Judy's  intuition  found  a  reason,  was 
remarked  on,  also,  by  the  Manchester  Guardian  in  its  issue 
of  the  twenty-fifth,  but  without  speculation  as  to  its  cause. 
Perhaps  it  was  due  not  so  much  to  fear  of  upheavals  in 
Ireland  as  to  the  reception  that  was  given  to  the  Times  and 
the  News  when  they  attempted  to  garb  themselves  in  the 
white  robes  of  peacemakers. 

On  the  seventeenth  of  the  month  the  greatest  of  London 
dailies  advanced  the  claim  of  England  to  a  peculiar  fitness 
to  the  role  of  mediator,  and  urged  the  Government  not  to 
shirk  from  the  difficulties  and  responsibilities  of  such  a  posi- 
tion. M.  Benedetti  was  in  England  at  this  time.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Times,  he  left  Calais  two  days  before  and  visited 
Granville  at  Walmer  Castle  where  Bernstorff  went  to  meet 

1  Weekly  Freeman,  Aug.  27,  1870;  Nation,  Aug.  20,  1870. 

1  Judy,  Aug.  31,  1870.  The  tendency  to  circle  that  was  displayed  in 
this  and  other  instances  by  London's  best  known  journal  was  called 
"  curvature  of  the  Times." 


I42      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [142 

him.  The  Manchester  Guardian  reported  that  Prince 
Murat  was  a  visitor  at  the  Castle  on  the  eighteenth.1  The 
day  that  the  Times  chose  for  its  advocacy  of  British  media- 
tion, the  Birmingham  Daily  Post  stated  that  already  the 
Government's  attempts  had  failed  and  the  Queen's  mes- 
sengers had  returned  from  Berlin.  The  Prussian  King  and 
his  Minister  had  balked  proceedings  by  declaring  that  if 
Napoleon  wished  for  peace  he  must  ask  for  an  armistice 
in  the  usual  way.  The  accuracy  of  the  Birmingham  paper 
seems  somewhat  doubtful  since,  surely,  if  such  a  decisive 
answer  had  been  determined  on,  Bernstorff  would  not  have 
been  permitted  to  meet  Benedetti,  and  had  it  been  com- 
municated to  England,  the  Times,  as  Ministerial  organ, 
would  have  been  deterred  from  urging  mediation.  The 
Standard  of  the  eighteenth  denied  that  any  foundation 
whatever  existed  for  the  story  that  the  English  Govern- 
ment had  tendered  its  good  offices.  Whether  the  Birming- 
ham paper  had  really  achieved  a  "  scoop  "  in  chronicling  the 
failure  of  negotiations  that  the  Governmental  papers  were 
not  allowed  to  notice,  and  the  Times  had  been  "  inspired  " 
to  urge  mediation  in  an  effort  to  frighten  a  nation  that 
showed  itself  recalcitrant,  rumours  were  so  rife  that,  on  the 
old  proverb  of  fire  and  smoke,  it  may  be  hazarded  that 
the  Standard  was  overly  confident  in  its  absolute  denial. 
Biographers  of  the  English  Ministers  could  have  done  much 
to  clear  the  mystery,  but  they  are  alike  silent  on  the  mes- 
sages sent  to  Berlin  and  on  what  passed  when  the  lights 
burned  long  in  Granville's  castle,  overlooking  the  Straits 
of  Dover. 

The  papers  favorable  to  France  were  those  most  un- 
favorable to  any  attempt  at  mediation  in  the  midst  of  de- 
feats which  they  believed  could  be  redeemed.  The  Pall  Mall 
Gazette  of  the  seventeenth  thought  it  improbable  that  Napo- 

1        l  Manchester  Guardian,  Aug.  20,  1870. 


143]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  I43 

leon  would,  at  this  time,  find  it  acceptable,  and  doubtful 
whether  England,  if  she  intervened,  could  do  so  only  for  such 
a  period  and  for  such  a  purpose  as  she  might  desire.  From 
north  of  the  Tweed,  the  Scotsman  with  his  native  caution, 
was  wary  of  the  violent  efforts  of  the  Times  to  share  in  the 
blessings  of  the  peace  maker.     It  remarked  that  its  power- 
ful contemporary  had  systematically  fallen  foul  of  France 
from  the  first, — had  blamed  her  for  vaingloriously  forcing 
war  on  an  unready  enemy  and  now  that  France,  herself, 
was  seen  to  have  been  ill  prepared,  had  told  her  she  was 
beaten  and  should  sue  to  Germany  not  to  punish  her  longer. 
It  believed  the  present  judgment  of  the  Times  might  prove 
as  fallible  as  had  been  her  estimate  of  the  military  situation 
the  month  before.1     In  its  disparagement  of  the  French 
chance  for  success  the  Morning  Post  believed  the  Times 
was  jumping  at  conclusions  which  the  German  commanders 
would  be  glad  to  arrive  at,  and  found  it  "  unbecoming  of 
gentlemen  sitting  at  their  desks  in  London  to  put  forth 
statements  so  unpleasant  and  so  unfounded  with  regard  to 
the     military    position     of     our     quondam     ally."2     The 
Dublin  Evening  Mail  may  be  considered  as  largely  repre- 
sentative of  Irish  opinion  when  it  expressed  confidence  that 
the  Times  would  not  be  permitted  to  drag  England  into  the 
quarrel  by  precipitating  an  impertinent  and  uncalled-for  in- 
tervention.3 

She  was  not.     The  mysterious  interviews  came  to  noth- 
ing.    Judy  might  urge  grandiloquently  that  England 

"  Step  forth  with  stern  but  friendly  mediation 
And  earn  the  gratitude  of  every  nation !" 

1  Weekly  Scotsman,  Aug.  20,  1870. 

*  Morning  Post,  Aug.  18,  1870. 

3  Evening  Mail,  Aug.  17,  1870.     The  opposite  opinion  was  expressed 
in  its  issue  of  Aug.  12. 


I44      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [144 

But  the  painful  rhyme  remained  unproductive.  There  wa3 
no  stepping  forth, — only  whispers  so  low  and  so  discreet 
that  at  this  far-off  time  one  cannot  give  their  import  but 
only  say  that  they  existed. 

Already  there  was  shadowed  the  dark  reason  that  was  to 
make  mediation  a  thing  so  difficult  no  nation  would  aspire 
to  press  it  openly,  and  peace  a  thing  so  dear  that  France 
might  be  expected  to  fight  unto  exhaustion.  On  the 
fifteenth  of  August,  the  day  Benedetti  set  sail  for  Dover, 
an  Irish  paper  commented  on  the  proclamation  of  the 
Prussian  King  abolishing  conscription  in  Alsace  as  fore- 
boding an  intention  to  reannex  that  province.  On  succeed- 
ing days,  British  papers  found  matter  for  reflection  in  his  ap- 
pointment of  Prussian  governors  for  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 
It  was  remarked  by  the  Telegraph  on  the  twentieth,  that 
in  the  King's  reply  to  a  papal  offer  of  mediation  he  had 
expressed  a  willingness  for  peace  at  whatever  time  guaran- 
tees would  be  given  him  against  future  attack  from  France. 
Even  those  papers  that  had  most  consistently  supported 
Prussia  showed  alarm.  "  A  province  cannot  nowadays  be 
transferred  when  its  inhabitants  protest  against  the  trans- 
fer," said  the  Times, 

and  even  if  we  could  suppose  the  change  formally  made,  it  would 
undo  all  the  benefits  of  peace.  .  .  .  The  transfer  of  Alsace  from 
France  to  Germany,  were  it  possible,  would  violate  the  essential 
principle  of  respect  for  national  sovereignty  now  universally 
acknowledged,  and  would  be  incompatible  with  the  permanent 
maintenance  of  peace.1 

And  the  News  expressed  fear  that  if  Alsace  were  granted 
Germany,  that  country,  whose  praise  she  had  so  lustily  been 
singing,  might  grant  a  sop  to  French  jealousy  and  pride  at 
the  expense  of  neutral  territory.2    If  the  principle  of  nation- 

1  Times,  Aug.  18,  1870. 

*  Daily  News,  Aug.  18,  1870. 


j  45]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  145 

ality  launched  by  Napoleon  was  proving  a  boomerang  for 
his  undoing,  the  Draft  Treaty,  also,  was  showing  remark- 
able dexterity  in  curving  back  to  the  detriment  of  Prussia. 
Britain  speculated  on  devices  that  would  provide  security 
without  too  deeply  wounding  France.     The  Economist  re- 
cords that  a  rumor  was  current  at  the  beginning  of  the  week 
to  the  effect  that  the  Government  favored  the  creation  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  into  a  neutral  state,1 — a  sort  of  apple 
of  discord  to  be  equidistantly  poised  between  the  two  com- 
petitors.    Only  fear  was  at  the  basis  of  the  rumor, — fear 
of  the  thing  even  "  Jupiter  "  named  briefly  and  hesitatingly 
as  being  too  dreadful  for  discussion.     Sir  Robert  Morier, 
in  a  letter  of  the  twenty-first,  wrote  that  this  contingency 
which  was  alarming  England  was  one  that  he  had  long  fore- 
seen.    He  proclaimed  himself  "  heart  and  soul "  with  Ger- 
many, "  but  he  was  not  blind  to  the  danger  of  her  taking 
over  two  provinces  the  inhabitants  of  which  were  more 
Gallic  than  the  Gauls,  because,  being  Germans,  they  could 
add    a    peculiarly    Teutonic    blatancy    to    their    French 
character."  2  John  Richard  Green,  though  rejoicing  at  Prus- 
sian success  as  the  victories  of  truth,  right,  and  intelligence, 
was  as  vehement  as  Morier  against  any  snatching  at  pro- 
vinces in  the  old  style  of  Louis  XIV.     "The  people  of 
Alsace,"  he  said,  are  French  to  the  core.     "Men  are  not 
cattle — even  if  they  have  the  ill-luck  to  be  Frenchmen."3 
Another  historian,  W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  while  dutifully  chorus- 
sing  pleasure  at  victories  that  would  "  raise  the  moral  level 
of  civilization,"  expressed  deep  compassion  for  France,  and 
especially  for  the  peasants  in  the  districts  under  invasion. 

1  Economist,  Aug.  27,  1870. 

*  Morier  to   Stockmar,   Darmstadt,    Aug.   21,    1870,   Memoirs   of  Sir 
Robert  Morier,  vol.  ii,  pp.  165-166. 

3  Green  to  E.  A.  Freeman,  Aug.  31,  1870,  Letters  of  J.  R.  Green,  pp. 
.259-261. 


I46     BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [146 

"  I  do  not  like  Bismarck,"  he  declared.  "  I  think  the  bom- 
bardment of  Strasburg  was  very  bad,  and  that  of  Paris 
would  be  much  worse.  I  am  very  anxious  to  see  whether 
the  Germans  will  prove  moderate  and  magnanimous  in 
peace."  x  From  the  editorial  office  of  the  Fortnightly,  John 
Morley  joined  his  voice  in  protesting  against  "  anything 
like  revindication  of  territory  in  Alsace  or  elsewhere  in 
consolidated  France,"  which,  he  believed,  ought  "  to  en- 
counter the  most  energetic  protests  from  the  entire  public 
opinion  of  Europe."  2 

So  it  was  that  the  last  of  August  found  England  watch- 
ing Prussian  movements  with  more  of  interest,  but  some- 
thing less  of  sympathy  than  she  had  felt  at  the  month's 
beginning.  She  could  not  so  wholeheartedly  applaud  a 
war  for  the  unification  of  Germany,  were  that  war  to  re- 
sult, also,  in  a  partial  disintegration  of  France.  There 
were,  too,  raisons  de  coeur  for  a  change  of  sentiment. 
Statesmen,  who  had  served  a  gay  apprenticeship  as  care- 
less attaches  in  brilliant  Paris;  green  grocers,  who  had 
stolen  across  the  Channel  for  one  blithe  holiday;  women, 
who  cherished  bits  of  gauze  and  lace,  instinct  with  the 
beauty  that  is  French,  had  pity  for  the  bel  royaume  so 
grievously  invaded.  Undoubtedly,  there  existed  in  Eng- 
land strong  sentiment  against  that  territorial  aggrandize^ 
ment  which  Granville,  during  his  league  making,  had  assured 
Prussia  his  Government  was  not  concerned  with.  England 
knew  nothing  of  the  strictures  that  had  been  laid  on  her 
by  that  "gentlemen's  agreement."  Her  Parliament  had 
been  prorogued  on  the  eleventh  without  its  mention,  and 
the  press  was  uninformed. 

The  shift  in  opinion  is  the  more  creditable  since  it  had 

1  Elizabeth  Lecky,  Memoirs  of  IV.  H.  Lecky  (N.  Y.,  1909),  p.  86. 
1  Fortnightly  Revietv,   Sept.   1,  1870,  France  and  Germany,  vol.  xiv,. 
pp.  367-376. 


I47]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  147 

nothing  to  do  with  the  immediate  value  of  the  pound  sterl- 
ing. By  the  second  week  in  August,  the  unsteadiness  fol- 
lowing the  first  great  panic  on  war's  declaration  was  well 
past.  An  unhealthy  mania  for  speculation  had  diminished. 
Prices  on  the  Stock  Exchange  were  steady.  The  change 
implied  that  French  success  had  been  more  dreaded  than 
Prussian  by  the  monied  interests.  Trade  in  coal  and  iron 
had  received  a  direct  impetus,  and  that  in  textiles  was  in- 
directly benefited  because  of  the  handicap  imposed  on  rival 
manufacturers.  Before  the  middle  of  the  month  the  Bank 
of  France  suspended  specie  payment  and  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land was  relieved  of  the  strain  of  competition  for  the  pre- 
cious metals.  Both  France  and  Prussia  contracted  great 
war  loans  to  British  advantage.1  Only  the  tailors  and 
certain  clerks  in  City  offices,  who  were  suffering  from  an 
influx  of  German  competitors  had  reasons  economic  for 
wishing  well  to  France.2 

Temporary  disturbances  were,  of  course,  to  be  looked 
for  the  week  before  Sedan.  The  stock  markets  were  in  a 
state  of  depression  pending  the  result  of  the  great  battle, 
which  it  was  believed  would  soon  be  fought.  The  stage 
was  set  for  the  last  act  of  the  "  circus  manager,"  and  Eng- 
land watched  in  a  tense  hush  of  expectation.  Even  so,  the 
disaster  of  September  the  second  was  so  complete  that  the 
expectant  were  astounded.  The  news,  published  in  the 
papers  of  the  next  morning,  was  that  not  only  had  the  Em- 
peror surrendered,  but  an  entire  army  of  almost  a  hundred 
thousand  men  had  been  made  prisoners  of  war.  The 
capitulation  was  not  confirmed  for  some  days,  and  in  Ire- 
land the  newspaper  offices  were  surrounded  each  night  at 
dusk  by  crowds  that  waited  for  hours  to  read  the  hateful 

1  Illustrated  London  News,  Aug.  20,  1870;  Spectator  and  Economist, 
Aug.  13,  1870;  Annual  Review,  1870,  vol.  cxii,  p.  79. 

*  Daily  News,  Aug.  31,  1870. 


I48      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [148 

bulletins  and  tear  them  down,  because  their  news  con- 
tinued stubbornly  unpleasant.  Windows  were  smashed  and 
the  matter  was  made  the  subject  of  an  editorial  by  Saun- 
ders'.1 

In  London,  wise  and  prudent  Englishmen  were  either 
sympathetic  or  silent  on  the  great  victory ;  but  in  more  than 
one  instance,  notably  at  the  entrance  to  the  Alhambra  be- 
fore the  curtain  went  up  for  the  evening's  performance, 
a  too  freely  declared  admiration  of  the  Prussians  led  to 
something  like  a  melee.  The  Queen,  always  slow  in  her 
royal  progress,  had  had  no  news,  on  the  third,  of  the  great 
battle,  but  presented  her  readers  with  full-page  portraits  of 
the  King  of  Prussia  and  his  defeated  rival.  The  former 
wore  his  mustache  curling  up,  like  optimistic  steers'  horns ; 
the  latter  wore  his  with  pointed  ends  down-drooping  as 
badge  of  mourning  for  the  calamity  of  the  day  before.  As 
England  gazed  on  Napoleon's  enigmatic  face  with  its  theat- 
rical hirsute  adornments,  she  saw  that  it  was  old  and  very 
weary.  She  believed  the  whirligig  of  time  would  never 
bring  to  him  revenge.  The  papers  were  filled  with  pseudo 
mortuary  notices  that  were  read  to  the  accompaniment  of 
German  bands  that  blared  Die  Wacht  am  Rhem  trium- 
phantly. They  chronicled  his  life's  events;  praised  him 
for  a  friendliness  to  England  that  she  had  sometimes  dis- 
regarded; recalled  his  endeavours  to  extend  French  trade, 
to  increase  her  industry,  and  develop  her  agriculture,  his 
efforts  to  promote  international  goodwill.  Soon  the 
poets  were  busy  with  him, — first  the  penny-a-liners  who 
wrote  on  order  for  the  press,  and  later  the  greater  ones, 
Browning  and  Buchanan,  who  wrote  more  ably  and  for 
longer  time.2  Surely  when  the  poets  weave  sonnets  of  a 
man's  life  the  fates  cease  to  find  its  thread  of  interest. 

1  Sounders',  Sept.  7,  1870. 

2  Robert  Browning,  Prince  Hohenstiel  Schwangau,  Saviour  of  Society, 


149]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  I4q 

Scattered  through  the  obituaries  were  some  that  were 
not  complimentary.  Once  a  Week  described  the  Emperor 
as  retiring  to  his  sarcophagus,  undismayed  by  the  ruin  he 
had  brought  on  France,  comforted  by  his  eternal  cigarette, 
his  belief  in  fatalism,  and  the  possession  of  a  large  fortune 
in  English  funds.  It  quoted  the  witty  verse  now  popular 
with  the  Parisians: 

"  Les  deux  Napoleons  les  gloires  sont  egales, 
Quoiqu'  ayant  pris  les  chemins  inegaux ; 
L'un  de  l'Europe  pris  les  capitales, 
L'autre  au  pays  a  prix  les  capitaux."  1 

His  personal  wealth  was  denied  by  the  Times,  which  did 
him  the  tardy  justice  to  admit  that,  though  for  so  long  a 
period  he  had  distributed  the  favors  of  the  most  splendid 
state  in  Europe,  he  had  suffered  little  of  her  gold  to  cleave 
to  his  hands.2  The  ignominious  end  of  this  Caesar  who 
as  Fun  had  said,  "  '  cried  Havoc,  and  let  slip  the  dogs  of 
war ' '  3  was  an  excellent  theme  for  the  moralists, — some- 
thing to  rattle  the  bones  of  all  the  old  quotations  gathering 
dust  in  editorial  closets.  The  Arews  sermonized  on  vaulting 
ambition  that  o'erleaps  itself  and  falls  on  the  other  side,  and 
had  a  goodly  following  of  imitators.4  But  the  utterances 
of  Polonius  soon  pall.  If  it  may  be  permitted  to  turn  the 
clock  of  public  opinion  slightly  forward,  more  interest  will 

Complete  Poetical  Works  (N.  Y.,  1917),  p.  907;  Mrs.  S.  Orr,  Robert 
Browning,  Life  and  Letters  (N.  Y.,  1891),  pp.  425-426;  W.  Hall  Griffin 
and  H.  C.  Minchin,  Life  of  Robert  Browning  (London,  1911),  p.  244; 
Robert  Buchanan,  Complete  Poetical  Works  (London,  1901),  vol.  i, 
Political  Mystics,  Songs  of  the  Terrible  Year,  pp.  295-347,  also  a  drama, 
Napoleon  Fallen. 

1  Once  a  Week,  Sept.  17,  1870. 

*  Times,  Sept.  21,  1870;  Economist,  Oct.  22,  1870. 

3  Fun,  July  30,  1870. 

4  Daily  News,  Sept.  3,  5,  1870. 


!  5q      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [  1 50 

be  found  in  the  details  of  Napoleon's  last  days  as  Emperor 
that  reached  England  somewhat  later. 

Green  was  fortunate  in  having  an  account  from  the 
French  historian,  Gabriel  Monod,  who  was  serving  with  a 
French  Protestant  Ambulance  at  Roncourt,  near  Beaumont, 
when  the  French  soldiers  came  pouring  in,  "  weary,  starved, 
mutinous."  They  had  had  no  rations  for  two  days,  and 
plundered  the  fields  for  potatoes,  and  then  flung  them- 
selves down  to  sleep  as  best  they  might.  The  Imperial 
Staff  came  clattering  down  the  street,  with  Napoleon,  old, 
way-worn,  covered  with  dust,  pasty-pale,  his  moustache 
gray-white.  All  night  long  thousands  came  straggling  in. 
At  early  morning  the  Emperor's  horse  was  called  for,  and 
Monod  saw  the  suite  appear  all  spick  and  span  in  the  midst 
of  the  mob  of  soldiery.  Napoleon  was  painted  to  the 
eyes,  his  hair  and  moustache  dyed  and  waxed  again.  Only 
one  or  two  peasants  cried  out  a  viva  for  him,  and  they  were 
answered  by  the  grim  looks  and  the  curses  of  the  soldiers. 
Some  shouted  "  a  bas  l' assassin! "  On  his  way  to  his  horse, 
he  passed  a  group  of  officers  and  made  a  low  salute,  but 
none  responded.1 

Another  vignette  came  from  Archibald  Forbes,  who 
wrote  for  the  Advertiser  and  the  News.  He  describes 
Napoleon  in  front  of  the  weaver's  hut,  where  he  had  his 
interview  with  Bismarck  and  arranged  for  his  surrender. 
A  half  troop  of  the  Slesvig  regiment  of  Life  Guards  formed 
a  semicircle  around  the  house,  while  the  lieutenant  and 
two  of  his  dismounted  men  marched  up  to  the  cottage  wall 
behind  the  Emperor's  chair  to  halt  and  draw  their  swords. 
The  Emperor  flushed  and  glanced  backward,  as  though  he 
did  not  half  like  these  German  tactics.  His  barber  told 
Forbes, — and   the   fact   was   confirmed  by  reports  of   the 

1  Green  to  E.  A.  Freeman,  Letters  of  J.  R.  Green,  pp.  263  et  seq. 


ISi]  THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  EMPIRE  j$i 

enemy, — that  Napoleon  had  conducted  himself  worthily 
at  Sedan,  had  directed  guns  with  his  own  hand,  and  kept 
continually  under  fire.  But  he  had  found  his  army  honey- 
combed with  socialism,  and  desirous  of  a  republic.  Many 
regiments  would  not  follow  their  officers.  It  was  Wimp- 
ffen,  not  MacMahon,  who  had  to  make  the  surrender, 
for  the  latter  had  been  wounded  in  an  attempt  to  rally 
some  of  the  disaffected.  In  Paris,  there  had  been  such 
vivas  for  the  war  and  for  himself,  that  he  had  chosen 
to  avoid  the  main  thoroughfares  on  his  journeyings  from 
St.  Cloud  to  the  Tuileries,  the  day  before  he  had  set  forth. 
He  thought  he  moved  in  the  popular  direction,  that  he  would 
lead  an  army  well  equipped,  eager  for  glory.1  Count  Bis- 
marck reported  that  Napoleon  told  him  at  the  weaver's  cot- 
tage that  he  never  desired  the  war,  that  he  was  forced  into 
it  by  his  people.  Again,  and  again,  he  repeated,  "  On  ma 
trompc,  on  m'a  trompc." 2 

It  is  hard  not  to  give  him  some  dole  of  sympathy.  Mixed 
warp  and  woof,  Punch  called  him,3  and  it  might  seem  from 
his  early  writings  that  fine  ideas  and  good  intentions  might 
have  won  for  him  lasting  honour,  had  not  the  old  Napoleonic 
legend  warped  them  hopelessly.  "  No  one  O'f  the  ex-royal- 
ties now  scattered  about  the  country  is  a  less  deserving  sub- 
ject of  sympathy  and  regret,"  said  Froude  in  Fraser's.* 
But  Froude's  epitaphs  have  a  way  of  getting  themselves  re- 
written by  posterity.  As  the  Spectator  said,  the  Emperor 
had  spent  two- thirds  of  his  life  in  dreaming  of  power  and 
the  remainder  in  exercising  it  to  such  poor  purpose  that  he 

1  Archibald  Forbes,  My  Experience  of  the  War  between  France  and 
Germany,  vol.  i,  pp.  253-254. 

2  Blanchard  Jerrold,  At  Home  in  Paris,  vol.  ii,  p.  13. 

3  Punch,  Sept.  17,  1870. 

*  Fraser's  Magazine,  Jan.,  1870,  Personal  History  of  Imperialism  in 
1870. 


1 52      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [  i  $2 

had  made  all  the  mistakes  he  had  inveighed  against  be- 
fore his  succession.1  Had  the  gods  loved  him  and  taken 
him  away  while  he  was  yet  Louis  Napoleon,  he  would  have 
been  looked  back  upon  as  the  most  promising  of  prince  pre- 
tenders. Circumstances  alter  personalities,  and  the  British 
were,  perhaps,  saner  in  their  judgment  when  they  con- 
demned a  system  that  made  the  fate  of  a  nation  depend  on 
one  man  only,  than  when  they  croaked  abuse  of  the  "  in- 
valid adventurer,"  the  "  Emperor  of  the  despot  brood." a 
and  the  "  crowned  colossal  thing  that  crawls."  3 

The  best  of  epitaphs  was  spoken  across  the  Channel  by 
one  of  the  officers  of  the  army  that  was,  in  the  appropri- 
ately inaccurate  French  of  King  William's  note  to  Napo- 
leon, "si  bravcment  battue  sur  vous  ordres."  *  It  was  the 
single  sentence  of  an  old  officer,  who  flinging  his  head  far 
back  to  inhale  the  fine  air  of  the  morning,  exclaimed  grate- 
fully, "  One  breathes  better."  5 

1  Spectator,  Sept.  io,  1870. 

2  W.  C.  Bennett  in  Literary  World,  Sept.  16,  1870. 

*  Rodien  Noel,  Sedan,  St.  Paul's  Magazine,  vol.  viii,  p.  162. 

*  Graphic,  Sept.  24,  1870. 

'  Spectator,  Sept.  10,  1870. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Reception  of  the  Republic 

After  the  great  victory  of  September,  royal  headquar- 
ters were  established  in  the  old  cathedral  city  of  Rheims, 
and  for  a  week  a  pause  was  made  while  men  asked  them- 
selves whether  the  war  was  at  an  end.  When  the  German 
soldiery  had  learned  the  Emperor  was  caught  in  the  mouse 
trap  of  Sedan,  there  had  broken  out  among  them  the  wild- 
est exhibition  of  delight;  for  they  believed  his  capture 
would  end  hostilities  and  make  possible  a  return  to  their 
homes.  It  was  remembered  that  the  King  had  proclaimed 
that  he  did  not  war  with  the  peace-loving  people  of  France 
but  their  ruler,  and  their  own  anger  had  been  stirred  not 
against  France  but  against  the  odious  Minister  of  the  Em- 
peror, M.  Benedetti,  who  had  insulted  their  aged  King. 
They  believed  that  France,  too,  was  eager  for  the  war  to 
end.  There  remained  the  matter  of  an  indemnity  to  be 
arranged,  a  treaty  to  be  signed  with  the  Empress  Regent,  or 
whomever  the  French  might  appoint  their  representative, 
the  attaching  of  red  seals  and  ribbons,  and  a  gay  return  to 
their  homes.1 

The  spotlight  must  be  shifted  from  an  army  that  marked 
time  and  waited  to  a  capital  where  civilians  were  about  to 
take  into  their  hands  the  command  the  Emperor  had  let  slip. 
The  officer  whom  he  had  appointed  Adjutant  General  of 

1  Archibald  Forbes.  My  Experience  of  the  War  between  France  and 
Germany,  vol.  i,  pp.  260-261 ;  C.  E.  Ryan,  With  an  Ambulance  during 
the  Franco-Prussian  War,  p.  362. 

153]  153 


! 54      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [  1 54 

the  Palace  before  setting  out  on  his  campaign,  had  been 
impatient  for  more  active  service.  Napoleon  comforted 
him  with  the  intimation  that  he  would,  perhaps,  find  greater 
danger  at  his  post  in  Paris  than  on  the  field  of  battle.1  On 
the  morning  of  the  fourth  of  September  this  General  must 
have  given  the  Emperor  credit  for  his  prescience.  Sir 
Charles  Dilke  stood  that  day  with  Labouchere  in  front  of 
the  Grand  Hotel  on  the  Boulevard  and  watched  the  fall  of 
Empire.     He  describes  it  for  his  grandmother. 

A  battalion  of  fat  National  Guards  from  the  centre  of  Paris, 
shop  keepers  all,  marched  firmly  past,  quietly  grunting,  "  L' abdi- 
cation !  L'abdication !"  They  were  soon  followed  by  a  battalion 
from  the  outskirts  marching  faster,  and  gaining  on  them  to  the 
cry  of  "  Pas  d'abdication !  La  decheance!  La  decheance!"  .  .  . 
We  stood  just  in  front  of  the  cavalry,  that  was  partly  composed 
of  mounted  Gendarmerie  of  the  Seine  .  .  .  and  kept  watching 
their  faces  to  see  whether  they  were  likely  to  fire  or  charge,  but  at 
last  the  men  began,  one  by  one,  to  sheathe  their  swords,  and  to 
cry,  "  Vive  la  Republique!"  and  the  Captain  in  command  at  last 
cried  "Vive  la  Republique!"  too,  and  withdrew  his  men,  letting 
the  crowd  swarm  over  the  bridge. 

The  Revolution  was  accomplished.  The  Englishman 
joined  those  who  went  sweeping  over  the  bridge  and  sing- 
ing the  Marseillaise  in  such  a  chorus  as  had  never  been 
heard  before.  "  They  halted  in  front  of  the  Chambers,  and 
after  ten  minutes  parley  inside,  the  leaders  returned,  and 
chalked  upon  one  of  its  great  columns  the  names  of  the 
representatives  of  Paris  declared  to  constitute  the  Pro- 
visional Government  ....  The  crowd  demanded  the  ad- 
dition of  Rochefort's  name,  and  it  was  added."  After  that 
he  followed  on  to  the  statue  of  Strasburg  that  was  decor- 
ated with  flowers,  in  recognition  of  the  gallant  defence  the 
city  was  still  making,  and  then  to  the  Tuileries.     A  Turco 

1  Capt.  the  Hon.  D.  Bingham,  Recollections  of  Paris,  p.  164. 


I55]  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  ^5 

detained  them  at  the  gates  by  dancing  in  front  of  the  crowd, 
but  finally  they  grew  impatient  and  insisted  on  entering  the 
private  gardens,  so  the  gates  were  thrown  open,  and  the 
crowd  swept  in,  and  up  into  the  palace,  and  through  each 
grand  apartment.  Nothing  was  touched,  for  guards  had 
been  stationed  everywhere,  and  the  people  respected  the 
power  of  the  new  Republic.  It  was  all  most  satisfactory. 
"I  would  not  have  missed  yesterday  for  the  world,"  Sir 
Charles  wrote  to  his  grandmother.1 

In  London  the  news  of  this  rose-water  revolution  was 
received  with  equanimity  and  in  many  quarters  with  posi- 
tive rejoicing.  It  had  been  accomplished  so  pacifically  that 
Fun  seemed  only  bent  on  making  a  poor  joke  when  she 
exclaimed,  " Le  roi  est  mort.  Vive  le  row\"  It  was  re- 
cognized that  the  word,  republic,  had  a  sort  of  talismanic 
charm  for  Frenchmen, — that  only  under  this  old-new  gov- 
ernment could  there  be  expected  those  prodigies  of  valour 
that  must  be  performed  if  the  Prussians  were  to  be  driven 
across  the  border.  Whether  or  not  the  metaphysical  meta- 
phor of  the  Observer  was  correct,  in  describing  a  dynasty  in 
France  as  cut  flowers  that  could  be  kept  fresh  only  for  a 
brief  time  by  tender  care,  or  whether,  as  the  Tories  believed, 
the  change  was  only  a  transient  one,  men  accepted  it  as  a 
means  to  a  welcome  end.  Gambetta  and  Jules  Favre,  said 
the  Standard,  naming  two  of  those  whose  names  Sir 
Charles  Dilke  had  seen  chalked  up  for  the  crowd  to  see,  had 
heretofore  done  all  they  could  to  embarrass  the  Govern- 
ment in  its  moment  of  supreme  emergency,  but  they  had 
acceded  to  power  under  a  pledge  to  carry  out  the  national 
will  and  could  be  expected  to  accomplish  all  that  was  pos- 

1  Gwynn  and  Tuckwell,  Life  of  the  Right  Hon.  Sir  Chas.  Dilke,  vol. 
ii,  pp.  109-110.  Cf.  Fleury,  Memoirs  of  Empress  Eugenie,  vol.  ii,  pp. 
427-428. 

1  Observer,  Sept.  17,  1870. 


I56      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [156 

sible  to  expel  the  enemy  from  French  territory.  It  ac- 
cepted, therefore,  a  Government  that  even  the  staunchest 
Imperialists  supported  as  the  best,  "if  only  a  provisional 
substitute"  for  the  Empire.  It  was  noted,  too-,  by  admirers 
of  the  exiled  prince  pretenders,  that  General  Trochu,  the 
President,  was  an  Orleanist  and,  though  patriotically  em- 
bracing every  means  at  hand  to  free  France  from  her  dif- 
ficulties, might  be  expected,  in  time,  to  revert  to  his  former 
principles.1  The  Globe,  indeed,  believed  it  impossible  for 
a  Republic  to  last  in  France,  since  the  theory  of  equal  dis- 
tribution of  citizenship  and  distinction  was  impracticable 
in  a  country  where  the  individual  appetite  for  honours  was 
peculiarly  keen.2  In  Ireland  the  Nation,  disgruntled  at  the 
overthrow  of  Empire,  denied  that  the  de  facto  Government 
was  representative  of  the  wishes  of  the  French  people, 
though  it  could  expect  their  support  so  long  as  it  devoted 
itself  to  repelling  invasion.3  The  Cosmopolitan,  taking  the 
unique  position  of  denying  efficacy  as  well  as  longevity  to 
the  new  Government,  prophesied  that  Jules  Favre  would 
shortly  have  to  yield  to  Prussia  the  provinces  of  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  and  a  hundred  millions  sterling  for  indemnitv. 
"Then,"  it  gloated,  "his  little  mushroom  Paris  Republic 
will  collapse  like  a  bubble  of  fetid  gas,  and  the  red  ring 
of  Jacobites,  by  which  M.  Favre  is  surrounded  will  '  make 
themselves  air'  like  Macbeth's  fiends  and  vanish  into  en- 
veloping night — into  the  contempt  of  history."4 

But  the  Times  held  that  Favre  and  his  fellows  had  sub- 
stantial claims  for  respect  in  view  of  their  past  services,  and 
hoped  their  way  might  be  made  easy.5     The   Telegraph 

1  Standard,  Sept.  6,  1870. 

*  Globe,  Sept.  9,  1870. 

3  Issue  of  Sept.  19,  1870. 

4  Ibid. 

*  Times,  Sept.  5,  1870. 


157]  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  icy 

lauded  them  for  "high  mental  gifts,  rich  culture,  and  spot- 
less reputation," — excepting  only  Rochefort  as  a  represen- 
tative of  "  rowdyism,"  and  justifying  even  his  election  be- 
cause of  the  suffering  entailed  by  his  high  courage.1 

That  the  members  of  the  Government  were  almost  all 
representatives  of  Paris  was  considered  not  inappropriate 
since  the  defence  of  the  capital  was  the  great  military  prob- 
lem they  would  be  called  to  solve.  The  fact  that  they 
described  themselves  as  a  Government  of  National  De- 
fence, rather  than  as  a  Committee  of  Safety,  was  believed 
an  indication  that  they  would  use  their  powers  moderately 
and  in  the  interest  of  all  France.  Jules  Favre,  Gambetta, 
and  Rochefort  were  a  guarantee  for  the  great  towns.  The 
large  military  command  which  the  Emperor  had,  perforce, 
kept  in  the  south  to  ensure  its  loyalty  could  now  be  directed 
against  the  enemy.2  Trochu,  it  was  said,  in  four  days  had 
been  able  to  assemble  an  army  from  the  remotest  corners 
of  France  and  place  them  in  Paris,  drilled,  armed,  equip- 
ped, and  ready  for  the  fray.3  "  King  William  has  yet  a 
good  deal  of  fighting  before  him,"  observed  the  Globe.41 
Sir  Edmund  Blount  wrote  that  the  Garde  Nationale  and 
the  Garde  Mobile  were  admirable — far  superior  in  appear- 
ance to  the  regular  troops  that  had  gone  to  meet  the  Prus- 
sians— well  behaved,  quiet,  without  drunkenness,  and  pos- 
sessed of  that  spirit  of  obedience  the  other  army  had  utterly 
lacked.5 

But  those  who  gave  the  new  Government  the  sincerest 
welcome  were  those  who  believed  its  value  was  inherent  in 
itself  and  not  simply  contingent  on  its  efficacy  in  expelling 

1  Daily  Telegraph,  Sept.  6,  1870. 

'  Manchester  Guardian,  Sept.  7,  1870 ;  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Sept.  7,  1870. 

*  Vanity  Fair,  Sept.  17,  1870. 

*  Globe  and  Traveller,  Sept.  5,  1870. 

*  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edmund  Blount,  diary  entry  of  Sept.  13,  1870. 


j 58      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [  1 58 

the  invading  Prussians.  They  were  men  to  whom  a  re- 
public, no  matter  by  whom,  or  of  whom  constituted,  was 
the  symbol  of  a  glorious  freedom — men  like  Swinburne, 
who  set  himself  the  task  of  writing  a  lengthy  ode  in  praise 
of  its  nativity — and  that  larger  class  to  whom  an  abstrac- 
tion was  moonshine,  but  who  suffered  under  the  realities 
of  an  imperialistic  "queendom"  and  looked  across  the 
waters  for  a  beacon  to  guide  them  to  a  safer  mooring. 
Louis  Blanc  had  told  them  what  great  things  the  Republic 
oi  '48  had  planned  to  accomplish.  He  was  gone  back  to 
his  own  country  now  and  many  letters  followed  him  to 
tell  of  the  change  of  feeling  taking  place  for  France.  To 
Charles  Bradlaugh  the  new  Republic  was  a  young  giant 
from  whom  could  be  expected  not  only  the  salvation  of 
France  but  such  social  reforms  as  would  benefit  the  world. 
With  a  florid  fervor  equalling  Gambetta's  he  begged  that 
the  people  of  all  nations  stretch  out  the  hand  of  fellowship 
to  the  "  thrice-risen  child  of  Freedom."  1  Henceforth  his 
journal,  the  National  Reformer,  that  had  used  its  lash 
against  a  dynastic  war  waged  by  the  Empire,  was  pledged  to 
aid  the  French  Republic  in  defence  of  its  territories. 

Much  interest  was  felt  in  the  first  steps  of  a  new  Gov- 
ernment of  which  such  diverse  things  were  said.  It  was 
believed  it  might  win  for  itself  allies  where  the  Empire 
had  failed.  A  pronouncement  was  waited  for  on  Italy. 
The  men  risen  to  present  power  were  those  who  had  con- 
sistently protested  against  the  French  occupation.  Would 
they  now  repudiate  the  annexation  of  Nice  and  Savoy  and 
promise  to  leave  Rome  in  the  unmolested  possession  of  the 
Italians?  M.  Jules  Favre  and  his  colleagues  did  nothing 
to  gain  an  alliance  that  the  Telegraph  thought  was  the  only 
one  they  might  secure.2     It  was  suggested  by  wide-spread- 

1  National  Reformer,  Sept.  11,  1870. 

2  Daily  Telegraph,  Sept.  16,  1870. 


I59]  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  Ign 

ing  England  that  the  new  Government  might  signify  its 
change  of  characer  by  abandoning  Algiers,  an  extravagant 
piece  of  folly  that  France  must  see  diverted  from  her  as- 
sistance many  soldiers  that  she  sorely  needed.  But 
General  Trochu  and  his  colleagues  recognized  their  powers 
as  provisional  and  outside  of  an  indiscreet  flourish  addressed 
to  Spain  about  the  fine  things  in  store  for  the  Latin  race, 
were  content  to  take  account  solely  of  the  business  in  hand.1 
They  were  no  innovators  but  the  delegates  of  a  hard-pressed 
nation. 

On  the  sixth  of  September,  M.  Jules  Favre,  in  his  capac- 
ity as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  issued  a  circular  which 
clearly  defined  the  war,  the  great  pivot  on  which  the  fortune 
and  future  career  of  France  must  turn.  It  attempted  to 
throw  the  onus  of  its  disastrous  declaration  on  the  defunct 
Empire,  and  for  itself  utterly  disavowed  any  intention  of 
conquest.  At  the  same  time  it  startled  England  and  Ger- 
many by  expressing  a  rigid  determination  not  to  cede  an 
inch  of  territory  nor  yield  a  stone  of  fortress  to  hasten  the 
making  of  peace.  Its  vehemence  in  this  regard  was  disap- 
proved by  the  Globe,2  which  wished  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment rather  to  take  the  lead  toward  preparing  France  for 
sacrifices  than  to  nerve  her  to  firm  resistance.  It  was  con- 
demned also  by  the  Times  and  Nezus,3,  that  still  antagonistic 
to  French  policies,  derided  this  simultaneous  proclamation 
of  a  desire  for  peace  and  a  resolution  not  to  budge  a  step 
to  get  it.  They  believed,  as  did  also  the  Post,4  that  France 
was  so  confident  that  the  changed  character  of  the  war  would 
bring  intervention  that  she  thought  she  could  be  careless  as 
to  whether  or  not  her  stubbornness  might  complicate  the 

1  Daily  Nezcs,  Sept.  13,  1870. 

2  Issue  of  Sept.  8,  1870. 
•Ibid. 

4 Morning  Post,  Guardian,  issues  of  Sept.  10,  1870. 


160      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [^o 

efforts  of  the  neutrals.  In  spite  of  the  sympathy  felt  for 
her,  such  a  ne  plus  ultra,  the  Guardian  believed,  would  deter 
France  from  gaining  any  ally,  save  only  that  of  a  wide- 
spread, engulfing  social  disorder.  It  feared  the  Radical 
leaders  were  willing  to  invoke  international  revolution. 
Favre,  himself,  it  acquitted  of  conscious  complicity  in 
such  malicious  endeavors,  though  it  deprecated  the  pos- 
sible effect  of  his  circular.1  He  was  believed  to  be,  as  Lord 
Lyons  said,  really  patriotic,  but  too  much  the  slave  of 
sentiment  to  be  a  good  diplomatist  or  a  skilful  negotiator. 
However,  the  Guardian's  suggestion  is  interesting  and 
worth  looking  into. 

-  On  September  the  fifth  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
Socialist  Democratic  Party  issued  a  manifesto  protesting 
against  the  annexation  of  Alsace  Lorraine.  It  declared 
that  "  in  the  interest  of  peace  and  liberty,  in  the  interest 
of  Western  Civilization,  the  German  workmen  would  not 
patiently  tolerate  the  annexation  of  these  two  provinces, 
but  would  faithfully  stand  by  their  fellow  workmen  in  all 
countries  for  the  common  international  cause  of  the  Pro- 
letariat." 3  As  a  demonstration  of  counter  opinion,  large 
meetings  of  the  most  influential  men  of  Prussia  had  been 
held  to  urge  the  King  to  exact  such  guarantees  as  would 
give  security  for  the  future  conduct  of  France  and  the  unity 
of  the  entire  German  people.4  The  Manifesto,  taking  note 
of  these  activities,  said  they  were  stage-managed  to  create 
the  impression  that  the  pious  King  was  coerced  by  the  ir- 
resistible behest  of  the  German  nation  to  abandon  his  pledge 

1  Morning  Post,  Guardian,  issues  of  Sept.  10,  1870. 

2  Lyons  to  Granville,  Sept.  12,  1870,  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Gran- 
ville, vol.  ii,  p.  55. 

1  The  General  Council  of  the  International  Working  Men's  Associa- 
tion on  the  War  (London,  1870),  p.  96;  London  Graphic,  Sept.  10,  1870. 
i  Manchester  Guardian,  Sept.  1,  1870. 


;[6i]  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  t6i 

to  war  only  on  the  soldiers  of  the  Empire.  Bismarck  well 
knew  there  were  social  and  political  malcontents  in  Ger- 
many as  there  were  in  France.  His  policy  was  to  silence 
them  by  repression  rather  than  coddle  them  by  concessions. 
In  Frankfort  the  war  had  not  been  received  with  enthus- 
iasm, for  many  of  its  inhabitants  hated  Prussia  and  be- 
lieved victory  would  make  her  doubly  autocratic.  Business 
there  was  at  a  standstill.  Many  great  houses  had  failed 
and  there  was  no  work  for  the  artisans.1  The  army  had 
shown  an  alarming  willingness  to  cry  quits  at  the  down- 
fall of  the  Empire.  Early  in  September  the  Volkes  Zeitung 
won  friends  by  its  plea  for  peace.  A  republic  in  France 
had  precedent  for  liberating  and  synthesizing  all  the  dis- 
content within  the  boundaries  of  its  neighbors.  "  What 
I  most  fear,"  it  was  reported  Bismarck  told  a  British 
attache,  "  is  the  effect  of  a  republic  in  France  upon  Ger- 
many itself.  That  is  what  the  King  and  I  most  fear,  for 
no  one  knows  so  well  as  we  do  what  has  been  the  influence 
of  American  republicanism  in  Germany."  2  Bismarck  was 
prepared  to  fight  an  enemy  in  front  and  resolved  to  pre- 
vent the  appearance  of  an  enemy  in  the  rear.  The  men 
who  had  signed  the  Manifesto,  and  even  those  who  had 
printed  it,  were  arrested  very  promptly  and  sent  to  Liitzen 
in  East  Germany.  Their  detention  roused  no  great  pro- 
test in  England.  The  Reformer  had  printed  the  appeal  in 
letters  half  an  inch  thick,  and  this  of  itself  had  been 
enough  to  invest  it  with  frightfulness  in  the  mind  of  the 
average  Britisher.a     Of  the  widely  read  journals  only  the 

1  Corvin,  Germany  under  War;  Temple  Bar,  vol.  xxx,  p.  277. 

2  Manchester  Guardian,  Sept.  26,  1870.  The  interview  with  Mr.  Malet 
was  reported  first  by  the  Daily  Nezcs.  Later  Bismarck  denied  that  he 
had  made  the  statements  ascribed  to  him.  Cf.  Manchester  Guardian, 
Oct.  8,  1870. 

s  Cf.  London  Graphic,  Sept.  24,  1870. 


l62      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [162 

Spectator  dared  to  praise  the  German  workmen  for  their 
advocacy  of  "  honorable  and  reasonable  political  meas- 
ures." 1  But  when  in  continuation  of  the  policy  of  repres- 
sion, Dr.  Jacoby  was  arrested  at  Konigsberg  for  speaking 
against  the  territorial  annexations,  the  British  roused  them- 
selves. They  protested  against  the  imprisonment  of  an 
elderly  "philosopher-democrat,"  who,  it  was  felt,  was  the 
very  honorable  representative  of  opinions  that,  though  they 
lost  caste  when  espoused  by  certain  of  the  German  workmen, 
were,  none  the  less,  shared  by  the  majority  of  Europe. 
Said  the  Telegraph,  "  The  admission  that  he  (Bismarck) 
fears  the  spirit  which  he  has  gagged  in  the  person  of  Dr. 
Jacoby  justifies  the  warning  that  in  trampling  on  the  honor 
of  France  and  violating  the  right  of  the  conquered  provin- 
ces to  be  consulted,  he  may  be  setting  a  brand  upon  his 
own  success  and  making  democracy  strong  by  identifying 
it  with  morality,  restitution,  and  lasting  peace." 2  The 
Manchester  Guardian  condemned  not  only  the  deed  but  the 
method  of  its  execution  which  it  called  the  exercise  of  an 
instrument  substantially  equivalent  to  the  lettres  de  cachet 
of  the  agents  of  divine  right.3  The  Court  Journal  re^ 
ported  the  rumour  that  many  more  were  marked  men  on  the 
Chancellor's  list.  For  the  British  to  advise  Count  Otho 
von  Bismarck  Schoenhausen  at  this  time  in  the  interest  of 
free  speech  would  have  been,  as  was  recognized,  something 
like  advising  a  Nasmyth  steam-hammer  while  it  was  fall- 
ing. But  when  other  refractory  papers  showed  themselves 
uninfluenced  by  the  punishment  meted  out  to  the  Frank- 
fort Journal  for  its  protest  in  favor  of  the  sturdy  old 
Radical,  and  especially  when  the  Cologne  Gazette,  influen- 
tial in  its  own  Rhineland  provinces  and  in   Prussia  and 

1  Spectator,  Sept.  17,  1870. 
*  Telegraph,  Sept.  24,  1870. 
s  Manchester  Guardian,  Sept.  26,  1870. 


363]  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  163 

South  Germany  as  well,  offered  opposition,  the  Chancellor 
realized  that  attempts  to  muzzle  the  press  were  impractic- 
able. His  failure  caused  him  to  lose  something  af  his  ex- 
cellent sang  froid,  and  to  express  strong  opinions  on  this 
lack  of  support.1  After  a  month  of  punishment  he  re- 
leased Professor  Jacoby  and  all  others  accused  of  like 
offense,  with  the  exception  of  some  Socialists.  The) 
British  hoped  their  criticism  had  influenced  him  in  this, 
but  the  Globe  and  the  Spectator  believed  it  was  due  rather 
to  the  dissatisfaction  expressed  by  the  Liberals,  especially 
in  South  Germany.2  Orders  were  given  that  no  more 
political  arrests  be  made  and  that  political  meetings  be  per- 
mitted. Bismarck  had  no  sympathy  with  the  German  ad- 
mirers of  the  Government  of  the  "gentlemen  of  the 
pavement,"  but  he  believed  he  could  afford  generosity  since 
the  object  of  their  praise  would  be  short-lived.  In  Metz 
there  was  a  great  army  under  the  staunch  Imperialist, 
Bazaine,  who  had  made  no  intimation  that  he  had  accepted  a 
change  of  masters.  The  Republic  had  gained  no  allies.  It 
had  not  even  received  recognition  from  the  great  monar- 
chical nations  of  Europe.  Even  in  France  its  legality  was 
dubious  for  it  had  had  no  popular  confirmation.  The  ple- 
biscite, so  signally  demonstrating  the  confidence  of  France 
in  its  Emperor,  remained  the  last  recorded  expression  of 
public  opinion.  Furthermore,  previous  republican  govern- 
ments had  been  of  short  duration,  and  had  occasioned  such 
disturbance  in  Europe  that  they  had  left  a  legacy  of  dread. 
This  one's  defiance,  certainly,  had  done  nothing  to  ingratiate 
it  with  its  enemy,  and  Bismarck  knew  it  had  small  chance  of 
making  good  its  boast.  When  the  time  should  come  for  a 
humiliating  peace  to  be  signed,  could  it  be  expected  that 
France,  France  of  the  provinces,  would  tamely  accept  this! 

1  Court  Journal,  Oct.  8,  1870;  Daily  News,  Oct.  14,  1870. 
1  Issues  of  Oct.  2j  and  Oct.  29,  1870,  respectively. 


!64      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [164 

Paris-born  Republic  and  give  to  it,  and  to  its  treaty,  the 
ratification  of  a  silent  consent?  However  helpful  the  Gov- 
ernment might  be  to  Prussia,  temporarily,  by  its  repellant 
influence  on  the  neutrals,  and  by  the  potentialities  it  might 
have  of  dividing  France  against  itself,  it  was  expedient  that 
when  the  time  for  peace  should  come,  there  should  be  men 
at  the  helm  of  a  different  character  from  Favre  and  Roche- 
fort.  Prussia  once  before,  conjointly  with  the  other 
Powers,  had  reimposed  a  dynasty  on  France  to  give  security 
to  a  hard  treaty.  Bismarck  now  held  as  his  prisoner  an 
Emperor,  who  cherished  great  ambitions  for  his  son.  Per- 
haps this  new  eaglet  could  be  taught  to  fly  as  Prussia  listed 
and  be  tethered  so  strictly  by  strong  obligations  that  his 
flight  would  be  always  within  the  zone  of  Prussian  influ- 
ence. The  father,  then,  was  treated  with  Imperial  honors. 
On  his  surrender,  Count  Bismarck's  phrase,  "  Sire,  I  re- 
ceive you  as  I  would  my  own  Royal  Master,"  was  quoted, 
and  not  with  favour,  among  the  Prussian  soldiery.  He  was 
assigned  the  magnificent  castle  of  Wilhelmshohe  as  resid- 
ence, and  Queen  Augusta  was  deprived  of  one  of  her  finest 
chefs  that  his  kitchen  might  be  under  proper  governance. 
A  member  of  the  North  German  Parliament  drew  atten- 
tion to  the  gilded  captivity  of  the  third  Napoleon  and  com- 
plained that  it  foreboded  his  reinstatement  as  sovereign 
of  France.  He  was  prosecuted  and  sentenced  to  a  two 
months'  imprisonment.1  The  Empress  and  the  Prince  Im- 
perial were  fugitives  in  England.  There  began  to  be  cir- 
culated, soon  after  their  arrival,  a  penny  sheet  called  "  La 
Situation  "  that  strongly  urged  a  restoration.2     It  could  not 

1  The  article  was  written  by  Dr.  Hirsch,  the  editor  of  Gewerkverein, 
in  which  journal  it  appeared.  Daily  News,  Nov.  7,  1870.  Cf.  Sept. 
letters  of  Berlin  correspondent  of  Daily  Telegraph;  Manchester  Guar- 
dian, Sept.  14,  1870;  Newcastle  Daily  Chronicle,  Sept.  14,  1870;  Graphic, 
Sept.  17,  1870. 

2  Literary  World,  Sept.  30,  1870. 


165]  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  165 

be  established  that  it  drew  its  inspiration  from  Eugenie's 
quiet  residence  at  Chislehurst.  She  did  not  make  it  the 
organ  o>f  her  communications  to  the  British,  and  at  least 
on  one  occasion,  its  statements  so  displeased  her  that  she 
made  use  of  space  in  the  Times  to  refute  them.  The  Duke 
of  Cambridge,  who  called  on  her,  found  her  low  and  sub- 
dued— looking  sixty  years  old.  He  believed  it  would  be  the 
Orleanists  who  would  have  the  next  turn  on  the  throne  of 
France.1  The  British  were  lavish  in  her  praise.  They  recalled 
her  courtesy  to  English  visitors  to  her  capital,  the  profusion 
of  her  charities,  her  bravery  in  visiting  the  sick  and  dying 
during  the  days  of  the  cholera.  But  they  regarded  her, 
none  the  less,  as  the  butterfly  ruler  of  a  holiday  France, 
now  broken  on  the  wheel  of  fortune,2 — not  as  the  regent  of 
a  dynasty  that  had  not  yet  signed  away  its  claims,  an  Em- 
press regent,  who  might  plot  dangerously  for  the  elevation 
of  her  son.  Huxley  praised  her  for  her  nobility  and 
dignity.  But  she  was  no>  Roland,  no  Corday,  he  said, — 1 
"  only  a  second-rate  Marie  Antoinette."  3  British  journals 
might  still  describe  the  lightest  bow  and  frailest  ruffle  of 
her  costumes  with  ponderous  minutiae,  but  it  was  only  the 
Queen  of  Fashion  that  they  meant  to  honor.  Let  King1 
William  shout  "  Vive  V Etnpereur ! "  as  much  as  he  pleased, 
no  one  but  Bismarck  would  echo  the  cry,  said  the  British 
papers.  No  Englishman  would  test  his  accent  with  the 
phrase. 

That  class  in  England  most  hostile  to  a  restoration  and 
the  territorial  cession  which  it  was  felt  would  surely  ac- 
company it,  was  the  same  that  opposed  Count  Bismarck' si 

1  Lord  Carlingford  to  Lear,  Oct.  19,  1870,  Later  Letters  of  Edward 
Lear,  p.  126. 

2  Daily  Telegraph,  Sept.  12,  Oct.  29,  1870;  London  Society,  Nov.,  1870. 

3  Life  and  Letters  of  Thos.  H.  Huxley  (edited  by  J.  W.  Harding,  N. 
Y.,  1896),  vol.  i,  p.  361. 


j66      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [166 

plans  in  Germany.  The  Spectator  called  it  with  courteous 
deference,  "the  operative  class."1  The  first  meeting  of 
republican  working  men,  called  together  after  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Provisional  Government,  was  held  in  Arundel 
Hall,  in  the  Strand,  on  the  seventh  of  September.  Its  pur- 
pose was  nonpartisan :  the  organization  of  a  movement  in 
favor  of  "  reestablishing  peace  in  the  present  crisis,  and  of 
procuring  arbitration  in  place  of  war  generally."  But,  in 
spite  of  remonstrances  from  the  presiding  officer,  George 
Odger  and  others  made  it  the  occasion  for  declaring  their 
sympathies  with  France.2  Two  nights  later,  after  the  cir- 
cular of  Jules  Favre  had  been  read  and  considered,  a  meet- 
ing at  St.  James's  Hall,  held  under  the  same  presidency, 
was  permitted  to  pass  resolutions  expressing  a  welcome  to 
the  French  Republic  and  the  hope  that,  since  the  cause  of 
hostilities  had  been  removed,  the  German  army  would 
discontinue  its  march  on  Paris,  and  England  would  exert 
herself  to  smooth  the  way  for  peace.3 

The  resolutions  and  the  speeches  urging  them  were  cri- 
ticized by  the  press  as  indiscreet  and  unnecessary.  The 
News  contended  that  wars  are  made  between  nations,  not 
between  their  governments, — on  which  false  assumption  the 
resolutions  had  seemed  to  base  themselves.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  pointed  out  that  there  was  not  in  France  any  power 
with  which  a  foreign  Government  could  safely  negotiate  a 
treaty.4  A  strange  doctrine,  truly,  for  if  the  power  of  a 
nation  extends  to  the  making  of  war,  when  the  desire  of  war 
ceases,  should  it  not  be  able  to  make  peace,  even  though  in 
giving  expression  to  its  desire  it  find  it  necessary  to  over- 
turn the  existing  Government?     It  would  seem  to  be  a  way 

1  Spectator,  Sept.  10,  1870. 

3  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Sept.  8,  1870. 

*  Times,  Sept.  10,  1870. 

*  Daily  News,  Sept.  12,  1870. 


167]  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  rfy 

of  saying.  "You  may  do  what  you  want  if  you  want  to 
make  war,  and  you  will  be  held  accountable  for  it;  but  if 
you  want  to  make  peace  you  must  do  what  your  Govern- 
ment wants,  and  you  must  bear  the  burden  of  its  decision." 
The  Morning  Post  expressed  regret  that  the  democracy  of 
London  seemed  incapable  of  understanding  the  events  that 
were  passing  before  their  eyes.1  Surely,  the  writers  of  the 
leaders  in  London's  greatest  dailies  did  little  to  help  them. 
On  the  day  following  the  meeting  in  St.  James's  Hall 
the  London  Democracy  held  a  demonstration  in  Hyde  Park 
at  which  it  was  resolved  that  the  address  of  Mr.  Odger  be 
sent  to  Jules  Favre,  and  the  British  Government  was  urged 
to  recognize  the  French  Republic  and  to  insist  on  an 
armistice  for  the  arranging  of  peace  by  impartial  arbitra- 
tion.2 Sixty  thousand  addresses  condemning  the  continu- 
ance of  war  had  been  sent  throughout  the  country  to  the 
centres  of  the  working  classes,  and  when  Odger  sailed  from 
Dover,  personally  to  deliver  his  resolutions  to  Favre,3  sim- 
ilar resolutions  were  already  on  the  way  from  Birmingham 
and  other  districts  where  the  "  operatives  "  abounded.  The 
succeeding  meetings  of  September  are  too  numerous  to 
chronicle,  but  characteristic  of  all  of  them  was  sympathy 
for  France ;  the  wish  that  England  intervene,  either  through 
mediation  or  a  defensive  alliance;  and  a  grandiose  desire 
to  put  an  end  to  war  for  all  time  by  some  system  of  in- 
ternational arbitration.  The  vehemence  with  which  the 
resolutions  were  proposed,  and  the  willingness  that  was 
shown  in  many  instances  to  plunge  England  into  present 
war  to  ensure  a  stable  peace  suggest,  somewhat,  the  amaz- 
ing antics  of  a  child  that  is  overjoyed  with  a  new  toy  but 

1  Morning  Post,  Sept.  12,  1870. 

*  Times,  Sept.  12,  1870;  Spectator,  Sept.  12,  1870;  Illustrated  London 
News,  Sept.  17,  1870. 

8  Times,  Sept.  22,  1870;  Punch,  Sept.  24,  1870. 


j68      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [168 

plays  with  it  after  the  old  manner — sticks  its  rattle  in  its 
mouth,  so  to  speak.     May  it  be  observed  that  these  meet- 
ings, even  though  they  numbered  among  the  audience  not 
only  workingmen,  but  Liberals  and  Comtists  of  the  white- 
shirted  upper  class  as  well,  were  regarded  as  of  about  as 
much  consequence  as  the  above  mentioned  performance? 
There  was,  albeit,  less  of  tolerance  in  England's  attitude. 
The  Manchester  Guardian  said  of  the  Democrats  that  they 
were  utterly  without  influence  except  in  the  negative  sense, — t 
that  the  majority  of  the  nation  generally  began  to  feel 
afraid  it  had  been  misled  if,  by  chance,  it  found  its  opinion 
in  any  political  question  agreeing  with  that  of  the  Demo- 
crats.1    And  when  the  Irish  Nationalists,  who  shared  their 
unpopularity,  began  to  hold  simultaneous  demonstrations 
with  them  in  Hyde  Park,  sympathy  for  France  in  some 
quarters,   at  least,   received  a  considerable   check.     There 
crept  in  a  fear  that  these  meetings,  where  the  Marseillaise 
was  sung,  and  republicanism  extolled,  where  international 
amity   was   discussed  by   men   of   many   races,   were   un- 
English, — that  Jules  Favre,  in  receiving  the  resolutions  and 
welcoming    George    Odger    was    trafficking    with    hostile 
forces.     A  great  bond  of  friendship  between  nations,   as 
between  men,  is  a  mutual  enemy.     And  so,  Bismarck,  op- 
posing a  bulwark  of  blood  and  iron  to  strange  new  forces, 
which  the  Republic  seemed  to  foster,  appeared  hallowed  in  a 
benevolent  nimbus.     It  is  hope-inspiring  that  the  derisive 
press  reports  of  the  working  men's  meetings  and  the  diverse 
theories  bodied  into  resolutions  did  not  blind  many  eminent 
men  to   the   value  and   sincerity   of   their  expressions   of 
sympathy  for  France.     If  Mr.  Bradlaugh  offended  by  his 
abuse  of  the  "God  protected  William  of  Prussia"  there 
were  Professor  Beesly  and  Sir  Henry  Hoare  to  give  the 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  Sept.  20,  1870. 


!69]  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  169 

meetings  dignity.  Best  of  all  there  was  honest  John  Mor- 
ley  to  use  the  Fortnightly  for  their  defense.  In  September 
he  was  writing : 

The  attitude  of  the  workingmen  toward  the  fallen  country  in  the 
bitter  hour  of  expiation  attests  a  large  and  compassionate  human- 
ity that  contrasts  instructively  with  the  crawling  prudence  of  that 
organ  of  the  English  press,  which  after  having  played  pander  to 
the  Empire  of  stock  jobbers  for  eighteen  years,  at  the  first  moment 
of  reverse  swiftly  turns  about,  asks  who  is  going  to  call  for  abdi- 
cation, and  then  by  a  crowning  stroke  eagerly  anticipates  demands 
which  the  German  Government  had  not  made,  waits  for  no  ulti- 
matum, prays  for  no  moderation  in  the  conqueror,  and  in  the 
overflowing  of  its  officious  baseness  urges  France  to  come  to  terms 
with  her  adversary  as  speedily  as  she  can,  "  even  though  these 
terms  include  the  loss  of  Alsace,  Metz  and  a  strip  of  Lorraine." 
Once  more  the  generosity  and  spirit  of  a  nation,  not  inferior  to 
any  other  in  either,  are  hidden  behind  the  ignoble  words  and 
grovelling  ideas  of  a  little  clique  of  journalistic  shadows.1 

It  was  the  leaven  of  men  of  known  worth  and  ability  that 
won  some  consideration  for  the  many  who  coupled  sage  de- 
sires capable  of  present  fulfillment  with  fantasic  hopes 
doomed  to  long  disappointment.  For  one  thing,  the  work- 
men wanted  official  recognition  of  the  French  Republic. 
The  densely  crowded  meeting  held  on  the  twenty-fourth  in 
St.  James's  Great  Hall  had  petitioned  the  Government  for 
this.2  It  was  demanded  next  day  by  a  more  radical  meet- 
ing in  Hyde  Park.3  On  September  the  twenty-seventh  the 
representatives  of  the  Trade  Societies  of  London  waited  on 
the  Premier  to  address  him  on  the  matter.  The  Man- 
chester Guardian  thought  the  attitude  illogical  because  the 
French,  themselves,  by  deferring  the  conclusion  of  a  settle- 
ment with  Prussia  until  their  position  had  been  ratified, 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  479-488. 

2  Manchester  Guardian,  Sept.  27,  1870. 
s  Times,  Sept.  27,  1870. 


j  j0     BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [  1 70 

acknowledged  the  Republic's  provisional  character.  The  de- 
facto  Government  already  was  given  practical  recognition. 
Until  such  time  as  it  should  become  formal,  anyhing  further 
would  be  inappropriate.1     John  Richard  Green  was  very 
doubtful  if  that  day  would  come.     If  the  Republic  showed 
itself   favorable  to  the  alienation  of   French  territory,   it 
could  not  stand  a  day,  if  it  did  not,  it  made  way,  in  his 
opinion,  for  the  "most  frightful  jacquerie  the  world  has 
ever  seen."     John  Stuart  Mill  believed  a  Government  which 
had   the   obedience1   of    all   the  country   not   occupied   by 
foreign  troops  should  be  accorded  an  official  recognition 
"as   de   facto."3     The  Daily  News,   which   early   in   the 
month  had  struck  out  boldly  for  a  recognition  that  would 
make   amends    for   England's    condonation   of    a    former 
coup  d'etat,  now  showed  repentance  for  its  rashness.4     It 
was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  Times,   regarding  with 
equanimity,  as  it  did,  the  possibility  of  a  Prussian  entrance 
into  Paris  as  preferable  to  an  excess  of   republicanism, 
should  join  in  the  petitions  for  recognition  addressed  to  the 
Prime  Minister.5     It  was  a  matter  for  wonder  that  Glad- 
stone received  the  delegates  of  the  Trades  Societies  at  all. 
He  was  believed  to  have  shown  himself  both  gracious  and 
sagacious  when,  after  hearing  them,  he  explained  that  Eng- 
land could  not  recognize  a  Government  not  yet  officially  sanc- 
tioned in  France,  but  would  lose  no  time  in  following  that 
country's    example    when    she    did    accept    it.     He    went 
further.     He  intimated  the  representations  the  deputation 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  Sept.  27,  1870. 

*  Green  to  E.  A.  Freeman,   Sept.  5,  1870,  Letters  of  John  Richard 
Green,  pp.  261-262. 

3  Mill  and  Helen  Taylor  to  Sir  Chas.  Dilke,   Sept.  30,   1870,  Letters 
of  John  Stuart  Mill,  vol.  ii,  p.  273. 

*  Cf.  editorials  in  News  for  Sept.  6  and  Sept.  12,  1870,  on  this  subject. 

*  Times,  Sept.  27,  1870. 


171  ]  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  iyi 

made  in  regard  to  the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  were 
not  antithetic  to  his  own  feelings  in  the  matter.1  The  work- 
men were  but  little  better  satisfied  with  the  conduct  of  the 
Government  after  Gladstone's  explanation.  Their  protests 
and  demonstrations  continued.  They  could  not  know  what 
had  been  done  already  in  the  interest  of  peace.  Ourselves 
live  later  to  the  advantage  of  our  knowledge.  For  fifty 
years  make  even  the  walls  of  Chancelleries  grow  thin.  We 
shall  listen  as  best  we  may,  and  perhaps  we  shall  find  that 
the  Government  had  done  something  more  to  overcome  the 
difficulties  of  peacemaking  than  the  orators  of  Trafalgar 
Square  believed.  And  if  France  had  to  content  herself 
with  the  mild  endeavours  we  are  about  to  study  instead  of 
the  one  ally  of  social  revolution  that  the  creation  of  the 
Republic  made  possible  to  her,  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  her 
own  conduct  together  with  Bismarck's  belated  wisdom  in 
releasing  political  prisoners  and  restoring  comparative  free- 
dom to  the  press,  and  the  British  practice  of  permitting 
freedom  of  speech  to  all  and  sundry,  prevented  a  precipi- 
tation of  that  bouleversement  whose  end  none  can  foresee. 

1  Morning  Post,  Daily  News,  and  Manchester  Examiner  of  Sept.  28, 
1870,  endorse  Gladstone's  attitude;  Globe  of  same  date  describes  it  as 
ambiguous.  Illustrated  London  News  is  most  captious  toward  the 
personnel  and  purpose  of  committee. 


CHAPTER  IX 
Abortive  Peace  Negotiations 

HOME  AND  FOREIGN  NEWS 

Thursday    — Mr.  Gladstone  bought  a  pair  of  slippers. 

Friday  — Immense  slaughter  of  French  and  Germans  before 
Sedan. 

Saturday     — Mr.  Cardwell  went  out  shooting. 

Sunday  — The  Emperor  of  France  abdicated  and  surrendered 
to  the  King  of  Prussia. 

Monday  — The  President  of  the  Board  of  Trade  passed  a  good 
night. 

Tuesday  — The  Empress  having  quitted  Paris,  a  Republic  was 
inaugurated. 

Wednesday — The  Home  Secretary  had  a  tea-party,  and  the  Prus- 
sians are  still  marching  on  Paris.1 

Judy's  chronicle  for  the  week  epitomizes  the  September 
attitude  toward  a  Manchester  Ministry  off  on  a  holiday 
while  the  Continent  flamed  with  war.  A  correspondent  of 
the  Times  thought  the  matter  was  more  reprehensible  if  it 
were  true,  as  reported,  that  the  Cabinet  had  made  an  ar- 
rangement with  other  Powers  not  to  join  in  the  struggle 
without  mutual  explanation.2  Was  it  to  be  expected,  asked 
Pall  Mall,  that  for  the  convenience  of  the  upper  classes,  the 
whole  world  of  nations  would  be  good  enough  to  fall  into 
a  state  of  suspended  animation  until  the  Upper  Ten  Thous- 
and had  spent  their  holidays  and  were  disposed  to  return 
to  work?3     The  members  of  the  Government  were  vari- 

1  Judy,  Sept.  21,  1870. 

2  "  Spectator  "  to  Tivt-es,  Sept.  7,  1870. 

3  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Sept.  7,  1870. 

172  [172 


I73]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  173 

ously  described  as  striding  after  grouse  over  the  breezy 
Scottish  moors  and  picking  up  shells  upon  the  beach  at 
Walmer.  The  Queen  herself  was  not  immune  from  criti- 
cism. She  was  at  the  furthest  extremity  of  her  kingdom 
so  that  every  despatch  coming  to  London  had  to  travel 
an  additional  three  days  before  it  could  gain  her  considera- 
tion. The  Economist  was  for  permitting  the  Premier  to 
sign  documents  in  the  Sovereign's  name  whenever  the  flag 
was  not  flying  over  the  royal  residences  at  Windsor  or  Lon- 
don.1 

But  it  was  the  activities  of  the  Prime  Minister  that  were 
held  up  for  special  derision.  "  Napoleon  III,"  said  the 
Globe, 

declares  war  against  Prussia,  and  as  a  counter  demonstration  Mr. 
Gladstone  commends  to  the  amusement  of  the  British  Senate  the 
astonishing  capabilities  of  his  favorite  ballot  toy.  The  cannon 
began  to  boom — the  box  began  to  rattle.  Since  then  a  dynasty 
has  been  wrecked ;  the  keel  of  a  Republic  laid ;  a  huge  fast-rolling 
wave  is  threatening  to  suck  into  its  vortex  the  ruins  of  an  invaded 
capital.  But  the  sublime  equilibrium  of  the  Premier's  nature  is 
not  even  now  disturbed.  .  .  .  He  brings  his  equable  frame  of 
mind  to  the  undivided  study  of  the  Workingmen's  International 
Exhibition,  and  discriminatingly  analyzes  its  curious  subtilties,  its 
dainty  refinements,  its  airy  monuments  of  artistic  triumph,  its  deli- 
cate guarantees  of  a  continuance  of  industry  —  promoting  peace, 
which  of  course  we  shall  always  enjoy."  2 

The  English  in  Paris  were  extremely  excited  by  the  inac- 
tivity oif  their  Government.  "  What  is  Lord  Granville 
doing?"  wrote  Sir  Edmund  Blount  to  a  friend  at  home. 
"  Does  he  think  that  the  majority  of  the  English  nation  will 
ever  pardon  a  Government  which  shows  culpable  apathy  at 
such  a  time? " 3    The  Globe  believed  his  lordship  was  setting 

1  Economist,  Aug.  27,  1870. 

2  Globe,  Sept.  9,  1870. 

'  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edmund  Blount,  p.  173. 


174      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [174 

an  example  in  his  own  person  of  the  role  of  neutrality  and 
nullity  he  wished  his  country  to  adopt.1  The  shades  of 
Palmerston  and  Canning  were  invoked  to  point  the  way  to 
action.2  The  more  taciturn  and  preoccupied  the  Minister 
appeared,  the  greater  were  the  efforts  to  rouse  him  with 
warnings.  It  was  urged  that  the  downfall  of  the  Empire 
was  the  psychological  moment  for  the  tendering  of  good 
offices.  The  sins  of  Napoleon  should  not  be  visited  on  the 
young  Republic,  the  struggle  should  not  be  allowed  to  be- 
come a  people's  war.  In  all  contention,  said  the  News, 
there  comes  a  time  when  events  unmistakably  indicate  the 
road  to  peace.  At  such  a  time  a  Neutral  may  interpose 
with  such  deliberate  but  decided  use  of  her  moral  authority 
as  may  prepare  the  way  for  peace.  It  hoped  Lord  Gran- 
ville might  now  find  his  opportunity.3  But  the  Govern- 
ment was  admitted  to  be  at  a  striking  disadvantage  because 
it  could  not  give  force  to  a  remonstrance  by  that  reserve  of 
strength  which  in  times  past  had  heartened  British  courage. 
It  would  take  more  than  the  generous  subsidy  that  Parlia- 
ment could  be  relied  upon  to  grant  to  render  efficient  those 
defences,  which  the  Globe  thought  had  been  criminally 
neglected  in  the  interests  of  a  false  economy.*  The  great 
claims  intimated  before  Sedan  in  the  pourparlers  carried  on 
with  the  Bishop  of  Strasburg  and  now  widely  bruited  in 
the  Prussian  press  gave  little  hope  that  any  mere  note  carry- 
ing would  prove  beneficent.5  Morier  believed  from  infor- 
mation gained  in  Germany,  that,  if  the  Neutrals  opposed 
the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  Prussia  was  prepared  to 

1  Sept.  7,  1870. 

*  Examiner  and  London  Review,  Sept.  3,  1870. 

3  Daily  News,  Sept.  10,  1870;  Standard,  Sept.  5  and  12,  1870;  Oxford 
Graduate,  Inside  Paris  during  the  Siege  (London,  1871),  pp.  75"76. 

4  Globe,  Sept.  7,  1870 ;  Punch,  Sept.  10,  1870. 

*  Daily  Telegraph,  Sept.  27,  1870. 


!75]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  175 

disregard  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  offer  part  of  it  to 
France  to  win  her  to  complaisance.1  But  it  is  nowhere 
intimated  that  such  a  possibility  proved  a  bogey  to  Lord 
Granville.  It  was  rather  the  absolute  divergence  of  the 
views  of  the  belligerents  than  the  fear  of  a  further  unscrupu- 
lous agreement  that  retarded  his  efforts  at  peace-making.3 
On  September  the  tenth,  the  day  after  France  was  forced 
to  surrender  Laon,  Tissot,  who  had  succeeded  Lavalette  as 
the  French  representative  in  London,  informed  Granville 
that  several  Powers  (probably  Austria,  Italy  and  Spain) 
sympathized  with  the  French  desire  for  an  honorable  peace 
and  asked  that  the  English  join  with  them  to  arrange  for 
the  signature  of  an  armistice.  He  reiterated  the  determina- 
tion, already  expressed  in  the  Favre  circular,  to  maintain 
the  integrity  of  France  even  if  such  a  resolution  led  to 
a  war  a  outrance.3  Notice  of  the  endeavours  of  these 
Neutrals  was  already  on  the  way  to  Bismarck  in  a  letter 
from  his  good  friend  and  former  school-fellow,  John  Loth- 
rop  Motley,  then  Ambassador  to  England  from  the  United 
States.  The  letter  was  a  very  amiable  and  quite  ex  officio 
communication  which  informed  Count  Bismarck  that  from 
frequent,  confidential,  and  earnest  conversations  with  those 
most  interested  and  influential  in  British  affairs,  the  writer 
was  aware  that  great  pressure  was  being  put  upon  the 
Government  by  the  other  considerable  Powers  in  favor  of 
some  kind  of  intervention,  mediation,  or  joint  expression  of 
opinion  as  to  the  terms  of  peace.  Hitherto,  England  had 
resisted  these  invitations  and  suggestions,  but  in  doing  so 
she  had  laid  herself  open  to  the  charge  of  being  an  obstruc- 

1  Memoirs  of  Hon.  Sir  Robert  Morier,  vol.  ii,  pp.  179-180. 

2  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  vol.  ii,  p.  357 ;  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord 
Granville,  vol.  ii,  p.  48;  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Sept.  12,  1870;  Times,  Sept. 
12,  1870. 

3  British  State  Papers,  Foreign  Office,  vol.  lxxi,  p.  58. 


I76      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [176 

tive  and  a  laggard.  In  view  of  these  matters,  he  believed 
it  his  duty,  as  a  sincere  friend  of  Prussia,  to  suggest  that 
the  "more  moderate  the  terms  on  the  part  of  the  conqueror 
at  this  supreme  moment,  the  greater  would  be  the  confidence 
inspired  for  the  future,  and  the  more  sincere  the  founda- 
tion of  a  durable  peace."  The  Prussian  Chancellor  an- 
notated this  "  sacredly  confidential  communication "  with 
the  words,  "  damn  confidence,"  and  filed  it  away.1  Neither 
he  nor  his  Sovereign  was  perturbed  at  the  suggestion  that 
England  was  to  be  budged  from  her  neutrality  by  Powers 
that  were  too  timid  themselves  to  take  the  lead.  King  Wil- 
liam, at  the  time  of  the  confiscation  of  the  property  of  the 
Queen's  cousin  of  Hanover,  had  said  that  England  had 
forgotten  the  days  of  Pitt  and  become  the  very  humble 
servant  of  the  economists  of  Manchester,  of  Gladstone, 
and  of  Cobden  and  his  disciples.2  There  was  no  reason 
to  believe  that  she  was  minded  to  change  her  policies. 
Prussia,  too,  was  resolved  to  continue  on  in  her  course,  and 
rejoiced  that  the  anomalous  position  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment made  it  appear  less  devious. 

Von  Bernstorff  was  instructed  to  inform  Lord  Gran- 
ville that,  though  Prussia  held  herself  in  readiness  to  meet 
every  overture  of  the  Queen,  she  could  not  regard  the  pro- 
posals of  the  existing  Government  in  France  with  such 
consideration  as  she  would  give  to  one  that  had  been  ac- 
cepted by  the  French  people.3  The  captive  Emperor  was 
still  to  Foreign  Powers  the  bearer  of  the  sovereignty. 
Prussia  asked  what  guarantee  would  be  given  for  the  re- 

1  Motley  to  Bismarck,  Sept.  9,  1870,  John  Lothrop  Motley  and  his 
Family  (edited  by  his  daughter  and  H.  St.  John  Mild-may,  London, 
igio),  pp.  288  et  seq. 

-  King  of  Prussia  in  conversation  with  Comte  de  Boeswerk,  A. 
Dumas,  La  Terreur  Prussienne  (Paris,  1872),  p.  54. 

3  Telegram  of  Bismarck  to  Bernstorff,  Sept.  12,  1870,  Brit.  State 
Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  p.  83. 


I77]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  177 

cognition  of  possible  peace  terms  by  the  present  Government 
of   France,   or  any  that  might   follow  it.     Diplomatically 
speaking,  this  statement  was  masterly.     It  offered  in  a  most 
courteous  way  an  assurance  to  the  Provisional  Government 
that  it  would  be  accorded  recognition  at  a  proper  price.     It 
apprized  England  that  she  would  be  violating  the  bounds 
of  propriety  if  she  too  closely  pressed  on  Prussia  the  soli- 
citations of  a  Government  from  which  she  herself  withheld 
formal  recognition.     If  England  unduly  urged   Bismarck 
to  negotiate  with  a  de  facto  Government, — the  durability 
of  which  he  avowedly  doubted,  would  she  not,  in  a  way,  be 
undertaking  to  underwrite  for  Prussia's  security  the  forth- 
coming  treaty?     The   dual    character    of    a    sovereign,    a 
vexatious  matter  that  had   appeared   in  the  dispute  over 
the  Hohenzollern  candidature,  now  reappeared  in  the  prob- 
lem of  the  status  of  the  captive  Napoleon.     He  had  sur- 
rendered, not  abdicated.     Moreover,  the  surrender  was  one 
of   his  person   and   involved  neither  his   imperial   power, 
which  he  had  delegated  to  the  Empress,  nor  his  military 
command,  which  he  had  resigned  to  MacMahon.     But  the 
restoration  of  the  Imperial  family  under  German  protection 
would  be  bitterly  resented  by  public  opinion  in  England,  as 
Granville  well  knew.     He  wrote  to  his  chief  that  he  did  not 
think  the  Cabinet  could  with  propriety  receive  the  com- 
munication of  such  an  idea  from  Prussia  without  record- 
ing its  objections.1 

Since  nothing  but  the  realization  of  a  contretemps  had 
been  gained  by  dispatches,  the  French  welcomed  the  sug- 
gestion of  the  veteran  diplomatist,  M.  Thiers,  that  he  go  to 
England  and  then  to  other  countries  to  plead  the  cause  of 
the  last  of  the  many  Governments  to  which  he  had  given 
allegiance.     And  so  while  the  Conservative  journals  were 

1  Granville  to  Gladstone,  Sept.  16,   1870,  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii, 
pp.  49-51  ;  Fleury,  Memoirs  of  Empress  Eugenic,  vol.  ii,  pp.  525-526. 


I78      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [ijg 

urging  on  England  mediation,  even  to  the  point  of  forcing 
consideration  for  her  pacific  intentions  by  dint  of  arms,  and 
their  Liberal  opponents  were  representing  that  her  part  was 
rather  to  soothe  French  susceptibilities  on  the  matter  of  an 
inevitable  loss  of  territory,  a  new  attack  on  the  policy  of 
passivity  was  launched  from  across  the  Channel.  M. 
Thiers  was  preceded  by  an  agent  sent  to  pave  the  way  for 
him.  This  precursor  reported  on  his  return  that  for  Glad- 
stone and  Granville  France  as  a  nation  no  longer  existed. 
"  They  were  polite,"  he  said  sadly,  "  but  seemed  to  think 
we  were  blotted  from  the  map  of  Europe."  x  He  seems  not 
to  have  been  made  aware  that  Thiers,  in  spite  of  his  long 
practice  in  diplomacy,  was,  perhaps,  not  the  most  appro- 
priate man  for  France  to  send  on  an  important  mission. 
His  part  in  doing  to  death  a  former  republic  certainly 
would  not  make  him  persona  grata  with  the  eager  friends  of 
France  that  met  in  St.  James'  Hall.  Thirty  years  ago  he 
had  fallen  from  power  because  he  could  not  win  support  for 
a  policy  which  was  on  the  point  of  precipitating  his  country 
into  war  with  England.  Even  by  those  whose  minds  were 
not  disturbed  by  memories,  it  was  recognized  that  he  was 
totally  out  of  sympathy  with  the  economic  theories  of 
Bright  and  Gladstone ;  and  that  he  had  done  what  he  could  to 
make  his  opposition  felt.  In  regard  to  the  present  war, 
he  was  regarded  by  the  Evening  Mail  as  its  ultimate  cause, 
— the  man,  who  above  all  others,  had  developed  "  that  bale- 
ful idea  of  French  dictatorship  in  Europe  which  was  at 
once  the  secret  of  the  power  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  and 
the  immediate  occasion  of  his  downfall."2  The  Daily 
News  saw  a  certain  poetic  and  dramatic  justice  in  the 
spectacle  of  this  historian  and  statesman,  who  thirty  years 
ago  was  meditating  a  sudden  attack  upon  the  British  fleet  in 

'Felix  Whitehurst,  My  Private  Diary  (London,  1875),  vol.  i,  p.  91. 
2  Evening  Mail,  Oct.  7,  1870. 


179]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  179 

the  Mediterranean,  making  a  diplomatic  tour  in  his  old  age 
as  a  suppliant  for  the  moral  intervention  of  the  neutral 
Powers  to  save  his  country  from  the  consequences  of  that 
vainglorious  and  aggressive  spirit  and  policy,  of  which  he 
had  ever  been  the  most  eloquent  and  powerful  advocate. 
He  was  likened  now  in  his  old  age  to  that  intrusive  old 
peace-maker,  Touchwood,  in  one  of  Scott's  romances. 
"Don't  be  afraid  of  me,"  says  Touchwood, 

though  I  come  thus  suddenly  upon  you,  I  acknowledge  that  my 
talents  and  experience  have  sometimes  made  me  play  the  busy- 
body, because  I  find  I  can  do  things  better  than  other  people,  and 
I  love  to  see  fellows  stare.  But  after  all,  I  am«n  bon  diable, 
and  I  have  come  four  or  five  hundred  miles  to  put  all  your  little 
matters  to  rights  just  when  you  think  they  are  most  desperate.1 

But  M.  Thiers  had  swallowed,  too  much  of  criticism  to  be 
greatly  perturbed  by  these  bitter  spoonfuls  administered 
by  the  British  press.  He  was  encouraged,  too,  by  the 
kindly  reception  and  good  hopes  extended  him  by  papers 
representing  so  many  and  so  diverse  interests  as  the  Times, 
the  Telegraph,  the  Record,  the  Examiner,  and  Saunders'.2 
If  the  News  refused  to  dignify  his  visit  by  calling  it  a  mis- 
sion, he  could  take  comfort  that  in  the  Standard  he  was 
dubbed  an  Ambassador  Extraordinary.3 

He  did  not  wait  upon  Lord  Granville  when  he  arrived  in 
London  until  he  had  talked  with  an  old  friend  about  his 
chances  of  success.  He  spoke  to  him  of  England's  duty  to 
support  France  in  the  interest  of  the  balance  of  power. 
But  his  friend  broke  in  abruptly  to  tell  him  to  put  such 
notions  out  of  his  head,  for  England  now  had  no  interest 
in  them.4     Perhaps  it  was  this  warning  that  deterred  Thiers 

1  Daily  News,  Sept.  14,  1870. 

2  Issues  of  Sept.  14,  16,  17  and1  15,  respectively. 

3  Standard,  Sept.  14,  1870. 

*  Robt.  Wilson,  Life  and  Tunes  of  Queen   Victoria   (London,   1887- 
88),  vol.  ii,  p.  871;  Fortnightly  Review,  March,  1884,  vol.  xxxv,  p.  418. 


lg0      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [  180 

from  asking  for  active  intervention.  Perhaps  it  was  the  cold 
courtesy  of  the  British  Foreign  Minister  who  refused  to 
concede  the  envoy's  argument  that  the  war  had  been  due 
entirely  to  the  Empire,  and  that  the  downfall  of  Napoleon 
removed  any  justification  of  its  continuance.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  the  French  diplomatist's  endeavour  to  cast  a  sombre 
pall  of  responsibility  over  the  defunct  Empire  was  as  for- 
tunate a  choice  of  argument  as  would  have  been  an  effort 
to  dress  forth  with  his  keen  wit  some  quite  live  arguments 
for  Prussian  responsibility  that  slumbered  in  the  record  of 
the  negotiations  preceding  war's  outbreak.  Instead  of  the 
active  intervention,  which  Granville  was  certainly  prepared 
to  refuse,  Thiers  urged  immediate  recognition  of  the  Re- 
public, and  the  exertion  by  England  of  that  moral  influence 
which,  when  supported  by  the  Neutral  Powers  that  only 
waited  on  her  leadership,  would  surely  oppose  an  irresist- 
ible barrier  to  Prussian  aggression.  Both  were  refused 
him.  On  the  petitioner's  own  argument  Lord  Granville 
had  good  reason  for  the  first  denial.  For  Thiers  had  urged 
nothing  more  in  favor  of  the  de  facto  Government  than  its 
present  expediency, — a  republic  represented  everybody  at  a 
time  of  crisis.  His  second  request  he  urged  with  better 
logic  and  far  greater  eloquence.  Even  by  reading  Gran- 
ville's report  of  the  interview  one  can  see  that  Thiers's 
heart  was  in  that  plea.  But  he  found  the  Foreign  Minister 
guided  by  a  policy  of  inertia.  "  In  other  days,"  Thiers 
wrote  Jules  Favre,  "  England  would  have  shuddered  with 
indignation  at  the  idea  of  allowing  so  great  a  revolution  as 
was  accomplishing  itself  to  be  fulfilled  without  taking  the 
part  in  it  proper  to  a  great  Power.  Today,  while  recogniz- 
ing that  Prussia  is  becoming  formidable,  e:he  prefers  to  shut 
her  eyes  and  ears  rather  than  to  see  it  or  hear  it  said  .... 
The  idea  of  a  great  war  dismays  her,  and  the  thought  of 
taking  a  step  that  might  meet  with  a  rebuff  ....  dismays 


!8i]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  iSl 

her  almost  as  much  as  war  itself."  a  The  net  result  of  his 
interviews  in  England  was  Granville's  promise  to  deliver 
a  message  from  the  French  Government  requesting  an  in- 
terview with  Bismarck,  and  to  accompany  it  with  words  of 
satisfaction  at  thus  aiding  a  meeting  which  would  afford  the 
best  means  of  making  each  party  acquainted  with  the 
other's  demands  and  so  arriving  at  an  honorable  peace.2 

With  this  sop,  M.  Thiers  set  out  on  his  circular  visit  to 
the  Continental  capitals, — an  "  old  Orleanist  premier,"  the 
Dublin  Review  described  him,  "  starting  on  his  hopeless 
cruise  from  court  to  court  in  search  of  an  ally,  at  the  bid- 
ding of  two  boisterous  barristers,  who  have  been  suddenly 
flung  from  the  gutter  into  the  Louvre."  3  At  St.  Peters- 
burg he  was  even  less  successful  than  in  London,  and  Pall 
Mall  published  a  squib  about  his  visit  there  that  must  have 
annoyed  Lord  Tennyson : 

"  Thiers,  idle  Thiers,  I  know  not  what  you  mean — 
Thiers,  claiming  pity  from  the  ruthless  bear! 
Thiers,  idle  Thiers,  you  gather  in  my  eyes 
A  fatal  likeness  to  the  autumn  fields 
Where  chaff  is  found,  but  golden  grain  no  more."  4 

At  Vienna  he  found  himself  at  table  with  the  Prussian  his- 
torian, von  Ranke,  and  made  bold  to  remonstrate  with  him 
on  the  inconsistency  of  his  country  in  pursuing  hostilities 
when  the  author  of  the  war  and  the  Government  he  headed 
had  become  things  of  the  past.  "  On  whom,  pray,  do  you 
then  make  war?  "  he  ended.  "  On  Louis  XIV,"  was  the 
grim   answer.5     The   story   was   told    with   gusto   by   the 

1  Memoirs  of  Louis  Adolphe  Thiers,  1870-1873  (London,  1915),  pp. 
11-12. 

3  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  53-57. 

8  Dublin  Review,  Oct.,  1870,  vol.  xv,  pp.  479-496. 

*  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Oct.  7,  1870. 

5  Edinburgh  Review,  April,  1871,  The  German  Empire,  vol.  cxxxiii, 
pp.  459  et  seq. 


lg2      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [182 

friends  of  Prussia  in  England.  Not  only  these  men,  but 
many  who  argued  against  them  for  the  merits  of  the  French 
case,  approved  the  outcome  of  the  London  mission.  The 
claims  of  the  belligerents  differed  so  widely  that,  as  Glad- 
stone said,  it  could  not  be  considered  an  offense  that  Eng- 
land did  not  interfere  and  unreservedly  second  pretensions 
of  which  she  could  not  approve.1  Much  was  hoped  from 
the  personal  interviews  so  soon  to  be  arranged.  The  Prus- 
sian King  disclaimed  ambition,  the  Republic  was  intense 
in  its  eagerness  for  peace.  If  both  were  honest,  peace  must 
come  speedily. 

Edward  Malet,  Second  Secretary  of  the  British  Lega- 
tion in  Paris,  was  chosen  to  bear  the  message  sent  from 
Granville  through  Lord  Lyons,  and  the  French  despatch 
from  Favre.  Sir  Edmund  Blount  was  glad  to  see  him  go, 
for  Paris  was  almost  invested  and  he  hoped  that  Prussia 
would  ask  moderate  concessions  and  not  insist  on  terms 
to  which  the  French  populace  would  not  allow  their  Gov- 
ernment to  accede.  He  believed  that  Malet  carried  des- 
patches not  only  from  England  and  France,  but  from  Rus- 
sia also.  However  that  may  have  been,  the  courier  arrived 
in  due  time  with  his  weightly  documents  at  the  Prus- 
sian outposts.  The  camp  was  in  an  excellent  temper.  Dr. 
Russell  had  come  back  only  recently  from  a  visit  to  London 
bringing  with  him  "  congratulations  and  reassuring  news."  * 
There  was  current  a  rumor  that  the  defence  of  Paris  had 
been  abandoned,  and  though  this  had  been  contradicted,  it 
was  still  believed.  So  it  came  about  that  on  the  morning 
of  the  sixth  when  Archibald  Forbes,  while  riding  on  the 

1  Gladstone  to  Chevalier,  Sept.,  1870,  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  vol. 
",  PP-  343,  344- 

*  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edmund  Blount,  p.  175. 

8  Journals  of  Field  Marshal,  Count  von  Blumenthal  (translated  by 
Maj.  Gillespie  Addison,  London,  1903),  p.   122. 


183]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  183 

outskirts  of  the  camp  with  a  hussar  officer,  saw  a  little 
posse  of  French  lancers  following  a  civilian  who  bore  a 
white  flag,  he  believed  the  emissary  had  come  in  confirma- 
tion of  the  soldiers'  gossip.  But  Mr.  Malet,  before  leav- 
ing the  next  morning,  told  him  the  true  reason  of  his  visit.1 
He,  perhaps,  reported  something  more  of  success  than 
might  be  implied  from  that  day's  entry  in  the  journal  of 
Field  Marshal,  Count  Blumenthal :  "  An  English  Attache 
was  with  Bismarck  this  morning.  He  had  brought  some 
communications,  regarding  an  armistice,  but  he  was  soon 
warned  off." 3 

Bismarck  had  really  consented  to  the  personal  interview 
that  Granville  recommended.  Three  days  later  a  very  dif- 
ferent sort  of  messenger  arrived  in  Paris.  It  was  Captain 
Johnson  with  despatches  that  probably  gave  instructions  to 
Lord  Lyons  as  to  the  British  attitude  toward  the  negotia- 
tions. As  he  was  driven  down  the  Faubourg  St.  Honore 
in  an  open  caleche  he  attracted  the  vociferous  attention  of 
French  pedestrians.  A  postilion  bestrode  one  of  his  horses, 
wearing  his  hair  a  la  Catogan,  and  tricked  out  in  a  jacket 
with  scarlet  facings,  a  gold-banded  hat,  huge  boots,  and  all 
the  appurtenances  that  were  now  seen  only  behind  the 
footlights  or  at  a  masquerade.  Vizetelly,  who  watched  his 
approach  to  the  Embassy,  was  all  for  singing  a  snatch  from 
a  comic  opera,  "  Oh,  oh,  oh,  qu'il  etait  beau" — but  the 
Parisians  were  looking  on  the  semi-military  gentleman  in 
the  caleche  with  suspicion.  By  some  illogic  of  wartime 
psychology,  they  believed  him  a  Prussian  spy  and  wanted 
to  stop  his  carriage  and  march  him  off  to  prison.  But  Cap- 
tain Johnson  flourished  his  cane  in  a  very  menacing  man- 
ner and  the  German  porter  of  the  Embassy  came  to  his 

1  Archibald  Forbes,  My  Experience  of  the  War  between  France  and 
Germany,  vol.  i,  pp.  280-282. 
*  Journals  of  Count  von  Blumenthal,  p.  127. 


1 84      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [^4 

assistance,  so  that  he  finally  drove  in  triumph  into  the  court- 
yard that  was  under  the  protection  of  the  Queen  of  Eng- 
land.1 The  bold  captain  seems  to  have  become  impatient 
of  his  threatrical  trappings,  that  not  only  roused  the  sus- 
picion of  the  French  but  the  laughter  of  his  own  country- 
men. "  Why,"  wondered  Felix  Whitehurst,  "  do  they  dress 
the  Queen's  messenger  like  King  George  the  Third,  or  the 
old  two  penny  postmen  in  the  Windsor  uniform,  and  stick 
V.  R.  in  their  caps  ?  "  Captain  Johnson  was  given  the  re- 
fusal of  a  washerwoman's  cart  and  donkey  for  his  return 
journey,  and  seriously  considered  accepting  it. 

But  we  must  not  linger  over  his  picturesque  difficulties,  for 
the  day  of  his  arrival  in  Paris  (September  the  nineteenth) 
Jules  Favre  and  Count  Bismarck  were  discussing  things  of 
grave  importance  at  Ferrieres,  the  county-seat  of  Baron 
Alphonse  de  Rothschild.  Jules  Favre  was  eager  for  a  peace, 
but  failing  that  he  would  have  welcomed  an  armistice  for  the 
convoking  of  a  Constituent  Assembly  that  would  give  to  his 
Government  the  national  approval  which  England  had  de- 
clared essential  for  her  recognition.  Count  Bismarck  was 
eager,  also,  that  France  be  ruled  by  something  more  than  a 
Provisional  Government  when  the  time  came  for  treaty 
making.  But  he  demanded  that  it  give  promise  of  being  of  a 
character  to  his  liking.  He  could  afford  to  show  some  indif- 
ference, since  as  he  cynically  protested,  already  he  had  two 
Governments — one  at  Wilhelmshohe  and  one  at  Paris. 
Bismarck  demanded  Strasburg,  the  two  departments  of  the 
Bas  and  Haut  Rhin,  and  a  part  of  Moselle,  including  Metz, 
Chateau  Salins,  and  Soissons.  As  a  guarantee  while  his 
terms  were  under  discussion,  he  asked  the  occupation  of 
Strasburg, — the  garrison  of  which  should  surrender, — Toul, 

1  E.  A.  Vizetelly,  My  Days  of  Adventure,  pp.  106-107 ;  Julian  Kune, 
Reminiscences  of  an  Octogenarian  Hungarian  Exile,  pp.  200-207. 
*  Felix  Whitehurst,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  151,  178. 


lS^]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  185 

Phalsburg,  and  a  fortress  dominating  Paris.1  On  the 
nineteenth  there  was  published  in  the  Standard  an  interview 
that  the  great  Chancellor  had  granted  its  correspondent  in 
which  he  had  declared  that  Metz  and  Strasburg  would  be  de- 
manded of  France  to  ensure  Prussia  from  future  attack. 
This  much  the  public  was  allowed  for  guessing  what  might 
pass  at  Ferrieres.  Lord  Lyons  wrote  on  this  day  that  he 
believed  a  loss  of  territory  and  a  French  humiliation  would 
be  great  evils  and  sources  of  danger,  but  he  did  not  wish  to 
aggravate  difficulties  by  holding  out  hopes  that  British 
mediation  could  overcome  them.2  This  was  a  clear  endorse- 
ment of  the  opinion  Bismarck  had  stated  in  a  manifesto 
on  the  mission  of  Thiers,3  and  it  seems  to  have  been  shared 
also  by  the  Government  in  London.  For  no  representa- 
tion on  the  rigorous  Prussian  conditions  was  made  by  the 
Ministry.  The  day  after  the  interview's  conclusion,  it  is 
true,  the  Queen  sent  a  belated  telegram  to  King  William,  ex- 
pressing the  hope  that  he  might  be  able  to  shape  such  con- 
ditions as  the  vanquished  might  accept.  The  King  replied 
courteously  but  insisted  that  he  must  place  in  the  first  line 
the  protection  of  Germany  against  the  next  attack  of 
France,  which  he  believed  no  generosity  would  be  able  to 
deter.4 

Jules  Favre  announced  the  results  of  the  Ferrieres  in- 
terview at  the  same  time  that  he  announced  the  more  or 
less  negative  results  of  the  mission  of  Thiers.  He  had  not 
been  able  to  accept  the  terms  either  for  a  peace  or  for  a 
truce,  and  though  he  claimed  that  four  of  the  members 

1  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  62;  Times,  Sept.  26,  1870. 

2  Lyons  to  Granville,  Sept.   19,   1870,  Newton,  Life  of  Lord  Lyons, 
vol.  i,  p.  323. 

s  Annual  Register  for  1870,  vol.  cxii,  p.  127. 

4  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  45-47. 


!86      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [186 

of  the  League  of  Neutrals  showed  a  willingness  to  inter- 
vene directly  on  the  basis  of  conditions  he  had  proposed, 
two  had  refused  the  cooperation  that  was  needed  to  make 
the  agreement  of  the  others  available.  He  believed,  how- 
ever, that  the  interview  was  not  barren  of  result  if  it  had 
had  the  effect  of  removing  the  misconceptions  of  Prus- 
sia's intentions  which  had  prevailed  among  the  Neutrals.1 
In  the  Prussian  camp,  there  existed  some  fear,  apparently, 
of  how  the  news  of  the  Ferrieres  meeting  might  be  received. 
Dr.  Russell  noted  in  his  diary  a  slight  apprehension  and 
great  iritation  lest  the  European  Powers  should  make  an 
effort  at  intervention.2  But  in  the  gaining  of  allies,  surely, 
nothing  succeeds  like  success,  and,  in  spite  of  the  opti- 
mistic declarations  of  her  press,  French  affairs  were  at  low* 
ebb.  The  surrender  of  Toul  was  imminent,  Strasburg  was 
in  flames,  Paris  completely  invested,  and  Marseilles  in  re- 
volt. Things  being  in  this  desperate  plight,  a  great  many 
British  agreed  with  Mr.  Lowe,  the  Chancellor  of  the  Ex- 
chequer, that  it  was  not  opportune  for  Ministers  to  sit  all 
day  round  a  table  covered  with  green  cloth,  with  wax  tapers 
burning,  perpetually  receiving  and  sending  forth  telegrams. 
There  were  three  courses  open  to  England  as  a  Neutral,  he 
said.  She  might  become  an  arbitrator  at  the  request  of 
both  belligerents;  she  might  herself  assume  authority  and 
intervene;  or  she  might  mediate  by  means  of  good  offices 
proffered  in  the  interests  of  both  sides.  It  was  this  last 
course  she  had  chosen  to  pursue,  and  there  was  no  necessity 
for  expenditure  of  candle  power  to  light  her  on  her  way.8 
Who  could  help  France,  said  the  Times,  when  disregarding 
her  own  danger  and  the  advantage  of  an  armistice,  she  re- 

1  Favre  to  Members  of  Government  of  National  Defense,  Sept.  21, 
1870;  Brit.  State  Papers,  lxxi,  pp.  105-110. 

2  W.  H.  Russell,  My  Diary  during  the  Last  Great  War,  pp.  326-327. 

3  Times,  Sept.  22,  1870. 


jg;]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  187 

jected  Count  Bismarck's  terms.1  The  Guardian  rejoiced 
that  the  Ministers  refused  to  be  hustled  or  dragged  into  un- 
welcome efforts  at  mediation  or  the  greater  perils  of  for- 
cible intervention.2  But  there  were  other  papers  which 
found  Mr.  Lowe's  exposition  of  the  attitude  of  his  Govern- 
ment far  from  satisfying.  He  had  done  no  more,  said  the 
Globe,  than  say  that  mediation  was  an  uncommonly  perilous 
business.  What  the  public  really  wished  to  know  was  at 
what  point  England  could  be  expected  to  allow  her  energy 
to  take  a  more  substantial  form  than  fear.3  The  Spectator 
complained  of  the  wish  for  a  neutrality  so  punctilious  that 
it  feared  to  trench  on  silence,  lest  some  clue  be  given  which 
might  encourage  one  of  the  belligerents.  The  Spectator 
believed  it  would  be  better  that  Germany  should  know 
clearly,  and  in  the  most  authoritative  way,  how  fast  she 
was  losing  England's  sympathy.4  As  for  the  cheese-paring 
economy  secured  through  the  light-saving  of  the  present 
diplomacy,  Pall  Mall  and  other  journals  thought  that  the 
moderate  expenditure  on  candles  which  a  weekly  meeting 
at  the  green  table  involved  would  not  be  held  amiss.  In 
Vienna,  Florence,  and  St.  Petersburg  cabinets  were  in  daily 
session.5 

By  far  the  strongest  answer  to  the  much  discussed  speech 
Mr.  Lowe  had  made  at  Elgin  appeared  in  a  carefully  worded 
letter  to  the  Times  from  Sir  Henry  Bulwer.  He  regretted 
the  absence  of  the  Ministers  from  the  capital,  but  made  no 
reference  to  their  inconsequential  activities  in  partridge 
shooting  and  seashore  studies.  He  regretted,  also,  that 
Parliament  was  not  in  session.     "I  have  great  confidence 

1  Times,  Sept.  26,  1870. 

*  Manchester  Guardian,  Sept.  19,  1870. 

1  Globe,  Sept.  19,  1870. 

4  Spectator,  Sept.  24,  1870. 

6  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Sept.  19,  1870;  Once  a  Week,  Sept.  24,  1870. 


r88      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [i8g 

in  Mr.  Gladstone,"  he  said,  "  and  great  confidence  in  Lord 
Granville;  but  their  fault  in  Foreign  Affairs,  if  they  have 
any,  is  not  presumption."  He  doubted  if  they  would  have 
full  confidence  in  themselves  without  being  in  legitimate 
communication  with  the  nation.  He  believed  the  rights  of 
Europe  paramount  to  those  of  France  and  Prussia,  and 
urged  that  national  interests  were  so  intermingled  that  in- 
tervention, if  ever  it  could  be  justifiable,  had  now  become 
so.  Albeit,  the  letter  closed  with  a  plea  only  for  media- 
tion.1 Its  readers  were  rather  dubious  as  to  just  what  Sir 
Henry  Bulwer  wished.  The  Evening  Mail  thought  he  de- 
manded too  much  of  England  in  expecting  her  to  ascer- 
tain the  least  that  Prussia  would  accept  and  the  most  that 
France  could  surrender.  If  she  should  fare  badly  in  her 
self-imposed  task,  would  she  not  have  to  resort  to  force  to 
save  herself  from  humiliation?2  The  News  attempted  to 
dismiss  Sir  Henry  as  an  ancient  disciple  of  Talleyrand, 
who  dearly  loved  his  Paris  and  could  not  endure  that  "  the 
capital  of  civilization  and  petit  soupers"  should  be  de- 
sieged,  but  who  dared  not  plainly  state  his  wish  for  an 
armed  intervention.5  Saunders',  though  believing  his  sug- 
gestions unsound,  appraised  him  as  being  rather  more  than 
an  Epicurean  follower  of  adhorred  French  diplomacy, — a 
man  instead,  who  was  "  rich  in  experience  and  loaded  with 
all  the  distinctions  of  a  long  diplomatic  life."4  The  letter 
was  described  by  the  Scotsman  as  an  excellent  piece  of 
writing  but  a  very  indefinite  guide  to  action.  Ministers 
and  people  in  general  were  called  upon  to  do  something  but 
no  intimation  was  given  of  just  what  they  ought  to  do  or 
what  would  happen  to  them  if  they  did  it.5 

1  Sept.  21,  1870. 

1  Evening  Mail,  Sept.  23,  1870. 

*  Daily  Telegraph,  Sept.  28,  1870. 
4  Saunders's,  Sept.  29,  1870. 

*  Weekly  Scotsman,  Oct.  1,  1870. 


!8q]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  189 

A  letter  printed  a  few  days  later  attempted  to  clear  away 
the  alleged  ambiguity  of  its  predecessor.  Sir  Henry,  it 
seemed,  wished  England  to  discard  her  neutrality,  and  be- 
come the  "  friend  of  both  belligerents,"  to  substitute  a  more 
difficult  role  for  one  already  overtaxing  her.  In  the  media- 
tion, which  he  urged  that  she  attempt,  he  wished  her  neither 
to  proclaim  that  she  meant  only  to  talk,  nor  to  bully  and 
swagger  and  employ  a  town  crier  to  go  about  saying  that 
she  did  not  mean  to  fight.  He  was  impatient  of  supinely 
waiting  for  a  time  suitable  for  good  offices.  He  had  never 
known  a  timid  rider  to  find  a  good  opportunity  for  trying 
his  horse  at  a  stiff  fence,  and,  it  was  said,  the  more  the  rider 
looked  at  it,  the  less  he  liked  it.1  The  paper  warfare  waged 
by  the  advocates  of  the  albino-like  policy  of  the  albino  Min- 
ister, Mr.  Lowe,  and  the  more  decided  and  more  dangerous 
course  suggested  by  the  picturesque  Sir  Henry,  roused  the 
echoes  in  many  journals.  That  the  latter's  eloquence  did 
not  win  more  to  his  ranks  from  his  own  class  was  due,  in 
part,  as  the  Saturday  Review  well  pointed  out,  to  French 
impropriety  in  exchanging  polite  communications  with  the 
English  Republican  malcontents  and  the  Irish  Fenians.  They 
especially  disliked  the  recognition  accorded  Mr.  Odger  as 
the  bearer  of  a  "  semi  diplomatic  message  from  a  fraction 
of  the  London  rabble." 2 

It  was  on  the  twenty-seventh  of  the  month,  while  the 
controversy  was  at  its  height,  that  the  public  was  amazed  at 
the  impudence  of  the  London  Trades  Societies  in  sending  a 
deputation  to  advise  the  Prime  Minister  on  his  foreign 
policy.  It  was  on  this  day,  too,  that  the  English  papers 
published  the  circular  of  von  Thile,  who,  presiding  at  Berlin 
in  Bismarck's  absence,  gave  out  the  Prussian  account  of 

1  Times,  Oct.  1,  1870.     A  second  letter  had  appeared  in  the  issue  of 
Sept.  27,  1870. 
'Saturday  Review,  Oct.  i,  1870. 


I90      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [190 

the  Ferrieres  interview.  The  circular,  of  course,  threw  the 
blame  for  the  continuance  of  the  war  on  the  unreasoned 
stubbornness  of  the  Government  of  National  Defence. 
The  Standard  and  the  Daily  Telegraph  believed  it  would 
have  no  other  effect  than  to  create  enthusiasm  in  the  "  beer 
houses  in  which  stay-at-home  warriors  formulate  the  policy 
and  screw  up  the  purpose  of  the  German  armies,"  1  To 
others  it  seemed  to  confirm  the  opinion  that  M.  Jules  Favre 
had  more  of  heart  than  head, — that  his  lachrymal  ductsi 
were  in  a  higher  state  of  development  than  his  cerebrum. 

On  the  day  the  Prussian  circular  was  first  discussed  in 
London,  Lyons  was  engaged  in  sending  to  Granville  a  com- 
munication from  this  same  emotional  Jules  Favre.  France, 
he  said,  had  been  encouraged  by  the  Foreign  Powers  to  ad- 
dress herself  directly  to  Count  Bismarck.  The  result  had 
been  a  painful  humiliation.  "  The  ambition  of  Prussia 
and  her  desire  to  destroy  France  were  now  patent  to  the 
world  and  entitled  his  country  to  appeal  to  Europe  for  sup- 
port. The  Powers  should  speak  to  Prussia  with  unmis- 
takable firmness  and  take  measures  to  ensure  that  they  be 
heeded.2  Her  willingness  to  make  every  reasonable  sacri- 
fice exculpated  France  from  blame  for  future  disasters. 
It  was  a  strong  letter,  and  the  fact  that  Strasburg  was  for- 
ced to  capitulate  on  the  day  it  was  written  did  its  part  in 
further  strengthening  it.  The  Cabinet  was  summoned  to 
meet  on  the  thirtieth, — a  date  so  unusually  early  that  the 
News  feared  the  public  might  conclude  that  intervention 
was  contemplated.3  In  spite  of  the  denial  of  the  Liberal 
papers,  many  did  think  so,  and  certainly  there  was  more 
reason  for  their  belief  than  there  had  been  at  any  previous 
time.     M.  Favre  had  the  support  of  the  Austrian  Minister 

1  Issues  of  Sept.  27,  1870. 

*  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  p.  99. 

3  Daily  News,  Oct.  i,  1870. 


!m]  "ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  191 

of  Foreign  Affairs,  who  had  already  suggested  the  oppor- 
tuneness of  collective  mediation  at  St.  Petersburg  and 
London.1  In  Russia  there  was  a  strong  current  in  favor  of 
France,  as  Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  the  secretary  to  the  British 
embassy,  noted.  But  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  she  could  not 
have  been  won  to  action  unless  the  efforts  of  the  other 
Neutrals  so  strengthened  this  current  as  to  have  swept  away 
the  barriers  of  official  opposition.  In  England,  Gladstone, 
himself,  strongly  opposed  the  transfer  of  territory  or  inhabi- 
tants by  mere  force.  Such  a  policy  called  for  the  reprobation 
of  Europe,  he  wrote  John  Bright,  and  Europe  was  entitled 
to  utter  it,  and  could  utter  it  with  good  effect.2  His  views 
on  the  territorial  cession  had  the  support  of  the  majority  of 
the  British  press.  The  Standard,  the  Globe,  and  the  Econ- 
omist being  especially  notable  for  their  denunciation  of 
the  Prussian  claims,3  while  Pall  Mall,  in  its  zeal  to  refute 
them,  crossed  the  Rhine  to  cite  arguments  from  such 
authorities  as  Grotius  and  Puffendorf.*  The  Times  looked 
on  the  transfer  as  a  necessary  evil.5  The  News,  alone,  pre- 
tended to  see  justice  in  it,  claiming  France  was  protected  by 
no  favoured-nation  clause  that  made  inviolate  her  territory.8 
But  Gladstone  failed  to  carry  his  Cabinet  with  him  in  his 
wish  to  join  with  other  Neutral  Powers  in  remonstance  of 
Prussia's  avowed  intentions.  It  was  Lord  Granville,  ac- 
cording to  that  gentlemen's  biographer,  who  persuaded  him 

'Sir  Horace  Rumibold,  Recollections  of  a  Diplomatist  (London, 
1902),  vol.  ii,  p.  292. 

1  Gladstone  to  Bright,  Sept.  30,  1870,  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  vol. 
ii,  p.  346 ;  see  also  ibid.,  pp.  346-348. 

3  See  especially  editorials  in  issues  of  Sept.  8,  6  and  24,  1870,  respec- 
tively. 

*  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Sept.  20,  1870. 

6  Times,  Sept.  23,  1870.  For  expressions  of  different  views  in  the 
same  paper,  see  the  editorials  of  July  11,  Sept.  16  and  21,  1870. 

6  Daily  News,  Sept.  15,  1870. 


I92      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [192 

to  refrain  from  any  official  expression  of  his  abhorrence  of 
the  cession  of  provinces  against  the  wishes  of  their  inhabit- 
ants.1    And  so  there  was  necessity  for  only  a  single  meeting 
of  the  Cabinet.     The  Ministers  separated,  said  the  Times, 
with  the  conviction  that  the  time  had  not  yet  come  for  the 
abandonment  of  their  policy  of   "  observant  neutrality." : 
Sir  Henry  Bulwer  and  others  thought  differently,  and  the 
Times  continued  to  give  space  to  their  ideas,  but  it  was  very 
impatient    of    them.     They    reminded    its    editor    of    the 
woman  who  confused  her  husband  when  his  affairs  were 
greatly    embarrassed   by    repeating  with   nervous    energy, 
"  Do  something,  my  dear!     Do  something!  "     In  its  semi- 
official capacity  it  declared  with  hearty  approval  that  Eng- 
land had  discarded  the  so  long  and  so  meticulously  guarded 
principle   of   the   European   balance  and   was   resolved   to 
rejoice  in  the  free  and  healthy  growth  of  her  neighbors.     If 
Cinderella's  sisters,  making  heroic  and  bloody  preparations 
for  trying  on  the  crystal  slipper,  had  heard  the  Prince's 
courier  extol  the  beauty  of  "  free  and  healthy  growth"  they 
would,  perhaps,  have  experienced  the  same   feelings  that 
France  had  when   she  read  these  tidings.     England  had 
elected  to  do  nothing  at  all,  but  the  Times  and  the  News,  it 
would  seem,  were  determined  that  she  assume  a  posy  atti- 
tude in  doing  it.     The  reason  for  this  vain  posturing  was 
that  the  Conservative  leaders  had  become  very  active.     The 
Earls  of  Carnarvon  and  Derby  had  gone  to  London  to 
confer  with  Disraeli.3     The  leaders  of  the  Standard  and 
the  letters  of  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  were  increasingly  annoying. 
There  was  such  a  swell  of  public  sympathy  for  France  that 
fear  was  felt  that  Lord  Derby  and  Mr.  Disraeli  might  ride 
the  tide  to  office.     But  Parliament  was  not  in  session,  the 

1  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  63. 

*  Times,  Oct.  1,  1870. 

s  N.  Y.  Herald,  London  correspondent,  Oct.  3,  1870. 


193]  ABORTIVE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  ^3 

by  elections  were  carefully  postponed,  and  for  the 
time  being  France  and  the  British  public  had  to  be  content 
with  Granville's  decision  to  offer  mediation  only  when  it 
was  plainly  apparent  that  both  belligerents  would  welcome 
it.  "  The  object  of  the  Provisional  Government,"  he  wrote 
to  Lyons,  "appears  to  be  that  Neutral  Powers  should,  if 
needful,  support  by  force  any  representations  that  they 
might  make  to  Prussia.  Her  Majesty's  Government  are 
bound  to  state  explicitly  that  they  themselves  are  not  pre- 
pared to  adopt  any  such  means,  or  to  propose  it  to  other 
Neutral  Powers."1  As  for  according  formal  recogni- 
tion to  the  hard-pressed  Government  of  France,  Great  Brit- 
ain must  postpone  that  until  such  a  time  as  France,  having 
recognized  it  herself  by  a  duly  elected  Assembly,  could 
justly  urge  its  claims  upon  the  Neutrals.2  Until  such  a 
time  England  would  continue  to  date  her  passports  the 
second  of  September.  His  country,  said  Sir  Robert 
Morier,  had  become  a  bit  of  wet  blotting  paper  amongst  the 
nations,  and  it  upset  his  serenity,  and  made  him  wish  to  be 
a  Maori  or  a  Turco,  both  of  whom  were  possessed  of  some 
kind  of  individuality  and  self-assertion.3 

1  Granville  to  Lyons,  Oct.  4,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  pp. 
116-117. 

*  Granville  to  Lyons,  Oct.  1,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxxi,  p.  in. 

1  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robert  Morier,  vol.  ii,  p.  206. 


CHAPTER  X 

War  A  Outran ce 

In  October  London  Society  reported  that  the  war  news, 
which  had  lately  held  its  own  against  the  grouse,  was  now 
opposing  a  sturdy  resistance  to  the  partridge.  More  people 
were  in  town  than  was  usual  in  such  an  unfashionably  early 
month.  Mrs.  Lloyd-Lindsay  wrote  that  it  was  possible  to 
assemble  at  a  dinner  at  the  German  Embassy,  Gladstone, 
Granville,  two  or  three  ambassadors,  Delane,  Hayward, 
and  other  notables.  Except  for  a  lack  of  dinner  part- 
ners for  these  eminent  guests,  it  was  quite  as  though  it 
had  been  the  middle  of  the  season.1  The  city  was  agog 
with  the  war.  Excitement  reached  its  height  when  the 
evening  papers  began  to  appear.  In  the  leading  thorough- 
fares— east  and  west — nearly  every  man  had  a  broad  or  a 
narrow  sheet  in  his  hand,  perusing  it  on  the  pavement. 
There  were  letters  to  be  read  from  special  correspondents, 
"  our  own'  correspondents ; "  leading  articles  devoted  to 
different  branches  of  the  war;  discussions  of  England's  own 
military  system ;  financial  articles, — very  dull  these,  because 
uncertainty  kept  trade  slack;  lists  of  subscriptions  in  aid 
of  the  sick  and  wounded;  advertisements  of  French  refu- 
gees who  wished  to  dispose  of  their  jewelry  or  find  em- 
ployment as  chefs,  governesses,  or  in  "  any  honorable 
capacity  whatever." 

1  Harriet  S.  Wantage,  Lord  Wantage,  a  Memoir  (London,  1907),  pp. 
188-189. 

194  tx94 


195]  WAR  A  OUTRAN CE  I95 

John  Bull  read  them  all.  He  knew  more  of  the  war's  hap- 
penings than  was  known  in  Germany  and  infinitely  more 
than  was  known  in  France.  He  was  being  hurried  through 
mighty  pages  of  history  at  express-rate  speed  and  was 
doing  his  best  to  keep  his  grip  on  things.1  Perhaps  he 
should  have  been  devoting  all  his  attention,  these  mid- 
autumn  days,  to  the  Imperial  Manifesto  and  the  Bismarck 
Circular,  but  he  was  very  human  and  his  interest  was  not 
always  in  constant  attendance  on  the  things  that  had  most 
claim  on  it.  The  Evening  Mail2  and  the  Weekly  Free-* 
man  acknowledged  early  in  October  that  they  were  bored 
by  the  war.  Its  epic  interest  had  expired  at  Sedan.  At 
times  Paterfamilias  was  wearied  also.  He  had  no  mind 
to  go  home  and  change  the  pins  in  his  wall  map  to  accord 
with  the  latest  telegrams.  It  was  fatiguing  to  note  the 
progress  all  in  one  way  and  the  superabundance  of  the 
Prussian  colours.  The  month  was  to  see  the  defeat  of  the 
French  at  Arthenay  and  at  Soissons,  Orleans  occupied,  the 
surrender  of  Chateaudon  and  Schelstadt,  and  at  the  last, 
the  capitulation  of  Metz,  with  its  garrison  of  six  thousand 
officers  and  a  hundred  and  sixty-seven  thousand  men.  The 
whole  thing  seemed  an  outrage  on  the  sporting  instincts  of 
our  honest  Englishman. 

He  was  tired,  too,  of  having  Herr  Bismarck's  face  stare 
at  him  from  the  window  of  every  printshop.  On  each 
account  of  a  fresh  Prussian  victory  the  visage  of  the  Chan- 
cellor made  its  reappearance  and  seemed,  alas,  to  have 
gained  nothing  of  beauty  during  its  retirement.  Some 
shops,  said  the  News,  had  whole  strings  of  Bismarck's,  like 

1  London  Society,  Oct.,  1870,  England  during  the  War,  vol.  xviii,  pp. 
384  et  seq.;  All  the  Year  Round,  Oct.  15,  1870,  p.  473. 
*  Evening  Mail,  Oct.  4,  1870. 
s  Weekly  Freeman's  Journal,  Oct.  8,  1870. 


I96      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [I96 

ropes  of  onions.1  There  were  always  enough  others  who 
were  not  tired  and  would  buy  them  for  their  table  albums. 
Enough  others,  too,  to  buy  the  patriotic  songs  that  were 
printed  in  sheets  and  sold  at  a  penny  apiece. 

Paterfamilias  was  especially  disgruntled  at  the  omnipre- 
sent Marseillaise.  It  was  rendered  on  barrel-organs  before 
his  front  door  in  the  time  of  a  dirge,  or  by  a  clarinet  af- 
flicted as  with  yelping  spasms  in  the  high  register  and 
with  sudden  mournful  eructations  in  the  lower  notes,  and 
its  effect  was  distinctly  depressing.  He  was  glad  when 
the  News  protested  against  this  conversion  of  a  splendid 
anthem  into  a  clamorous  invocation  for  coppers.2  Gustave 
Dore  was  exhibiting  what  purported  to  be  an  idealization 
of  the  song — an  idealization  described  by  the  Art  Journal 
as  a  masculine,  disreputable,  undressed  harridan  with  a 
large  sword  and  banner,  and  a  painfully  distended  mouth.9 
Paterfamilias  was  inclined  to  believe  it  a  very  realistic  pre- 
sentment of  the  Marseillaise  as  he  knew  it.  At  Agricul- 
tural Hall  the  war  was  illustrated  by  a  morning  panorama 
of  its  principal  scenes,  and  at  North  Woolwich  there  wa9 
an  al-fresco  painting  of  Weissenbourg  and  a  representa- 
tion of  the  battle  with  real  fire  and  real  British  volunteers 
to  take  the  part  of  the  combatants.4  At  Mme.  Tussaud's 
they  were  consantly  adding  new  figures  to  the  military 
contingent  of  the  wax  works.5 

In  the  comic  journals  the  gods  of  battle  took  on  a  more 
fantastic  turn,  and  the  awful  Bismarck  and  his  royal 
master  brought  a  disrespectful  chuckle  from  some  who  at 

1  Daily  News,  Oct.  18,  1870. 
'Ibid.,  Oct.  17,  1870. 
3  Art  Journal,  Oct.,  1870. 

*  London  Society,  Oct.  1,  1870,  England  during  the  War,  pp.  ^S^etseq. 
5  Daily  Telegraph,  Dec.  xg,  1870;  John  T.  Tussaud,  Romance  of  Mme. 
Tussaud's  (London,  1920),  chap,  xxii,  passim. 


jgy]  WAR  A  OUTRANCE  1 97 

first  had  accorded  them  only  awed  admiration.1  If  idols 
can  be  kept  in  darkened  recesses  or  exhibited  only  behind  a 
cloud  of  incense  when  men's  heads  are  lowered,  a  coat  of 
gilding  may  be  sufficient  to  cover  feet  of  clay.  But  an  idol 
brought  to  the  market  place  to  furnish  forth  copy  for  every 
paper  of  the  United  Kingdom  has  need  to  be  one  hundred 
percent  fine  gold  from  top  to  toe.  When  King  William  had 
prostrated  himself  in  prayer  and  humiliation,  and  heralded 
his  entrance  into  war  with  a  pious  proclamation  of  his 
honorable  intentions,  he  had  been  exalted  by  many  sincere 
Britishers  to  a  position  only  a  little  lower  than  the  angels. 
They  experienced  now  a  feeling  of  annoyance  at  the  profuse 
thanks  he  rendered  Providence  for  each  of  his  various  vic- 
tories. It  was  esteemed  an  unmannerly  presumption  that 
Prussia,  having  the  services  of  Bismarck  and  von  Moltke, 
should  lay  claim  also  to  a  monopoly  of  the  Divine  guardian- 
ship. 

The  fact  that  Bazeilles  was  burned  on  the  day  of  Sedan, 
with  a  horrible  thoroughness  which  made  its  name  soon 
known  throughout  the  world,2  encouraged  the  British  to 
deride  the  king's  devotion.  "  Providence  be  thanked,"  he 
had  telegraphed  to  his  Queen  on  the  great  day,  whereupon 
Punch  misquoted  him  in  this  wise: 

"  Thanks  be  to  God, 
My  dear  Augusta, 
We've  had  another  awful  bluster; 
Ten  thousand  Frenchmen  sent  below, 
Praise  God  from  whom  all  blessings  flow !"  3 

It  was  related  that  a  wounded  prisoner,  writhing  in  agony, 

1  The  cartoons  of  Sir  Arthur  Tenniel  in  Punch  are  especially  clever. 

*  C.  E.  Ryan,  With  an  Ambulance  in  the  Franco-German  War,  pp. 
88-89;  Graphic,  Sept.  10,  1870;  Athenaeum,  Dec.  24,  1870;  Spectator, 
Sept.  17,  1870;  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Sept.  21,  1870;  Saunders',  Sept.  24, 
1870;  Annual  Register  for  1870,  vol.  xvii,  p.  189. 

3  Punch,  Sept.  3,  1870. 


I98      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [198 

called  out  on  God  to  aid  him :  "  Why  do  you  call  on  God?  " 
said  his  next  neighbor,  "  Don't  you  know  He  has  forsaken 
us  and  gone  over  to  the  Prussians?"  r  England  could  not 
think  so.  She  disliked  the  orders  to  fire  villages  as  a 
means  of  making  peasants  hunt  out  the  franc  tireurs.  She 
did  not  like  requisitions  enforced  by  terror.  A  Protestant 
pastor  vouched  for  the  truth  of  the  horrors  suffered  by 
the  hundreds  of  homeless  after  the  burning  of  the  village  of 
Cherizy.2 

Strasburg  had  been  bombarded  in  spite  of  the  appeals 
of  its  Bishop  to  General  Werder.  Its  starving  citizens  had 
been  denied  the  privilege  of  seeking  a  place  of  safety  be- 
fore the  guns  were  fired.3  The  Art  Gallery  and  the  Cathed- 
ral had  not  been  able  to  resist  the  bombs  of  the  pious  King 
William.  An  estimate  of  the  damage  done  to  them  was 
given  in  the  Athenaeum.4  But  the  loss  of  the  Library  was 
considered  irreparable.  Its  wonderful  collection  of  in- 
cunabula and  manuscripts  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries  could  never  be  replaced.  The  Alsatians,  them- 
selves, claimed  that  it,  with  the  Cathedral,  had  been  made 
the  special  targets  for  artillery  fired  under  General  Werder's 
orders.  The  Bookworm  inveighed  against  the  conscious 
destruction  of  a  priceless  collection  by  a  lieutenant  of  the 
"God-fearing,  God-mouthed  King  of  Prussia."5  Ruskin 
published  his  opinion  of  the  Prussian  commander  who  had 
succumbed  to  the  tempting  target  which  the  famous  build- 
ings made  in  the  glare  of  the  naming  city.     He  found  no 

'  The  Monthly  Packet  of  Evening  Readings,  March,  1871. 

*  Spectator,  Oct.  29,  1870;  see  also  Times,  Oct.  28,  1870,  Jan.  11,  1871. 

*  Manchester  Guardian  and  Daily  Telegraph  of  Sept.  2,  1870. 

4  Athenaeum,  Nov.  19,  1870,  vol.  xliv,  p.  662. 

5  Bookworm,  Sept.,  1870,  The  Burning  of  the  Strasburg  Library,  pp. 
138-139;  Daily  Telegraph,  Oct.  7.  1870. 


199]  WAR  A  OUTRANCE  I99 

consolation  in  the  news  that  the  Parisians  would  attempt 
to  repair  the  losses  by  casting  a  great  bronze  Strasburg.1 

The  Times  made  it  an  opportunity  for  sententiously  re- 
minding the  Prussians  that  the  gratification  of  military 
honour  should  not  be  accompanied  by  the  debasement  of 
their  moral  qualities.2  Vanity  Fair,  in  adding  the  portrait 
of  the  Crown  Prince  to  its  gallery  of  notables,  remarked 
that  the  English  might  have  wished  another  husband  for  the 
Princess  Royal  than  the  fighting  heir  of  a  despotic  and  ag- 
gressive monarch.3  It  was  hoped  he  would  not  send  her 
battle  loot.  Stories  came  back  that  showed  the  invaders 
found  it  particularly  difficult  to  resist  the  acquisition  of 
impedimenta.  Where  professional  soldiers  had  stolen  for 
self  alone,  the  home-loving  German  requisitioned  with  a 
loving  memory  of  wife  and  children  that  induced  a  more 
painstaking  thoroughness.* 

The  most  telling  expression  of  the  changed  estimate  of 
the  Prussian  military  that  was  taking  place  between  July 
and  October  appears  in  the  statements  of  two  young  Eng- 
lishmen who  had  been  so  fired  with  enthusiasm  for  King 
William's  cause  at  the  war's  beginning  that  they  had  at- 
tached themselves  to  the  Prussian  armies.  One  was  Sir 
Charles  Dilke,  who  had  hoped  for  fine  things  from  future 
alliance  with  "  our  brothers  in  America,"  and  "  our  kins-1 
men  in  Germany  and  Scandinavia,"  but  became  disgusted 
at  the  arrogance  and  aggressiveness  of  the  Prussians  after 
their  first  victories.  There  was  in  the  Prince's  suite,  he 
wrote,  a  celebrated  German  Liberal,  the  writer  and  politi- 
cian, Gustav  Freytag,  who  had  the  bad  taste  to  wear  the 

1  Academy,  Oct.  i,  1870,  pp.  431  ct  seq.;  Temple  Bar,  Nov.,  1870,  vol. 
xxx,  p.  548;  All  the  Year  Round,  Sept.  io,  1870. 

'Oct.  18,  1870. 

3  Vanity  Fair,  Sept.  24,  1870. 

*  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Sept.  21,  1870. 


200      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [200 

Legion  of  Honour  in  the  invaded  country,  and  made  him- 
self further  obnoxious  by  his  constant  patriotic  exultation. 
Dilke  and  Auberon  Herbert,  who  was  with  him,  soon  de- 
serted their  ambulance  corps,  and  the  former  was  in  Paris 
in  time  to  witness  the  September  revolution.1  There  was, 
also,  Lord  Edmund  Fitzmaurice,  who  returned  to  England 
in  October  and  made  public  acknowledgment  of  the  shift 
of  his  sympathy  to  France.  He  believed  that  if  German 
opinion  had  not  been  tampered  with  by  governmental  in- 
fluences, it  would  have  shown  a  strong  dislike  for  territor- 
ial spoil,  but  that  the  scheme,  originated  in  the  King' si 
Cabinet,  had  been  advanced  so  cunningly  that  the  acquisition 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  was  now  considered  a  national 
necessity.  He  testified  to  the  Prussian  demoralization  in 
victory  as  being  so  great  as  to  justify  the  loss  of  sympathy 
he,  and  many  other  Englishmen,  had  felt.2 

A  great  deal  was  being  said  just  then  of  French  degener- 
acy, of  which  Lord  Fitzmaurice  professed  himself  incompe- 
tent to  judge.  The  English  proved  as  adept  as  the  Gaul  in 
seeking  out  a  woman  on  whom  to  put  the  blame  for  the  dis- 
aster. Lord  Granville  and  many  others  named  the  Emp- 
ress as  the  cause  of  war,  and  linked  with  her  as  entrigants: 
the  names  of  various  high  dignitaries  of  the  Roman  Church, 
or  that  of  Marshal  Leboeuf,  as  inclination  led  them.3.  All 
made  much  of  the  luxury  Eugenie  had  sponsored  and  that 
had  so  conspicuously  flaunted  itself  on  the  Parisian  boule- 

1  Gwynn  and'  Tuckwell,  Life  of  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Chas.  Dilke,  vol.  i,  pp. 
104-108. 

'Letter  to  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Oct.  18,  1870;  for  criticisms  of  letter, 
see  Lord  Carlingford  to  Lear,  Oct.  19,  1870,  Later  Letters  of  Edward 
Lear,  p.  126 ;  Examiner  and  London  Review,  Oct.  22,  1870. 

3  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  vol.  ii,  pp.  51,  388;  Earl  of 
Malmesbury,  G.  C.  B.,  Memoirs  of  an  ex-Minister,  vol.  ii,  pp.  415-416. 
Cf.  Dr.  Evans,  Second  Empire,  pp.  167-168;  see  also  Spencer  Walpole, 
History  of  Twenty-five  Years,  vol.  ii,  pp.  492-493. 


201]  WAR  A  OUTRANCE  201 

vards.1  There  were  those  who  said  the  loose  morals  that 
went  unrebuked  at  Court  were  emulated  by  the  soldiers, 
who  marched  away  wreathed  and  fettered  by  the  garlands 
that  had  been  flung  round  them  by  their  women,  who  ran 
beside  them,  singing,  to  the  station.  A  number  of  pro- 
fessional dancers  had  come  over  from  Paris  and  were 
astounding  London  audiences  by  a  certain  set  of  contor- 
tions which  were  at  first  described  as  the  French  national 
dance.  In  October,  after  a  good  deal  of  editorial  preach- 
ing, the  magistrates  were  induced  to  revoke  the  licenses  of 
the  Alhambra  and  Highbury  Barn,  that  had  housed  the 
chief  offenders.2  But  it  is  safe  to  say  that  these  irrespon- 
sible refugees  had  already  done  not  a  little  to  strengthen 
the  disapprobation  of  the  British  who  crowded  the  stalls 
to  see  them.  Lady  Churchill  wrote  that  a  more  exclusive 
audience  was  equally  entertained  and  shocked  by  the  doings 
and  sayings  of  two  pretty  and  lively  refugees,  who  with 
their  husbands,  preferred  shooting  birds  in  England  to 
being  shot  at  in  France.  They  had  taken  a  place  in  the 
country  and  the  ladies  astonished  the  sober  yokels  by  hunt- 
ing in  kilts  and  puffing  away  at  little  cigarettes.  They  were 
of  a  very  sprightly  humour  and  the  practical  jokes  that  they 
played  in  exile  were  not  over-nice  in  their  regard  for 
British  propriety.3  The  English  marvelled  at  the  antics  of 
these  exponents  of  a  civilization  that  was  on  trial  for  its 
very  life.  There  were  those  who  pointed  out  that  it  had 
produced  and  applauded  that  frail  heroine  of  romance, 
Mile,  de  Maupin.4     The  arch-moralist,  Rossetti,  was  very 

1  Lady  John  Russell,  a  Memoir,  p.  230;  Mrs.  El.  Lecky,  Memoir  of 
W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  p.  85. 

*  Daily  News,  Sept.  20,  1870;  Examiner  and  London  Review,  Oct.  15, 
1870. 

5  Mrs.   George   Cornwallis    West,    Reminiscences   of  Lady   Randolph 
Churchill,  p.  28. 

*  Andrew   Lang,  Theophilc  Gautier,  Dark  Blue,  March,   1871,  pp.  27 
et  seq. 


202      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [202 

sure  that  Mme  Bovary1  was  somehow  culpable  for  the 
deep  sorrow  of  poor  France.  The  impotence  of  Favre's 
tears  before  Bismarck,  the  amusing  spectacle  of  Thiers, — ' 
drumming  the  merits  of  the  new  Republic  before  the  rulers 
of  Europe  and  finding  little  interest  in  his  sample  case, — 
were  believed  by  many,  even  of  those  who  wished  it  other- 
wise, to  indicate  that  France  must  speedily  succumb  to  the 
aggressive  virility  of  her  neighbour.  Delane  was  specu- 
lating on  just  what  day  in  October  Paris  would  give  the 
signal  for  surrender.2 

England  was  abruptly  startled  from  her  melancholy 
musings  by  the  aerial  flight  of  Gambetta  from  Paris  to 
Tours.  There  was  a  whistling  of  hostile  bullets  when  his 
balloon  cleared  St.  Denis,  and  at  Creil  the  Prussians  suc- 
ceeded in  piercing  it,  and  in  grazing  Gambetta's  hand,  but 
finally,  early  in  the  afternoon  of  October  the  seventh,  it 
descended  near  Montdidier  to  catch  in  an  oak  tree  and 
leave  the  Minister  hanging  head  downwards  with  his  legs 
clutched  round  the  ropes  of  the  car.  The  peasants,  who 
believed  him  a  Prussian,  were  reassured  by  the  sight  of  the 
tricolour  and  the  sound  of  a  hearty  Vive  la  Republique. 
They  assisted  him  to  the  ground  and  cheered  him  that  even- 
ing when  he  was  driven  away  to  his  destination.  "  Honour 
to  the  brave!"  exclaimed  the  London  Illustrated  News, 
and  forthwith  dubbed  the  new  deliverer  the  "  Minister  of 
the  Balloon." 3  It  was  natural  that  so  theatrical  a  descent 
of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  should  arouse  the  good- 
natured  raillery  of  the  British.  Gambetta  was  called  a 
political  athlete,  a  winged  messenger,  and  was  congratulated 
on  having  experienced  no  more  serious  "  reverse "  on  his 

1  Ford  Madox  Huefer,  Ancient  Lights  and  Certain  New  Reflections 
(London,  1911),  p.  182. 
1  Dasent,  lohn  Delane,  vol.  ii,  p.  270. 
$  Illustrated  London  Nezvs,  Oct.  15,   1870. 


203]  WAR  A  OU TRANCE  203 

journey  than  the  awkward  episode  of  the  inhospitable  oak 
tree.1 

It  was  soon  recognized,  however,  that  Gambetta  must  be 
taken  seriously, — that  he  had  accumulated  all  the  authority 
from  Tours  to  Marseilles  into  his  hands,  and  that  his  suc- 
cess in  using  it  would  determine  the  fate  of  the  Republic.3 
His  proclamations  began  to  be  read  and  criticized  as  care- 
fully as  those  of  the  great  Chancellor  himself.  They  of- 
fered a  striking  contrast  to  the  Chancellor's.  As  the  Ex- 
aminer said,  if  Count  Bismarck  revelled  in  the  inexorable, 
M.  Gambetta  outdistanced  all  competitors  in  the  field  of 
official  boast.  The  one  appealed  to  horror,  the  other  to 
hope.3  The  Record  found  Bismarck's  pronunciamentos 
hard,  exultant,  and  arrogant.4  The  Spectator  said  that  the 
famous  iron  and  blood  not  only  backed  his  diplomacy  but 
seemed  to  enter  into  it.5  In  October  he  issued  a  sort  of  dis- 
claimer of  German  responsibility  for  the  dreadful  suffer- 
ing that  he  foresaw  for  Paris.  She  would  be  reduced  to 
starvation,  he  said,  and  the  besiegers  would  not  be  able  to 
afford  help  to  her  famished  populace.6  Gambetta' s  pro- 
clamation showed  another  picture.  Paris  was,  indeed, 
somewhat  bored  at  not  having  its  letters  daily,  and  its  fresh 
vegetables  so  plenteously.  It  missdd  its  rides  into  the 
country.  But  with  a  garrison  of  six  hundred  thousand  and 
a  ring  of  impregnable  fortifications,  it  stood  at  ease  and 
calmly  defied  its  foes.7     All  of  this  was  said  in  a  style  that 

1  Judy,  Oct.  26,  1870;  see  also  Chamber's  Journal,  March  4,  1871,  pp. 
129  et  seq. 

2  Spectator,  Oct.  22,  1870. 

1  Examiner  and  London  Review,  Oct.  15,  1870. 

*  Record,  Sept  30,  1870. 

5  Spectator,  Oct.  8,  1870. 

'Illustrated  London  News,  Oct.  15,  1870. 

1  Examiner  and  London  Review,  Oct.  15,   1870. 


204      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [204 

seemed  to  many  of  the  English  bombastic, — even  "  menda- 
ciously rhapsodic."1  "If  he  (Gambetta)  carried  the 
newly  published  document  in  the  car  of  his  balloon,"  said 
the  Telegraph,  "  he  could  have  wanted  little  other  ballast. 
It  is  heavy  with  doom,  loaded  with  forthcoming  miseries 
and  madness — a  burden  of  passionate  pride  and  national 
impenitence." 2  The  Court  Journal,  though  somewhat 
sarcastic,  was  more  tolerant.  "  We  ought,"  it  said,  "  to 
proclaim  all  honor  to  inflation,  at  the  moment  when  the 
Government  itself  is  borne  through  the  air,  and  drops  from 
the  clouds,  carpet  bag  in  hand,  laden  with  its  own  mes- 
sages, and  transporting  its  own  decrees." :  And  the  Man- 
chester Examiner  conceded  that  brave  words  and  great 
deeds  might  sometimes  go  together  and  that  for  the  French, 
at  least,  fine  phrases  were  one  of  the  necessaries  of  life.4 

Almost  at  the  same  time  that  the  news  of  Gambetta's  sen- 
sational flight  reached  England,  it  was  learned  that  Gari- 
baldi had  come  to  France.  Indeed,  the  Dublin  Review 
needed  to  juggle  its  dates  only  a  little  to  declare  that  the 
one  had  descended  from  his  balloon  to  embrace  the  other.5 
There  was  practical  unanimity  in  England  in  declaring1 
that  the  presence  of  the  valiant  old  Italian  was  not  of  ad- 
vantage. By  the  majority,  his  appearance  was  regarded 
as  distinctly  unfortunate.  It  would  deepen  the  tint  of  the 
Republic  that  already  seemed  alarmingly  red  to  many  who 
wished   to   be   its    friends.     The   Guardian    spoke   of    his 

1  The  Interests  of  Europe  in  the  Conditions  of  Peace  (pamphlet, 
London,  1870)  ;  see  also  Quarterly  Review,  Oct.,  1870;  Terms  of  Peace, 
pp.  540  et  seq. 

1  Daily  Telegraph,  Oct.  11,  1870. 

1  Court  Journal,  Oct.  29,  1870. 

4  Manchester  Guardian,  Oct.  12,  1870. 

5  Dublin  Review,  Oct.  1,  1870,  The  Fall  of  the  Empire,  vol.  xv,  pp. 
479  ct  seq. 


205]  WAR  A  OUTRANCE  205 

utter  lack  of  political  stability,  and  of  the  ease  with  which 
he  might  be  used  by  men  of  extreme  opinions.1  The  News 
believed  his  championship  of  the  new  government  would 
cause  dissension  in  those  classes  from  which  it  needed 
financial  and  military  support.2  His  desire  to  secure  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  for  the  one-time  enemy,  who  had  wrested 
from  Italy  Nice,  and  Savoy  was  declared  by  the  sober- 
minded  Saunders'  as  utterly  quixotic  or,  what  was  the 
same,  Garibaldian.3  From  the  standpoint  of  the  influential 
class  in  England,  it  would  have  been  better  had  the  French 
thanked  the  noble  old  chieftain  for  his  goodwill  and  then 
conducted  him  civilly  to  the  frontier  and  seen  him  safely 
aboard  a  ship  bound  for  Caprera.  He  brought  a  great 
heart,  said  the  Times,  but  what  France  needed  was  a  head, 
— the  ability  to  organize  her  shattered  resources,  the  saga- 
city that  would  win  confidence  in  her  good  intentions  for 
the  future, — not  only  among  her  own  people  but  abroad.4 
The  old  Commander,  with  the  magic  of  his  fame,  the  mag- 
netism that  reduced  his  followers  almost  to  the  frenzy  of 
idolaters,  disturbed  pacific  England.  He  was  an  idealist, 
and  idealists  could  do  such  shocking  things. 

But  if  the  perfervid  tone  of  Gambetta's  eloquence 3  and 
the  colour  of  the  shirt  that  covered  the  brawny  shoulders! 
of  Garibaldi  alienated  some  Britons  who  had  sympathies 
with  the  French,  they  further  inflamed  the  zeal  of  those 
workingmen  who  had  already  espoused  the  cause  of  the 
Republic.  Already  these  were  demanding  that  Parliament 
be  assembled  that  it  might  teach  the  Ministry  its  duty  in 
recognizing  the  new  Government,  and  in  rebuking  Prussia 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  Oct.  11,  Nov.  7,  1870. 

*  Daily  News,  Oct.  14,  1870. 

3  Saunders',  Oct.  13,  1870. 

4  Times,  Oct.  II,  1870. 

*  His  General  Order  was  called  in  England  "Garibaldi's  Hymn'". 


206      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [206 

for  the  greed  she  wished  to  gratify  in  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine.1    The  conservative  Standard  regretted  that  many  of 
all  classes  of  English  society  were  deterred  from  taking 
part  in  the  agitation  for  mediation,  because  if  they  did  take 
part  they  would  be  expected,  too,  to  shout  for  the  French 
Republic  and  do  such  undignified  things  as  carry  torches 
and  wait  on  the  Prime  Minister  with  representations  as  to 
his  foreign  policy.2     The  Tories,  who,  to  some  extent,  had 
sympathized  with  France  before  the  fall  of  the  Imperial 
Government,  had  small  sympathy  with  their  new  associates, 
the  Comtists.     They  resented  the  attempt  to  identify  her 
cause  with  republicanism,  solidarity,  and  the  brotherhood 
of  man.     They  believed  the  French  themselves  were  not 
very  proud  of  the  kinship  the  Leather  Lane  republicans 
claimed  for  them  with  their  "  cousins — German."  3     There 
was  a  torch-light  demonstration  of  about  six  hundred  of 
these  Democrats  in  Palace  Yard,  a  few  days  after  Garibaldi 
had  been  invested  with  his  French  command.     Their  reso- 
lutions were  more  than  usually  ardent,  and  found  little  re- 
sponse among  the  absent   Conservatives.     Gladstone  was 
to  be  instructed  to  recognize  Republican  France  and  to  pro- 
test against  its  dismemberment;   he  was  urged   to  call  a 
special  meeting  of  Parliament,  so  that  if  Germany  persisted 
in  her  harsh  demands,  Great  Britain  could  be  empowered 
to  take  up  arms  in  opposition.4     The  Economist  was  sure 
that,  had  the  working  class  attributed  any  practical  im- 
portance to  this  or  the  other  meetings,  it  would  have  seen 
to  it  that  the  minority  that  opposed  the  resolutions  would 
have  been  swelled  to  a  majority.     The  stay-at-homes  had 

1  Times,  Oct.  5,  1870. 

*  Standard,  Oct.  13,  1870. 

1  Judy,  Oct.  26,  1870;  Times,  Oct.  24,  1870. 

1  Times,  Oct.  20,  1870;  Illustrated  London  News,  Oct.  22,  1870. 


207]  WAR  A  OUTRAN CE  207 

felt  assured  that  the  middle  class  was,  for  the  most  part,  in 
favour  of  caution  and  could  be  trusted  to  counter-balance 
the  turbulent  wishes  of  their  brothers.1  England  possessed 
a  very  fine  navy,  but  it  was  believed  that  the  men  whose 
taxes  supported  it  were  too  practical  to  attempt  to  send  it 
to  the  relief  of  Paris. 

Among  the  Irish,  of  course,  it  was  not  expected  that 
considerations  of  common  sense  would  prevail.  The  Tablet 
thundered  that  the  new  Government  was  composed  of  the 
disciples  of  Voltaire ; 2  but  in  October,  Lecky  wrote  that  Irish- 
men were  still  as  passionately  French  as  they  had  been  in 
the  days  of  the  Catholic  Empire.  The  country  people,  he 
said,  stopped  him  in  the  road  to  ask  for  news  of  the  war, 
and  carmen  and  guides  overwhelmed  the  hapless  tourist 
with  political  discussion.3 

The  Corporation  of  Dublin  exceeded  its  functions  by  call- 
ing for  Her  Majesty's  Government  and  those  of  the  other 
Neutral  Powers  to  intervene  for  peace.4  A  dealer  in  the 
Strand  made  much  money  from  a  caricature  map  which 
showed  England  quaking  with  fear  and  rage,  and  holding 
by  a  string  Ireland,  who,  as  a  little  dog,  was  very  eager  to 
get  loose  and  fight.5  No  one  was  surprised  when  in  the 
middle  of  October,  an  Irish  Ambulance  Corps  left  Dublin 
to  sail  to  Havre.  The  Times  was  fearful  that  these  strong, 
young  Irishmen  had  left  for  a  more  dangerous  purpose  than 
they  avowed,  and  urged  the  Home  Secretary  to  take  meas- 
ures against  the  violation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act* 

1  Economist,  Oct.  22,  1870,  The  Middle  and  the  Working  Classes  in 
th-e  War,  vol.  xxviii,  pp.  1283  et  seq. 

*  Nov.  26,  1870. 

!  El.  Lecky,  Memoirs  of  W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  p.  87. 

*  Saunders',  Oct.  25,  1870. 

6  Art  Journal,  Oct.,  1870,  pp.  322-323. 
6  Issues  of  Oct.  11,  15,  1870. 


20S      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [208 

Von  Bernstorff  was  still  showing  an  amazing  facility  at 
peppering  the  Government  with  remonstrances  on  the  ex- 
portation of  coal  and  munitions  of  war.     According  to  an 
English  M.  P.,  in  Havre  when  the  contingent  arrived,  the 
seventy  Irishmen  were  told  that  they  were  expected  to  join 
the  French  Army.     Fifty,  he  said,  went  on  to  do  so,  and 
the  rest  applied  to  the  English  consulate  to  be  sent  home.1 
The  Irish  Nations  account  of  the  expedition  was  very  dif- 
ferent.    Two  hundred  and  fifty,  instead  of  seventy,  went 
to  Havre,  it  recorded,  and  since  only  forty  could  be  used  as 
hospital  attendants,  a  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  number  de- 
cided to  join  the  Foreign  Legion.     The  others  returned  to 
Dover.2     The  Compagnie  Irlandaise  was  allowed  to  fight 
as  a  unit  under  its  own  flag,  that  had  been  quartered  with 
the  tricolour.     It  gave  a  good  account  of   itself   and  re- 
mained to  hear  the  last  shot  fired  by  the  Foreign  Legion. 
But  the  admonition  of  the  Times  was  heeded,  and  the  For- 
eign Enlistment  Act  thereafter  so  carefully  enforced  that 
no  further  such  companies  of  men  on  mercy  bent  were  al- 
lowed to  leave  the  Empire.3 

The  ill  luck  of  the  Irish  in  attaching  themselves  to  a  lost 
cause  was  signally  emphasized  by  the  astounding  news  of 
the  surrender  of  Metz  that  followed  hard  on  their  arrival. 
It  g-ave  the  month  its  climax.  Marshal  Bazaine.  after  a  siege 
of  only  seventy  days,  gave  up  the  fortress  that  France  had 
proudly  called,  "  La  Pucellc."  It  was  only  very  gradually 
the  English  came  to  know  the  story  that  lay  behind  the 
Marshal's  surrender.  Until  they  did,  the  denunciations  of 
Gambetta  seemed  bombastic  rhodomontade  to  be  as  utterly 
discredited  as  the  usual  accusations  of  unfairness  shrilled 

1  Letter  to  Times,  Oct.  15,  1870. 

2  Irish  Nation,  Oct.  22,  1870. 

"Duquet,  Ireland  and  France,  passim;  see  also  Report  of  Irish  Am- 
bulance Corps  for  1870  (Dublin,  1871). 


209]  WAR  A  OUTRAN CE  209 

out  by  a  poor  loser.1  It  was  realized  that  the  surrender  was 
most  timely  for  the  Germans.  For,  if  the  six  corps  of  the 
army  surrounding  the  city  could  have  been  detained  some 
weeks  longer,  great  things  might  have  been  expected  of 
General  Aurelles  de  Paradin,  who  had  taken  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Loire, — much  to  its  advantage, — and  of 
General  Keratry,  who  was  forming  an  army  in  Brittany.2' 
We  must  take  some  liberty  with  the  sequence  of  disclo- 
sures, if  we  are  to  follow  the  sequence  of  the  events  that 
made  up  the  ugly  episode.  Early  in  the  month,  the  news- 
papers noticed  as  relatively  unimportant  the  Emperor's  pub- 
lication of  a  manifesto  from  Wilhelmshohe.  It  was  an 
attempt  to  free  himself  from  the  charge  of  having  precipi- 
tated the  disastrous  war.  The  English  saw  its  chief  signi- 
ficance in  the  fact  that  Bismarck  had  permitted  its  appear- 
ance.3 It  was  a  straw  worth  noting,  especially  since  the 
semi-official  journals  were  claiming  that  he  had  not  wholly 
given  up  the  Bonapartist  dynasty.1  The  Spectator  believed 
that  the  superfluous  discourtesy  with  which  he  had  branded 
as  "  totally  without  foundation "  a  report  made  by  Dr. 
Russell  of  the  ex-Emperor's  Sedan  interview  with  the  King, 
was  due  to  an  attempt  to  screen  the  Imperial  captive  from 
the  hostile  criticism  to  be  expected  from  an  exposition  of 
his  ignorance  of  the  military  situation  at  that  battle.5  If 
these  straws  showed  the  way  the  wind  blew,  it  was  thought 
Prussia  was  eager  to  checkmate  the  Republic  and  reestablish 
the  dynasty. 

1  Daily  News,  Oct.  31,  1870;  see  also  Memoir  of  Edward  Blount, 
diary  entry  for  Nov.  17,  1870;  Manchester  Guardian,  Oct.  31,  1870; 
Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Nov.  2,  1870. 

2  Saturday  Review,  Dec.  17,  1870. 

3  Daily  News,  Oct.  4,  1870. 

*W.  H.  D.  Adams,  The  Franco -Prussian  War  (London,  1872),  vol. 
ii,  p.  37. 
5  Spectator,  Oct.  8,  1870. 


2io     BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [2io 

On  October  the  eighth,  the  London  papers  commented  on 
the  visit  to  Chislehurst  of  General  Bourbaki,  brother  of 
Mme.  Le  Breton,  the  Empress'  friend  and  attendant.  They 
very  naturally  drew  the  conclusion  that  General  Bazaine,  who 
had  permitted  his  subaltern  to  make  the  journey  from  Metz, 
must  still  consider  himself  to  be  fighting  for  the  Regent,  and 
that  Bismarck,  in  granting  passports  to  the  visitor,  showed 
that  he  hoped,  for  good  things  from  the  interview.1  A 
little  later  the  go-between  in  the  negotiations  came  in  for 
much  editorial  comment.  He  was  a  certain  M.  Regnier, 
an  obscure  Frenchman,  who  baffled  attempts  at  deciding 
whether  he  was  a  clever  but  inconsiderable  busy-body  or  a 
very  shrewd  agent  of  the  Prussian  government.  Whatever 
his  character,  he  had  certainly  done  his  part  in  serving  Prus- 
sia's purpose.  On  a  visit  to  Hastings  he  had  obtained  an  in- 
terview with  the  Empress,  and  by  a  bit  of  strategy,  an 
autographed  message  from  the  Prince  Imperial  to*  his 
father.  By  means  of  a  passport  from  the  Prussian  Em- 
bassy he  carried  this  to  Ferrieres,  while  Bismarck  was 
negotiating  with  Favre.  Needless  to  say,  he  greatly  em- 
barrassed the  attempts  of  the  Provisional  government  by 
affording  the  Prussian  a  threat  in  the  form  of  an  alterna- 
tive Imperial  negotiation.  On  the  termination  of  the 
Ferrieres  interviews,  he  carried  his  autograph  to  Metz  as 
proof  of  his  claim  that  he  was  a  messenger  from  the  Em- 
press, who  wished  to  communicate  with  its  commander. 
Bazaine  forthwith  sent  General  Bourbaki  to  Chislehurst, 
and  M.  Regnier  returned  to  Bismarck  to  tell  him  that 
Bazaine  had  declared  his  willingness  to  capitulate,  on  con- 
dition that  he  be  allowed  to  march  to  France  and  there 
proclaim  the  Regency.  For  this  he  was  willing  to  sign 
a  peace  ceding  Alsace  and  Lorraine.     Bourbaki,  however, 

1  Graphic;  Daily  Telegraph. 


2 1 1  ]  WAR  A  OUTRAN CE  211 

on  his  arrival  before  Eugenie,  found  that  she  did  not  ap- 
prove the  intrigue  and  was  absolutely  opposed  to  signing 
away  French  territory.  There  was  nothing  for  the  General 
to  do  but  return  and  admit  to  his  superior  that  the  mission 
was  founded  on  a  deception.  The  Spectator  believed  that, 
had  the  Empress  acceded  to  the  terms  offered  through  Bour- 
baki,  her  son  would  have  been  carried  to  Metz  and  pro- 
claimed Emperor.  But  though  letters  passed  between 
Eugenie  and  King  William,  and  she  granted  von  Bernstorff 
an  interview,  and  even  availed  herself  of  permission  briefly 
to  visit  Napoleon  at  Wilhelmshohe,  it  must  be  said  to  her 
credit  that  not  even  the  future  of  her  son  tempted  her  to 
become  Count  Bismarck's  puppet.1 

On  October  the  nineteenth,  the  editor  of  the  Times  wrote 
in  a  private  letter  that  there  were  rumours  of  peace  that 
the  Belgians  swore  were  well  founded.  No  one  could  find 
reason  for  them,  but  the  Belgian  Minister  went  so  far  as  to 
maintain  that  a  treaty  was  practically  signed.2  On  this  day, 
too,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  Lyons  news  of  intelli- 
gence sent  him  from  Brussels  that  a  treaty  had  been  signed 
between  the  Prussians  and  Marshal  Bazaine.  Lord  Lyons 
replied  that  the  Provisional  Government  had  no  knowledge 
of  such  a  treaty,  but  that  it  had  known  for  some  time  that 
the  Marshal  was  communicating  with  the  enemy  and  sus- 
pected that  he  negotiated  on  the  basis  of  a  Bonapartist  re- 
storation. The  last  telegram  received  by  them,  however,  in- 
dicated that  Bazaine  had  changed  his  aim  and  was  dicker- 
ing for  his  own  establishment  as  dictator.3  The  day  that 
Lyons  sent  this  information  to  his  chief,  the  Times  published 
a  story  by  a  correspondent  at  Wilhelmshohe,  who  had  been 

1  Spectator,  Oct.  15,  Nov.  12,  1870;  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Nov.  11,  1870. 

2  Dasent,  John  Delane,  vol.  ii,  pp.  271-272. 

3  Lyons  to  Granville,  Oct  20,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi    00 
168-169.  ' 


212      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [212 

told  by  a  commissioner  from  Alsace  that  the  Prussians  had 
offered  the  Marshal  permission  to  leave  Metz  with  his  army 
and  go  wherever  he  pleased,  while  they  held  Alsace  and 
Lorraine.  On  the  twenty-second  it  was  reported  by  the 
Graphic  that  Bazaine  already  had  sent  his  aide-de-camp  to 
Prussian  headquarters  at  Versailles  to  negotiate  directly. 
According  to  the  Court  Journal,  Bazaine' s  wife  herself 
went  with  the  company  on  the  express  condition  that  she 
be  allowed  an  interview  with  the  King.  She  was  described 
as  a  lady  with  eyes  "  black  as  night  " — "  eyes  that  could 
look  behind  her."  But  the  all-seeing  emissary  and  her  es- 
corts, it  appears,  did  not  arrive  until  after  her  husband  had 
surrendered.1 

Meantime,  General  Boyer  had  come  to  Chislehurst  from 
Metz  on  the  twenty-second,  and  had  departed  empty- 
handed,  as  had  others  before  him.2  On  the  twenty-sixth 
the  Empress  authorized  a  statement  that  she  was  further- 
ing no  intrigues  for  peace  or  for  an  armistice.3  Bazaine'si 
capitulation,  the  day  after,  went  even  further  to  make  the 
British  regard  the  Empress'  residence  as  a  retreat  rather 
than  a  centre  for  political  intrigue. 

It  was  found  that  the  Marshal  had  surrendered  without 
stipulating  for  any  conditions  favorable  to  the  dynasty ;  but 
that  he  had,  nevertheless,  worked  traitorously  against  the 
Republic  was  not  believed  until  the  narrative  of  G.  T.  Rob- 

1  Court  Journal,  Nov.  5,  1870. 

2  Daily  News,  Oct.  26,  1870.  Revue  Historique  (March- April,  1918) 
prints  the  text  of  a  letter  which  the  Empress  addressed  to  King  Wil- 
liam in  Oct.,  1870.  The  reply  was  received  on  the  26th  and  proved 
unacceptable.  See  also  Fleury,  Memoirs  of  Empress  Eugenie,  vol.  ii, 
pp.  540-560,  for  an  account  of  the  fruitless  mission  for  the  Empress 
undertaken  by  the  son  of  Theophile  Gautier.  Young  Gautier  arrived  at 
Versailles,  Oct.  23.  Bismarck  refused  the  terms  the  Empress  offered, 
declaring  he  must  have  Alsace  and  Lorraine ;  see  also  Bemstorff  Papers, 
vol.  iii,  chap,  xx;  Dr.  Evans,  The  Second  Empire,  pp.  31  et  seq. 

'Daily  News,  Oct.  26,  1870. 


213]  WAR  A  0UTRANCE  213 

inson  appeared  some  time  later.  This  correspondent  of  the 
Guardian,  due  to  his  presence  within  the  fortress,  had  en- 
joyed exceptional  advantages  for  observation,  and  his  re- 
velations were  not  to  Bazaine's  credit.  The  Marshal's  own 
report,  published  in  England  in  December,  was  disappoint- 
ing even  to  those  inclined  to  think  him  honest.  It  was 
described  as  eminently  dry,  official,  and  unsatisfactory,1 — • 
minus  a  single  word  that  might  have  revealed  heroism. 
The  men,  said  Robinson,  had  fought  splendidly  in  the  sortie 
of  August  the  thirty-first,  and  might  have  followed  up  their 
success  and  raised  the  siege  under  another  commander.2 
Even  at  later  times,  they  could  have  cut  their  way  through 
the  besiegers,  but  they  were  weakened  by  the  fear  that  they 
would  be  sold  for  a  price,  that  the  Empress,  or  her  son,  was 
to  be  brought  to  Metz  to  make  peace.  They  knew  Bour- 
baki  had  gone  to  her,  and  Boyer.  They  were  told  the 
Germans  occupied  Normandy  and  Picardy;  that  Brittany 
was  in  revolt  for  a  restoration ;  that  the  Reds  were  murder- 
ing and  plundering  in  all  the  great  cities  of  France;  that 
Italy  was  on  the  point  of  declaring  war  to  recover  Savoy 
and  Nice.  It  was  said,  the  garrison  had  been  won  to  a  sur- 
render, believing  food  was  exhausted,  when,  in  reality, 
there  remained  enough  to  provision  it  for  months.3  Robin- 
son drew  a  horrible  picture  of  the  French  Commander 
dawdling  over  his  late  breakfasts  in  the  villa  he  dared  not 
leave  for  fear  of  assassination.  There  he  took  time  from 
his  pleasures  to  suppress  the  city's  papers  and  replace  them 
by  official  sheets  that  painted  all  things  black.     There  he 

1  Saturday  Review,  Dec.  31,  1870. 

2  Cf.  <C.  Allanson  Winn,  What  I  Saw  of  tlte  War;  Archibald  Forbes, 
My  Experiences  of  the  War  between  France  and  Germany,  pp.  294-298. 

3  Dublin  University  Magazine,  Dec,  1870,  French  Defeats  and  French 
Victories,  pp.  648  et  seq.;  G.  T.  Robinson,  The  Fall  of  Metz,  pp.  380- 
453- 


2i4      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [214 

busied  himself  with  promoting  pretty  men  who  sat  their 
horses  well  in  the  Imperial  Guard,  utterly  ignoring  the 
engineers  and  artillerymen,  who  were  not  pretty  and  were 
Republicans.  From  the  villa  there  went  forth  mysterious 
messengers  charged  with  letters  for  Versailles  or  Chisle- 
hurst,  but  there  never  came  an  order  for  a  sortie  or  a  mes- 
sage for  the  sick  and  wounded  in  the  hospitals.  Men  re- 
fused the  Marshal  his  title  and  spoke  of  him  simply  as 
M'sieu.1  He  seemed  a  great,  black  spider, — stupid  and 
malevolent.  No  one  in  Metz  was  surprised  that  on  his  way 
to  Germany  he  was  attacked  by  the  mob  and  only  saved  by 
his  Prussian  escort.3 

1  Spectator,  Nov.  5,  1S70. 


CHAPTER  XI 
A  Moon  of  Treaties  and  an  Eclipse 

In  October  the  Examiner  imagined  Mr.  Moneybags  or 
Sir  Empty  Pate  as  exclaiming :  "  Would  you  have  us  go  to 
war?  or  threaten  to  do  so?  or  call  out  the  militia?  or  re- 
call Lord  Augustus  Loftus  from  Berlin?"  whereupon  he 
would  express  his  own  opinion  of  what  should  be  done  by 
taking  a  pompous  pinch  of  snuff,  refilling  his  emptied  glass, 
and  otherwise  ministering  to  his  own  comfort.1  But  those 
who  wished  to  follow  this  discreet  example  must  have  had 
to  do  so  amidst  a  clamour  of  suggestion  and  remonstrance 
from  all  sides.  For  the  issues  of  the  war  were  becoming 
daily  more  distinct  and  increasingly  challenged  comment. 

October  was  the  month  that  completed  the  transference 
of  the  war  from  the  guidance  of  the  Marshals  of  the  Em- 
pire to  the  new  leaders  of  the  Republic.  In  that  month  it 
became  clear  that  France  was  determined  to  fight  on, 
though  with  no  other  gain  in  alliance  than  the  old  Garibaldi 
and  some  score  of  irresponsible  young  Irishmen, — that  her 
object  was  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  her  territory  against 
the  aggression  of  a  nation  that  had  seemed  essentially 
moderate  and  pacific,  but  was  submitting  itself  now  to  a 
leadership  that  was  brutal  and  predatory.  England  could 
not  yet  determine,  it  is  true,  whether  France  was  tinting 
herself  a  Belleville  red  or  only  a  constitutional  pink,  or 
whether  the  new  government  was  to  have  a  life  long  enough 
to  make  its  particular  shade  a  matter  of  importance.  She 
was  eager  that  France  gain  peace  that  she  might  put  her 

1  Examiner  and  London  Review,  Oct.  7,  1870. 
215]  215 


2i 6      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [2i6 

house  in  order, — a  just  peace  that  would  not  cause  such 
destruction  as  would  make  necessary  an  entire  rebuilding. 
France  had  braved  the  hurricane  and  a  certain  amount  of 
chastening  was  desirable,  but  England  was  very  eager  for 
a  just  determining  of  the  amount.  Parlor  strategists  gave 
way  to  arm-chair  diplomats.  The  movements  of  von 
Moltke  were  neglected.  Treaty  making  became  the  vogue. 
The  officials  of  the  government  were  bombarded  with  paper 
pellets  of  suggestion,  and  erected  a  wordy  system  of  de- 
fence behind  which  they  could  continue  their  amicable  let- 
ter carrying. 

It  was  recognized  that  the  great  stumbling  block  to  peace 
was  the  difficulty  involving  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and  the 
British  occupied  themselves  steadily  with  its  solution. 
There  were  those  who  believed,  with  Punch,  that  France 
should  be  allowed  to  keep  her  provinces  if  only  she  would 
signify  her  new  righteousness  by  restoring  Nice  and  Savoy 
to  Italy.1  Others,  like  the  Graphic,  wishing  to  make  her 
renunciation  still  more  retroactive,  advised  that  she  restore 
not  only  the  Italian  districts  but  the  once  German  Alsace 
and  Lorraine.2  Moral  advice  to  either  belligerent  on  the 
subject  of  annexations  seemed  to  a  number  of  Englishmen 
somewhat  pharisaical  on  the  part  of  a  nation  that  had  forci- 
bly annexed  more  territory  than  all  the  nations  of  Europe. 
A  former  colonial  governor  wrote  the  Times  that  his 
countrymen  should  remember  the  parable  of  the  beam  and 
the  mote.3  There  were  advocates  of  the  Telegraph's  com- 
promise plan  of  erecting  the  disputed  provinces  into  an  in- 
dependent neutralized  state  under  a  guarantee  of  the 
Powers.4     John  Stuart  Mill  would  have  had  the  guarantee 

1  Punch,  Oct.  29,  1870. 

a  Graphic,  Oct.  15. 

1  F.  B.  Head,  letter  to  Times,  Oct.  26,  1870. 

*  Daily  Telegraph,  Sept.  23,  1870. 


217]  A  M00N  0F  TREATIES  AND  AN  ECLIPSE  217 

last  for  a  definite  period, — say  fifty  years,— after  which  the 
provinces  should  be  given  the  power  to  annex  themselves  to 
whichever  claimant  they  favored.1  Lloyd  Lindsay,  on  a 
visit  to  Versailles,  discussed  the  matter  with  Count  Bismarck 
and  found  the  Chancellor  willing  to  approve  such  a  plan 
with  certain  important  stipulations.  The  provinces  he 
would  have  constituted  a  kind  of  neutral  colony  under  Ger- 
man protection  with  their  fortresses  garrisoned  by  German 
troops.  He  felt  quite  strong  enough  to  insist  on  this  and 
to  reject  immediately  Lloyd  Lindsay's  alternative  that  the 
fortifications  be  razed  to  the  ground.2  The  Economist  was 
impatient  of  the  plan  in  any  form : 

Of  all  things  most  dangerous  are  engagements  at  once  important 
and  indefinite,  and  guarantees  are  both  par  excellence.  .  .  .  Either 
they  mean  much,  and  then  are  important  contracts  which  may 
bring  us  into  trouble  hereafter;  or  they  mean  nothing,  and  then 
no  one  will  ask  for  them,  and  they  won't  be  given.3 

A  guaranteed  Alsace-Lorraine  would  be  a  district  that  as- 
suredly could  be  expected  to  put  the  two  definitions  to  a 
test. 

Another  compromise  measure  which  found  British  advo- 
cates was  that  of  yielding  Prussia  only  part  of  her  de- 
mand. Sir  Robert  Morier  and  a  certain  writer  for  Fraser's 
claimed  to  find  in  Alsace  a  friendly  disposition  toward  the 
invading  army  that  they  believed  in  the  event  of  annexation 
could  be  fostered  into  a  real  patriotism  for  the  new  Ger- 
many.4 The  News  suspected  that  Bismarck,  in  asking  for 
Metz,  was  only  advancing  an  exorbitant  demand  with  the 

1  Mill  to  Sir  Chas.  Dilke,  Sept.  30,  1870,  Letters  of  J.  S.  Mill,  vol.  ii, 
pp.  273-274. 

*  Harriet  S.  Wantage,  Lord  Wantage,  a  Memoir,  pp.  194-198. 
1  Economist,  Oct.  22,  1870. 

*  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robt.  Morier,  vol.  ii,  pp.  204-205;  A  Month  with 
the  Belligerents,  Fraser's  Magazine,  Oct.,  1870;  pp.  483  et  seq. 


2i8      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [218 

idea  of  manipulating  public  opinion  to  a  more  ready  ac- 
quiescence in  the  real  ones.  A  member  of  Parliament, 
in  a  pamphlet  on  The  Interest  of  Europe  in  the  Conditions, 
of  Peace,  was  willing  to  deal  so  generously  with  Prussia 
as  to  grant  a  financial  indemnity  together  with  Alsace  and 
as  much  of  Lorraine  as  would  include  Metz.  He  oblig- 
ingly outlined  four  other  alternatives  which  would  still 
safeguard  the  interests  of  Europe,  should  his  main  pro- 
posals prove  unacceptable.2 

This  laboured  scheme  of  the  Honorable  Member,  like 
many  others  propounded  at  this  time,  was  ingenious  but 
confusing.  Ruskin  attempted  to  simplify  the  affair  by 
translating  it  into  narrow  and  homely  conditions.  "  Sup- 
pose," he  said, 

that  Lancashire,  having  absorbed  Cumberland  and  Cheshire,  and 
been  much  insulted  and  troubled  by  Yorkshire  in  consequence, 
and  at  last  attacked,  and  having  victoriously  repulsed  the  attack, 
and  retaining  old  grudges  against  Yorkshire,  about  the  color  of 
roses  from  the  fifteenth  century,  declares  that  it  cannot  be  possibly 
safe  against  the  attacks  of  Yorkshire  any  longer  until  it  gets  the 
township  of  Giggleswick  and  Wigglesworth,  and  a  fortress  on  the 
Pen-y-gent.  Yorkshire  replying  this  is  totally  inadmissible,  and 
that  it  will  eat  its  last  horse  and  perish  its  last  Yorkshire  man, 
rather  than  part  with  a  stone  of  Giggleswick,  a  crag  of  Pen-y- 
gent,  or  a  ripple  of  Ribble, — Lancashire  with  its  Cumbrian  and 
Cheshire  contingents  invades  Yorkshire,  and  meeting  with  much 
Divine  assistance,  ravages  the  West  Riding,  and  besieges  York  on 
Christmas  day.3 

On  this  analysis,  he  had  no  patience  with  the  Prussian 
claim  of  a  need  for  defence,  and  believed  she  was  pressing 
her  victory  too  far,  dangerously  far.     He  would  have  had 

1  Daily  News,  Oct.  8,  1870. 

2  Op.  cit.  (London,  1870),  passim. 

3  John  Ruskin,  Complete  Works  (edited  by  Cook  and  Wedderburn, 
London,  1903-1912),  vol.  xxvii,  pp.  22-23. 


219]  A  MOON  OF  TREATIES  AND  AN  ECLIPSE  2IQ 

England  help  France,  but  just  how  he  failed  to  say.  And 
the  fact  that  he  organized  an  association  to  combat  the  ef- 
forts of  the  Anglo-French  Intervention  Committee  makes  it 
difficult  to  see  by  what  means  he  expected  to  secure  for 
France  the  integrity  he  so  humorously  defended.1  The 
Globe,  disagreeing  with  his  views,  dismissed  one  of  his  let- 
ters to  the  Telegraph  very  brusquely.  If,  it  said,  Mr. 
Ruskin  was  ashamed  to  speak  as  an  Englishman,  as  he  pro- 
fessed, he  should  carry  his  modesty  a  little  further  and 
feel  ashamed  to  write.  A  number  of  simple,  honest  people, 
it  believed,  would  be  driven  by  this  letter  to  speculating  as 
to  whether  he  "  was  a  very  wise  man  or  a — something  else 
very  widely  different." 2 

Ruskin's  equivocal  position  was  that  of  many  others 
whose  determination  that  Prussia  should  not  acquire  French 
territory,  was  only  equalled  by  their  vagueness  as  to  what 
means  should  be  used  to  restrain  her.  The  member  for 
Derby  won  the  applause  of  his  constituents  when  he  de- 
clared himself  certain  that  there  would  never  be  peace  in 
Europe  or  peaceful  relations  between  Prussia  and  France 
so  long  as  the  Prussians  were  in  possession  of  French  terri- 
tory.3 Another  member,  speaking  in  Greenock,  declared  it 
a  matter  of  European  interest  that  no  unwilling  population 
be  handed  over  to  rulers  whom  they  were  not  disposed  to 
obey.4  Mf.  Vernon  Harcourt,  not  only  in  speeches  to  his* 
constituents  at  Oxford,  but  in  the  much  discussed  letters  to 
the  Times  which  he  signed  "  Historicus,"  urged  the  inherent 
danger  of  the  Prussian  demands.  Another  very  able  con- 
troversialist, who  wrote  under  the  name  of  "  Scrutator," 
declared  that  a  peace  concluded  on  the  threatened  territorial 

1  Ibid.,  vol.  xxxiv,  p.  502;  Daily  Telegraph,  Oct.  7,  1870. 
a  Globe  and  Traveller,  Oct.  10,  1870. 

2  Mr.  Bass  at  Bouverie  St.  meeting,  Spectator,  Oct.  8,  1870. 
4  Austin  Bruce,  Spectator,  Oct.  1,  1870. 


220      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [220 

cession  would  be  no  more  than  a  truce  which  would  keep  alt 
Europe  in  a  state  of  armed  preparation  for  the  renewal  of 
the  conflict.1  There  were  times  when  Dasent  and  Delane 
let  slip,  somehow,  the  control  of  their  great  daily,  and  some 
under-editor,  Thomas  Chenery,  perhaps,  invested  its  very 
leaders  with  sentiments  as  favorable  to  France  as  those  of 
Pall  Mall  and  the  Standard.-  On  October  the  twenty-first 
there  appeared  a  stinging  rebuke  to  the  great  nation  that 
seemed  "  bent  on  offering  up  respect  for  the  liberty  of 
others  and  care  for  its  own  freedom  on  the  altar  of  mili- 
tary preeminence."  The  length  of  the  tether  that  was  al- 
lowed the  paper  when  it  was  under  its  own  proper  guidance 
was  a  proposal  that  England  join  with  Russia  and  Austria 
in  advocating  the  destruction  of  the  strong  places  of  Alsace 
and  Lorraine,  and  undertake  with  them  to  ally  itself  with 
either  France  or  Germany  in  case  one  of  the  two  should  de- 
clare war  without  submitting  its  grievance  to  their  arbitra- 
tion. The  proposal  won  little  favor  in  England.  That 
nation  was  reluctant  to  undertake  engagements  for  the 
future  and  very  frank  in  pointing  out  how  little  her  past 
performance  made  such  engagements  worth.  Forcible  in- 
tervention, the  proposal  of  terms  by  the  Neutrals,  their  de- 
termination by  a  Congress,  diplomatic  protest,  or  a  simple 
facilitation  of  negotiations, — all  were  discussed  and  had 
their  adherents. 

No  suggestion  aroused  such  a  torrent  of  comment  as  an 
anonymous  article  that  appeared  toward  the  latter  part  of 
the  month,  tucked  away  in  the  last  pages  of  the  Edinburgh. 
It  was  very  soon  recognized  as  an  unofficial  utterance  of 
the  Prime  Minister  himself,  and  so  it  attracted  such 
attention  that  the  spectacle  was  afforded  of  a  quarterly  run- 

1  Times.  Oct.  18,  1870 ;  see  also  "  Scrutator's "  letter  to  Times,  Oct. 
27,  1870. 

*  Dasent,  John  Delane,  vol.  ii,  p.  270. 


22 1  ]  A  MOON  OF  TREATIES  AND  AN  ECLIPSE  22I 

ning  into  a  second  edition.  From  a  persual  of  this  article, 
which  was  entitled  Germany,  France  and  England,  it  ap- 
pears that  Gladstone's  idea  of  the  duties  of  neutrality  was 
to  administer  equal  doses  of  criticism  to  both  belligerents,  to 
appropriate  much  soothing  syrup  of  self -congratulation  for 
his  own  country,  and  to  comfort  the  world  with  the  as- 
surance that  all  would  be  well  in  the  future  when  public 
right  should  come  into  its  own.  There  was  a  review  of 
the  policy  of  France  and  Germ*,*~'"  ''-rectly  preceding  the 
war,  based  not  on  the  British  Blue  Book,  but  merely  on 
popular  opinion, — so  prejudiced  was  it  against  the  cause  of 
France.  There  was  criticism  of  the  German  military 
system  as  being  unduly  burdensome  and  founded  on  the 
principle  of  compulsion.  There  was  a  gibe  at  King  Wil- 
liam's piety,  an  expression  of  doubt  as  to  the  beneficence  of 
Germany's  possession  of  power;  and  a  stern  condemnation 
of  the  declared  intention  of  wrenching  a  million  and  a 
quarter  of  people  from  the  country  to  which  they  had  be- 
longed for  years.1  It  ended,  as  the  Saturday  Review  ob- 
served, with 

one  of  those  high-falutin  descriptions  of  the  moral  greatness  and 
superiority  of  England,  and  of  her  right  to  sermonize  the  world, 
which  are  so  provoking  to  foreigners,  and  act  so  injuriously  on 
ourselves.2  Safe  behind  its  thread  of  silver  sea,  England  is  to 
exhort  all  men  to  do  as  she  does,  and  to  be  like  her,  perfectly  just, 
perfectly  moderate,  and  perfectly  impartial.  We  have,  it  seems, 
been  placed  by  Providence  in  a  position  very  like  that  of  a  clergy- 
man ;  for  just  as  he  may  say  what  he  likes  without  fear  of  hissing 
or  reply,  so  we  may  say  what  we  like  without  fear  of  any  one 
crossing  the  Channel.* 

If  this  principle  were  accepted,  the  reviewer  could  not  re- 

1  Germany,  France  and  England,  Edinburgh  Review,  Oct.,  1870,  vol. 
exxxii,  p.  554. 
*  Saturday  Reznezv,  Nov.  12,  1870. 


222      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [222 

sist  speculating  on  what  sermons  the  Americans  might 
preach,  with  the  breadth  of  the  Atlantic  between  them  and 
those  they  were  bent  on  improving. 

It  was  Gladstone's  phrase  of  "  Happy  England,"  and  the 
"  streak  of  silver  sea  "  which  was  her  surety  that  most  stuck 
in  the  craw  of  Englishmen.     Judy,  taking  it  for  text  wrote : 

"  Calmly  we  view  the  riot  and  commotion 
Wrapp'd  in  our  happy  insularity; 
'Tis  true,  we  once  swore  friendship  and  devotion, 
But,  Heav'n  be  thank'd !    between  us  lies  the  ocean, 
And  the  protective  barrier  of  Neutrality."  x 

Sir  Edward  Sullivan,  reviewing  the  article  in  a  pamphlet 
which  he  entitled  Happy  England,  declared  that  far  from 
being  in  a  fortunate  condition,  England  was  disliked,  en- 
vied, looked  upon  as  a  scold,  an  acid-and-water  Pharisee. 
As  for  the  happy  isolation,  the  matter  of  her  being  without 
allies  far  outweighed  the  beneficent  Providence  which  had 
dowered  her  with  a  "  streak  of  silver  sea."  2 

There  was  measured  praise  for  Gladstone's  performance 
in  Pall  Mall,  the  Echo,  and  the  Spectator,2,  but  the  general 
verdict  condemned  such  a  departure  from  ministerial  dig- 
nity and  reserve  as  the  contribution  of  an  anonymous  and 
frankly  spoken  article  at  a  time  when  the  hope  for  media- 
tion should  have  imposed  silence.  Of  all  the  indiscreet 
and  injudicious  actions  of  Mr.  Gladstone,  this  one  was 
characterized  by  the  Record  as  being  the  most  injudicious 
and  indiscreet.4  Certainly,  to  speak  of  the  late  Imperial 
Government  as  insane,  profligate,  and  lying;  of  the  Court 
as  having  created  a  close  and  foul  atmosphere  which 
tainted  the  conscience  of  the  world ;  and  to  speak  of  Prus- 

xJudy,  Oct.  26,  1870. 

s  Cf.  review  of  Happy  England,  John  Bull,  Feb.  11,  1871. 
1  Issues  of  Oct.  19,  Nov.  7,  and  Nov.  5,  respectively. 
4  Record,  Nov.  9,  1870. 


223]  A  M00N  0F  TREATIES  AND  AN  ECLIPSE  223 

sian  statesmanship  as  brutal  and  unscrupulous;  and  the 
scheme  for  annexation  as  pillage,  was  hardly  a  happy  pre- 
lude for  the  urging  of  friendly  offices. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  combination  of  such  candour 
with  a  style  that  recalled  the  copy  books  of  Eton  induced 
several  critics  to  disbelieve  the  rumour  of  Gladstone's  author- 
ship. Even  that  great  man  must  have  been  somewhat  non- 
plussed at  hearing  the  Scotsman  say : 

If  Mr.  Gladstone  could  have  been  capable  of  such  an  indiscre- 
tion, he  certainly  would  not,  unless  he  had  undergone  some  soften- 
ing of  the  brain  since  the  end  of  the  session,  have  executed  the 
mistake  weakly  and  clumsily.  .  .  .  It  is  obviously  the  production 
of  a  young  man,  and  a  very  young  writer,  whose  sins,  whatever 
may  happen,  should  not  be  visited  upon  ...  a  father  whose 
name  is  so  illustrious,  and  whose  responsibilities  are  so  solemn.1 

Except  fcr  the  prestige  of  the  anonymous  writer  the 
Edinburgh  had  added  to  its  lists,  it  was  admitted  that  the 
case  for  France  was  better  set  forth  in  the  Quarterly.2  It 
expounded  the  righteousness  of  sympathy  with  France,  but 
a  sympathy  that  kept  its  hands  folded.  At  the  same  time 
it  seasoned  its  arguments  with  outspoken  rebuke  of  the 
supineness  of  Governmental  policy  and  the  low  state  of 
the  Kingdom's  military  equipment.  "  In  the  course  of 
the  last  ten  years,"  said  one  of  its  contributors,  "  we  have 
practised  an  ostentatious  and  verbose  neutrality  throughout 
three  great  wars  and  one  small  war.  The  result  is  that 
there  is  no  people  in  Christendom  which  does  not  despise  or 
detest  us."3 

The  great  middle  class  in  England  had  not  been  dis- 
satisfied with  the  policy  during  that  time,  and  this  class  waa 

1  Scotsman,  Nov.  7,  1870. 

*  The   War  between  France  and  Germany,    Quarterly  Review,   Oct., 
1870,  pp.  293  et  seq. 

3  The  Terms  of  Peace,  ibid.,  Oct.,  1870,  pp.  540  et  seq. 


224      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [224 

now  somewhat  suspicious  that  the  Quarterly,  the  Opposi- 
tion's organ,  was  urging  the  extremity  of  France  for 
the  purpose  of  effecting  a  general  change  rather  than  an  ex- 
ceptional deviation.  They  disliked  the  Quarterly's  insis- 
tence on  the  necessity  of  increasing  the  army  and  navy. 
David  Urquhart  in  his  Diplomatic  Review  was  arguing  that 
the  "  desolation  of  Christendom  "  was  caused  by  the  loss 
of  politeness,  and  that  if  a  betterment  could  be  effected  in 
the  method  of  rearing  children,  and  in  the  forms  of  salu- 
tation and  cleanliness,  a  surer  basis  would  be  established  for 
religious  and  moral  discipline.1  Not  many  Englishmen  fol- 
lowed him  in  all  his  fine  philosophizing,  but  they  disliked 
increase  of  armament  as  much  as  he  did.  They  were  glad 
to  believe  he  was  guilty  of  a  fallacy  when  he  declared,  "  In 
England  both  the  people  and  the  Government  are  engaged 
in  schemes,  not  for  the  defence  of  the  country,  but  for 
the  increase  of  its  nominal  defenders,  so  that  they  may  be- 
come worthy  of  butchery." 

Those  Ministers  who  made  bold  to  speak  their  opinions 
officially,  unfailingly  took  their  cue  from  the  September 
speech  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  that  had  favoured 
only  a  willingness  for  mediation,  and  not  from  the  article  in 
the  Edinburgh.  They  advised  that  England  keep  its  con- 
science in  its  breeches'  pocket  and  preserve  its  tender  senti- 
ments under  a  glass  dome  of  neutrality  so  that  they  might 
not  be  subjected  to  the  contact  of  a  Prussian  rebuff.2 

From  France  there  came  the  plan  of  Guizot  that  neutral 
nations  assign  the  reasonable  limits  of  Prussian  claims  and 
French  resistance,  and  establish  the  principle  of  a  great 
European  arbitration  in  the  duels  of  nations.3  It  was  a 
call  to  high  endeavour  and  many  grieved  that  it  should  go 

1  Diplomatic  Reviezv,  Oct.  12,  1870,  pp.  14  et  seq. 
*  Manchester  Guardian,  Oct.  22,  1870. 
1  Times,  Oct.  26,  1870. 


225]  A  MOON  OF  TREATIES  AND  AN  ECLIPSE  22$ 

unanswered.  Came  also  an  appeal  from  the  philanthropist 
and  great  silk  merchant  of  Lyons,  Aries  Dufour,  President 
of  the  International  and  Permanent  League  for  Peace,  who 
for  forty  years  by  precept  and  example  had  striven  to  knit 
close  the  ties  of  friendship  between  his  country  and  Great 
Britain,  and  to  further  concord  among  all  nations.  He 
asked  that  England  use  her  powerful  voice  to  enlighten 
Europe  on  the  character  the  war  had  latterly  assumed,  and 
do  for  France  in  her  hour  of  trial  those  offices  he  would 
have  urged  on  his  own  country,  had  her  neighbour  suf- 
fered disaster.1 

While  the  British  were  thus  indulging  themselves  in  an 
orgy  of  unofficial  treaty-making  and  criticism,  which  was 
having  no  effect  on  the  conduct  of  the  two  belligerents,  the 
Government  was  still  laboring  constantly,  if  half-heartedly, 
in  an  effort  to  bring  the  two  principals  themselves  to  evolve 
and  agree  upon  peace  terms.  The  British  Ministers  were 
aware  early  in  October  that  General  Burnside's  volunteer 
efforts  at  securing  an  armistice  had  failed.2  On  the  six- 
teenth, Lyons  wrote  to  Granville  that  the  Comte  de  Chau- 
dordy  3  was  urging  that  England  use  its  influence  in  a  direct 
manner  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end  on  terms  which  it  would 
be  possible  for  France  to  accept.  He  pointed  out  the 
serious  responsibility  incumbent  on  England  as  the  head  of 
the  League  of  Neutrals,  since  by  its  formation  France  had 
been  prevented  from  gaining  possible  allies.4  With  a  con- 
sciousness of  the  justice  of  the  French  claims  in  this  re- 
gard,  Granville  wrote  to  the  British  Ambassador  at   St. 

1  Ibid.,  Oct.  19,  1870.    Cf.  Evening  Mail,  Oct.  21;  Examiner,  Oct.  22; 
Times,  Oct.  25,  1870. 

2  Daily  Telegraph,  Oct.  19,  1870. 

1  Minister   of    Foreign    Affairs    for   the    Provisional    Government   at 
Tours. 

*  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  p.  145. 


226      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [226 

Petersburg  suggesting  that  there  was  reason  to  believe 
that  France  would  agree  to  the  razing  of  the  fortifications  of 
Metz  and  Strasburg  (the  concession  which  it  will  be  re- 
membered was  being  advocated  by  the  Times) ,  and  asking 
that  Gortchakoff  be  consulted  as  to  the  possibility  of  an  un- 
derstanding between  England  and  Russia.  In  the  event  of 
a  favorable  answer,  the  Ambassador  was  instructed  to 
inquire  whether  Russia  believed  it  possible  to  end  the  siege 
of  Paris,  and  whether,  jointly  with  the  other  Neutrals,  she 
would  make  simultaneous  appeals  to  the  two  belligerent 
governments.  Gortchakoff's  answer  was  in  no  way  en- 
couraging. He  believed  the  demands  contained  in  Bis- 
marck's Circular  to  the  Foreign  Powers  would  not  be 
modified  by  French  military  success.  The  disapproval  of 
the  Neutrals  unless  backed  by  threats  of  armed  intervention 
would  be  unavailing.  His  master  was  interested  as  to  the 
English  opinion  of  what  terms  might  be  accepted,  but  saw 
no  hope  for  any  good  from  their  mutual  agreement  on 
the  matter.1 

Before  this  answer  could  be  received  from  far-off  Rus- 
sia, M.  Tissot  apprized  Granville  that  he  had  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  Italy  was  about  to  respond  favorably  to  French 
solicitations  for  her  armed  assistance.  He  asked  that  Eng- 
land encourage  thi$.  The  British  Foreign  Minster  rew 
plied  very  properly  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  his 
country  to  advise  another  to  loose  hold  of  that  neutrality 
which  itself  was  holding  to  tenaciously.2  A  Cabinet  council 
called  on  the  twentieth  was  forced  to  proceed  without  a  de- 
finite knowledge  of  what  terms  would  be  acceptable  to 
France.  After  the  rebuff  of  Jules  Favre  and  the  very 
definite  demands  set  forth  by  Bismarck,  France  thought  it 
would  be   undignified  to   suggest  anything    further.     She 

1  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  pp.  146,  170-171. 

8  Granville  to  Lyons,  Oct.  18,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxxi,  p.  155. 


227]  A  MOON  OF  TREATIES  AND  AN  ECLIPSE  22J 

was,  however,  eager  that  the  Neutrals  of  themselves  take 
action.1  The  result  of  the  meeting  was  the  despatch  of 
telegrams  to  the  British  Ambassadors  at  Tours,  Berlin, 
St.  Petersburg.  Vienna,  and  Florence  with  the  object  of 
inducing  the  belligerents  to  agree  to  an  armistice  for  the 
convocation  of  a  Constituent  Assembly.2  Russia  surprised 
the  British  by  withholding  the  desired  instructions  from  her 
representative  in  Berlin  and  by  sending,  instead,  a  private 
letter  to  King  William.  Lord  Loftus  could  only  hope  it 
contained  a  recommendation  of  his  government's  proposal.3 
Italy's  response,  and  that  of  Austia-Hungary,  was  favor- 
able. But  Italy  was  still  scarce  made,  and  as  for  Austria, 
as  Princess  Metternich  remarked  to  Granville,  what  aid 
could  she  give? — now  that  she  was  no  more  than  a  Power 
of  the  third  or  fourth  rank, — "  just  as  was  England." 4 

Granville's  suggestions  on  the  armistice  were  so  timid 
that  they  rather  seem  to  justify  the  lady's  estimation  of  his 
country's  rank.  He  had  abstained  from  definite  proposals 
and  contented  himself  with  directing  the  attention  of  the 
belligerents  to  the  horrors  of  a  bombardment  which  might 
be  avoided  by  the  convention  of  a  Constituent  Assembly. 
As  to  the  terms  of  the  armistice,  he  refrained  from  sugges- 
tion. The  Manchester  Guardian  was  quite  mistaken  in 
its  assumption  that  the  English  proposals  were  coupled  with 
a  statement  of  what  Europe  believed  would  be  the  condi- 
tions of  a  fair  and  durable  peace.  It  was  quite  right  in 
saying  that,  were  this  not  the  case,  the  Ministry  had  simply 

1  Lyons  to  Granville,  Oct.  20,  1870,  ibid.,  vol.  lxxi,  p.  169. 
1  Karl  Abel,  International  Relations  before  and  during  the   War  of 
1870,  vol.  ii,  pp.  334-3& 

3  Loftus  to  Granville,  Oct.  26,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  pp. 
180-190;  Newton,  Life  of  Lord  Lyons,  vol.  i,  p.  354. 

4  Lady  Betty  Balfour,  Personal  and  Literary  Letters  of  Robt.,  First 
Earl  of  Lytton,  vol.  i,  pp.  258-259. 


228      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [228 

exchanged  "a  policy  of  lamentable  feebleness  for  one  of 
purposeless  energy."  1 

The  representations  of  the  Neutrals  availed  France  noth- 
ing. The  preference  of  Russia's  for  isolated  action  showed 
that  the  League,  even  in  pursuit  of  a  timorous  policy,  was 
no  real  unit.  Once  more  the  Government  of  France  in- 
voked the  aid  of  the  veteran  Thiers,  who  forthwith  set  out 
for  Versailles,  to  urge  the  armistice.  The  very  fact  that 
negotiations  were  to  be  conducted  through  him  and  not 
through  the  ambassadors  of  the  Neutral  League  was  a 
Prussian  triumph.  It  showed  the  practical  isolation  of 
France,  no  matter  how  true  might  be  her  claim  of  having 
Europe's  sympathy.  M.  Thiers  was  regarded,  moreover, 
as  the  high  priest  of  chauvinism,  who  had  done  more  than 
any  man  in  France  to  create  antagonism  for  Prussia. 
"  When  he  sues  for  peace  they  may  almost  fancy,"  said  the 
Guardian,  "that  the  vainglorious  spirit  of  his  country, 
which  he  personifies,  has  at  last  been  sufficiently  chastised."  2 
He  was  believed  to  be  the  opponent  of  that  kind  of  republi- 
canism for  which  the  Liberals  of  South  Germany  and  the 
French  followers  of  Gambetta  and  Jules  Favre  had  a  com- 
mon sympathy,  —  a  negotiator,  then,  well  pleasing  to  the 
Chancellor. 

Thiers  was  very  soon  made  to  see  that  the  favour  of  the 
meeting  was  granted  to  him  as  the  emissary  of  France  alone, 
and  not  of  France  backed  by  the  Neutral  Powers.  He 
began  the  interview  on  the  thirty-first,  by  speaking  of  the 
projected  armistice  as  having  been  proposed  by  the  Neutrals. 
Bismarck  objected  impatiently  and  arrogantly  to  considering 
any  suggestion  as  coming  from  them.  In  speaking  of  Eng- 
land, he  showed  especial  ill  humour.  The  despatch,  he 
said,  to  which  she  had  rallied  support,  descanted  at  great 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  Oct.  24,  1870. 
"Ibid.,  Oct.  31,  1870. 


229]         A  M00N  0F  TREATIES  AND  AN  ECLIPSE  229 

length  on  humanity  but  came  to  no'  precise  conclusions.  To 
the  French  envoy,  himself,  Bismarck  was  courteous,  and 
during  the  first  half  of  the  five  days  occupied  in  negotia- 
tions, he  appeared  somewhat  conciliatory.  He  had  at  hand 
no  M.  Regnier  with  whom  he  could  pretend  to  be  negotiat- 
ing; but  he  did  allude  to  the  members  of  the  late  regime 
who  were  endeavouring  to  reconstitute  their  government 
at  Cassel.  Thiers  showed  no  alarm.  He  declared  the 
Second  Empire  was  dead  beyond  the  power  of  revival.  On 
the  second  of  November,  the  question  was  reached  of  the 
revictualling  of  Paris  during  the  period  of  the  armistice. 
Count  Bismarck  raised  no  fundamental  objections,  but 
decided  to  postpone  further  discussion  until  the  following 
day,  when  he  would  have  consulted  with  the  staff.1 

The  famous  Dr.  Russell,  in  a  conversation  before  the  in- 
terviews, had  warned  Theirs  that  the  Prussian  Military 
Cabinet  would  not  entertain  his  proposal  for  a  moment; 
Russell  himself  refused  to  "  recommend  "  it  in  the  Times. 
Whether  or  not  his  judgment  was  correct  and  Thiers  was1 
arguing  against  a  foregone  conclusion  cannot  be  known; 
for  before  negotiations  were  resumed  an  event  took  place 
which  may  have  diverted  Bismarck  from  his  intentions. 
News  reached  Versailles  of  a  revolutionary  insurrection  in 
Paris.  Though  this  was  quickly  followed  by  assurances! 
that  the  movement  was  under  control,  a  renewal  of  the 
negotiations  found  Bismarck  firmly  opposed  to  the  capital's! 
revictualling.     After  some  further  parley,  Thiers  departed.3 

This  disastrous  episode  of  the  thirty-first  of  October  con- 
vinced Bismarck  that  Paris  was  a  city  divided  against  it- 
self,— one  that  could  be  expected  speedily  to  capitulate.     It 

1  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  vol.  ii,  p.  65 ;  Memoirs  of  M. 
Thiers,  1870- 187 5,  p.  73- 

2  Atkins,  Life  of  Sir  W.  H.  Russell,  vol.  ii,  p.  224. 

8  Thiers  to  Lyons,  Nov.  10,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  p.  221. 


230      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [230 

showed  him,  too,  that  though  the  old  Orleanist  diplomat 
with  whom  he  was  negotiating  might  be  to  him  persona 
grata,  he  was  distrusted  by  a  very  effective  minority  of 
Parisians.  It  was  extremely  improbable  that  any  moderate 
terms  which  he  might  sponsor  would  be  accepted.  The 
pretext  for  the  discontent  of  Belleville  and  its  leaders  was 
that  the  Government,  in  accepting  the  offices  of  Thiers,  had 
embraced  a  policy  of  moderation  which  directly  contra- 
dicted the  wishes  of  the  capital.  The  city  had  been  stung  to 
the  quick  by  the  surrender  of  Bazaine.  The  National 
Guard,  by  its  loyalty  and  efficiency  in  suppressing  the  in- 
surrection, made  it  possible  for  the  Government  to  sub- 
stitute an  appeal  to  universal  suffrage  for  the  decision  of 
triumphant  insurgents  as  to  whether  or  not  its  actions  had 
been  arbitrary.  The  vote,  taken  November  the  third,  ap- 
proved its  efforts  to  obtain  peace;  but  only  on  the  under- 
standing that  it  adhere  to  the  principles  originally  set  forth 
by  Favre.  However,  as  we  have  seen,  the  negotiations  on 
which  they  balloted  were  already  known  by  Thiers  to  be 
hopeless.  In  reporting  his  lack  of  success,  he  concluded  by 
saying,  "  The  time  has  now  come  for  the  Neutral  Powers  to 
judge  if  sufficient  attention  has  been  paid  to  their  advice,  but 
it  is  not  us  they  can  reproach  with  having  disregarded  it, 
and  we  make  them  judges  of  the  conduct  of  both  belligerent 
Powers." x 

The  net  result  of  the  negotiations  was  the  conviction  that, 
unless  the  Neutrals  strengthened  their  policy,  Paris  must 
either  surrender  or  try  Bismarck's  alternative  of  "  stewing 
in  its  own  juice." 

1  Annual  Register  for  1870,  vol.  cxii,  pp.  205-206.  Accounts  of  the 
uprising  of  Oct.  31st  occur  in  Spectator,  Nov.  5,  and  Manchester  Ex- 
aminer, Nov.  9,  1870. 


CHAPTER  XII 

A  Stroke  From  the  Bear 

"  I  am  no  worshipper  of  Gladstone's,  and  I  think  he  has 
shown  himself  eminently  'parochial'  all  through  the  war; 
but  Granville  has,  I  believe,  done  all  that  could  be  done  with 
any  safety  ...  I  think  it  was  we  who  principally  egged 
him  into  proposing  the  armistice."  So  wrote  Delane  in  a 
private  letter  of  November  the  ninth.1  The  Tunes,  there- 
fore, felt  it  incumbent  to  comfort  the  Ministry  with  the 
assurance  that,  though  the  October  negotiations  had  failed, 
their  own  efforts  in  regard  to  them  had,  at  least,  served  to 
soothe  the  uneasy  feelings  of  the  British.  Were  any  one 
to  be  blamed  in  the  matter,  it  showed  an  inclination  to  blame 
Thiers,  who  was  a  "  charming  old  man"  and  a  "  delightful 
causeur,"  but  whose  circle  of  ideas  was  no  longer  elastic, 
and  who,  above  all  others,  had  been  the  original  cause  of 
the  war.  The  Telegraph  pointed  out  that  France  had 
technically  placed  herself  in  the  wrong  by  breaking  off  the 
negotiations  after  Bismarck's  refusal  to  permit  a  revic- 
tualling  of  Paris.  By  this  she  had  for  the  time  being  for- 
feited the  right  to  expect  Britain's  good  offices.3  Some  there 
were  who  professed  satisfaction  with  the  failure,  believing 
that  an  armistice  might  have  delayed  rather  than  hastened 
peace.  + 

1  Dasent,  John  Delane,  vol.  ii«  p.  273. 

*  Times,  Nov.  8,  7,  3,  1870. 

*  Daily  Telegraph,  Nov.  9,  1870. 

4  J.  M.  Ludlow,  Europe  and  the  War,  Contemporary  Review,  Nov., 
1870,  pp.  649  et  seq. 

231]  231 


232      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [232 

No  such  palliation  or  resignation  was  to  be  found  in  the 
Standard.  It  declared  Granville  had  played  a  poor  "  if 
not  a  contemptible  part,"  in  urging  the  delegation  at  Tours 
to  persuade  the  Paris  Government  to  negotiate  on  terms 
left  solely  to  the  discretion  of  Bismarck.1 

The  despatches  of  the  belligerents  induced  little  change 
in  the  British  mind.  Each  imputed  bad  faith  to  the  other. 
Those  who  took  their  opinions  from  the  Times  believed 
that  Bismarck  was  justified  in  refusing  the  unsuspected 
demand  for  the  revictualling  of  the  capital.  Those  who 
quoted  the  Standard  commended  the  French  for  insisting 
on  a  demand  that  Bismarck  had  been  given  to  understand 
would  be  at  the  very  foundation  of  the  armistice.  They 
said  the  Chancellor  had  prolonged  the  interviews  only  to 
gain  time  to  complete  his  siege  operations.2  They  believed 
that  when  he  set  himself  seriously  to  negotiate  it  would  be 
with  a  Bonapartist,  and  not  the  half-Orleanist,  half-Repub- 
lican Thiers.3  It  was  remarked  as  significant  that  he  had 
allowed  the  generals  captured  at  Metz  to  visit  the  Emperor 
at  Wilhelmshohe.  Bazaine  had  installed  himself  at  Cassel, 
where  there  was  already  a  nest  of  intriguing  Imperialists.4 
General  Changarnier,  who  alone  of  the  exiles  could  have 
rallied  a  strong  party  in  France,  was  in  Brussels  where  he 
was  urged  both  by  Prussia  and  the  Imperialists  to  lend  him- 
self to  their  schemes.5  Early  in  November  there  appeared 
a  defence  of  the  Emperor,  written,  ostensibly,  by  an  officer 
of  his  staff.  Not  even  the  anonymous  article  by  which 
Gladstone  had  sought  to  justify  his  foreign  policy  roused 
such  a  chorus  of  disapproval  as  did  this.     It  was   pro^ 

1  Standard,  Nov.  2,  1870. 

2  Saunders',  Nov.  8,  1870. 

3  Weekly  Scotsman,  Nov.  5,  1870.  1 
*  Saturday  Review,  Nov.  26,  1870. 

6  Fleury,  Memoirs  of  Empress  Eugenie,  vol.  ii,  pp.  337-361. 


233]  A  STR0KE  FROM  THE  BEAR  233 

nounced  by  the  Advertiser  to  be  "  futile  and  most  ineffec- 
tual," and  was  derided  by  the  Spectator  as  a  "  marvellous 
admission  of  intellectual  incompetence." l  It  rallied  no 
support  for  the  Emperor,  but  it  deepened  the  distrust  for 
Bismarck,  who  was  believed  to  have  permitted  its  publica- 
tion for  his  own  ends. 

Lord  Lyons  noted  as  a  further  cause  for  Germany's  loss 
of  sympathy  at  this  time,  the  increase  and  violence  of 
Prussian  press  attacks  on  England."  They  prevented  the 
Crown  Prince  at  Versailles  from  being  "  as  jolly  as  usual;  " 
for  he  would  have  liked  it  understood  in  England  that  they 
were  not  at  all  officially  encouraged.6  But  whether  "  in- 
spired "  or  no,  Prussian  criticism  was  to  be  taken  account 
of  when  it  came  not  only  from  newspaper  writers  but  from 
her  most  eminent  men.  Von  Sybel  made  it  a  ground  of 
complaint  that  the  British  had  presumed  to  condemn  the 
reunion  to  their  fatherland  of  two  stubborn  provinces  that 
had  grown  overfond  of  their  foster  mother.3  A  pamphlet 
reprinted  from  the  Prussian  Annals  and  entitled,  What  Do 
We  Demand  From  France?  had  gone  through  three  edi- 
tions early  in  November.  It  was  by  von  Treitsehke,  and 
derived  especial  interest  as  embodying  the  view  of  the 
spokesman  of  German  Liberalism.  The  demand  was,  oif 
course,  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  Mommsen,  and  even  Max 
Miiller,  whose  gentle  spirit  and  ripe  scholarship  had  so 
endeared  him  to  the  land  of  his  adoption,  were  in  favor  of 
the  forcible  annexation  by  Prussia  of  the  two  disputed  dis- 
tricts.4 That  "  absolute  intellectual  freedom  in  the  pre- 
sentation of  thought,"  which  the  Earl  of  Lytton  found  an 

1  Issues  of  Nov.  5,  1870. 

*  Newton,  Lord  Lyons,  vol.  i,  p.  342. 

2  W.  H.  Russell,  My  Diary  during  the  Last  Great  War,  vol.  ii,  p.  225. 

4  Sun,  Nov.  3,  1870. 

5  Athenaeum,  Nov.  5,  1870. 


234     BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [234 

especial  characteristic  of  Germans,1  forced  England  to  see 
that  what  Bismarck  had  been  urging  was  no  more  than  the 
wish  now  of  all  Germany.  "  He  moves,"  said  Vanity  Fair, 
"the  King,  the  princes,  and  the  people  about  like  pawns 
upon  a  chess  board." 2 

Those  British  who  had  believed  the  beneficence  of  Ger- 
man administration  would  palliate  the  injustice  of  annexa- 
tions, were  dismayed  into  protest  by  the  harshness  of  the 
edicts  with  which  the  governance  of  the  provinces  was  in- 
itiated. They  doubted  Carlyle's  judgment  when  he  said 
that  Bismarck's  gain  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  would  do  all 
the  world,  and  even  France  itself,  a  great  deal  of  good.3* 
Rather,  they  agreed  with  the  News  in  believing  that  the 
territorial  aggrandizement  of  Germany  meant  the  territorial 
insecurity  of  Europe.4 

It  has  already  been  shown  that  the  conduct  of  the  Ger- 
man soldiery  had  dampened  the  antebellum  enthusiasm  for 
German  justice  and  humanity.  Certain  sections  of  the 
regulations  on  which  the  Landsturm  had  been  formed  to 
meet  a  French  invasion  were  printed  in  November  by  a 
British  journal.5  They  made  it  apparent  that  under  pro- 
vocation Germany  would  have  evolved  a  body  comparable 
to  the  franc  tireurs,  against  whom  she  executed  such  whole^ 
sale  reprisals.  Lady  Georgiana  Bloomfield  brought  back 
to  London  distressing  accounts  of  the  sufferings  of  the  sick 
soldiers  in  Germany.  They  were  packed  off  anyhow  without 
medical  attention  and  left  to  find  their  way  home,  or  die, 

1  Balfour,  Personal  and  Literary  Letters  of  Robt.,  First  Earl  of 
Lytton,  vol.  i,  p.  261. 

2  Vanity  Fair,  Oct.  15.  1870. 

•Conversation  of  Carlyle  and  Lecky,  Duquet,  Ireland  and  France, 
intro.,  p.  xx. 

4  Daily  Nezvs,  Nov.  19,  1870;  Anglo  American  Times,  Nov.  12,  1870. 

5  Once  a  Week,  Anglo  American  Times,  issues  of  Nov.  19,  1870. 


235]  A  STROKE  FROM  THE  BEAR  235 

as  best  they  could.  Frequently  they  got  no  further  than 
the  railway  stations.1  It  was  all  too  evident  that  the  Ger- 
man zeal  for  efficiency  spent  itself  too  prodigally  in  destruc- 
tion to  take  care  for  the  salvage  of  the  wrecks  of  war. 

What  touched  the  British  more  nearly  was  the  discern- 
ment of  an  unsuspected  vastness  in  Prussian  ambition. 
There  were  rumours  that  the  great  new  state  would  exact 
a  large  part  of  the  French  fleet  at  the  signing  of  the  treaty, 
— that  she  intended  to  make  the  Baltic  into  a  Prussian  lake. 
The  French  charge  d'affaires  in  London  wrote  Thiers  that 
the  English  were  indignant  at  the  demand  of  the  Prussian 
press  for  Heligoland  as  key  of  the  North  Sea.2  Weeks  be- 
fore, the  Diplomatic  Review  had  quoted  Urquhart's  earlier 
writings  in  an  attempt  to  prove  that  it  was  Russia's  design 
to  erect  Prussia  into  a  maritime  rival  of  England.3  The 
Court  Gazette  spoke  with  assurance  of  a  secret  treaty  be- 
tween King  Wilhelm  and  the  Tsar,  which  "threatened  the 
liberty  of  every  other  people."  Bismarck,  it  declared,  was 
planning  to  join  the  "  Great  Dumb  Nation  "  in  an  expedition 
against  China  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  joint  con- 
trol in  that  great  Empire  to  the  danger  of  British  power  in 
India.4  Rumours  such  as  these  were  disregarded.  But  it 
was  feared  that  real  danger  did  exist  in  the  passion  for 
unification  that  possessed  the  Germans.  The  Saturday 
Review  complained  they  had  run  mad  on  the  idea  of  reunit- 
ing every  part  of  what  any  professor  of  history  chose  to 
say  had  once  been  theirs.5     In  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette  there 

1  Lady  Georgiana  Bloomfield,  Reminiscences  of  Court  and  Diplo- 
matic Life,  vol.  ii,  p.  342. 

1  Tissot  to  Thiers,  Nov.  12,  1870,  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  vol.  xxxiii, 
p.  774- 

1  Diplomatic  Review,  Oct.  12,  1870. 

*  Nov.  5,  1870. 

*  Saturday  Review,  Nov.  26,  1870. 


236      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [236 

was  published  a  resume  of  Dr.  Wagner's  pamphlet  claim- 
ing Holland  and  German  Switzerland  as  parts  of  the 
Fatherland.  These,  and  every  other  detached  part  of  the 
nation,  said  the  eminent  Professor,  should  be  made  to  feel 
the  duty  of  bowing  to  the  wishes  of  the  whole. 

It  came  about  that  the  crowds  that  attended  the  war  con- 
certs at  the  Alhambra  cheered  the  Marseillaise  more  than 
The  Watch  on  the  Rhine.1  They  had  an  uneasy  apprecia- 
tion of  the  truth  of  the  jest  that  appeared  in  Fun: 

The  where  -  is  -  the  -  German  -  Fatherland-never-sufficiently-to-be- 
impressed-on-all-nations  question !  So !  We  the-in-one-bond- 
united-of-Germany-concatenated  to  have  that  song  gesungen  wish. 
Hein  so!  .  .  .  Where  is  the  German  Vaterland?  Everyveres! 
Everyveres  in-the-spirit-in-due-philosophy-of-all  Teutonic  aspira- 
tions born  infusion-spreading-yah ! 

In  the  Crystal  Palace  the  managers  had  collected  a  great 
number  of  chassepots,  and  needle  guns,  and  effigies  of 
French  and  German  soldiers.  There  were  relics  of  the 
fields  of  Worth  and  Sedan, — blood-rusted  saber  bayonetsi 
and  bullets  beaten  out  of  shape.  There  were  almost  two 
hundred  sketches  by  artists  of  the  Illustrated  London  News 
and  the  Graphic,  all  hot  with  the  newly  visioned  horrors  of 
war.2  Men  came  and  looked,  and  went  again  into  the  sun- 
light where  the  autumn  leaves  were  drifting  down.  And 
they  were  somehow  puzzled  as  to  whether  it  could  be  true, 
as  Carlyle  claimed,  that  might  made  right.  George  Eliot 
said  that  at  this  time  the  conscience  of  every  man  wasi 
trembling  after  some  great  principle  as  a  consolation  and  a 
guide.3  Each  strove  for  truth  in  his  capacity  and  bodied 
his  conclusions  as  best  he  could  in  word  and  deed.     There 

1  Daily  Nezvs,  Nov.  11,  1870;  Daily  Telegraph,  Nov.  19,  1870. 

1  Art  Journal,  Nov.,  1870. 

*  Cross,  George  Eliot's  Life  as  Related  in  her  Letters,  p.  553. 


237]  A  STROKE  FROM  THE  BEAR  237 

was  much  poor  verse  written  and  published  by  sympathetic 
editors  on  the  pitiful  ineptitude  of  war.  Christina  Rossetti 
was  one  of  the  more  able  who  appealed  to  the  armed  King 
William  and  warned  him  that  vengeance  was  only  for  the 
Lord.1  Robert  Buchanan  limned  a  splendid  picture  of  the 
perfect  state, — the  country  that  would  let  no  wronged  land 
lack  assistance  in  extremity.2  Even  jocund  Mr.  Punch  be- 
came heavily  poetic  in  his  condemnation  of  the  hate  that 
defied  humanity.3 

More  effective  for  France  than  poets'  lines  that  ran  to 
meet  their  fellows  with  a  rhyme  was  the  martial  prose 
of  others  of  its  defenders.  In  the  Contemporary,  J.  M. 
Ludlow  urged  on  England  the  abandonment  of  her  neutral- 
ity. "  Neutrality,"  he  said,  "is  practically  only  impartial 
so  long  as  two  combatants  are,  or  appear  to  be,  equally 
matched;  from  the  moment  that  one  of  the  two  has  the 
upper  hand,  it  is  simply  the  passive  acquiescence  of  the 
neutral  in  all  the  evil  that  the  stronger  may  wreak  upon  the 
weaker."  4  It  was  subversive  of  the  interests  of  civilization 
that  France  be  battered  into  a  lesser  Power.  He  advised 
that  England  act  on  a  hint  of  Garibaldi's  and  call  a  Euro- 
pean congress  to  determine  how  to  stop  the  war  by  united 
action.  In  November,  also,  the  Fortnightly  published 
Frederic  Harrison's  remarkable  article  on  "  Bismarckism." 5 
Its  thesis  was  the  necessity  of  preventing  the  destruction 
of  international  morality  in  Europe  and  the  restoration  of 
the  old  military  standard.     He  would  have  had  England 

1  C.  Rossetti,  Thy  Brother's  Blood  Crieth,  Graphic,  Nov.  5,  1870. 

2  Buchanan,  The  Perfect  State,  Complete  Poetical  Works  of  Robt. 
Buchanan,  p.  338. 

'Punch,  Nov.  19,  1870. 

*  Europe  and  the  War,  Contemporary  Review,  Nov.,  1870,  pp.  648 
et  seq. 

*  Fortnightly  Review,  Nov.,  1870,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  631  et  seq. 


238      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [238 

check  the  progress  of  Prussia  by  diplomacy,  if  possible,  but 
failing  that,  by  force  of  arms.  He  thought  she  would 
not  have  to  intervene  alone,  but  could  rally  all  the  other 
Neutrals  to  her  leadership.  Perhaps  she  could  have,  had 
the  laboring  class  controlled  diplomacy.  The  working  men 
of  all  of  Europe,  said  the  Anglo  American  Times,  opposed 
the  annexation  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.1  John  Morley 
pointed  out  that  on  the  salient  questions  of  the  decade  they 
had  shown  themselves  to  have  been  dowered  with  truer 
vision  than  the  "  privileged  orders,"  which  now  denied  their 
sagacity.  This  was  because  the  interests  of  the  multitude 
could  never  be  anti-social.2 

It  may  be  considered  significant  of  more  than  a  realiza- 
tion of  present  danger  when  diplomats  were  urged  to  as- 
semble at  a  signal  from  Garibaldi,  and  when  a  superiority 
of  political  prescience  was  conceded  to  manual  laborers.  It 
was  a  time  of  indecision  and  doubt,3 — a  time  when  some  ad- 
vocated experiments  that  only  increased  the  alarm  of  their 
fellows.  Uncertainty  of  the  future  had  caused  a  veritable 
strike  of  capital.  France  was  buying  nothing  of  England, 
save  the  commodities  that  occasioned  the  remonstrances  of 
von  Bernstorff.  The  merchant  marine  of  Germany  had 
been  almost  annihilated,  and  that  country  could  be  reached 
only  through  the  channel  of  neighboring  neutrals.  To  be 
sure,  the  business  of  Manchester  was  experiencing  a  re- 
newed activity  which  was  attributed  to  the  enforced  idle- 
ness of  ten  millions  of  French  spindles.4  But  the  benefits 
of  a  few  favored  industries  were  more  than  counterbalanced 
by  the  general  unrest.  Though  money  was  tight,  the  large 
loan  asked  by  France  had  been  readily  subscribed  late  in 

1  Anglo  American  Times,  Nov.  12,  1870. 

7  Fortnightly  Rez-iew,  Nov.,  1870,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  581  et  seq. 

3  Cf.  Banker's  Magazine,  Nov.,  1870. 

4  Spectator,  Nov.  5,  1870.    Cf.  Times,  Nov.  8,  1870. 


239]  A  STR0KE  FROM  THE  BEAR  239 

October.1  And  though  the  capitulation  of  Metz  had  raised 
the  value  of  the  French  stcck,  since  it  seemed  to  foretell  an 
early  peace,  there  was  yet  an  unselfish  rejoicing  when  news 
came  in  mid-November  that  Aurelles  de  Paladin  had  won 
a  splendid  victory  and  recaptured  Orleans.2  King  William 
sent  news  of  this  reverse  to  his  Queen  in  a  despatch  in  which 
there  was  no  mention  of  the  Deity.  From  the  chopfallen 
humour  of  the  King,  the  British  estimated  his  disappoint- 
ment to  have  been  great  indeed. 

"  Everyone  seems  pleased  with  the  French  success  at  Or- 
leans," wrote  Matthew  Arnold.3  Many  were  glad  to  be- 
lieve that  the  repulse  would  have  a  tendency  to  cause 
Prussia  to  diminish  demands  of  which  they  disapproved. 
Gladstone  was  one  of  these.  He  wrote  to  Lord  Lyons  that 
he  was  to  the  last  degree  reluctant  to  promote  compliance 
on  the  part  of  France  with  the  change  in  the  political  status 
of  the  citizens  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.4 

On  the  night  following  the  reentry  of  the  French  into 
Orleans,  the  Lord  Mayor  of  London  held  his  annual  banquet 
at  the  Guildhall.  The  feast  was  made  the  occasion  for  a 
more  or  less  formal  indication  of  the  changed  attitude  of 
the  British  toward  the  two  contestants.  It  was  declared 
that  the  war,  at  the  outset,  had  been  waged  by  Germany  for 
a  purpose  which  had  their  hearty  endorsement  but  that  it 
had  been  continued  for  conquest  and  was  no  longer  praise- 
worthy.5 The  Lord  Chief  Baron,  in  presenting  the  new; 
Mayor  to  the  Baron  of  the  Exchequer,  delivered  a  eulogy 
on  the  virtues  of  France  and  a  homily  on  the  ambitions  of 

1  Weekly  Scotsman,  Nov.  5,  1870. 
*  London  Times,  Nov.  12,  1870. 

3  Letters   of  Matthew  Arnold    (edited  by  W.   E.    Russell,   London, 
1896),  vol.  ii,  p.  53- 

4  Gladstone  to  Lyons,  Nov.  7,  1870,  Newton,  Life  of  Lord  Lyons,  vol. 
i,  PP-  334-335- 

5  Daily  Telegraph,  Nov.  10,  1870. 


240      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [240 

Prussia.  His  extravagance  of  praise  and  blame  were  ex- 
cused by  the  News  on  the  assumption  that  he,  like  so  many- 
good  Englishmen,  was  suffering  from  "  war  on  the  brain."  L 
The  Minister  of  War  in  his  speech  made  an  opportunity  for 
getting  before  the  people  his  plan  for  the  formation  of  a 
large  army  of  reserves.  The  Lord  Chancellor  eagerly  de- 
fended his  country's  observance  of  neutrality.  Gladstone, 
in  a  manner,  seconded  the  pleas  and  assertions  of  his  col- 
leagues, and  after  sententious  observations  on  the  horrors 
of  war,  declared  it  England's  duty  to  interpose  at  a  proper 
time  to  secure  a  permanent  peace.2  The  speech  of  Granville 
was  a  courteous  intimation  to  the  Premier  that  he  had,  per- 
haps, somewhat  deviated,  as  men  are  wont  to  do  at  ban- 
quets, from  the  rectilinear  correctness  of  his  official  attitude. 
The  war  was  none  of  England's  making,  he  said.  France 
and  Germany  both  had  pronounced  it  to  have  been  inevit- 
able. England  had  done  her  full  share  in  pacific  endeavour 
both  before  and  since  its  inception,  and,  though  by  no  means 
intending  to  discontinue  her  labours,  would  be  quite 
happy  to  see  peace  brought  about  by  the  belligerents  alone, 
or  by  another  of  the  Neutral  Powers.3 

Some  of  the  papers  thought  that  in  these  speeches  quite 
enough  had  been  said.  Others  regretted  that  Gladstone's 
desire  for  a  permanent  peace  had  not  impelled  a  definite 
pronouncement  against  Germany's  wish  for  aggrandize- 
ment. The  Ministers  were  overacting  their  neutral  role, 
said  the  Spectator,  like  the  man  who  insisted  on  colouring 
himself  all  over  before  he  would  go  on  for  Othello.4     But 

1  Daily  Neivs,  Nov.  11,  1870;  Spectator,  Nov.  12,  1870. 
1  Illustrated  London  News,  Nov.  12,  1870. 

3  Spectator,  Nov.  12,  1870.  At  about  this  time  Bruce  made  an  im- 
politic speech  in  which  he  likened  France  to  a  house-breaker  and  as- 
serted that  her  destruction  would  make  for  England's  future  peace  and 
prosperity. 

4  Manchester  Guardian,  Nov.  12,  1870. 


241  ]  A  STROKE  FROM  THE  BEAR  241 

from  that  paper's  own  resume  of  the  November  speeches 
the  members  of  Parliament  were  making  in  the  provinces, 
the  Government  would  have  had  the  backing  of  neither  the 
Liberals  nor  the  Conservatives  as  parties,  had  it  espoused 
the  cause  of  France.1  Thiers,  however,  was  encouraged  by 
the  Guildhall  speeches,  and  by  a  letter  from  the  charge 
d'affaires  in  London  urging  that  he  take  advantage  of  the 
increased  sympathy  for  France.  Tissot  had  been  assured 
by  Mr.  Otway,  an  under-secretary  of  Granville's  depart- 
ment, that  the  feeling  against  Germany  would  end  in  the 
formation  of  a  European  coalition.2  In  consequence  of 
these  bright  auguries,  Thiers  approached  Lord  Lyons  with 
a  project  for  uniting  with  France,  Austria,  Italy,  Turkey, 
and  Spain.  This,  he  thought,  would  lead  to  a  general  con- 
gress for  the  settlement  oi  peace.  He  was  willing  to  as- 
sign to  England  the  leading  part  in  bringing  these  fine 
things  about.  Lyons  wrote  to  Granville,  on  the  fourteenth, 
that  he  had  deemed  it  prudent  to  listen  and  say  nothing, 
'■  which  was  never  difficult  with  Thiers."  3 

Great  Britain  was  in  no  mood  for  forming  a  coalition  to 
oppose  Prussia.  Rather,  she  was  negotiating  even  more 
timorously  than  hitherto.  At  about  the  time  of  the  above 
statements  to  Granville,  John  Scott  Russell,  F.  R.  S.,  was  in 
Versailles  with  high  hopes  that  he  might  obtain  a  passport 
into  Paris  and  be  enabled  to  visit  there  a  friend  who  was  a 
member  of  the  Committee  of  Defence.  It  was  his  plan  to 
find  out  from  this  friend  the  terms  on  which  Paris  might 
be  won  to  a  capitulation  and  then,  by  communicating  them 
to  the  German  authorities,  open  the  way  for  a  resumption  of 
negotiations.     He  claimed  to  have  been  encouraged  to  un- 

1  Ibid.,  Nov.  5,  1870. 

*  Tissot   to    Thiers,    Nov.    12,    1870,    Revue   des   Deux   Mondes,    vol. 
xxxiii,  pp.  773-774- 

8  Newton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  338. 


242      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [242 

dertake  his  mission  by  authority  much  higher  than  his  own. 
But  whatever  hint  he  gave  at  Versailles  of  his  semi-official 
character,  it  availed  him  no  more  than  did  his  acquaintance 
with  the  King  and  Bismarck,  and  their  knowledge  of  the 
great  public  works  he  had  constructed  for  Prussia.1  He 
was  whisked  off  bag  and  baggage,  wrote  the  correspondent 
of  the  Times,  and  given  orders  not  to  attempt  to  visit  Paris 
and  not  to  show  himself  again  at  Versailles. 

It  would  seem  that  the  Prussian  leaders  were  in  no  happy 
humour  at  this  time,  and  the  rather  presumptuous  requests 
of  Mr.  Russell  drew  upon  him  greater  severity  than  in  them- 
selves they  merited.  The  reason  for  the  surcharged  atmos- 
phere was  the  arrival  at  Versailles,  on  the  fourteenth,  of  a 
Russian  general  with  a  most  unwelcome  letter  from  his 
Emperor.  It  was  an  announcement  to  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia of  the  Russian  abrogation  of  those  articles  of  the  Treaty 
of  1856,  which  had  to  do  with  the  neutralisation  of  the  Black 
Sea.  Bismarck,  according  to  Lord  Augustus  Loftus,  was 
enraged  at  the  stupid  impatience  which  precipitated  an  event 
which  he  considered  would  not  have  been  timely  for  a  good 
four  weeks.2  The  date  of  the  repudiation,  October  the 
twenty-ninth,  showed  Russia  had  exercised  some  forbear- 
ance in  restraining  herself  for  a  fortnight.  But  Bismarck 
could  not  believe  that  any  advantage  was  derived  from 
postponing  its  publication  from  the  days  following  the 
capture  of  Metz  to  the  days  following  the  loss  of  Orleans. 
The  news  that  Russia  had  sent  circulars  announcing  her 
repudiation  to  the  European  courts  was  given  the  Times 
correspondent  by  the  Duke  of  Coburg  on  the  following  day. 
What  will  England  do?  Russell  was  asked  on  all  sides, 
and  when  he  kept  silence  the  Prussians  replied  for  him, 

1  J.  S.  Russell,  Into  Versailles  and  Out,  Macmillan's  Magazine,  Feb., 
1871,  vol.  xxiii,  pp.  319  et  seq. 
s  Lord  Augustus  Loftus,  Diplomatic  Reminiscences,  vol.  i,  p.  335- 


243]  A  STR0KE  FROM  THE  BEAR  243 

"  Nothing."  It  was  a  humiliating  moment  for  the  famous 
reporter  of  the  Crimea,  who  had  spent  two  years  of  his  life 
on  the  plateau  in  front  of  Sebastopol.  He  feared  the  Prus- 
sians were  right  in  their  belief  that  England  would  sub- 
mit. "  Our  old  alliances  are  gone,"  he  confided  to  his 
diary,  "  and  our  new  alliances  are  valueless,  and  all  we  have 
left  to  make  us  remember  the  Crimean  War  is  the  income 
tax."  x 

In  London  the  publication  of  Prince  Gortchakoff's  Cir- 
cular created  a  furore.  The  conviction  that  armed  force 
would  be  opposed  to  the  Russian  attempt  caused  a  panic 
comparable  to  the  one  precipitated  by  the  French  declaration 
of  war.  The  indignation  of  the  press  was  intense  and 
immensely  disturbing  to  the  pacific  ministry.  Resentment 
was  heightened  because  there  had  existed  a  tendency  to 
deride  those  who  had  pointed  to  Russia  with  suspicion. 
"  Urquhartism,"  the  News  had  declared  in  September,  "  is1 
as  extinct  as  the  faith  of  the  Jacobites." 2  It  had  been 
thought  victorious  Prussia  would  act,  not  in  connivance  with, 
but  in  opposition  to  those  Russian  designs  which  were  anti- 
thetic to  British  interests.  Men  were  eager  to  make  so 
clamorous  their  indignation  that  no  echo  of  their  past  com- 
placency could  survive.  Lord  Granville's  prompt  answer 
to  the  Circular,  declaring  it  impossible  for  his  Government 
to  sanction  Russia's  repudiation,  gave  only  partial  satis- 
faction. The  Standard  of  the  seventeenth  declared  the 
Circular  a  direct  challenge  and  a  provocation  to  battle.  It 
prophesied  the  Ministry  could  not  survive  a  week  unless 
it  put  away  its  childish  dreams  of  peace.  It  was  not  only  in 
the  Opposition  press  that  bellicose  statements  continued  to 
appear.  The  Scotsman  demanded  that  Prussia,  as  a  co- 
signer of  the  Treaty  of  1856,  should  be  required  actively  to 

1  W.  H.  Russell,  My  Diary  during  the  Last  Great  War,  pp.  457-458. 
1  Daily  News,  Sept.  12,  1870. 


244      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [244 

oppose  Russia  under  pain  of  being  regarded  as  a  party  to 
her  crime.1  Pall  Mall  advised  that  inquiry  be  made  of 
Prussia  as  to  whether  she  would  aid  in  enforcing  the  obser- 
vance of  the  treaty.  In  the  event  of  a  reply  that  was  de- 
layed or  ambiguous,  Pall  Mall  recommended  an  immediate 
declaration  of  war.  Its  editor's  opinion  was  that  the  re- 
sponse would  be  unfavorable :  "  The  complaints  of  the  Prus- 
sian Government  against  England  and  her  exports  began 
the  moment  the  war  began.  They  did  not  begin  mildly, 
but  boisterously,  and  in  a  surprisingly  minatory  way. 
They  were  designed  to  set  up  a  grievance,  to  give 
grounds  for  a  quarrel."2  The  Northern  Whig  shared 
the  opinion  of  Pall  Mall  as  to  the  course  the  Government 
should  take.  The  Telegraph  and  the  Guardian  displayed 
their  ingenuity  in  adducing  unpleasant  facts  to  support  the 
theory  of  a  Russo- Prussian  alliance.  Gortchakoff  was  be- 
lieved to  have  out-Bismarcked  Bismarck  in  calling  at  this 
time  for  a  public  acknowledgment  of  that  quid  pro  quo  he 
had  been  promised  for  neutrality.3  It  was  the  conviction 
of  Prussian  complicity  that  brought  anger  to  fever  heat. 
Bismarck  was  thought  to  be  behind  Gortchakoff,  beating 
time  with  his  mighty  arm,  as  in  the  children's  game  of 
Dumb  Orator,  to  the  threats  that  Russia  voiced.  It  was 
seen  that  two  great  wars  could  not  be  waged  on  the  Con- 
tinent without  eventually  being  merged  into  one.  Many 
believed  that  Russia  would  be  as  surely  punished  and 
England  would  fight  for  a  better  cause,  if  the  Government 
chose  to  cooperate  with  France  rather  than  make  direct  war 
on  the  eastern  nation.4 

1  Scotsman,  Nov.  19,  1870. 
1  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Nov.  17,  1870. 
'  Issues  of  Nov.  17,  18,  respectively. 
4  Spectator,  Nov.  19,  1870. 


245]  A  STR0KE  FR0M  THE  BEAR  245 

Ireland  more  than  matched  England  in  manifesting  its 
indignation.  The  Belfast  Examiner  urged  the  "immediate 
release  of  France  from  the  fangs  of  Prussia"  as  the  only 
means  of  saving  Europe  from  tyranny.1  The  Nation  re- 
joiced that  England  could  avert  war  only  by  an  abject 
humiliation,  and  that  if  she  did  not  do  so,  she  might  be  in- 
duced to  a  favorable  settlement  of  the  Irish  question.2 

"  Never  was  there  a  time,"  said  the  Illustrated,  "  when 
Britain  was  less  disposed  to  put  up  with  insult,  never  a 
time  when  she  was  more  disposed  to  do  justice." 3  The 
reaction  against  an  impassivity  that  had  proven  disastrous 
was  alarmingly  strong.  "  The  Government  appears  to  be 
in  trouble,"  wrote  Disraeli  to  Lord  Derby,  "and  probably 
will  continue  to  be  so."  4  Not  only  its  policy,  its  very  com- 
position was  under  fire.  So  long  as  Bright  remained  a 
member  of  the  Cabinet,  men  said  that  Russia  would  dis- 
count to  the  minimum  the  apparent  firmness  of  Lord  Gran- 
ville.5 For  it  was  known  that  Bright  had  always  opposed 
some  of  the  clauses  of  the  disputed  treaty.  Tradition  had 
it  that  the  Emperor  Nicholas  declared  on  his  death-bed  that 
he  had  been  betrayed  into  war  by  his  belief  in  the  Man- 
chester School.0  The  Evening  Mail  of  Dublin  noted  hope- 
fully a  rumour  that  Bright  would  resign,  were  the  Russian 
Circular  treated  as  a  casus  belli.7  The  Standard  recom- 
mended that  the  country  generously  retire  him  with  the 
pension  to  which  he  would  be  entitled  by  a  few  weeks  more 

1  Belfast  Daily  Examiner,  Nov.  22,  1870. 
1  Irish  Nation,  Nov.  19,  1870. 
3  Illustrated  Daily  News,  Nov.  19,  1870. 

*  Disraeli  to  Derby,  Nov.  27,  1870,  Buckle,  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli, 
vol.  v,  p.  130. 

5  Nov.  30,  1870. 

6  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Nov.  22,  1870. 

7  Issues  of  Nov.  21,  1870. 


246      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [246 

of  service.1  A  timorous  or  over-dexterous  diplomacy,  said 
Pall  Mall,  would  inevitably  miscarry,  should  the  Cabinet 
continue  to  be  discommoded  by  his  presence.2  He  was  con- 
sidered the  apostle  of  the  unfailing  pacifism  of  those  traders, 
who,  so  long  as  the  trade  in  calico  thrived,  were  indifferent 
as  to  the  success  of  their  country's  policy.  It  was  not  John 
Bright's  nature  to  be  disturbed  by  criticism.  He  was  un- 
easy about  what  course  the  Cabinet  might  take,  and  he  urged 
on  Gladstone  every  reason  that  he  could  to  permit  Russia  to 
have  a  fleet  on  the  Black  Sea  and  an  arsenal  on  its  coast, 
if  such  were  her  desires.3. 

The  Government  sent  Odo  Russell  to  Versailles  to  inter- 
view Count  Bismarck  on  the  matter.  It  gave,  by  this,  a 
practical  recognition  of  the  exigency  that  had  occasioned 
France  to  send  her  envoy  to  Ems  rather  than  to  Madrid  for 
the  discussion  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidature.  Perhapsl 
it  was  a  realization  that  one  should  not  clearly  condemn  an 
example  one  has  to  follow  that  caused  Gladstone,  at  this 
time,  to  repent  his  published  criticism  of  the  French.  He 
attempted  to  get  the  Times  to  intimate  that  he  had  been 
only  the  "  inspirer  "  of  the  Edinburgh  article.4  Odo  Rus- 
sell felt  himself  to  be  in  a  position  even  more  dubious  than 
that  of  the  Prime  Minister.  He  was  uncertain  as  to  his 
instructions,  and,  as  he  confided  to  Dr.  Russell,  somewhat 
anxious  as  to  the  sort  of  reception  he  might  get  from  Bis- 
marck. The  famous  correspondent  could  give  him  but 
slight  encouragement.  Matters,  he  admitted,  were  very 
unsatisfactory.  There  was  a  conviction  in  the  Prussian 
camp  that  England,  by  not  having  restrained  France,  was 

1  Standard,  Nov.  24,  1870. 

* Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Nov.  22,  1870. 

*  Trevelyan,  Life  of  John  Bright,  pp.  417-418. 

*  Disraeli  to  Derby,  Nov.  27,  Buckle,  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  vol. 
v,  pp.  130-131- 


247]  A  STROKE  FROM  THE  BEAR  247 

really  responsible  for  the  war.  It  was  said  she  was  jeal- 
ous of  Prussian  success  and  eager  to  prevent  German  unifica- 
tion. The  Crown  Prince,  however,  was  not  antagonistic. 
And,  even  among  those  who  were,  there  existed  a  certain 
basic  sentiment  that  English  transgressions  should  be  toler- 
ated, since  she  was  an  "  offshoot  of  the  Germanic  race." 
Junkerdom  was  pleased,  too,  that  Granville  had  sent  an 
envoy  to  discuss  the  violent  rupture  of  a  treaty  that  England 
had  allowed  Prussia  to  sign  only  through  the  insistence  of 
France. 

It  was  Bismarck,  himself,  who  told  Dr.  Russell  of  the 
outcome  of  the  mission:  "This  whole  question  is  to  be 
settled  by  half  a  dozen  sensible  men  sitting  around  a  table 
and  talking  it  over  quietly."  An  attendant  brought  hia 
cloak  to  the  Chancellor  while  they  were  conversing.  It 
was  lined  with  Russiain  sable,  and  as  he  put  it  on  he  added 
with  a  grim  smile,  "  It  is  not  a  matter  for  ill  blood,  or  for 
war,  or  angry  language.  It  is  quite  certain  that  I  have  no 
desire  to  see  Europe  enveloped  as  I  am."  And  he  drew  his 
fur  coat  about  his  ears — bade  the  correspondent  goodnight, 
and  drove  off  to  the  Chancellery. 

The  next  day,  the  twenty-second,  the  news  leaked  out  at 
Versailles  that  Odo  Russell's  tone  at  his  interview  had  not 
indicated  that  complaisance  which  had  been  expected  from 
an  envoy  at  the  headquarters  of  the  conquering  Prussians. 
He  had  threatened  with  undiplomatic  directness  that  unless 
Bismarck  could  get  Russia  to  withdraw  the  Circular,  Eng- 
land would  be  compelled  to  go  to  war,  with  or  without  al- 
lies. The  correspondent  of  the  Times,  who  had  been  grieved 
that  Granville's  firm  reply  to  Gortchakoff  should  waver 
into  submission  to  a  Conference,  recovered  his  high  spirits. 
He  believed  that  England  had  consented  to  Prussia's  plan 
only  on  the  understanding  that  Russia  would  be  induced  to 
make  a  preliminary  renunciation  of  her  claims.     It  was  a 


248      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [248 

fine  thing  to  be  a  Briton,  wrote  the  old  correspondent  of 
the  Crimea.  "  Instead  of  being  a  nation  of  sordid  traders 
engaged  in  prolonging  war,  we  have  suddenly  become  a 
chivalrous  people,  prepared  to  enter  upon  an  immense  strug- 
gle solely  to  vindicate  our  honour  and  maintain  an  idea."  l 

But  Odo  Russell  had  made  his  declaration  only  on  the 
hypothesis  that  he  could  do  whatever  he  had  not  been  told 
not  to  do.  His  own  conception  of  British  obligations  so 
differed  from  his  chief's  that  he  had  to  enter  into  elaborate 
explanations  of  his  reasons  for  having  exceeded  his  instruc- 
tions.2 What  he  had  done  was  not  repudiated,  since  it 
had  gained  Prussian  permission  for  the  convoking  of  a 
congress.  But  it  was,  nevertheless,  disavowed  by  implica- 
tion when,  a  month  later,  Russia  was  allowed  to  enter  the 
Conference  without  having  revoked  the  Circular  that  had 
caused  its  convention.  The  few  days  gained  by  sending 
an  envoy  to  Versailles  had  taken  the  edge  from  English 
anger.  It  was  safe  now  to  postpone  accepting  the  resigna- 
tion that  John  Bright  had  tendered  on  the  score  of  ill  health. 
The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  had  impressed  on  the 
exquisite  Dorothy  Nevill  that  she  preach  the  only  gospel, 
"peace  at  any  price,"  and  the  pretty  creature,  wrote  Dis- 
raeli, cynically,  went  about  society  preaching  accordingly.3 
Gortchakoff's  supplementary  note,  it  was  declared,  im- 
plied that  the  despatch  was  meant  to  be  only  an  emphatic 
expression  of  discontent.*  Count  Bismarck,  though  ex- 
pressing no  disapproval  of  the  objects  and  demands  of 
Russia,  had  disavowed  complicity  in  her  presentation  of 
the  Circular.     This  reassurance  was  published.5 

1 W.    H.    Russell,    op.   cit.,   pp.   470-473 ;    Fitzmaurice,    Life   of  Lord 
Granville,  vol.  ii,  p.  73. 

*  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  vol.  ii,  pp.  353-354. 

8  Buckle,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  131. 

4  Daily  Telegraph,  Nov.  23,  1870. 

5  Cf.  W.  H.   Russell,  op.  cit.,  pp.  494-495 ;  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Nov. 
29,  1870. 


249]  A  STR0KE  FROM  THE  BEAR  249 

To  be  sure  there  were  rumblings  from  the  press.  The 
Standard  urged,  insidiously,  that  England  refuse  to  submit 
to  an  insult  that  she  could  punish  almost  without  effort.1 
The  Manchester  Examiner  refused  to  follow  its  sister,  the 
Guardian,  into  the  paths  of  peace.2  A  correspondent  of  the 
News  managed  to  get  published  in  that  pacific  journal,  an 
account  of  the  alleged  arrangement  arrived  at  by  Gortcha- 
koff  and  Bismarck  at  the  war's  outbreak.  Pall  Mall  pointed 
out,  as  a  strong  argument  for  its  authenticity,  the  news 
from  Versailles  that  it  was  understood  there  that  Russia 
would  yield  to  friendly  representations  and  the  decisions  of 
a  conference.3  Such  assurance  of  Russian  intentions  was 
utterly  lacking  in  London.  Bismarck's  statement  seemed 
more  that  of  the  partner  to  an  agreement  than  that  of  a 
merely  neutral  onlooker.  Fun  carried  clever  cartoons 
showing  Bismarck  as  a  bear  tamer  with  John  Bull  offering 
his  charge  a  cannon  ball  to  try  his  teeth  on  when  he  had 
done  with  devouring  treaties.  Judy  showed  the  Chancellor 
as  a  laundress  trying  to  hide  from  Constable  Bull  a  devout 
King  William  and  a  very  well-armed  and  ferocious  bear. 

Before  the  month  was  out  the  press,  for  the  most  part, 
came  to  believe  in  a  conference  as  the  only  desideratum. 
The  Nation  dolorously  suspected  that,  whatever  else  was 
done,  England  would  not  fight,  and  Ireland  would  have  to 
wait  another  opportunity  to  attempt  to  gain  a  repeal  of  the 
Union.  The  British  publicists,  it  said,  would  pretend  to 
find  in  Gortchakoff's  later  language  sufficient  satsf action 
for  their  offended  dignity.  The  Irish  Freeman  was  in 
agreement  with  the  Nation,  and  derided  the  English  at- 
tempts to  deck  out  the  scarecrow  fright  so  that  it  might  ap- 
pear as  embodied  justice  and  moderation.     They  were  im- 

1  Standard,  Nov.  21,  1870. 

2  Cf.  editorials  of  two  papers  for  Nov.  21,  1870. 

s  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Nov.  29,  1870 ;  Irish  Freeman,  Nov.  26,  1870. 


250     BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [250 

patient  of  the  Times,  which  was  using  all  its  influence  to  hush 
the  anger  against  Russia.1  Delane's  unique  opinion  was 
that  the  Gortchakoff  note  was  the  outcome  of  Thiers' s 
journey  to  St.  Petersburg,  and  could  be  easily  disposed  of 
by  a  congress.2 

While  Odo  Russell  was  abroad,  the  cause  of  peace  was1 
favoured  at  home  by  the  very  diverse  writings  of  several 
eminent  men.  John  Stuart  Mill,  in  private  and  public 
letters,  advised  his  country  to  yield  to  Russia  her  den 
mands.  He  was  frankly  distrustful  of  British  military 
strength.  But  he  based  his  main  plea  on  the  fallacy  of 
regarding  treaties  as  being  contracted  in  perpetuity.  It 
should  be  expected,  he  said,  that  irksome  obligations  would 
be  disavowed  so  soon  as  the  barrier  of  fear  was  removed 
from  the  nation  that  had  submitted  to  them.  He  recom- 
mended that  Russia  be  allowed  her  abrogation,  and  that 
England  save  her  dignity  by  issuing  a  protest  reserving 
liberty  of  action.3  The  Earl  of  Shaftesbury  was  seriously 
disturbed  by  a  doctrine  legalizing  only  those  documents 
to  which  the  signatories  were  in  voluntary  agreement.  He 
feared  that  if  England  sanctioned  its  principles  there  would 
be  difficulty  in  bringing  wars  to  a  conclusion.  How  could 
Prussia  feel  security  in  a  treaty  with  France,  if  it  were  con- 
ceded that  that  country  should  be  allowed  to  abrogate  it 
so  soon  as  she  felt  herself  strong?  As  to  what  touched 
England  more  nearly,  diplomats  must  have  seen  that  the 
recognition  of  this  arm-chair  philosophy  would  drive  a 
wedge  into  the  foundation  of  the  British  Empire.  Treaties 
of  her  own  inclined  so  heavily  in  England's  favour  that 
her  co-signatories  might  he  expected  to  welcome  the  prin- 

1  Irish  Freeman,  Nov.  26,  1870. 

J  Delane  to  Dasent,  Nov.  27,  1870,  Dasent,  John  Delane,  vol.  ii,  p.  278. 
3  Mill  to  Times,  Nov.  22,  1870 ;  cf.  also  his  letters  to"  friends  Nov.  18, 
10,  21,  1870,  Letters  of  John  Stuart  Mill,  vol.  ii,  pp.  278-283. 


25 1  ]         A  STROKE  FROM  THE  BEAR  25 1 

ciple  that  no  sanction  save  that  of  power  existed  to  legalize 
her  advantages.1 

The  letters  from  the  historian,  Froude,  published  at  this 
time,  avoided  any  argument  as  to  abstract  principles,  but 
heartily  agreed  with  Mill's  decision  that  the  Russian  action 
should  be  tolerated.  E.  A.  Freeman,  too,  published  his 
opinion  that  war  with  Russia  would  be  monstrous.2  And 
the  very  concrete  proposal  of  Lord  John  Russell  for  im- 
mediate mobilization  gave  a  hint  to  the  nation  of  what  it 
would  mean  to  translate  angry  words  into  angry  acts.3  At 
the  Reform  Club  and  the  Carlton  men  still  grumbled  at  the 
taxes  entailed  by  the  war  of  the  Crimea.  The  horrors  of 
its  campaign  were  of  contemporary  memory. 

Thomas  Carlyle  at  this  time  rendered  service  by  diverting 
to  his  own  person  some  of  the  excess  emotion  that  had  been 
venting  itself  in  indignation  at  Russia.  Men  were  enraged 
by  his  dogmatic  assumptions  that  it  was  "perfectly  just, 
rational,  and  wise  that  Germany  should  take  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  home  with  her;"  that  France  had  been  smitten 
into  "  hideous  wreck  and  impotence,  testifying  to  gods  and 
men  what  extent  of  rottenness  and  hidden  vileness  lay  in 
her;"  that  "noble,  patient,  deep,  pious,  and  solid  Germany 
should  become  Queen  of  the  Continent."4  The  Globe  re- 
gretted that  the  sage  of  Chelsea  had  grown  unjust  and  ill- 
ogical in  his  retirement.5  The  Spectator  marvelled  that  he 
advised  as  panacea  for  European  ills,  an  enforcement  of  the 
law  of  retaliation.6     The  Standard  was  stung  to  the  quick 

1  Globe  and  Traveller,  Nov.  22,  1870. 
1  Evening  Mail,  Nov.  22,  1870. 
3  Nov.  letters  to  Times. 

*  Letter  to  Times,  Nov.  18,  1870. 
5  Globe,  Nov.  18,  1870. 

*  Spectator,  Nov.  19,  1870. 


252      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [2$2 

by  his  derision  of  the  "  cheap  pity  and  newspaper  lamenta- 
tion over  fallen  and  afflicted  France."  It  advised  Carlyle 
that  mercy  would  better  become  him  than  the  singing  of 
hosannahs  to  the  God  of  Vengeance  who  armed  the  Prus- 
sian hosts.1  Even  the  News,  which  condoned  passion  and 
exultation  as  excusable  on  the  part  of  a  nation  that  was 
victorious,  regretted  that  he  had  so  distorted  facts  as  to 
make  Prussia  appear  the  victorious  innocent  and  France 
the  deceitful  villain  of  a  Surrey  melodrama.2 

Certain  it  is  that  the  vigour  of  his  convictions  had  led 
Carlyle  to  hymn  his  praise  and  chant  his  hate  on  a  most 
inopportune  occasion.  The  Gortchakoff  Circular  had 
brought  home  to  England  the  danger  of  having  France  be- 
come a  Power  of  the  second  rank.  Even  those  who  be- 
lieved that  Prussia  had  not  been  an  accomplice  in  the  Rus- 
sian plan,  still  said  that  no  single  signatory  of  the  treaty 
would  have  dared  its  repudiation  had  France  been  able  to 
join  England  in  resistance.  The  press  became  adept  at 
discovering  chances  for  French  success.  "Who  counsels 
submission  now?"  asked  Pall  Mall  in  the  last  week  of 
November.  "  Who  speaks  today  of  the  folly  and  wicked- 
ness of  not  giving  in?  "  The  News,  which  once  had  admin- 
istered discouraging  counsel  to  France,  "in  epigram  in 
the  smart  manner,"  was  now  commending  her  for  efforts 
which  deserved  success.  Gambetta,  it  found,  had  acted  with 
wonderful  energy  and  decision.  He  had  roused  all  of 
France,  made  generals  and  organized  armies.  He  was 
about  to  make  the  Prussians  feel  they  had  made  a  mistake 
in  marching  on  Paris  without  having  reduced  the  prov- 
inces. The  Telegraph,  which  Pall  Mall  described  as  having 
tearfully  advised  submission,  while  its  great  heart  throbbed 
in  agony  and  delighted  in  each  throb,  conceded  that  "the 

1  Standard,  Nov.  19,  1870. 
1  Daily  News,  Dec.  14,  1870. 


253]  A  STROKE  FROM  THE  BEAR  253 

predictions  of  the  wise  had  never  been  so  signally  falsified  as 
during  the  present  war."  As  for  the  Times,  it  had  ceased 
to  warn  France  "  in  the  words  of  Omniscence  and  in  the 
voice  of  Fate."  l  It  now  professed  events  to  be  so  doubtful 
as  to  admit  of  some  discussion  as  to  how  the  balance  ulti- 
mately would  incline.  Men  believe  largely  what  they  wish 
to  believe.  In  late  November  there  was  good  reason  to 
wish  that  Gambetta,  who  was  "  displaying  the  energy  of  a 
Jacobin  and  the  self  restraint  of  an  English  Cabinet  Min- 
ister," 2  might  yet  expel  the  Prussians,  or,  at  least,  conclude 
an  honourable  peace. 

Every  kind  of  effort  made  now  by  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment received  encouragement.  England  read  sympatheti- 
cally a  pamphlet  by  a  certain  M.  Renouf,  which  it  was  un- 
derstood had  been  inspired  by  Thiers,  She  was  in  no 
mood  to  cavil  at  the  accusations  it  made  against  Bismarck 
or  the  Government  of  the  Empire.3  The  official  protest 
against  German  atrocities,  published  by  Chaudordy  on  the 
twenty-ninth,  could  not  have  been  issued  at  a  time  more  op- 
portune. Its  authenticated  lists  of  instances  of  violence 
would  have  caused  horror  at  any  time,  but  a  present  griev- 
ance against  Prussia  somewhat  prolonged  the  shudder.4  It 
was  fitting  that  England  should  grieve  over  the  bruises  of  a 
broken  reed  when  she  needed  to  rejoice  in  the  strength  of 
an  ally. 

On  the  day  before  the  Chaudordy  Circular  was  published, 
Granville  was  instructing  Lyons  to  use  all  his  influence  to 
obtain  the  assent  of  France  to  the  proposed  Conference. 
He  was  to  point  out  that  it  was  a  great  step  for  the  Pro- 
visional Government  that   Prussia  had  asked  England  to 

1  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Nov.  24,  1870. 

*  Spectator,  Nov.  19,  1870. 

3  Resume  of  pamphlet  in  Saturday  Review,  Nov.  26,  1870. 

♦Paul  Deschanel,  Gambetta  (N.  Y.,  1920),  pp.  117-118. 


254      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [254 

exert  her  good  offices  in  this.1  On  the  night  of  the  thirtieth 
all  London  was  in  gloom  because  it  was  believed  that  Paris 
had  capitulated.2  She  had  not.  Her  armies  had  even  taken 
Brie  and  Champigny,  but  imperfect  communication  between 
the  capital  and  Tours  had  caused  the  sortie  to  fail.  On 
the  second  of  December,  the  Parisian  Army  was  forced  to 
retreat.  Its  efforts  had  resulted  disastrously  and  had  af- 
forded, too,  a  pretext  for  Prussia  to  end  the  negotiations 
that  Thiers  was  conducting  for  the  Government  of  Tours. 

Had  the  sortie  been  successful,  or  had  France  won  one 
other  such  victory  as  that  of  Orleans,  the  shift  in  the 
sympathy  of  the  Times  and  the  News  might  have  been  fol- 
lowed by  a  recognition  of  the  Republic.  But  so  quickly  did 
disaster  follow  on  the  brief  success  of  late  November  that 
within  a  fortnight  Orleans  was  lost  and  the  Tours  Gov- 
ernment was  forced  to  take  refuge  in  Bordeaux. 

The  Government  of  its  enemy  had  never  been 
stronger.  British  papers  carried  news  of  the  opening  of 
the  German  Parliament.  King  William  had  come  before  it 
with  the  grateful  announcement  that  Baden  and  Hesse 
Darmstadt  had  become  states  of  the  Confederation;  that 
the  accession  of  Wurttemberg  had  been  definitely  arranged, 
and  that  of  Bavaria  was  soon  to  be  expected.  His  state- 
ment that  the  war  would  be  prosecuted  until  necessary 
frontiers  were  gained  had  received  hearty  approbation.3 
He  had  spoken  as  a  conqueror.  It  might  be  expected  that 
the  delegate  he  would  send  in  the  succeeding  month  to 
London  would  come  as  the  envoy  of  a  conqueror.  The 
energy  of  Gambetta  and  the  victory  of  Aurelles  de  Paladin 
had  encouraged  England  for  a  space  to  hope  that  she  might 
have  the  support  of  the  ally  who  had  helped  her  exact  from 

1  Newton,  Life  of  Lord  Lyons,  vol.  ii,  p.  34°. 

*  Times,  Dec.  1,  1870. 

3  Daily  News  and  Saturday  Review,  Nov.  26,  1870. 


255]  A  STR0KE  FROM  THE  BEAR  255 

Russia  provisions  which  were  become  a  subject  for  discus- 
sion. It  was  feared  now  that,  even  were  France  repre- 
sented, her  envoy  would  have  no  more  weight  than  a  shadow 
on  the  wall.  "  We  must  vail  our  proud  tops,"  wrote  Sir 
James  Hudson.  Sir  Robert  Morier  assented.  People 
asked  him,  he  said,  with  a  sort  of  pitying  condescension  if 
he  were  an  Englishman.1  At  Vienna  Mr.  Lytton  inveighed 
against  the  "  hen  hearted  and  pin  headed  Cabinet "  that 
made  its  agents  ridiculous,  and  negatived  every  idea  of 
carrying  out  a  consecutive  foreign  policy. 

1  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robt.  Morier,  vol.  ii,  p.  210. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

Anarchic  December 

The  delayed  publication,  eary  in  December,  of  Gortcha- 
koff's  second  note,  from  which  the  Government  had  osten- 
sibly derived  much  comfort,  was  a  revelation  to  the  British 
public  of  how  easily  a  Manchester  Ministry  could  be  satis- 
fied.1 Russia,  in  her  reply,  no  more  than  signified  a  willing- 
ness to  join  in  a  deliberation  having  for  its  object  the  settle- 
ment of  guarantees  for  the  consolidation  of  peace  in  the  East, 
making  no  retraction  of  her  previous  assertion  that  she  no 
longer  considered  herself  bound  by  the  Black  Sea  clauses 
of  the  treaty  of  1856.  As  excuse  for  her  precipitate  and 
irregular  conduct,  she  mentioned  the  absence  of  a  regular 
government  in  France,  which  postponed  the  possibility  of 
the  treaty's  modification  by  a  conference.2  Many  believed 
wjth  the  Standard  that  Gortchakoff,  had  he  wished  to  be 
frank,  might  have  added  that  it  was  this  lack  and  the  as- 
sured friendliness  of  Prussia  which  had  enabled  him  to 
take  the  law  into  his  own  hands.3  More  was  suspected  than 
was  known,  for  the  Foreign  Office  held  back  the  fact  that 
Bismarck  had  refused  to  accede  to  a  tripartite  agreement, 
guaranteeing  the  Treaty  of  1856,  the  provisions  of  which 

1  "  In  keeping  back  the  publication  of  Prince  Gortchakoff's  reply  to 
Lord  Granville.  The  Government  secured  a  substantial  advantage.  .  .  . 
If  the  tenor  of  the  St.  Petersburg  despatch  had  been  made  public  while 
the  issue  of  peace  or  war  still  seemed  doubtful,  it  would  have  evoked 
an  outburst  of  feeling  which  must  have  materially  impaired  any  pros- 
pect of  a  pacific  solution."    Daily  Telegraph,  Dec.  3,  1870. 

2  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Dec.  6,  1870;  Spectator,  Dec.  3,  1870. 

3  Standard,  Dec.  6,  1870;  Nation,  Dec.  10,  1870. 

256  [256 


25/]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  257 

would  have  stopped  at  once  the  irregular  action  of  Russia.1 
But  the  simple  fact  that  the  note  was  implicitly  a  reaffirma- 
tion rather  than  a  denial  of  Russia's  previously  expressed 
intentions,  went  far  to  strengthen  the  suspicion  of  Prussian 
connivance.2 

More  than  ever,  men  were  eager  that  France  be  present  at 
the  council  board.3  The  matter,  it  was  conceded,  presented 
difficulties.  The  French  government  had  not  won  the  re- 
cognition of  any  of  the  signatories  of  the  treaty  about  to  be 
discussed.  In  the  society  of  European  states  she  was  classed 
as  an  illegal  power  that  could  send  only  an  unauthorized 
representative.  There  was  prevalent  an  idea,  said  the 
Spectator,  that,  though  kings  and  emperors  might  be  re- 
cognized offhand  as  persons  naturally  entitled  to  rule,  re- 
publics should  be  officially  ignored  until  legalized  by  a  vote. 
Still,  in  a  matter  of  extremity,  it  expressed  the  hope  that 
the  aristocratic  Secretary  who  presided  at  No.  10,  Down- 
ing Street,  might  not  sacrifice  an  alliance  for  the  sake  of 
a  bit  of  diplomatic  etiquette.4  When  it  became  known  that 
the  Cabinet  had  decided  to  break  the  monotony  of  reading 
of  French  defeats  by  taking  its  holidays,  men  realized  punc- 
tilio was  still  to  be  observed.  The  exodus  of  the  Ministers 
from  the  capital,  however,  did  not  serve  to  advance  any 
belief  in  the  placid  and  pleasant  future  of  a  country  that 
was  being  placidly  and  pleasantly  governed  while  Europe 
was  involving  itself  in  a  veritable  maelstrom.  Editors, 
who  had  no  time  to  indulge  in  "  the  usual  round  of  Christ- 

1  Odo  Russell  to  Granville,  Dec.  18,  1870,  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Lord 
Granville,  vol.  ii,  p.  74. 

2  Saunders',  Dec.  5,  1870 ;  Illustrated  London  News,  Dec.  3,  1870. 
For  account  of  meeting  of  Emperor  of  Russia  and  King  William  at 
Ems  in  June,  1870,  see  Capt.  Edward  Prim,  War  Chronicle  of  1870 
(London,  1871). 

3  Standard,  Dec.  1,  1870;  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Jan.  24,  1871. 

4  Spectator,  Dec.  3,  1870. 


258      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [258 

mas  entertainments,"  found  it  more  than  ever  pleasurable  to 
criticize  the  Government  for  its  impassivity. 

"  Driftwood  politicians,"  they  were  called,  "  with  no 
strong,  stern,  proud  principles  to  guide  them,"  spun  round 
and  round  by  the  tempest  of  the  war,  insanely  watching  the 
play  of  a  Russian  nor'easter,  and  liking  it.1  Some  day, 
warned  the  Court  Gazette,  the  Prussian  Empire  would 
strike  a  blow  to  support  itself  by  war,  and  "  five  hundred 
Cobdens  arrayed  in  voluminous  speech"  could  not  con- 
vince an  Englishman  of  common  sense  that  the  dangerous 
time  should  not  be  prepared  for.2  From  nowhere  did  they 
receive  so  scathing  an  indictment  as  from  the  dignified  pages 
of  the  Gentleman's  Magazine.  That  publication  was  most 
heartily  fatigued  at  the  "  so-called  policy  of  peace  inaugur- 
ated by  Quaker  platitudes  at  Christian  tea  meetings."  The 
principles  of  the  Bright  and  Gladstone  school  were  highly 
moral, — more,  they  were  angelic — "based  on  the  holiest 
ami  best  aspirations  of  a  virtuous  people.  If  they  had 
angels  to  deal  with,  angels  for  subjects,  angels  for  neigh- 
bors, angels  for  allies,  angels  for  foes — an  angelic  policy  of 
liberty,  love  and  mutual  trust  would  be  in  perfect  order." 
But  England,  it  reminded  its  readers,  was  possessed  of  five 
hundred  million  square  miles  of  territory  in  all  parts  of  the 
world.  It  could  not  be  governed  by  the  principles  of  Mr. 
Bright's  carpet  warehouse,  even  when  embellished  by  the 
sophistries  of  Lowe,  and  sweetened  by  the  economics  of  the 
"  noble  Savage."  The  mission  of  England  was  to  stand 
between  the  contending  nations  of  Europe  and  it  had  shame- 
fully forsaken  it,  due  to  the  pretty  moral  notions  of  "  sugar 
and  carpet  philosophers."  3 

1  Imperial  Federation  in  Contemporary  Review,  Dec.,  1870. 

2  Court  Gazette,  Dec.  10,  1870. 

3  Russia's  Gage  of  Battle  in  Gentleman's  Magazine,  Dec,  1870,  vol. 
vi,  pp.  105  et  seq. 


259]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  2$Q 

Their  own  dissatisfaction  induced  the  English  to  contem- 
plate with  a  certain  degree  of  pleasure  the  difficulties  that 
were  being  experienced  in  a  country  which  they  were  be- 
ginning to  regard  with  disfavour.  It  had  been  believed 
at  first  that  a  parliament  had  been  elected  in  Germany 
wholly  to  Count  Bismarck's  liking.  But,  though  Dr.  Jacoby 
had  been  defeated  because  of  his  opposition  to  the  an- 
nexation of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,1  it  was  apparent  from 
a  debate  on  the  war  that  the  Government  had  still  to  en- 
counter open  opposition.  Four  of  the  Socialist  deputies 
braved  the  anger  of  their  colleagues  by  pleading  that 
moderation  be  shown  to  France.  They  were  silenced,  and 
men  cried  out  that  their  bones  should  be  broken.2  But  in 
the  extreme  Left  of  the  Socialist  Party  there  were  many 
to  echo  their  denunciation  of  the  annexation.  On  the  tenth 
of  December  the  question  of  transforming  the  German 
Confederation  into  an  Empire  provoked  further  opposition. 
Six  of  the  party  voted  against  the  change,  and  refused  to 
accede  to  the  proposal  to  make  the  Prussian  King  an  Em- 
peror. Two  of  these  recalcitrants,  Herr  Liebknecht  and 
Herr  Bebel,  were,  within  a  few  days,  arrested,  though  their 
adverse  vote  was  not  assigned  as  the  cause  of  their  arrest. 
They  had  signed  a  manifesto,  issued  from  Brunswick  by 
the  leaders  of  the  party,  opposing  annexation,  and  this  was1 
supposed  to  be  the  basis  for  the  charge  of  treason.3  A 
popular  democratic  journal  that  questioned  the  right  of 
their  arrest  was  immediately  seized  in  Berlin.  "  Whatever 
King  William  and  his  great  Minister  may  be,"  said  the 
Economist,  "  the  last  thing  one  would  accuse  them  of 
being  is  Liberal."  4     The  Reuter  News  Agency,  which  re- 

1  Spectator,  Nov.  19,  1870. 

1  Ibid.,  Dec.  3,  1870. 

3  Manchester  Guardian,  Dec.  21,  1870,  Spectator,  Dec.  24,  1870 ;  Daily 
Telegraph,  Dec.  22,  1870. 

*  Economist,  Dec.  24,  1870. 


26o      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [260 

ceived  its  information  from  the  German  firm  of  Wolff, 
transmitted  no  news  of  these  events  to  London.  This,  ac- 
cording to  the  Telegraph,  was  because  the  German  com- 
pany, in  this  instance,  was  forbidden  the  right  of  publica- 
tion.1 Why  the  offense  of  the  deputies  should  have  been 
described  as  high  treason  was  a  matter  which  the  enterpris- 
ing correspondent  of  the  Telegraph,  who  first  had  gotten 
the  news  to  England,  could  not  explain.  Long  afterward 
it  was  revealed  that  the  severe  charge  had  been  made  be- 
cause the  Marxists,  Bebel  and  Liebknecht,  were  found  to 
have  been  attempting  to  organize  a  rising  in  Berlin,  and  had 
opened  negotiations  to  that  end  with  the  Lassalle  branch  of 
the  Socialist  Party.2  Their  imprisonment  prevented  them 
from  embarking  on  an  enterprise  which  would  have  been 
impotent,  except  for  the  advertisement  it  would  have  given 
abroad,  that  there  existed  a  German  party  recklessly  op- 
posed to  the  Government's  aims. 

In  Alsace  itself  the  conquerors  showed  themselves  equally 
strong  and  ready  to  crush  incipient  revolt.  Those  natives 
who  expressed  too  loudly  their  discontent  at  being  "  reun- 
ited," were  punished  by  courts  martial.  In  retaliation  the 
Alsatians,  who  before  had  spoken  a  patois,  now  spoke 
French.3  Lord  Lyons  wrote  his  chief  that  he  did  not 
wonder  at  the  increase  of  irritation  against  the  Germans. 
But  it  was  somewhat  illogical  that  Germany  should  show 
herself  angry  at  not  being  loved,  and  resolve  to  have  it  out 
on  France  while  she  was  weak.4  None  but  a  German,  said 
the  Spectator,  would  chasten  a  people  under  invasion  for 

1  Daily  Telegraph,  Dec.  23,  1870. 

3  Life  of  H.  M.  Hyndman  (New  York,  1911),  pp.  391-393- 

3  Spectator,  Dec.  24,  1870. 

4  Lyons  to  Granville,  Dec.  26,  1870,  Newton,  Life  of  Lord  Lyons, 
vol.  ii,  pp.  15-16. 


26 1  ]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  26 1 

expressing  their  displeasure,  and  expect  to  have  his  hand 
kissed  while  he  did  it.1 

Not  content  with  pointing  out  her  misdeeds  to  Germany, 
manv  British  continued  to  accuse  their  own  Government  of 
being  criminally  negligent  in  taking  no  steps  to  prevent 
them.  The  erection  of  terrorism  into  a  system  was  mak- 
ing it  more  and  more  apparent  that  European  peace  and 
progress  were  not  to  come  from  Bismarckism.  Freeman  and 
Carlyle  might  insist  that  military  success  led  to  German 
unity — a  blessing  for  civilization,  but  in  spite  of  such  emin- 
ent opinion,  the  party  grew  that  believed  the  outcome  of 
Prussian  victories  meant  no  more  than  the  imperial  magni- 
fying of  a  feudal  lord. 

It  was  Frederic  Harrison's  wish  to  crystallize  this  discon- 
tent into  a  demand  for  active  intervention.2  Paris  still  held 
out,  and  he  hoped  that  by  popular  demand  the  British  Par- 
liament might  reconvene  before  she  was  won  to  a  surrender. 
His  article  on  Bismarckism  in  the  Fortnightlly  had  roused 
widespread  discussion.  For  the  most  part  it  had  been  com- 
mended. It  was  doubted,  though,  if  its  author  could  suc- 
ceed in  his  honourable  endeavour  to  combine  the  foreign 
policy  of  Chatham  with  national  armaments  small  enough 
to  be  carried  in  a  carpetbag.  It  seemed  anomalous  that  a 
plea  for  intervention  should  be  coupled  with  a  plea  against 
the  increase  of  the  British  army.3  Could  the  balance  of 
power  be  maintained  by  the  protocols  of  a  Government  that 
foreign  diplomats  believed  had  turned  their  bullets  into 
ledgers?  But  Mr.  Harrison  was  loath  for  England  to 
import  the  ideals  of  Prussia.4     He  condemned  with  fiery 

1  Spectator,  Dec.  24,  1870. 

*  Fred   Harrison,    Autobiographic  Memoirs    (London,    1911),   vol.   ii. 
P-  3- 
8  Manchester  Guardian,  Dec.  6,  1870. 
4  Standard,  Dec.  10,  1870. 


262      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [262 

eloquence  the  "swordsman's  jargon  and  garrison  cant" 
that  were  employed  to  disguise  the  professional  lust  of 
her  strategists.  His  series  of  letters,  that  began  with  the 
group  published  in  Pall  Mall  early  in  December,1  showed 
him  to  be  strong-sinewed — capable  of  wielding  a  battle  axe 
as  ably  as  the  "  Sage  of  Chelsea."  He  had  the  knack,  as 
the  Echo  said,  of  sending  an  ugly  epithet  at  the  head  of  an 
antagonist  with  the  force  of  a  brickbat ; 2  the  capacity,  said 
the  Spectator,  of  good  honest  hating  that  was  veritably 
Christian,  because  the  enjoyment  it  produced  was  so  great 
that  one  had  to  love  the  enemy  who  had  occasioned  it.s 
For  all  that,  'he  was  not  the  man  to  bring  public  opinion  to 
the  point  of  intervention.  The  Conservatives  were  of- 
fended by  his  hostility  to  national  armaments  and  his  af- 
fection for  Republicanism.*  The  Whigs  were  wearied 
by  his  stress  on  the  international  duties  which  he  believed  de- 
volved on  England.8 

Proofs,  however,  of  his  charges  of  imperialism  against 
Germany  continued  to  appear.  On  December  the  tenth 
the  Spectator  recorded  the  petition  of  Bremen  to  the  Ger- 
man Parliament  that  it  obtain  the  King's  consent  to  a  de- 
mand for  the  cession  of  French  Cochin  China.  The  prospect 
that  Pondicherry  and  Chandemagore  might  also  become 
Prussian  was  disquieting.  It  was  not  to  be  expected  the 
new  Empire  would,  in  India,  prove  so  easy  a  neighbour  as 
France  had  been.  She  might  attempt  to  invade  England's 
monopoly  of  the  growth  of  opium  and  the  sale  of  salt. 
She  might  reject  the  principle  France  had  adhered  to  of  re- 
fusing aid  to  native  Powers  that  dared  revolt.     One  may 

1  Fred.  Harrison,  op.  cit..  vol.  ii,  pp.  3"4- 

*  Echo,  Dec.  9,  1870. 

s  Spectator,  Dfc.  10,  1870. 

'Standard,  Dec.  10;  Illustrated  London  News,  Dec.  10,  1870. 

*  Fred.  Harrison,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  10-12. 


2g3]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  263 

presume  the  India  House  was  pleased  when  the  German 
Parliament  decided  to  postpone  dividing  the  bear's  skin 
until  the  animal  showed  itself  less  lively. 

This  evidence  of  a  Prussian  regard  for  the  fitness  of 
things  was  counterbalanced,  however,  when  on  the  same 
day  that  the  Spectator  commended  the  decision  against  de- 
manding Cochin  China,  the  Globe  announced  that  Prussia 
had  repudiated  the  Treaty  of  1867,  which  guaranteed  the 
neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  Even  Mr.  Mill,  with  his  ad- 
vanced ideas  about  the  limitations  of  treaties,  it  was  thought, 
might  find  the  pace  becoming  over-rapid.  Two  days  before 
this,  it  had  been  reported  by  Pall  Mall  that  Bismarck  was 
negotiating  with  the  King  of  Holland  for  the  duchy's 
cession.1  The  announcement  of  the  Independance  Beige, 
on  which  the  Globe  based  its  warning,  was  more  alarming 
and  was  rumoured  to  have  been  confirmed  by  a  circular  sent 
to  Count  von  Bernstorff.  Prussia,  it  was  claimed,  due  to 
Luxemburg's  disregard  for  the  obligations  of  neutrality, 
declared  herself  absolved  from  further  observation  of  the 
Treaty  of  London.2  The  fact  that  the  little  country  that 
had  angered  Prussia  rested  its  safety  on  a  guarantee  which 
was  collective,  freed  England,  said  the  News  and  the  Re- 
cord, from  obligation  the  moment  the  treaty  was  denounced 
by  another  of  its  signatories.3  Nevertheless,  it  was  ad- 
mitted that  it  would  be  dangerous  to  condone  the  repudia- 
tion by  a  single  Power  of  a  treaty  that  had  been  signed  in 
concert.*  The  case  against  Prussia  seemed  darker  when  it 
was  remembered  that  the  treaty  had  been  signed  four  years 

1  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Dec.  18,  1870. 

*  Times,  Dec.  14,  1870. 

8  Issues  of  Dec.  13,  14,  respectively. 

*  Standard,  Dec.   13;    Weekly  Freeman,   Dec.   17,   1870;   Daily  Tele- 
graph, Dec.  14,  1870. 


264      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [264 

before  primarily  on  her  solicitation.  That  the  treaty's 
violation  invoked  collective  action,  or  none  at  all,  was  denied 
by  many,  who  declared  the  opinions  of  Derby  and  Stanley 
to  that  effect  had  been  no  more  than  posterior  declarations 
and  could  in  no  way  retroactively  invalidate  the  individual 
obligation.  For  only  in  one  clause  was  the  guarantee 
spoken  of  as  being  collective.  No  action,  however,  it  was 
conceded,  was  incumbent  on  a  guarantor  until  it  was  re- 
quested by  the  King  of  Holland.  While  his  representations! 
were  awaited,  England  indulged  in  arguments  as  to  how 
far  she  was  obligated  to  render  him  assistance. 

So  little  was  the  Cabinet  trusted  that  Pall  Mall  reported, 
as  current,  a  rumour  that  the  Prussian  annexation  had  been 
agreed  to  by  the  Government  in  consideration  of  the  aban- 
donment of  designs  on  Lorraine.1  Amazing  as  such  an 
agreement  would  have  been,  however,  it  is  even  more  amaz- 
ing to  find  that  this  very  scheme  had  been  advocated  two 
months  before  by  a  journal  that  now  was  most  vociferous  in 
urging  Luxemburg's  protection.  It  was  the  Standard  that 
on  October  the  twentieth  had  suggested  that  if  Prussia  could 
not  content  herself  with  increase  of  territory,  an  equivalent 
might  be  found  for  Alsace  and  Lorraine  by  the  annexation 
of  Luxemburg.  On  the  same  day  the  Sun  had  remarked  that 
"  upon  certain  conditions  the  annexation  of  Luxemburg  ta 
Prussia  might  be  a  laudable  and  satisfactory  procedure,  and 
the  powers  might  wisely  wink  at  the  setting  aside  of  the 
treaty  in  order  to  facilitate  the  arrangement." 

On  the  fourteenth  of  December,  the  Telegraph  gave  out, 
for  what  it  was  worth,  a  statement  that  Luxemburg  already 
had  been  occupied  by  Prussian  troops.  Very  soon,  the  news 
was  found  to  have  been  false.  But  England  was  uneasily 
conscious  that,  had  it  been  true,  it  was  doubtful  whether  her 

1  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Dec.  14,  1870. 


265]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  265 

Government  would  have  done  anything  further  than  to  split 
hairs  and  to  resort  to  the  "  complete  letter  writer  "  style  of 
condonement  of  the  offense.  The  Morning  Advertiser  cried 
out  for  on  hour  of  Henry  the  Eighth,  of  Cromwell,  or  of 
Pitt.1  The  country  was  very  weary  of  having  its  pride 
poulticed  with  politely  worded  remonstrances.  The  simi- 
larity of  Bismarck's  denunciation  of  the  treaty  of  1867  to 
Gortchakoff's  repudiation  of  the  treaty  of  1856  was 
alarmingly  convincing  of  the  disrespect  with  which  the 
leader  of  the  League  of  Neutrals  had  come  to  be  regarded.2 
England  writhed  at  having  to  receive,  so  soon,  a  second  les- 
son in  the  practices  of  the  new  militarism.  Sounders' 
voiced  the  sentiment  of  practically  all  the  press  when  it  be- 
wailed the  fact  that  confidence  was  overthrown,  and  the 
only  security  against  aggression  henceforth  would  be  in 
bayonets  and  ordnance.3  The  Times  believed  that  British 
connivance  at  Bismarck's  pretensions  in  regard  to  Luxem- 
burg would  be  fatal  to  the  good  faith  of  international  agree- 
ments and  result  in  a  succession  of  internecine  contests  to 
test  out  the  military  strength  of  nations.4 

Sir  Robert  Morier  named,  as  the  more  immediate  effect 
of  Prussia's  action,  the  restoration  of  Louis  Napoleon  with 
the  gift  of  the  French  portion  of  Belgium  to  buy  him  a  wel- 
come. In  return,  he  said  Germany  would  expect  what  was 
left  of  Belgium  together  with  Luxemburg  and  Holland.5 
An  argument  for  some  such  plan  was  adduced  by  a  few 
from  the  fact  that  Germany  had  made  public  certain  des- 
patches  found  at   St.  Cloud   which   showed  the   Emperor 

1  Dec  14,  1870. 

2  Times  and  Daily  Telegraph,  Dec.  15,  1870. 
'Saunders',  Dec.  19,  1870. 

4  Times,   Dec.   16,   1870;  see  also  Illustrated  London  Ne7vs,   Dec.   17, 
1870. 

5  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robert  Morier,  pp.  238-239. 


266      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [266 

to  have  received  the  assurance  of  support  in  the  war  from 
all  the  local  authorities.1  But  whether  this  was  an  attempt 
to  rehabilitate  the  Emperor  or  to  increase  Prussian  hatred 
against  the  French  nation  was,  certainly,  open  to  debate. 
The  News  recorded  a  rumour  that  Bismarck  was  conspiring 
to  use  the  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  prisoners  he 
held  in  Germany  to  effect  an  Imperial  restoration.  As  a 
basis  for  suspicion  it  cited  the  publication  at  Cassel  of  a 
pamphlet  which  the  Allgemeine  Zeitung  declared  was  in- 
tended to  influence  Germany  to  a  tender  regard  for  the 
Emperor.  The  British  paper  noted,  too,  that  those  Im- 
perial panegyrics  which  had  been  appearing  in  London  in 
La  Situation  had  been  copied  with  approval  into  the  organ 
of  the  Prussian  Government  at  Versailles.2  Enough  of 
gossip  there  was  to  cause  "  someone  higher  up,"  for  whose 
reliability  the  Times  stood  sponsor,  to  insert  in  that  paper  a 
denial  that  any  intrigue  was  being  furthered  by  help  from 
the  Empress  at  Chislehurst.3  London  Society,  believing 
that  if  plots  were  abrewing,  England  should  make  her  pre- 
ference known,  advocated  the  Orleanists,  and  a  return  of 
the  Comte  de  Paris.  The  Tablet,  just  as  emphatically, 
espoused  the  claims  of  the  Comte  de  Chambord.4  Napoleon, 
with  Luxemburg  as  lagnappe,  had  no  backers. 

Whether  the  Luxemburg  affair  was  the  symptom  of  a  de- 
sign somewhat  deeper  or  an  excrescence  caused  by  irri- 
tation at  the  overlong  endurance  of  France,  it  remains  a 
mystery  why  Bismarck  should  have  declared  in  his  Circular 
that  his  Government  no  longer  could  consider  itself  bound 
to  any  consideration  for  the  Grand  Duchy's  neutrality,  if  he 

1  Saturday  Review,  Dec.  10,  1870. 
*  Daily  News,  Dec.  30,  1870. 

s  Times,  Dec.  26,   1870;   see  also  Illustrated  London  News,  Dec  31, 
1870. 
'London  Society,  Dec.,  1870;  Tablet,  Sept.  17,  Oct.  22,   1870. 


267]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  267 

only  meant  (as  he  claimed  later)  x  to  take  precautionary 
measures  of  defence  against  military  injury,  and  had  no  in- 
tention of  denouncing  the  treaty  of  1867.  The  matter  ap- 
pears more  obscure  when  it  is  noted  that  this  pleasing  inter- 
pretation of  a  distinctly  contrary  declaration  was  not  com- 
municated to  Granville  by  Bernstorff  until  the  second  week 
of  February,  more  than  two  months  after  the  date  of  the 
disturbing  Circular.  Strangely  enough,  however,  when 
the  Circular  was  published  by  the  British  journals  on  the 
twenty-first  of  December,  it  was  regarded  by  the  public  as 
much  less  alarming  than  rumour  had  represented  it.2 

In  spite  of  its  distinct  repudiation  of  any  further  regard 
for  Luxemburg's  neutrality,  many  of  the  British  papers 
viewed  it  as'  no  more  than  a  minatory  declaration  designed 
to  frighten  the  little  Duchy  into  good  behavior.  The  News? 
pretended  such  chagrin  at  its  countrymen's  lapse  from  pas- 
sivity that  it  expressed  the  hope  that  public  opinion  would 
render  an  apology  to  the  falsely  suspected  Chancellor.3 
Officially,  England  had  shown  no  agitation,  and  the  public, 
while  not  going  to  the  length  advised  by  the  News,  gradually 
became   less   vociferous. 

While  excitement  over  the  affair  was  at  its  height,  M. 
Reitlinger,  the  friend  and  private  secretary  of  Jules  Favre, 
was  granted  an  interview  by  Granville  and  a  little  later  by 
the  Premier.  Reitlinger  had  come  from  Vienna,  where 
Count  Beust  had  authorized  him  to  say  that  "  if  England 
wished  effectively  to  intervene  with  the  object  of  obtain- 
ing honourable  conditions  of  peace  for  France,  England 
would  not  be  alone,  and  Austria  would  go  with  her." 
Reitlinger  shrewdly  believed  that,   though   the  offer  had 

1  Graphic,  Jan.  21,  1871. 

2  Manchester  Guardian,  Dec.  21,  1870,  was  the  first  British  paper  to 
carry  Bismarck's  dispatch. 

5  Daily  Nezvs,  Dec.  24,  1870. 


268      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [268 

been  made  in  good  faith,  it  had  been  made  in  the  belief  that 
England  would  hold  aloof.  His  interview  with  Granville 
showed  that  Beust  had  been  safe  in  his  assumption.  There 
was  praise  for  French  "  elasticity,"  'but  a  rebuke  for  the 
temerity  the  Provisional  Government  had  shown  in  having 
broken  off  the  armistice  negotiations.  Lord  Granville  gave 
a  sympathetic  exposition  of  the  difficulties  that  confronted 
Prussia  because  of  the  lack  of  a  de  jure  government  in 
France.  He  advised  several  ingenious,  though  impractic- 
able, means  of  obtaining  this  and  hinted  that,  were  it  not 
soon  forthcoming,  Favre  and  his  associates  might  incur  the 
responsibility  of  occasioning  an  Imperial  restoration.  In 
the  matter  of  obtaining  an  armistice  Granville's  advice  was 
that  France  address  herself  directly  to  Versailles,  though  he 
had  no  information  as  to  whether  or  not  the  Prussians  were 
inclined  to  negotiate,  and  would  not  promise  England's  good 
offices  in  the  matter. 

In  short,  M.  Reitlinger  encountered  in  London,  as  he  had 
elsewhere,  "  an  unmeasured  fear  of  being  exposed  and  com- 
promised." Lord  Granville  assured  him  that  the  Cabinet's' 
cautious  policy  had  the  approval  of  the  nation.  Among  the 
military,  he  admitted,  there  was  a  professional  desire  for 
war,  and  among  the  working  class  there  were  many  who 
favored  it;  but  for  the  rest,  their  ideas  differed  according 
to  their  political  opinions,  and  there  was  no  programme  on 
which  they  wished  to  unite.  The  most  confortable  words 
the  Minister  permitted  himself  to  utter  was  an  intimation 
that,  when  the  terms  of  peace  came  to  be  discussed,  England 
would  consider  the  time  more  favorable  for  intervention. 

Gladstone,  when  interviewed  at  Hawarden  Castle  where 
he  was  spending  the  holidays,  went  a  little  further  and  said 
that  England  would  not  agree  to  any  territorial  cession. 
"  All  he  meant,"  said  Reitlinger,  "  was  simply  that  England 
did  not  approve  of  Prussian  annexation  of  the  two  pro- 


26q]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  269 

vinces,  but  that  she  could  do  nothing  to  stop  it."  After 
this  revelation  the  Frenchman  was  very  eager  to  make  his 
way  back  to  Paris  and  explain  away  the  illusions  that  existed 
there  as  to  an  intervention.  To  this  end,  Granville  at- 
tempted to  get  a  safe  conduct  for  him  from  von  Bernstorff, 
but  the  request  was  refused.1 

Perhaps  the  disappointment  of  the  French  envoy  led  him 
to  underestimate  the  Premier's  declaration.  On  the  tenth  of 
December,  Gladstone  had  written  Granville  that  he  regretted 
not  having  indicated  England's  opinion  on  the  question 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  when  the  opportunity  for  doing  so 
had  been  auspicious.  He  wished  that  the  Cabinet  might  ar- 
rive at  an  agreement  on  the  subject  before  it  came  up  in  a 
practical  form.  As  for  himself  he  said,  "I  have  an  appre- 
hension that  this  violent  laceration  and  transfer  is  to  lead 
us  from  bad  to  worse,  and  to  be  the  beginning  of  a  new 
series  of  European  complications."  2 

No  hint  of  the  Reitlinger  visit  appears  in  the  press.  While 
he  was  in  London,  the  conditional  promise  he  had  won  at 
Vienna  was  negatived  by  certain  proposals  of  Bismarck's, 
which  promised  Austria  more  solid  advantage.3  Lever,  the 
British  consul  at  Trieste,  though  he  knew  nothing  of  these 
negotiations,  wrote  that  England,  in  the  event  of  war  with 
Russia,  need  not  count  on  Austrian  assistance.  Victory 
for  Austria  could  be  bought  only  at  the  price  of  concessions 
to  Hungary,  and  defeat  would  mean  for  her  the  loss  of  her 
German-speaking  provinces.     She  could  risk  neither. 

The  preclusion  of  Austrian  intervention  was  a  happy  stroke 
for  Prussia.     For  on  the  sixteenth  of  December  when  Gran- 

•Fred.  Reitlinger,  A  Diplomat's  Mission  of  1870,  passim;  Granville 
to  Lyons,  Dec.  14,  1870,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  pp.  241-242. 
7  Morley,  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  vol.  ii,  pp.  70-71  • 
3  Paul  Deschanel,  Gambetta,  p.  98. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  117- 


270     BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [2yo 

ville  presented  certain  proposals  of  Chaudordy,  looking  to 
an  armistice  for  the  revictualling  of  Paris,  Bismarck,  sure  of 
Russia  and  Austria,  was  enabled  to  refuse  them  with  the 
greatest  degree  of  confidence.  Meetings  were  still  held  in 
London  to  favour  the  recognition  of  the  French  Republic 
and  to  oppose  its  enemy ;  but  the  Ministers  were  absent  from 
the  capital,  and  the  demonstrators  had  to  content  themselves 
with  carrying  their  resolutions  to  the  French  embassy.1 
England  felt  that  she  had  been  reduced  to  a  spectator,  with 
a  very  poor  seat  at  that.  She  had  to  watch  the  successful 
conclusion  of  the  task  the  North  German  Parliament  had 
been  created  to  perform, — the  union  of  North  and  South 
Germany.  The  Confederation,  it  was  understood,  only 
waited  on  the  King's  consent  to  receive  a  higher  dignity  be- 
fore transforming  itself  into  an  Empire.2 

Across  the  Atlantic,  the  American  House  of  Representa- 
tives had  voted,  by  a  great  majority,  nearly  all  those  meas- 
ures hostile  to  England  that  had  received  the  President's  re- 
commendation.3 It  was  alleged  that  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  three  months  had  been  beset  by  proposals  from  the  Rus- 
sian Minister  urging  a  joint  demonstration  against  England.* 
Mr.  Fish,  it  was  stated,  had  resisted  these  solicitations. 
But  the  fact  remained  that  his  country  had  chosen  this  time 
for  most  incontinently  urging  a  settlement  of  the  Alabama 
Claims.  There  existed  a  suspicion  that  Prussia,  too,  en- 
couraged her  insistence.  Mr.  Washburne,  who  had  kept  his 
residence  in  Paris,  was  the  intermediary  between  that  city 
and  the  outside  world,  through  a  famous  despatch  bag 
which  he  was  allowed  to  receive  and   send  out  weekly. 

1  Times,  Dec.  19,  1870. 
4  Saturday  Review,  Dec.  10,  1870. 
%Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Dec.  17,  1870. 

*  Statement  telegraphed  from  Washington  to  the  N.  Y.  Tribune  and 
quoted  in  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Dec.  17,  1870. 


271]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  27 1 

Other  diplomats,  who  had  refused  to  submit  to  the  inspec- 
tion of  their  papers,  had  been  brusquely  left  "  incommun- 
icado." The  American  Minister  was  also  honoured  by  being 
the  appointed  channel  of  communication  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  National  Defence  and  the  Prussian  leaders  at 
Versailles.1  A  special  favor  had  been  granted  him  by  Bis- 
marck in  the  liberation  of  a  hundred  or  so  of  his  country- 
men who  had  tired  of  witnessing  the  investment.  It  was 
claimed,  too,  that  Prussia  intended  to  please  America  by 
demanding  half  of  the  French  fleet  for  the  reduction  of 
British  power  on  the  high  seas.2  All  this  prepared  belief 
for  the  Standard's  story  that  Prussian  despatches  had  been 
captured  which  urged  America  to  press  the  Alabama  claims. 
Very  soon,  the  news  was  found  to  be  false.3  But  the  fact 
that  it,  at  first,  excited  alarm  is  evidence  of  the  suspicions 
that  were  tormenting  England. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  British  were  annoyed  by  these 
rumours,  alarming  news  came  to  her  from  across  the 
Channel.  The  German  army  had  completed  its  march  to 
the  coast  and  had  occupied  Havre,  Dieppe,  and  other  lead- 
ing French  seaports,  greatly  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
British  ship  owners  that  had  been  monopolizing  the  Havre 
floating  trade.  Word  came  that,  not  content  with  flatten- 
ing John  Bull's  pocket  book,  the  German  leaders  were  medi- 
tating an  attack  on  England  so  soon  as  their  affairs  in  France 
should  leave  them  free  for  it.  For  the  most  part,  the  pro- 
posed invasit  >n  was  ridiculed.  Would  their  invaders  come 
by  balloons,  swimming  belts,  or  a  channel  tunnel?  the 
British  asked.     Much  alarm,  however,  was  pretended  by  the 

1  Diary  of  the  Siege  of  Paris,  published  as  supplement  to  Gallignani's 
Messenger,  1871 ;  Capt.  the  Hon.  D.  Bingham,  Recollections  of  Paris, 
pp.  211-212. 

*  Examiner  and  London  Review,  Nov.  5,  1870. 

3  Anglo-American  Times,  Jan.  21,  1871. 


272      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [272 

Standard,1  and  jealous  discussions  of  the  Prussian  military 
system  were  more  than  ever  the  vogue  in  that  and  other 
papers.  Many  urged  that  England  introduce  compulsory 
service  and  much  space  was  given  to  pleas  that  the  army  be 
remolded  on  the  Prussian  model.2 

A  fillip  to  the  hopes  of  the  militarists  came  when,  on  the 
twenty-first  of  December,  six  British  colliers  were  seized  and 
sunk  by  Prussian  orders  off  Duclair.  The  vessels  had  been 
sacrificed  through  the  military  necessity  of  forming  an  ob- 
struction to  the  activities  of  French  gunboats  that  had  been 
sailing  up  and  down  the  Seine,  to  the  menace  of  German 
operations  at  Rouen.  On  the  twenty-fourth,  a  seventh  vessel 
was  seized  for  the  same  purpose.  According  to  international 
law  the  raid  had  been  executed  without  any  violation  of 
neutral  rights.  For  the  colliers,  though  they  had  docked 
and  discharged  their  cargoes  by  Prussian  permission,  were 
subject  to  the  exigencies  of  a  belligerent  engaged  in  active 
operations  of  war.  But  international  law,  somewhat  im- 
perfectly understood  at  times  by  its  own  exponents,  is  of 
even  more  obscurity  to  the  layman. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  early  news  of  the  seizure 
aroused  indignation.  It  was  reported  to  have  been  accom- 
plished over  the  protest  of  the  British  captains  and  with  the 
Union  Jack  still  flying.  In  France,  the  papers  aggravated 
irritation  by  speculating  on  what  the  British  would  do  to 
exact  reparation  for  the  owners  and  to  punish  the  insult  to 
the  sailors,  who  had  barely  been  allowed  time  to  escape.3' 

1  Standard,  Dec.  24,  1870;  see  also  Globe  and  Traveller,  Dec.  13,  1870. 

*  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Dec.  9,  17,  1870;  Archibald  Forbes,  The  Vic- 
torious Prussians  in  St.  Paul's  Magazine,  Dec.  1870,  vol.  vii,  pp.  282 
et  seq. 

s  War  Correspondence  of  the  Daily  News,  pp.  406-409;  Stowell  and 
Munro,  International  Cases,  vol.  ii,  p.  544;  Granville's  representations 
to  Prussia  are  summarized  in  a  despatch  sent  Lyons,  Dec.  31,  1870,  Brit. 
State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  pp.  2-3. 


273]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  273 

The  Weekly  Freeman  believed  that,  even  if  Granville  could 
"  smooth  away  atrocities  and  by  sweet  persuasion  bring  Bis- 
marck to  behave,"  he  still  would  fail  to  coo  the  nation  into 
a  contemptible  quiescence  under  insult.  At  first  the  British 
papers  bristled  almost  equally  with  indignation,1  but  when 
it  became  known  that  the  early  accounts  had  been  exagger- 
ated, and  when  the  moderate  journals  had  explained  the  in- 
tricacies of  international  law,  the  British  saw  they  had  not 
been  insulted  and  became  less  restive.2 

However  much  interest  was  diverted  during  December 
by  the  proceedings  of  the  German  Parliament,  and  by  the 
Luxemburg  Circular,  and  the  Duclair  incident,  the  focal 
point  of  attention  remained  the  beleaguered  capital.  Its  fall 
was  awaited  as  the  signal  for  the  end  of  war.  On  Sep- 
tember the  seventeenth,  Lord  Lyons  and  his  staff  had  left 
for  Tours.3  Mr.  Wodehouse,  the  secretary,  who  had  been 
left  in  charge  of  the  embassy,  somewhat  later  departed  also, 
under  instructions  from  Lord  Granville.4  The  military 
attache,  Colonel  Claremont,  lingered  of  his  own  free  will 
for  some  time,5  and,  in  turn,  went  off,  leaving  Sir  Edward 
Blount,  a  resident  banker  of  Paris,  as  Great  Britain's  unoffi- 
cial representative.6  From  early  December  to  late  January, 
the  sixteen  hundred  English  in  the  capital  were  dependent  on 
this  kind  expatriate  and  on  the  overworked  Minister  of  the 

1  Spectator,  Dec.  31;  Daily  Telegraph,  Dec.  28,  1870;  Morning  Ad- 
vertiser, Dec.  28,  1870. 

1  Annual  Register,  1871,  vol.  cxiii,  p.  4. 

1  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edward  Blount,  p.  176;  E.  A.  Vizetelly,  My  Days 
of  Adventure,  pp.  96-97. 

*  Oxford  Graduate,  Inside  Paris  during  the  Siege,  pp.  100-101 ;  White- 
hurst,  My  Private  Diary  during  the  Siege  of  Paris,  vol.  i,  pp.  252-283. 

8  Whitehurst,  op.  cit.,  p.  343. 

6  Blount  was  placed  in  charge  of  the  embassy  as  consul  on  Dec.  10, 
hy  Col.  Claremont,  but  he  did  not  receive  official  appointment  until 
Jan.  24,  1871.     Cf.  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edward  Blount,  pp.  187-191. 


274      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [274 

United  States.  The  embassy  remained,  however,  of  much 
interest,  because,  as  the  wags  said,  the  Manchester  Gov- 
ernment was  so  fittingly  represented  by  four  fat  and  very 
placid  sheep  that  browsed  on  the  embassy  lawn.1  At  Christ- 
mas time  when  the  menus  were  more  and  more  embellished 
by  such  items  as  chien  a  la  Bismarck,  and  cotelettes  d'ane 
praline  es  a  la  fag  on  de  notre  Fritz,2  it  was  not  only  the 
British,  who  came  to  gaze  at  the  unconscious  animals  that 
fattened  under  extra-territorial  rights. 

The  most  famous  chefs  of  Paris  tearfully  acknowledged 
their  extremity.  In  times  past,  some  genius  of  the  white 
cap  dressed  out  a  salad  so  judiciously  that  his  patron  de- 
clared that  with  such  sauce  one  could  devour  his  very  father 
with  enjoyment.  His  recipe,  alas,  was  unrecorded,  but 
ingenuity  survived.  Correspondents  wrote  that  donkey 
flesh  was  being  so  prepared  as  to  have  a  poultry  flavour,  and 
had  come  to  be  a  tempting  delicacy.  In  the  Athenaeum,  it 
was  stated  that  the  proprietor  of  those  little  beasts  that  once 
were  the  delight  of  the  damsels  of  Paris,  who  visited  Robin- 
son's to  dine  on  fete  days  with  the  students  in  the  trees,  had 
become  a  butcher,  and  regaled  the  Quartier  Latin  with  the 
flesh  that  had  been  bestridden  with  such  hilarity  in  days 
when  Paris  went  a  picnicking.3  From  the  Jardin  des 
Plantes  the  elephants  were  led  forth  to  pay  their  tribute,  too. 
The  Prussians  should  think  of  these  things,  said  the  Tele- 
graph. It  would  not  do  to  gain  the  city  only  to  find  the 
cooks  starved  in  their  own  kitchens,  the  table  d'hdtes  cut  up 
for  firewood,  and  the  stew  pans  melted  into  bullets.4  The 
items  of  the  makeshift  menus  were  all  very  amusing  when 

^izetelly,  op.  cit.,  pp.  96-97. 

s  Bingham,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  passim. 

*  Athenaeum,  Nov.  12,  1870. 

4  Daily  Telegraph,  Nov.  17,  1870. 


2/5]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  2J$ 

Henry  Labouchere  wrote  of  them  in  his  witty,  cynical  way.1 
But  London  grieved  that  at  the  Christmas  season  all  Paris) 
had  become  an  Oliver  Twist  that  asked  for  more. 

The  "  Agony  Column  "  of  the  Times  was  now  the  peculiar 
property  of  French  refugees.  It  was  filled  with  messages 
to  friends,  inquiries  about  the  health  of  the  besieged,  re- 
proofs for  silence.2  But  most  conspicuous  among  them  all, 
said  BelgrazA®,  "  there  became  apparent  the  signs  and  tokensl 
of  the  Triumph  of  Baby.  His  birth,  his  progress,  hisl 
health,  his  precious  teeth,  his  fakes  et  gestes  " — were  all  de- 
tailed to  gladden  the  heart  of  his  distant  father.  Almost 
you  might  see  le  roi  Bebe  clapping  his  hands  and  crowing  in 
that  column.3  The  British  wondered,  for  a  time,  how  the 
advertisers  expected  the  Times  to  enter  Paris  in  such  quan- 
tity as  to  make  their  efforts  at  communication  practical. 
But  the  faith  of  the  refugees  was  rewarded.  "  I  doubt,"  said 
Wickham  Hoffman  of  the  American  legation,  "  if  you  could 
so  hedge  in  a  city  that  the  Times  would  not  penetrate  it." 
The  great  paper  entered  Paris  by  pigeon  post.  Its  messages' 
were  photographed  in  microscopic  characters  and  enclosed 
in  a  quill,  which  was  fastened  longitudinally  to  the  centre 
feather  of  one  of  the  "  Antwerps,"  "  Dragons,"  or  "  Blue 
Chequers  "  that  were  the  aerial  messengers  of  the  besieged. 
On  its  arrival  the  film  was  enlarged  by  a  magic  lantern,  and 
the  messages  copied  and  sent  to  their  different  addresses  by 
post-office  officials.  One  bird  was  said  to  have  brought  in 
no  less  than  fifteen  thousand  messages  for  private  in- 
dividuals, besides  despatches  for  the  government. 

From  late  in  September,  when  the  first  postal  balloon  had 
carried  out  its  pigeon  passengers,  the  birds  had  shared  with 

1  Henry   Labouchere,   Journal   of   the   Besieged  Resident    (London, 
1871),  passim. 

2  Memoirs  of  Sir  Wemyss  Reid  (London,  1905),  p.  168. 
1  Belgravia,  Apr.,  1871. 


2y6      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [276 

the  aeronauts  the  burden  of  keeping  Paris  in  communication 
with  the  world  outside.  Pictures  of  the  more  famous  of 
them  were  published  in  British  papers  and  some  of  their 
post-marked  feathers  were  brought  to  London  as  souvenirs. 
One  of  these  pigeons,  called  the  "  Minister,"  because 
of  its  service  to  Gambetta,  was  trained  to  such  in- 
telligence that,  it  was  said,  when  it  fell  victim  to  a  Prussian 
bullet,  it  exhibited  an  appropriate  spirit  of  patriotism  and 
promptly  swallowed  its  despatch.  Even  with  those  who 
would  not  credit  such  bird  stories,  the  exploits  of  the 
feathered  messengers  played  a  part  in  rousing  sympathy  and 
admiration.1 

They  did  not,  however,  cause  any  such  international  com- 
plication as  did  Mr.  Washburne's  despatch  bag.  The 
American  Minister,  by  virtue  of  his  having  taken  over  the 
representation  of  the  Prussians,  possessed  the  privilege  of 
receiving  newspapers  and  sealed  dispatches.  He  was  in 
the  habit  of  leaving  the  Times  and  other  papers,  when  they 
had  become  somewhat  stale,  on  his  library  table,  and  of 
allowing  the  curious  the  privilege  of  reading  them.  Certain 
correspondents,  whose  eagerness  for  news  was  not  satisfied 
by  this  kindness,  learned  that  later  copies  were  kept  by  Hisi 
Excellency  concealed  under  his  mattress.  It  proved  not  dif- 
ficult to  bribe  the  chambermaid  of  the  unsuspecting  diplo- 
mat to  show  them  the  Times  now  and  again.  Their  cur- 
iosity was  not  unnatural,  for  Paris  was  full  of  wild  rumours 
of  monster  meetings  in  Hyde  Park,  and  threats  to  dethrone 
the  Queen,  and  drive  Gladstone  from  office.2 

No  harm  would  have  come  from  the  peccadillo  had  not 
Labouchere,  who  was  at  all  times  irrepressible,  shielded  the 

1  The  fullest  accounts  appeared  directly  after  the  war.  Cf.  The  Bal- 
loon and  Pigeon  Post,  Chamber's  Journal,  March  4,  1871,  pp.  129  el 
seq.;  All  the  Year  Round,  March  10,  1871. 

2  Bingham,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  211-212. 


277]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  277 

abigail  and  slandered  the  Minister  by  writing  the  News  that 
copies  of  the  latest  London  journals  were  always  to  be  found 
on  Mr.  Washburne's  table.1  Very  naturally,  the  matter 
was  made  the  subject  of  complaint  by  Bismarck.  Von 
Moltke  found  it  detrimental  to  his  plans  that  recent  papers 
should  reach  the  besieged  without  having  been  censored  by 
the  Prussian  authorities.  The  answer,  sent  by  Mr.  Wash- 
burne,  showed  a  complete  ignorance  of  the  activities  of  the 
correspondents  but  a  true  estimate  of  the  disesteem  in  which 
the  French  held  British  journalism.  It  was  charged,  he 
said,  that  the  lugubrious  papers  were  sent  him  by  the  Prus- 
sians in  the  hope  that  their  bad  news  would  discourage  the 
besieged.2  To  avoid  further  complaints  from  the  French 
and  Prussians,  he  permitted  himself  to  be  deprived  of  the 
papers  during  the  last  two  weeks  of  December,  and  when 
they  made  their  reappearance  in  his  bag  he  guarded  them 
very  strictly. 

Parisians  must  have  had  the  optimism  of  Gambetta  to 
have  derived  any  aid  and  comfort  from  the  Times.  Ac- 
cording to  Labouchere,  they  believed  it  was  in  the  pay  of 
Prussia,  and,  in  official  circulars,  it  was  spoken  of  as  the 
habitual  organ  of  Count  Bismarck's  policy.3  An  English- 
man, writing  from  Paris,  said  that,  had  it  been  corporeal, 
it  would  have  been  mobbed  and  trampled  on  a  thousand  times 
for  the  cold  sneers  and  taunts  with  which  it  derided  the 
French.  "A  bas  le  Times!"  was  a  familiar  cry  in  Paris  be- 
fore the  day  came  when  all  efforts  were  concentrated  on  the 
siege.*  British  phlegm  was  found  harder  to  bear  than  Prus- 
sian broadsides.     The  service  rendered  the  besieged  by  the 

1  Wickham  Hoffman.  Camp,  Court  and  Siege. 

8  Letters  of  Bismarck  and  Washburne,  Dec.  6,  12,  1870,  Washburne 
Correspondence  during  the  Franco-German  War,  pp.  128-129. 

1  Times,  Oct.  19.  1870. 

*All  the  Year  Round.  Sept.  17,  1870;  Blanchard  Jerrold,  At  Home 
in  Paris,  vol.  ii,  pp.  20-22. 


278      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [278 

Times' s  "  Agony  Column  "  was  not  sufficient  to  counteract 
the  resentment  felt  at  the  paper's  leaders.  The  journal  of 
Printing  House  Square  was  no  more  discouraging  than 
other  of  its  contemporaries,  but  it  was  more  irritating  be- 
cause of  its  prestige,  and  for  a  certain  puritannical  twang 
with  which  it  gave  its  advice.1  Even  the  Standard,  which 
in  London  was  regarded  as  markedly  pro-French,  came  in 
for  censure.  Certain  news  culled  from  it  by  the  editor  of 
La  Vcrite  by  the  aid  of  an  American,  caused  the  Journal 
OfUciel2  to  denounce  it,  also,  as  "notoriously  hostile  to 
France."  4     Defeat  had  heightened  sensibility. 

Whatever  kindliness  entered  into  the  regard  of  the 
French  for  their  pacific  neighbours  was  engendered  by 
gratitude  for  their  benefactions.  The  great  sums  of  money 
subscribed  to  the  Red  Cross  through  the  efforts  of  Col. 
Lloyd  Lindsay  made  possible  the  relief  of  hundreds  of  the 
sick  and  wounded.3  Within  Paris  itself,  scores  were  aided 
by  the  generosity  of  Richard  Wallace,  to  whom  the  fortune 
of  the  eccentric  Lord  Hertford  had  been  bequeathed.4 
From  London  money  was  forwarded  by  the  French  Bene- 
volent Society,  the  Ladies'  Committee,  and  many  organiza- 
tions that  devoted  themselves  to  the  assistance  of  special 
groups.  The  journals  were  liberal  of  their  space  in  solicit- 
ing aid  for  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  in  advertising  charity 
bazaars  and  concerts. 

A  fund  receiving  much  publicity,  was  that  sponsored  by 
Lord  Vernon  to  enable  French  agriculturists  to  prepare  the 
next  year's  harvest.  Its  directors  had  the  good  fortune  to 
secure  the  assistance,  in  their  efforts,  of  the  well  beloved 
Pere  Hyacinthe,  who  lectured  for  its  benefit  on  the  twen- 

1  Bingham,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  147 ;  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Dec.  13,  1870. 

2  Oxford  Graduate,  op.  cit.,  pp.  1-3,  81-82. 
B  Whitehurst,  op.  cit.,  p.  244. 

4  Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  231. 


279]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  279 

tieth  of  December  in  the  Queen's  Concert  Rooms  in  Han- 
over Square.  The  News  records  that  the  pavements  in 
front  of  the  famous  old  Rooms  were  thronged  for  the  best 
part  of  an  hour,  so  that  the  scene  resembled  the  entrance 
to  the  pit  of  a  theatre  on  a  first  night.1  At  the  stairs  a 
phalanx  of  policemen  mounted  guard,  and  a  hand-to-hand 
scramble  took  place  between  the  men  in  blue  and  those  in 
broadcloth.  The  Telegraph  records  that  Victorian  matrons 
forgot  their  decorum,  and  screamed,  and  plunged  their  stiff 
taffetas  into  the  melee.2 

Those  who  won  to  the  inside  were  well  rewarded  by  the 
simple,  earnest  words  of  the  excommunicated  Carmelite. 
At  a  time  when  nationalism  was  running  riot,  he  was  able  to 
speak  of  Germany  without  rancour  and  of  France  without 
undue  laudation.  He  saw  no  inherent  necessity  for  war. 
In  spite  of  diversities  of  language,  of  temperament,  of 
culture,  he  insisted  that  the  essential  unity  of  races  under 
one  common  Father  was  still  the  natural  and  normal  destiny. 
His  own  country,  he  believed,  had  offended  in  previous  times, 
as  Germany  offended  now,  against  that  common  sense  which 
urged  one  to  encourage,  rather  than  resent,  the  strength 
and  unity  of  neighbouring  nations.  As  for  the  future  of 
France,  he  could  not  believe  that  the  mere  possession  of 
two  provinces  was  so  essential  to  her  greatness  that  their 
loss  would  forfeit  her  high  estate.  Nor  did  he  think  their 
gain  by  Germany  would  be  such  surety  against  aggression 
as  would  derive  from  moderation.  He  had  faith  in  the 
gratitude  of  nations.  The  two  provinces,  he  said,  should 
be  left  as  a  bond  of  union  between  two  neighbours.  They 
were  the  hand — almost  he  might  say  the  heart — of  Germany, 
reposing  affectionately  in  the  hand  and  heart  of  France.3 

1  Daily  News,  Dec.  21,  1870. 

2  Daily  Telegraph,  Dec.  21,  1870. 

z  Saturday  Review,  Dec.  24,  1870;  Father  Hyacinthe,  Macmillan's 
Magazine,  March,  1871,  vol.  xxiii,  pp.  401  et  seq.;  Morning  Post,  Dec. 
21,  1870. 


28o      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [28o 

There  were  some,  no  doubt,  who  went  away  from  the 
crowded  concert  room  to  say  their  Christmas  prayers  for 
those  "  in  danger,  necessity,  and  tribulation,"  with  a  truer 
sense  of  the  cause  of  danger,  and  the  necessity  of  prevent- 
ing it,  and  how  best  tribulation  could  be  avoided. 

Among  these,  as  well  as  among  their  fellows,  who  still- 
saw  darkly  only  into  the  immediate  future,  there  was  great 
fear  of  a  bombardment.  For  the  present,  it  meant  hor- 
ror; for  the  future,  still  greater  horror, — bred,  as  it  would 
be,  from  mutual  hate  engendered  by  injustice  given  and  re- 
ceived. "  Paris  will  not  be  besieged,"  the  British  had  said, 
when  the  Prussians  began  their  march  to  that  capital.  Such 
an  event,  said  the  Times,  would  be  an  anomaly  in  civiliza- 
tion, a  catastrophe  throughout  Europe.1  The  News  de- 
clared that  for  Paris  to  offer  itself  to  useless  siege  for  the 
sake  of  a  supposed  point  of  honour  would  be  as  much  an 
anachronism  as  for  King  William  to  bind  the  Emperor  to 
his  triumphal  car.2  One  of  the  editors  of  the  heed's  Mer- 
cury was  passionately  angry  that  the  French  cut  down  the 
woods  around  the  city,  which  might  have  afforded  shelter  tot 
the  enemy.  He  considered  that  they  were  destroying  the 
property  of  the  world  from  childish  fear.8  When  it  was 
known  that  Paris  was  really  invested,  men  comforted 
themselves  that  the  siege  would  be  brief.4  They  believed 
her  walls  would  fall,  like  those  of  Jericho,  at  the  first  blast 
of  the  enemy's  trumpets.  A  few  there  were,  like  Edward 
Fitzgerald,  who  were  even  willing  that  the  gay  and  carnival 
part  of  Paris  should  suffer,  in  order  that  the  French  might 
be  reduced  to  sobriety  while  they  rebuilt  it.5 

1  Times,  Aug.  26,  27,  1870;  The  Invasion  of  France,  Quarterly  Re- 
view, Jan.,  1 87 1,  pp.  122  et  seq. 

2  Daily  News,  Aug.  25,  1870. 

3  Memoirs  of  Sir  Wemyss  Reid,  p.  167. 
*  Economist,  Sept  10,  1870. 

5  Edward   Fitzgerald,   Letters  and   Literary  Remains  of,  vol.  ii,  pp. 
302-303. 


28 1  ]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  28 1 

When,  week  after  week,  the  city  still  endured,  they  were 
reluctant  in  England  to  render  her  a  meed  of  praise. 
"  Paris  throughout  has  been  herself,"  they  said, 

half  drunk,  half  inspired,  capable  of  any  crime,  of  any  heroism, 
no  figure  for  the  good  to  admire,  yet  always  leaving  the  suggestion 
that  in  her  wickedness,  as  in  her  greatness,  there  is  a  trace  of  a 
being  who  is  in  some  mysterious  way  beyond  or  beneath  the  laws 
to  which  we  mortals  yield.1 

It  was  not  until  men  knew  hunger  was  taking  toll  in  the  city 
and  that  the  end  was  not  far  off,  that  they  ceased  regarding 
it  as  the  abstract  of  all  the  vices  and  the  beauties.  Then 
they  took  thought  for  the  Parisians,  and  for  the  British  that 
were  within  the  gates. 

Bismarck  was  in  a  quandary — vexed  at  the  city's  obstin- 
acy and  fearful  to  rouse  indignation  by  resorting  to  a  bom- 
bardment. The  resistance  of  the  provinces  was  daily  mak- 
ing it  more  necessary  to  free  for  other  work  the  two  hun- 
dred thousand  that  invested  it.  According  to  Archibald 
Forbes,  the  German  impression  up  to  the  middle  of  De- 
cember was  that  the  siege  would  soon  be  over.  Bismarck 
and  von  Moltke  had  been  decieved  as  to  the  store  of  pro- 
visions within  the  walls.  They  were  eager  to  repair  their 
miscalculations  by  a  bombardment ; 2  but  the  Crown  Prince 
and  his  staff,  and  the  commander  of  the  siege  artillery,  held 
to  the  early  plan.3  Their  opinion,  Bismarck  believed,  wasi 
due  to  a  wretched  regard  for  principles  of  humanity. 
"  From  London,"  he  complained,  "  representations  were 
received  in  our  most  influential  circles  to  the  effect  that  the 
capitulation  of  Paris  might  not  be  brought  about  by  bom- 

1  Spectator. 

2  Archibald  Forbes,  My  Experiences  of  the  War  between  France  and 
Germany,  vol.  ii,  pp.  70-71. 

*  Karl  Abel,  Letters  on  International  Relations  of  1870,  vol.  ii,  pp. 
433-434- 


282      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [282 

bardment,  but  only  by  hunger."  He  was  impatient  of  this) 
English  "  cant,"  and  frankly  suspicious  that  it  was  a  subter- 
fuge designed  to  rob  him  of  the  fruits  of  victory.  Delay, 
he  knew,  was  dangerous.1 

The  Examiner  told  the  English  that  the  German  troops 
and  people,  too,  were  tired  of  war,  tired  of  the  monotony 
of  the  siege,  tired  of  caring  for  the  three  hundred  thousand 
prisoners  that  had  to  be  provided  for  in  German  towns. 
They  pitied  Paris,2  but  this  did  not  prevent  them  from  insist- 
ing that  vigorous  proceedings  be  taken  against  it.  Even  the 
University  of  Gottingen  and  other  learned  bodies,  which 
Trinity  College  of  Dublin  appealed  to,  contented  themselves 
with  tincturing  an  unfavorable  reply  with  piety.3  They 
wanted  the  war  to  end.  Bismarck  wrote  that  he  was  tor- 
mented by  the  apprehension  that  Germany's  interests  might 
be  severely  injured  through  hesitation  and  delay.  He  was 
increasingly  impatient  of  the  "  female  influences,"  which  set 
themselves  against  him;  at  the  ladies  of  great  courts,  who 
glorified  the  English  catchwords  of  humanity  and  civiliza- 
tion. He  was  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  withstanding 
them,  and  settling  with  France  before  delay  allowed  the 
Neutrals  to  unite  in  an  understanding  on  the  forthcoming 
peace.4  In  attempting  to  avoid  this  eventually,  he  know  he 
would  have  to  resort  to  an  expedient  so  unpopular  that  it 
might  precipitate  the  very  accord  it  was  designed  to  pre- 
vent. It  was  alarmingly  significant  when  Russell,  whose 
Prussian  sympathies  had  been  well  known,  asked  that  his) 
successor  be  sent  out  by  the  Times,  so  that  he  might  return 
without  witnessing  the  bombardment.  He  was  induced  to 
stay  by  Delane,  who  wrote,  mysteriously,  that  he  had  been 

1  Bismarck,  The  Man  and  the  Statesman,  vol.  ii,  pp.  124-125. 

2  Examiner,  Dec.  17,  1870. 
2  Spectator,  Dec.  24,  1870. 

4  Bismarck,  The  Man  and  the  Statesman,  vol.  ii,  pp.  113,  121. 


283]  ANARCHIC  DECEMBER  283 

assured  from  the  beginning  that  the  dreaded  contingency- 
would  not  take  place.1 

Regard  for  British  susceptibilities  induced  Bismarck  to 
show  himself  very  amenable  in  the  affair  of  the  colliers  sunk 
off  Duclair,2  and  to  delay  bringing  the  siege  guns  into  action 
until  the  flames  had  died  away  from  Christmas  puddings 
that  decked  the  tables  of  London  town.  But  on  the  twenty- 
sixth  of  December,  the  bombardment  was  begun  of  Mount 
Avron,  an  eminence  on  the  east  side  of  Paris;3  and  while 
the  children  in  England  were  still  clapping  their  hands  at 
the  pantomimes,  their  parents  began  to  fear  for  the  sixteen 
hundred  British  that  were  immured  within  the  walls.  Rus- 
sell, whom  the  King  of  Prussia  had  called  the  Minister  of 
Public  Opinion,  realized  that  he  had  been  tricked  into  con- 
tinuing to  countenance  the  German  operations  through  the 
deception  practised  on  his  chief.  Like  the  good  newspaper 
man  that  he  was,  he  did  not  show  himself  disgruntled.  But 
he  was  very  tired  of  the  "  grand  but  uneasy  atmosphere  of 
Versailles ;  "  tired  of  being  pumped  by  Bismarck ;  of  hearing 
his  country  sneered  at  by  stripling  subalterns.  More  than 
ever,  he  was  sure  that  when  France  went  down,  England 
would  lose  her  only  ally, — an  ally  whom  she  had  much  to 
forgive,  and  from  whom  she  had  much  to  endure,  but  who, 
after  all,  would  have  continued  constant.4 

1  J.  B.  Atkins,  Life  of  Sir  IV.  H.  Russell,  vol.  ii,  p.  203. 

2  Annual  Register  for  1871,  vol.  cxiii,  p.  4. 
4  Times,  Dec.  30,  1870. 

4  J.  B.  Atkins,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  227-228. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
"  Peace  at  Any  Price  " 

The  British  lion,  in  the  early  days  of  1871,  was  in  a 
most  unenviable  condition.  Judy  represented  him  as  caged, 
and  masked  with  the  dolorous  face  of  Gladstone.  From 
without,  he  was  being  baited  by  Bismarck,  who  prodded  him 
with  the  Berlin  press,  and  by  Russia,  who  had  just  flung  at 
him  a  batch  of  treaties.  Uncle  Sam  was  shown  waiting  his 
turn  to  join  in  the  torment  by  poking  at  him  the  Alabama 
Claims.  The  lion  was  gazing  at  some  broken  ships  that  lay 
in  the  corner  of  his  cage.  Someone  had  scratched  from  the 
wall  the  legend,  "  Dicu  et  mon  Droit"  and  substituted, 
"  Shop  Forever!  "x  That  the  lion  was  peacefully,  if  sadly, 
experiencing  the  safety  provided  by  isolation,  Ruskin  de- 
clared was  due  to  two  bad  reasons.  The  noble  beast  had  not 
sense  enough  to  determine  in  a  great  national  quarrel  which 
side  was  right,  nor  courage  enough  to  defend  the  right, 
could  he  have  discerned  it, — "  being  on  this  first  of  Jan- 
uary, 1 871,  in  much  bodily  fear;  that  is  to  say,  afraid  of  the 
Russians,  afraid  of  the  Prussians,  afraid  of  the  Americans, 
afraid  of  the  Hindoos,  afraid  of  the  Chinese,  afraid  of  the 
Japanese,  afraid  of  the  New  Zealanders,  and  afraid  of  the 
Caffirs."  2 

Things  having  come  to  such  a  pass,  the  Dublin  Mail  could 
not  confine  its  rebukes  to  Gladstone  and  Granville;  for, 
though  it  viewed  them  as  "  poor,  pusillanimous  whipsters," 

1  Judy,  Jan.  4,  1871. 

2  Ruskin,  Complete  Works,  vol.  xxvii,  pp.  11-12. 

284  [284 


285]  " PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  285 

it  conceded  that  they  did  no  more  than  show  "  the  very  age 
and  body  of  the  time."  l  The  Quarterly,  due  to  Salisbury's 
influence,  laid  all  the  blame  on  the  Ministry's  policy  of  re- 
trenchment. It  prophesied  that,  unless  a  change  were  made, 
the  day  would  come  when  England  would  collapse  as  com- 
pletely as  had  France.2  The  Court  Journal  accused  the 
Government  of  having  inculcated  the  principle  of  cowardice 
under  the  soft  words  of  "  peace  at  any  price."  3  Even 
the  Edinburgh,  which  had  rendered  much  service  in  uphold- 
ing the  Ministry's  hands  in  times  past,  was  giving  warning 
that  the  destruction  of  French  power  would  mean  the  loss  of 
a  large  part  of  British  influence  on  the  Continent.4  In  the 
Times,  passivity  was  rebuked  by  a  statement  that,  with  Paris 
actually  under  fire,  one  wise  and  good  man  of  high  public 
character,  if  he  spoke  for  a  neutral  nation,  might  yet  be 
listened  to  by  both  belligerents.  But  nothing  of  this  kind  was1 
excepted  now  from  an  Englishman.  "  You  Englis',"  said 
a  well  known  Italian  editor,  "  You  Englis'  are  so  damn 
happy,  you  will  do  not'ing  for  nobody." 5 

The  British  were  very  impatient  that  Gladstone's  state- 
ment of  the  case  for  "  Happy  England  "  seemed  in  Europe 
to  have  been  regarded  as  a  national  utterance.  The  Econ- 
omist voiced  a  common  wish  when  it  desired  that,  if  the 
Government  was  committed  to  a  policy  of  inactivity,  it 
might  still  say  something  about  the  war  that  every  one  could 
make  his  own.  It  believed  that  if  the  public  was  given 
nothing  more  "  magic  and  memorable,"  officially,  than  the 

1  Dublin  Evening  Mail,  Jan.  2,  1871. 

7  Lessons  of  the  War,  Invasion  of  France,  Quarterly  Review,  Jan., 
1871 ;  cf.  Economist,  Jan.  28,  1871. 

3  Court  Journal,  Jan.  7,  1871. 

*  Edinburgh  Revietv,  Jan.,  1871. 

5  Letter  of  Versailles  Correspondent,  Jan.  9,  1871 ;  Spectator,  Jan.  17, 
1871. 


286      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [286 

phrases  of  Granville's  despatches,  the  Cabinet  would  face 
the  February  sessions  with  slight  popular  support.  Its 
salvation  lay  only  in  the  presumable  weakness  of  the  Op- 
position.1 The  Spectator  regretted  that  Gladstone  did  not 
yield  to  the  popular  demand  by  adding  to  his  pacific  Min- 
istry someone  possessed  of  a  mote  rugged  resolution  than 
was  apparent  among  its  present  members.  Bright's  resigna- 
tion late  in  December  would  have  seemed  to  clear  the  way 
for  this.  But  the  opportunity  was  not  approved.  The 
transference  to  the  Irish  Secretaryship  of  Lord  Harting- 
on,  and  the  removal  of  Mr.  Fortescue  to  the  Board  of  Trade 
effected  no  such  reformation  as  would  ensure  a  strong  war 
administration  and  a  more  liberal  sympathy  in  Foreign 
Affairs.3  England  had  ceased  to  preach  sermons  to  France 
on  the  war's  disasters,  and  was  increasingly  eager  to  apply 
its  lessons  to  herself.  But  on  the  face  of  her  diplomacy, 
the  change  was  not  apparent. 

On  January  the  fourth,  the  bombardment  of  Paris  was  be- 
gun without  notice  to  the  besieged.  The  members  of  the 
Diplomatic  Corps  within  the  city  at  once  prepared  a  protest 
to  Count  Bismarck.  It  was  observed  that  due  notice  should 
have  been  given  of  the  intention  to  shell  the  city,  SO'  that 
diplomats  and  neutrals  might  have  withdrawn,  and  the 
citizens  have  provided  better  protection  for  children  and 
the  sick.  The  Chancellor  was  asked  to  make  some  amends1 
for  his  precipitancy  by  permitting  neutrals  to  place  them- 
selves and  their  property  in  safety.3  The  note  went  to 
Bismarck  without  the  signature  of  any  English  official, — not 
even  that  of  a  vice-consul's  under  secretary,  as  Felix  White- 
hurst  put  it.4     Sir  Edward  Blount,  who  had  been  represent- 

1  Economist,  Jan.  7,  1871. 
1  Spectator,  Jan.  7,  1871. 

3  Bingham,  Recollections  of  Paris,  vol.  i,  pp.  299-300. 
*  Whitehurst,  My  Private  Diary  during  the  Siege  of  Paris,  vol.  ii,  p. 
231. 


287]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  2%J 

ing  as  best  he  could  the  many  besieged  English,  regretted 
that  he  was  placed  in  a  false  position  by  his  lack  of  authority. 
The  absence  of  England's  signature,  he  said,  had  produced  a 
painful  effect.1  On  the  twenty-third,  when  the  Swiss  Min- 
ister, acting  for  the  Diplomatic  Corps,  sent  a  second  com- 
munication to  Bismarck,  Sir  Edward  was  still  unable  to 
give  it  England's  sanction.2  Lyons  had  written  to  Gran- 
ville of  his  uneasiness  for  the  English  left  in  the  place,3  but, 
no  more  from  London  than  from  Paris,  was  any  representa- 
tion made  on  behalf  of  the  immured  British. 

Indignation  over  the  bombardment  and  fear  for  the  ex- 
patriates was  heightened  when  news  came  to  England  that 
churches,  schools,  asylums,  and  hospitals  were  being  made 
the  particular  targets  of  Prussian  bullets.  At  first,  Blount 
would  not  believe  this,  but  soon  his  diary  was  saddened  by 
notices  of  the  damage  done, — he  came  to  believe  inten- 
tionally,— on  St.  Sulpice,  the  Pitie  Hospital,  and  the  Par- 
thenon.4 Fun,  under  the  caption  of  "German  Imperial 
Charity,"  presented  a  picture  of  bombs,  which  it  described 
as  "  contributions  to  the  hospitals,  ambulance,  etc.,  of 
Paris."  5  The  Manchester  Guardian,  recalling  the  conduct 
of  the  invaders  at  Strasburg  and  Bazeilles,  believed  the 
slaughter  of  civilians  in  Paris  was  simply  a  further  applica- 
tion of  the  system  of  terror  that  before  had  been  found  ef- 
ficacious.6 

On  the  second  day  of  the  bombardment,  a  meeting,  large, 
and  as  the  press  described  it  "  promiscuous  "  and  "  miscellan- 

1  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edward  Blount,  p.  200. 

*  Stowell  and  Munro,  International  Cases,  vol.  ii,  pp.  112-114. 
3  Newton,  Lord  Lyons,  vol.  i,  pp.  356-357. 

*  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edward  Blount,  pp.  200-201 ;  John  Bull,  Jan.  21, 
1871. 

5  Fun,  Jan.  14,  1871. 

6  Manchester  Guardian,  Jan.  16,  1871. 


288      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [288 

eous,"  was  held  in  Cannon  Street  Hall,  London,  to  urge 
on  the  Government  the  urgency  of  recognizing  the  French 
Republic,  and  of  giving  it  active  support.  Mr.  Merriman, 
Sir  Henry  Hoare  and  others  spoke,  and  aroused  such  en- 
thusiasm as  to  win  hostile  notice  from  the  press.  That 
the  journals  viewed  the  meeting  askance  was  due  to  the 
belief  that  its  organizers  were  animated,  not  so  much  by  a 
too  ardent  sympathy,  as  by  a  desire  to  stir  the  working  class 
to  a  demand  for  a  republic  in  Great  Britain.1  As  a  result, 
however,  of  the  bellicose  spirit  of  its  resolutions,  the  Council 
of  the  Workingmen's  National  Peace  Society  issueld  a 
series  of  questions  that  it  advised  each  individual  to  ask 
himself  before  he  should  cast  public  vote  in  favour  of  war. 
John  Ruskin  was  one  of  those  who  aided  the  Council  in  its 
endeavours.2 

Another  meeting  was  held  on  the  same  night  at  a  hall  in 
Old  Street,  and  presided  over  by  Charles  Bradlaugh.3 
Whatever  British  workingmen  did  under  his  leadership, 
was  sure  to  be  regarded  even  more  suspiciously  than  what 
they  might  be  induced  to  do  by  the  advanced  Liberals  and 
the  Comtists.  The  more  active  did  such  guidance  as  his 
appear  to  be,  the  more  certain  was  it  that  the  coming  Par- 
liament would  find  neither  party  eager  to  give  armed  sup- 
port to  France.  There  were  many  who  were  glad  of  this. 
John  Stuart  Mill  was  one.  He  regretted  that  the  political 
leaders  of  the  working  classes  had  been  led  away  by  the 
Comtists  and  by  the  mere  name  of  a  republic  into  wishing  to 
give  armed  support  to  a  Government,  which,  he  believed, 
dreaded  to  face  any  popular  representation.  The  peasantry, 
he  thought,  were  being  forced  to  fight  through  sheer  fear  of 

1  Spectator,  Standard,  Daily  Telegraph,  Daily  News,  issues  of   Jan, 
7,  1871. 
1  Ruskin,  Complete  Works,  vol.  xxviii,  pp.  26-27. 
3  Saturday  Review,  Jan.  7,  1871. 


289]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  289 

being  punished  by  those  who  had  elevated  themselves  to 
power.1 

But  for  France,  irrespective  of  her  Government,  there  was 
whole-hearted  sympathy  in  all  of  England.  On  January  the 
sixth,  an  artists'  exhibition,  held  at  the  Suffolk  Street  Galler- 
ies, gave  such  an  opportunity  for  a  demonstration  of  friend- 
liness as  did  not  exact  a  simultaneous  confession  of  radical- 
ism. The  art  journals  recorded  that  it  was  attended  by 
much  greater  crowds  than  had  gone  to  a  previous  exhibition 
held  for  the  relief  of  destitute  German  orphans.  The  group 
of  Pre-Raphaelities  then  prominent  in  England  greatly 
admired  the  young  artist,  Henri  Regnault,  who  had  waived 
his  exemption  from  service  and  within  a  fortnight  was  to 
keep  a  rendezvous  with  death.  D'Aubigny,  the  friend  of 
George  Eliot,  was  in  England  at  the  time.  Meissonier,  the 
painter  of  battles;  Gustave  Dore;  Victor  Giraud,  who  had 
three  salon  prizes  to  his  credit;  the  realist  Courbet;  Puvis 
de  Chavannes,  were  some  of  those  whose  works  enriched 
the  exhibition.  Even  its  catalogue  now  would  prove  en- 
thralling to  connoisseurs.  British  artists  very  eagerly  con- 
tributed their  work,  also,  to  assist  France,  and  such  collec- 
tors as  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  the  Marquis  of  Lansdowne, 
and  Miss  Burdett-Coutts  stripped  their  galleries  of  their 
dearest  treasures  to  join  with  them.  Towards  the  middle 
of  the  month,  the  Lord  Mayor's  Fund  for  the  relief  of  the 
noncombatants  in  the  environs  of  Paris  afforded  another  in- 
nocuous method  by  which  a  respectable  Briton  could  dis- 
creetly show  his  sympathy  for  France.2 

Irritation  at  Prussia  was  being  augmented  by  certain 
verbal  bombs  which  she  let  fly  at  England  during  the  pro- 
gress of  the  seige.     On  January  the  sixth,  the  Times  re- 

1  Letters  of  John  Stuart  Mill,  vol.  ii,  pp.  292  et  seq. 

2  Art,  Pictorial  and  Industrial,   Jan.,   1871,  pp.   152-153;  Athenaeum, 
Jan.  7,  1871,  p.  25;  Times,  Jan.  17,  1871. 


290      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [290 

ported  that  the  Moniteur  of  Versailles,  "  a  French  journal 
possessed  of  a  German  spirit,  and  pursuing  German  ends) 
under  a  French  disguise/'  announced  that  the  only  part  left 
for  England  to  play  was  that  of  effacing  herself.  In  main- 
taining his  contention,  the  writer  examined  critically  the 
British  military  system  and  pronounced  its  condition  quite 
hopeless.  No  matter  how  strongly  the  Tories  of  the  Stand- 
ard and  the  Quarterly  might  have  enunciated  the  same  opin- 
ion, after  they  themselves  had  reviewed  the  mistakes  of  Mr. 
Cardwell,  they  lost  their  party  attitude  of  criticism  and  be- 
came sputtering  Britishers  as  soon  as  victorious  foreigners 
sneered  at  their  army. 

To  still  their  resentment,  the  Times  was  informed  very 
promptly  that  the  irritating  article  had  not  possessed  the 
official  authority  which  its  publication  in  the  Moniteur  had 
seemed  to  argue.1  But  that  measurements  were  still  being 
taken  for  John  Bull's  shroud,  appeared  from  the  fine  plans 
for  invasion  which  young  officers  were  making  at  Versailles 
and  Orleans.2  Disraeli,  who  believed  it  would  be  fatal  for 
his  party  to  adopt  an  anti-German  policy,  was  fearful  that 
his  fellow  Tories,  in  their  zeal  for  repairing  the  country's 
defences,  would  be  led  to  make  a  bogey  of  victorious  Ger- 
many.3 David  Urquhart,  on  the  other  hand,  found  a  cer- 
tain satisfaction  in  the  fact  that  Lord  Derby  busied  himself 
with  calculations  as  to  the  number  of  men  von  Moltke  would 
need  to  conquer  England.  For  a  long  time  he  had  been 
preaching  that  Prussia  was  the  agent  with  which  Russia 
intended  to  avenge  the  Crimea.4  The  man  of  anomalies 
found  himself  at  ease  now  that  England,  also,  was  suspicious. 

1  Times,  Jan.  12,  1871. 

2  Daily  Telegraph,  Jan.  4,  1871 ;  Invasion  of  France,  Quarterly  Re- 
view, Jan.,  1871,  pp.  122  et  seq. 

3  Buckle,  Life  of  Disraeli,  vol.  v. 
*  Diplomatic  Review,  Jan.,  1871. 


291]  "  PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  291 

Day  by  day,  the  papers  showed  themselves  more  critical 
of  Prussia's  conduct.  When  German  headquarters  at 
Versailles  misquoted  an  official  French  document  in  order  to 
assert  that  the  Provisional  Government  was  offering  a 
bounty  to  any  imprisoned  officer  who  would  break  his 
parole  and  escape,  the  Spectator  branded  the  charge  as  a 
deliberate  and  dishonorable  falsehood.1  British  papers  re- 
printed the  French  offer,  which  specifically  excepted  from 
its  provisions  those  officers  who  had  made  any  sort  of  agree- 
ment with  the  Germans.  When  the  accusation  was  later 
embodied  in  a  circular  and  coupled  with  an  attack  on  France 
for  alleged  breaches  of  the  Geneva  Conventions,  it  was  again 
condemned  as  false  by  the  British  press,  and  the  cited  viola- 
tions against  the  Red  Cross  were  discounted  as  being  unac- 
companied by  proof.  Bismarck  was  criticised,  moreover, 
for  having  couched  his  charges  in  insolent  phrases  that 
compared  badly  with  the  courteous  tone  of  the  Chaudordy 
Circular.  "  So  far,"  said  the  Scotsman,  "  as  the  tone  and 
tendency  of  Count  Bismarck's  dispatch  can  be  regarded  asi 
an  indication  of  the  national  character  of  which  he  says  so 
much,  they  would  show  the  Germans  incapable  of  any  mercy 
towards  those  who  might  be  under  their  feet."  2 

A  war  correspondent  of  the  News,  while  claiming  that, 
as  a  rule,  the  French  "  religiously  respected  "  the  Geneva 
flag,  admitted  that  there  were  too  often  grounds  for  their 
suspecting  it  when  it  flew  from  the  German  lines.  For 
the  French  had  found  their  adversaries  full  of  tricks.  One 
of  these  was  to  shelter  their1  operations  under  its  care.  To 
quote  directly :  "  The  chiefs  of  an  army  would  not  sanction 
such  a  use  to  it ;  but  an  army  is  made  up  of  units  and  com- 
panies ....  and  these  units  and  small  companies,  when 
detached,  will  be  found  to  possess  in  diverse  degrees  the 

1  Spectator,  Jan.  7,  1871. 

*  Weekly  Scotsman,  Jan.  21,  1871. 


292      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [292 

sentiment  of  honour.  Various  detachments  have  been 
known  to  seek  for  success  by  unworthy  wiles,  as  for  ex- 
ample, by  holding  their  muskets  butt-end  upwards,  in  sign 
of  surrender,  when  they  had  no  intention  of  surrendering 
....  and  others  have  been  known  to  shelter  themselves 
from  attack  by  hoisting  the  Red  Cross  on  posts  when  they 
wished  to  make  themselves  comfortable."  1 

C.  Allanson  Winn,  who  accompanied  General  von  Goben's 
corps  throughout  the  campaign  and  expressed  in  his  early 
letters  much  admiration  for  the  victors,  wrote  in  January 
that  the  Prussian  Army  had  greatly  deteriorated,  both  in 
system  and  morale.  It  had  come  to  conduct  itself  in  a 
manner  "  worthy  of  the  Imperialists  of  the  Thirty  Years 
War."  Among  other  of  his  charges,  he  claimed  that  at 
Metz  and  other  towns  the  Prussians  had  violated  interna- 
tional law  by  compelling  the  civilian  inhabitants  to  con- 
struct rifle  pits  and  earthworks.2  The  more  famous  cor- 
respondent of  the  Times,  Mr.  Russell,  wrote  regretfully 
from  Versailles  of  the  inexplicable  harshness  of  the  German 
prefect  there.  M.  Rameau,  the  mayor,  who  earlier  in  the 
war  had  been  courteously  received  by  Bismarck,  had  been 
placed  in  a  cell  in  a  common  prison,  where  he  was  "  ill  nearly 
to  death."  Three  members  of  his  Council  had  also  been 
imprisoned.  The  charge  was  that  they  had  refused  to  pay 
the  fine  imposed  for  their  not  having  opened  a  store  of 
groceries  on  a  certain  day.  The  supplies  for  the  store, 
which  had  been  bought  in  Germany,  had  not  reached  Ver- 
sailles, because  the  German  authorities  had  refused  to  al- 
low them  to  be  conveyed  thither  by  the  French  railways. 
One  could  not  make  bricks  without  straw,  observed  the 
Spectator,  even  though  ordered  to  do  so  by  a  German  pre- 
fect.3 

1  Daily  News,  Jan.  16,  1871. 

2  What  I  Saw  of  the  War,  Athenaeum,  Jan.  7,  1871,  PP-  «  et  seq. 
-Spectator,  Jan.  7,  1871. 


293]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  293 

Another  matter,  which  incurred  the  disfavour  of  the 
British,  was  the  increasing  confiscation  of  property  !by 
"  requisitions."  An  English  doctor  with  the  German  army 
described  it  as  a  pretty  way  of  borrowing  without  payment. 
The  Bavarians,  he  said,  by  grace  of  it,  swept  the  villages 
of  everything.  "  They  remind  one  always  of  a  visitation  of 
locusts.  One  meets  them  on  the  road  to  Paris  with  a 
couple  of  champagne  bottles  slung  at  each  side.  If  one 
goes  south  there  are  more  Bavarians,  if  one  goes  north, 
there  they  are  again." x 

It  was  these  accounts  of  the  changed  character  of  the 
German  conduct  that  made  the  British  very  ready  to 
laugh  at  the  telegraphic  news  that  Judy  claimed  to  have  in- 
tercepted for  their  enlightenment.  Early  in  January,  it 
published  the  following: 

"  Today  a  short  but  violent  attack  of  the  enemy  was  made  on 
the  five  hundredth  division,  which  being  reenforced  by  the  Duke 
of  Muckbigstuck  with  the  nine  hundredth  division,  captured  the 
whole  of  the  French  Army  of  the  Loire  and  other  places,  with  the 
exception  of  one  chasseur  and  a  drummer  boy,  who  have  since 
entrenched  themselves  and  now  threaten  our  right  wing.  As  yet 
they  haven't  done  much.     Providence  with  us,  as  usual." 

"  The  enemy  violently  attacked  us  yesterday  in  enormous  force, 
but  was  victoriously  repulsed  by  the  two  hundred  and  forty-ninth 
division  of  the  Mucklehumburgers  of  the  Guard,  and  pursued  as 
far  as  the  clouds,  to  which  they  had  carried  off  their  heavy  artil- 
lery in  balloons.  A  few  thousand  prisoners  fell  into  our  hands, 
together  with  three  bottles  of  vin  ordinaire  and  a  corkscrew.  Our 
losses  are  one  spiked  helmet  and  a  coloured  clay  pipe.  Providence 
is  clearly  on  our  side." 

But  though  Judy  thus  followed  the  policy  of  her  con- 

1  In  the  Field  with  the  Prussians,  Paris  and  the  War,  All  the  Year 
Round,  Jan.  14,  1871,  on  German  reprisals.  Cf.  Humphrey  Sandwith, 
The  War  and  the  Ambulance,  Macmillan's  Magazine,  Nov.,  1870,  pp.  38 
et  seq.;  Archibald  Forbes,  My  Experience  of  the  War  betzueen  France 
and  Germany,  p.  259;  Temple  Bar,  Sept.  5,  1870;  Spectator,  Feb.  4,  1871. 


2Q4      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [294 

temporaries,  Punch  and  Fun,  in  transferring  her  sympathy 
to  France,  and  a  change  in  the  leaders  of  the  more  serious 
papers  was  easily  noticeable,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that 
Germany  was  left  without  sympathizers.  That  country's 
defenders  were  many,  and  they  were  strengthened  at  this 
time  by  Bismarck's  admirable  attitude  in  the  matter  of  the 
Duclair  incident.  On  January  the  ninth,  the  Foreign  Office 
was  reassured  by  a  communication  from  the  Chancellor  which 
admitted  the  claim  of  the  British  ship  owners  to  indemnifica- 
tion, and  promised  to  reimburse  them  as  soon  as  their  losses 
could  be  equitably  estimated.1  From  Versailles,  Odo  Rus- 
sell wrote  that  Bismarck  had  gracefully  waived  the  question 
of  the  merits  of  the  case,  because  he  valued  the  friendship 
and  good  will  of  England  too  highly  to  endanger  it  by  ac- 
cepting the  exonerating  decision  of  his  law  officers.2  The 
Spectator  was  happy  to  find  that  he  had  shown  himself  so 
reasonable  in  the  matter  and  regretted  that  many  bellicose 
British  had  attempted  to  use  a  petty  incident  to  coerce  the 
Government  into  a  change  of  policy.  The  Saturday  Review 
praised  the  Count's  despatch  for  its  courtesy  and  found  its 
content  perfectly  satisfactory  to  the  British  claims.3 

This  display  of  amenity  on  the  part  of  Bismarck  may  have 
tempered,  somewhat,  the  reception  that  was  accorded  to 
certain  efforts  made  at  this  time  to  regain  sympathy  by  a 
restatement  of  the  German  case.  The  Fortnightly  Review, 
then  current,  contained  noteworthy  articles  by  Professor  von 
Sybel  and  Karl  Blind,  both  of  whom  attempted  to  show  that 
German  supremacy  would,  truly,  be  an  advantage  to  Europe. 
The  News  was  sceptical.     It  saw  more  grounds  for  hope  in 

1  Bismarck  to  Bernstorff,  Jan.  8.  1871 ;  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxii, 

P-  5- 

2  Odo  Russell  to  Granville,  Jan.  8,   1871  ;  ibid.,  vol.  lxxi,  p.  6.     Cf. 
Stowell  and  Munro,  International  Cases,  vol.  ii,  pp.  548-549. 

2  Issues  of  Jan.  14,  1871. 


295]  " PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  295 

the  French  Republic,  now  battling  so  valiantly,  than  it  did 
in  the  prospective  German  Empire.  The  first  could  only  per- 
plex despotic  monarchs  with  a  fear  of  change;  the  second 
might  be  expected  to  sit  like  a  nightmare  on  the  liberal 
aspirations  of  the  world.1 

Of  more  importance  than  the  articles  in  magazines,  was 
a  pamphlet  collection  of  letters  on  the  war  by  Mommsen, 
Strauss,  Max  Miiller,  and  Carlyle.2  It  was  not  new  mater- 
ial. The  letters  of  Carlyle  already  had  been  widely  com- 
mented on,  as  had  those  written  by  Professor  Miiller  in  his 
controversy  with  the  famous  "  Scrutator,"  Count  Gasparin. 
But  their  appearance  within  the  same  cover  afforded  a  very 
valuable  and  succinct  statement  of  the  German  case.  The 
Daily  Telegraph  summed  up  their  joint  pleadings  as  falling 
under  the  heads  of  ethical,  strategical,  and  penal  arguments 
for  the  Tightness  of  success.  As  for  the  ethical  reason  for 
the  transfer  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  Germany,  the  Tele- 
graph declared  that  plain  English  common  sense,  uninspired 
by  the  ultra-Kantish  mysticism  of  modern  Germany,  could 
not  understand  the  sacredness,  or  even  the  logic,  of  the 
"  obligation  "  which  the  conquerors  claimed  impelled  them 
to  annex  a  population  so  passionately  French  as  to  show  a 
murderous  antipathy  for  its  self-appointed  benefactors.  In 
regard  to  the  strategic  argument,  the  Telegraph  submitted 
that  it  had  been  greatly  weakened  by  the  creation  of  a  power- 
ful Teutonic  state,  and  urged  that  German  strategists,  in 
conjunction  with  neutrals,  direct  the  Empire  to  a  readjust- 
ment of  its  claims.  The  punitive  argument  was  dismissed  as 
representing  a  vindictiveness  incompatible  with  civilization. 
Nor  could  her  claims  in  this  respect  be  salutary  for  herself. 
A  permanent  humiliation,  the  Telegraph  believed,  would  be 

1  Daily  News,  Jan.  5,  1871. 

2  T.  Mommsen,  D.  F.  Strauss,  F.  Max  Miiller,  T.  Carlyle,  Letters  on 
the  War  between  Germany  and  France  (London,  1871). 


2Q6      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [296 

a  perpetual  provocation  to  hostility,  rather  than  a  guarantee 
of  peace.1 

The  fact  that  arguments  which  could  not  be  esteemed  by 
the  English  were  thus  presented  by  Germans,  from  whom 
the  most  exalted  opinions  were  expected,  was  dishearten- 
ing. George  Eliot  wrote  that  she  was  pained  to  find  the 
educated  voices  had  not  a  higher  moral  tone  about  national 
and  international  duties  and  prospects.  But  then,  she  ad- 
ded, no  people  can  carry  on  a  long  war  without  being  brutal- 
ized by  it.2  Meredith,  too,  noted  the  dangerous  exaltation 
of  Germany's  defenders.  "  One  smells,"  he  said,  "  the 
cognac  of  victory."  He  admired  the  German  at  all  times, 
but  he  admired  France,  too,  and  never  more  than  in  defeat.* 
The  Fortnightly,  that  carried  von  Sybl's  defence  of  the 
Fatherland,  was  enriched  by  a  soaring  ode  in  which  Meredith 
praised  the  unconquerable  spirit  of  France.4 

A  fugitive,  but  not  inaccurate,  gage  of  public  opinion 
during  this  month  was  afforded  by  the  activities  of  Parlia- 
mentarians in  the  provinces.  It  behooved  honourable  mem- 
bers, even  more  than  it  did  editors,  to  show  a  meticulous 
regard  for  the  public's  sympathies.  The  near  approach  of 
the  sessions  was  a  stimulus,  too,  to  all  those  ex-ofncio 
orators  who  were  accustomed  to  speak  with  excessive  shrill- 
ness and  persistence  because  they  knew  they  must  remain 
without  the  walls.  A  notable  meeting,  held  on  the  tenth 
at  St.  James's  Hall,  afforded  an  auspicious  opportunity  for 
speakers  to  outline  for  absent  Parliamentarians  the  course 
that  they  were  desired  to  pursue.  It  was  organized  by  a 
few  Positivists  and  their  political  allies,  without  the  aid  of  a 

1  Daily  Telegraph,  Jan.  28,  1871. 

2  George  Eliot,  Complete  Works  (Life  and  Letters),  p.  555. 

*  Meredith  to  Capt.  Maxse,  Jan.  3,  1871,  Letters  of  George  Meredith, 
vol.  i,  p.  222. 

4  Meredith,  France,  1870,  Fortnightly,  Jan.  1,  1871,  vol.  xv,  pp.  87-94. 


297]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  297 

single  member  from  either  House.  Professor  Beesly  was 
the  chairman.  Among  the  speakers  were  Captain  Maxse 
(who  served  Meredith  for  the  hero  of  Beauchamp's  Career), 
and  Sir  William  Marriott — both  of  whom  were  looking  out 
for  Radical  seats;  Mr.  Bradlaugh,  who  later  occupied  one 
after  a  spirited  physical  and  legal  contest  with  those  mem- 
bers that  were  unwilling  to  admit  an  atheist;  Mr.  Odger, 
whom  the  papers  described  as  a  professional  agitator;  and 
Mr.  Frederic  Harrison,  whose  Bismarckism,  reprinted  in 
pamphlet  form,  was  having  a  tremendous  sale. 

"  The  meeting,"  according  to  Harrison's  Memoirs,  "  was 
as  hotly  bellicose  as  could  be  imagined."  The  hall  was; 
crowded,  and  the  audience  contested  with  the  speakers  the 
privilege  of  being  vociferous.  It  was  resolved  that  the  Gov- 
ernment should  be  urged  to  ascertain  from  Germany  the 
terms  on  which  peace  could  be  made ;  and  that,  in  the  event 
that  a  cession  of  French  territory  was  demanded,  England 
should  call  on  the  neutral  Powers  to  join  with  her  in  re- 
sisting it.  An  attempt  was  made  by  some  of  the  more 
pacific  to  amend  the  motion  by  declaring  against  interven- 
tion. But  this  was  shouted  down.  No  one  dared  to  of- 
fer for  consideration  the  printed  list  of  proposals  that  had 
been  prepared  by  the  Peace  Party.  Every  allusion  to  Re- 
publicanism was  cheered  to  the  echo,  and  Gladstone  was 
condemned  in  forceful  language  for  having  failed  to  re- 
cognize the  Government  of  France.1 

The  ardour  of  the  meeting  proved  alarming  to  the  Bri- 
tish press.  In  an  attempt  at  comfort,  the  Globe  maintained 
that  though  the  hall  was  crowded,  it  still  had  held  only  "  a 
minute  proportion  of  the  workingmen  of  London,"  and  that 
the  "  better  class  "  of  this  substratum  of  British  society  had 
remained  away.2     The  Spectator  believed  that  the  ambition 

1  Examiner,  Jan.  14,  1871 ;  Times,  Jan.  11,  1871 ;  Frederic  Harrison, 
Autobiographic  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  p.  15. 

2  Globe  and  Traveller,  Jan.  12,  1871. 


298      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [298 

of  the  friends  of  France  to  influence  the  Government  had 
o'erleaped  itself  to  its  own  injury.  The  Economist,  after  an 
elaborate  analysis  of  the  condition  of  public  opinion,  de^ 
nounced  the  meeting  as  being  misrepresentative  of  the 
wishes  of  the  majority.  "  Nobody  could  think  for  a  mom- 
ent," it  declared,  "  that  Professor  Beesly,  and  Mr.  Frederic 
Harrison,  and  Mr.  Congreve  are  in  any  sense  exponents 
of  a  large  section  of  English  society.  So  far  as  we  have 
any  knowledge  of  the  middle  class,  we  should  say  that  these 
gentlemen's  sympathies  are  often  a  very  fair  measure  of  the 
antipathies  of  the  greater  portion  of  that  class."  They 
were  rather,  thought  the  Economist,  the  exponents  of  the 
agitators  among  the  trades  unions,  and  of  that  political  sec- 
tion of  the  working  class  which  the  last  election  had  shown 
to  be  small.1  But  even  those  journals  that  depreciated  the 
importance  of  the  meeting  at  St.  James's  Hall  were  willing 
to  make  of  the  occasion  a  text  for  a  discourse  to  the  Min- 
istry on  its  unpopularity.  Such  meetings  as  this,  they  said, 
would  have  provided  a  valuable  lesson  for  any  premier 
capable  of  rising  to  the  conception  of  a  foreign  policy. 
Gladstone  was  not  such  a  one.  He  was  a  chairman  of  a 
vestry  grown  to  colossal  proportions,  and  could  not  change 
his  qualities,2 

A  meeting  of  the  Prime  Minister's  constituents,  held  at 
Greenwich  at  about  the  same  time  as  the  London  meeting, 
gave  evidence,  more  startling,  of  the  discontent  he  had 
aroused.  Resolutions  were  prepared  and  read,  declaring 
that  the  electors  had  ceased  to  have  confidence  either  in  his 
home  or  his  foreign  policy,  and  demanding  a  restoration  of 
that  parliamentary  trust,  which  in  an  "  unguarded  and  evil 
hour,"  had  been  committed  to  his  care.  Such  confusion 
resulted  that  the  resolutions  could  not  be  submitted  to  a  vote. 

1  Spectator  and  Economist,  issues  of  Jan.  14,  1871. 

2  Jan.  28,  1871 ;  Standard,  Jan.  12,  1871. 


299]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  299 

A  show  of  hands,  however,  was  accepted  as  an  indication 
that  Greenwich  was  still  willing  to  be  represented  by  the 
Prime  Minister,  and  the  meeting  was  hastily  adjourned. 
Such  public  evidence  of  dissatisfaction  among  the  consti- 
tuency that  two  years  before  had  chosen  him  its  representa- 
tive, certainly,  did  nothing  to  fortify  his  waning  power.1 
The  explanation  given  was  that  the  meeting  had  been 
swayed  by  a  local  grievance,   incidental  to  the  policy  of 
isolation  and  disarmament.    .Among  the  dockyards  closed  by 
the  First  Lord  of  the  admiralty  had  been  the  one  at  Deptford, 
which  had  given  much  employment  to  the  citizens  of  Green- 
wich. Discontent  at  the  resulting  hardships  had  been  keen,2 
and  Mr.  Gladstone  had  not  chosen  to  allay  it  by  following  the 
example  of  lesser  Parliamentarians,  who  courted  their  consti- 
tuents with  seasonable  speeches.     He  had  disregarded,  alike, 
the  power  of  words  and  the  influence  of  the  pocket  book. 
Not  until  the  coming  sessions  could  the  mistake  be  repaired. 
Edward  Bulwer,  in  a  letter  to  his  son,  recorded  that  the  Gov- 
ernment was  "  terribly  out  of  favour  with  all  parties,  and 
Gladstone  distrusted  and  almost  despised."     He  believed, 
however,   that   when   Parliament   opened,  a   few  speeches 
might  bolster  up  the  Cabinet  until  those  dampers,  the  taxes, 
could  moderate  the  growing  ardour  for  defense  and  Euro- 
pean prestige.3 

Sir  Charles  Dilke  was  winning  applause  at  Chelsea  by 
scoring  the  Government  for  withholding  recognition  from 
the  French  Republic,  and  for  doing  nothing  to  prevent  the 
loss  of  territory.4     The  Member  for  Bradford,  Mr.  For- 

1  Saunders",  Jan.  11;  Economist,  Jan.  21,  1871. 

2  Spencer  Walpole,  History  of  Twenty-five  Years,  vol.  ii,  pp.  117-118. 

3  Bulwer  to  Owen  Meredith,  Jan.  29,  1871,  second  Earl  of  Lytton, 
Life,  Letters,  and  Literary  Remains  of  Edward  Bulwer,  First  Lord 
Lytton  (N.  Y.,  1883),  vol.  ii,  p.  477- 

4  Spectator,  Jan.  14,  1871. 


3oo      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [300 

ster,  was  treated  to  a  vehement  manifestation  of  discon- 
tent when  he  endeavoured  a  defence  of  the  Governmental 
policy.1  Sir  Henry  Hoare,  however,  on  attempting  to  win 
in  the  provinces  that  agreement  to  an  active  French  alliance, 
which  he  had  often  heard  acclaimed  in  London,  was  forced 
to  acknowledge  a  failure.2  The  critics  of  the  Government, 
when  they  ranged  afield,  missed  the  support  of  pauperism, 
that  in  the  capital  provided  a  second  for  any  motion  ex- 
pressing discontent  and  giving  promise  of  employment. 

Mr.  Bradlaugh,  and  Mr.  Odger,  before  audiences  which 
the  Times  described  as  made  up  of  the  class  that  followed 
them,  continued  to  protest,  ad  libitum,  against  the  pro-Prus- 
sian tendency  of  the  Government  and  sometimes  adjourned 
their  meetings  with  loud  groans  for  the  German  Army,  the 
King,  and  Count  Bismarck.3  The  Catechism  for  Interven- 
tion was  well  thumbed  in  the  Capital,  in  spite  of  the  activi- 
ties of  the  Metropolitan  Peace  Party;4  and  those  who 
quoted  it  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  their  attempts  at 
oratory  treated  with  unaccustomed  respect  by  Tory  papers.5 
Liberals  were  alarmed  at  the  widening  breach  between  the 
Government  and  the  Radicals.6  They  were  convinced  that 
the  alliance  could  last  no  longer  than  the  period  of  tension 
which  was  being  caused  by  an  exceptional  situation.  But 
the  matter  was  particularly  regrettable  because  diplomats 
were  expected  soon  to  assemble  for  the  discussion  of  the 
Black  Sea  matter.  It  was  hoped  that  while  their  sessions 
were  in  progress  there  would  occur  no  flagrant  indication 
of  the  Government's  unpopularity. 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  Jan.  18,  1871 ;  Spectator,  Jan.  21,  1871. 

2  Spectator,  Jan.  14,  1871. 

3  Times,  Jan.  13,  1871. 

i  The  Mail,  Jan.  13,  1871. 

5  Cf.  Weekly  Scotsman,  Jan.  14,  1871. 

•  Globe  and  Traveller,  Jan.  5,  1871. 


30I]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  30 1 

Fortunately  for  the  Liberals,  the  event  of  the  Conference 
provided  such  a  test  for  the  new  political  alliance  as  they 
had  longed  for.  It  had  been  extensively  remarked  that 
Conservatives'  sympathy  had  been  much  strained,  because 
their  new  allies  in  the  demand  for  a  policy  of  increased 
armament  and  active  intervention  were  even  more  vocifer- 
ous in  their  enthusiasm  for  republicanism.  Trouble  was 
foreseen  when  it  became  rumoured  in  London  that  Jules 
Favre,  who  more  than  anyone  at  that  time  was  representa- 
tive of  this  principle,  would  represent  France  at  the  Con- 
ference. M.  Favre,  as  delegate  of  France,  would  have  been 
welcomed  by  the  Tories  right  heartily;  M.  Favre,  as  the 
exponent  of  those  theories  with  which  former  French  Re- 
publics had  alarmed  their  neighbors,  might  be  expected  to 
carry  in  his  brief  case  the  bomb  of  international  revolution. 
The  Trades  Unions  and  the  great  Benefit  Societies  formed 
the  project  of  welcoming  him  by  a  tremendous  ovation. 
According  to  the  Spectator,  it  appeared  that  the  reception 
was  to  be  as  imposing  and  spectacular  as  a  former  one  ten- 
dered to  Garibaldi.1  The  Irish  were  to  turn  out  to  a  man. 
In  every  possible  way  the  demonstrators  were  to  express 
their  sympathy  for  France  and  their  indignation  that  its' 
Government  had  not  been  recognized.  The  "  Jules  Favre 
Demonstration  Committee "  planned  incessantly,  and  its 
work  was  detailed  to  meetings  that  expressed  approval  by 
liberal  subscriptions.  There  was  a  certain  flamboyance 
about  the  project  that  caused  Conservatives  to  shake  their 
heads.  In  the  procession  Mr.  Odger  was  arranging,  there 
was  to  be  carried  a  Union  Jack  muddied  with  foot-prints  to 
recall  the  insults  that  were  supposed  to  have  been  put  upon  it 
at  Duclair.  Close  by  was  to  be  carried  a  legend,  describing 
it  as  "  the  flag  that  braved  a  thousand  years,"  and  another, 

1  Spectator,  Jan.  14,  1871. 


302      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [302 

with  the  declaration  that  "  Britannia  rules  the  waves."  In 
the  vanguard  were  to  march  uniformed  Volunteers,  to  show 
that  it  was  through  no  want  of  enthusiasm  in  the  army  that 
England  held  aloof.1  But  the  Government  decisively  vetoed 
this  last  plan  and  ignored  the  protests  that  Volunteers 
should  enjoy  civilians'  rights  except  when  the  country  was 
about  to  be  invaded.2 

In  spite  of  these  finely  elaborated  plans,  there  was  no 
parade  on  the  appointed  day.  The  seventeenth  of  January 
saw  diplomats  from  Prussia,  Austria,  Turkey,  Italy,  and 
Russia  quietly  make  their  way  to  the  Conference,  but  the 
representative  of  France  was  conspicuously  absent.  It  was 
said  that  though  Jules  Favre  had  accepted  the  commission 
of  the  Bordeaux  Government  to  represent  France,  he  found 
that,  at  the  moment,  it  would  be  inexpedient  to  quit  the  side 
of  General  Trochu.  Under  the  circumstances,  the  Confer- 
ence was  adjourned  for  a  week,  after  having  declared  that  a 
treaty,  contracted  collectively,  could  not  be  abrogated  ex- 
cept by  the  collective  consent  of  the  signatories.31  Mr. 
Odger  and  Mr.  Merriman,  with  a  few  others,  met  disconsol- 
ately in  the  French  Minister's  committee  room  and  entrusted 
an  address  to  the  editor  of  La  Liberte,  which,  on  his 
return  to  France,  he  was  to  use  to  induce  Favre  to  hasten 
over.4 

The  public  welcome  to  the  French  apostle  of  republican- 
ism was  indefinitely  postponed.  But  on  the  following  day, 
the  King  of  Prussia  became  German  Emperor  and  was 
speedily  felicitated  on  his  new  honour  by  Great  Britain' si 

1  National  Reformer,   Jan.   15,    1871 ;  Manchester  Guardian,  Jan.   12, 
1871  ;  Judy,  Jan.  18,  1871 ;  Daily  Telegraph,  Jan.  19,  1871. 

2  Volunteer  Service  Gazette,  Jan.  28,  1871 ;  Times,  Jan.  18,  1871. 

3  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  iii,  p.  1904 ;  Morley,  Life 
of  Gladstone,  vol.  ii,  p.  356. 

4  Times,  Jan.  19,  1871. 


303]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  303 

Queen.  It  cannot  be  said  that  the  haste  of  the  Royal  con- 
gratulations was  in  any  way  indicative  of  British  opinion  on 
the  ceremony  that  took  place  in  the  Hall  of  Mirrors  at 
Versailles.  From  first  to  last,  England  showed  herself  dis- 
gruntled. The  title  of  Kaiser  recalled  to  her  memories  of 
absolute  government  and  aggressive  war.1  "  Names  ex- 
press things,"  observed  the  Saturday  Review,  "  the  revived 
German  Empire  is  the  index  of  great  changes  which  have 
already  happened  and  it  probably  points  the  way  to  changes 
of  equal  magnitude  to  come."  His  title  was  conferred  on 
the  uniformed  monarch  by  another  king,  also  in  uniform, 
and  in  the  midst  of  victorious  generals.  "  Thou  hast  it 
now,"  chanted  the  News,  "  '  King,  Cawdor,  Glamis,  all ' — ■ 
King  of  an  enlarged  Prussia,  President  of  the  North  Ger- 
man Confederation,  Emperor  of  Germany  ....  We  are 
willing  to  hope  that  a  future  better,  if  less  brilliant  and  ad- 
venturous than  her  past,  awaits  the  Prussian  nation."  It 
was  fearful,  however,  that  the  successes  of  the  present  cam- 
paign might  serve  to  fortify  that  military  element  in  Prus- 
sia, which  for  centuries  had  outweighed  the  interests  of 
the  civilian.3 

To  be  sure,  the  new  Emperor  sketched  a  gracious  pro- 
gramme for  Germany  to  carry  out  under  the  shadow  of  his 
throne.  "  The  new  German  Empire,"  said  William  I, 
"  will,  I  hope,  be  an  empire  of  peace."  His  wish  read  like  a 
mocker}'  to  the  Guardian,  that  compared  it  with  rumoured 
conditions  of  a  peace  which  would  be  the  equivalent  of  a 
proclamation  of  perpetual  war  with  France.4  The  Tablet, 
too,  after  noticing  the  cause  given  France  and  Austria  to 
plan  for  revenge,  and  the  alarm  England  was  beginning  to 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  Dec.  9,  1870. 
'Saturday  Review,  Dec.  17,  1870. 
1  Daily  News,  Dec.  8,  1870. 
4  Manchester  Guardian,  Jan.  17,  1871. 


304      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [304 

feel  over  an  invasion,  could  not  see  on  the  political  horizon 
those  fair  visions  of  an  abiding  peace  that  seemed  to  have 
inspired  his  message.1  The  fear  of  the  military  strength  of 
Prussia,  prophesied  the  Newcastle  Chronicle,  for  years  to 
come  would  arrest  the;  pacific  development  essential  to 
Europe's  prosperity.2  Tradition  belied  the  Emperor's 
promises.  He  was  one  of  that  house  which  had  for  its  ideal 
the  organization  of  a  state  into  an  armed  camp.  What  his 
line  had  done  for  Prussia,  it  was  feared,  it  would  do  now 
for  all  Germany.  "  Prussia  is  by  no  means  the  noblest  of 
nations,"  said  the  Globe. 

She  has  not  a  notion  of  what  is  meant  by  true  political  life.  Her 
ideal  man  is  a  soldier.  The  Government  may  trample  on  the 
Constitution,  but  what  is  that  to  the  meek  citizen?  After  all,  the 
Constitution  is  the  gift  of  the  Crown.  The  state  is  everything 
and  the  individual  nothing.3 

Since  the  sovereign  was  supposed  to  body  forth  the  state 
for  mortal  man, — since  even  the  great  Bismarck  prided  him- 
self on  rendering  him  feudal  fealty,  the  character  of  Wil- 
liam I  was  of  the  greatest  interest  to  the  British.  Vanity  Fair 
presented  its  readers  with  a  startling  cartoon  of  the  man, 
who  had  just  been  proclaimed  Emperor,  "  by  the  grace  of 
Krupp."  He  was  represented  as  seated  at  dinner, — a 
gargantuan  figure  in  a  bemedalled  uniform.  Propped  on 
the  table  were  a  huge  fork  and  knife  bearing  the  legend, 
"  Bismarck  Fab."  Red  wine  had  spilled  from  his  glass 
on  the  white  table  linen.  A  bottle  of  "  Rhin  "  was  at  his 
right  hand,  and  servitors  bearing  salvers  heaped  with  money 
bags  ascended  to  the  table  on  long  ladders.  The  sketch  of 
the  Emperor's  career,  which  accompanied  the  picture,  ex- 

1  Tablet,  Jan.  21,  1871. 

2  Newcastle  Daily  Chronicle,  Jan.  14,  1871. 

3  Globe  and  Traveller,  Dec.  28,  1870. 


305]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  305 

ceeded  in  its  abuse  even  the  vehement  Standard.  He  was 
described  as  resembling  a  domesticated  tiger,  which  once 
having  tasted  blood,  still  longed  for  more.  Scheswig- 
Holstein,  Saxony,  and  Hesse  were  named  as  the  victims  he 
had  devoured  to  create  a  zest  for  the  banquet  at  Versailles. 
He  waited  greedily  for  the  destruction  of  Paris,  but  piously, 
withal.  For  piety,  said  Vanity  Fair,  was  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  elements  in  his  character.  He  believed  that 
the  Almighty  preferred  needle  guns,  to  chassepots,  Uhlans  to 
Zouaves,  Germans  to  French,  Prussians  to  Germans,  and  the 
King  of  Prussia — as  his  choicest  instrument — to  all  the 
world.1  Judy  depicted  him  as  catching  up  his  imperial 
robes  to  run  away  with  the  plundered  jewel  casket  of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  He  could  do  this  and  whatever  else  he 
pleased,  said  Judy. 

"  Because,  you  see,  'twas  understood 
He  was  so  very,  very  good — 
He  had  no  fear  of  Nemesis."  2 

If  fierce  barbarity,  reckless  waste  of  life  and  vandalism 
were  the  claims  to  the  title  of  high  and  mighty  Emperor, 
the  Belfast  Examiner  conceded  that  the  right  of  the  pious 
and  hypocritical  William  was  unquestionable.3 

More  temperate  estimates  of  the  Emperor  did  appear,  but 
sparsely.  The  Economist  compared  him  very  cleverly  with 
Wellington,  as  the  Iron  Duke  had  appeared  during  the  long 
peace :  "  a  very  efficient  officer — not  general — of  Tory  opin- 
ions, whose  self  esteem  has  been  a  good  deal  raised  by  suc- 
cess, and  who  judges  of  policy  by  a  narrow,  though  honest 
code, — the  visible  and  immediate  interest  of  the  country 
he  governs." 4     But  tolerance  never  went  so  far  as  to  allow 

1  Vanity  Fair,  Jan.  7,  1871. 

7  Judy,  Feb.  8,  187 1. 

3  Belfast  Examiner,  Jan.  23,  1871. 

■*  Economist,  Jan.  21,  1871. 


306      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [306 

a  eulogy.  'At  the  most,  it  was  only  admitted  that  the  future 
might  modify  the  current  distrust. 

England,  having  been  distracted  for  the  moment  by  the 
Imperial  coronation,  returned  to  her  own  affairs  the  more 
eagerly,  because  the  distraction  had  been  an  unpleasant  one. 
Within  the  interim  of  the  meetings  of  the  Conference, 
politicians,  by  their  speech-making,  continued  to  give  a 
fair  index  of  the  views  that  were  held  on  British  policy. 
One  of  these  was  Mr.  Otway,  an  under  secretary  in  Gran- 
ville's Department,  who  had  resigned  his  office  on  account 
of  the  strong  opinions  he  held  on  the  Government's  paci- 
fism. His  resignation,  says  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  had  fallen 
flat x  and  he  went  to  Chatham  to  explain  his  course  to  hisi 
constituents.  In  his  speech  there,  he  condemned  Bismarck 
for  the  bombardment  of  Paris  and  for  a  brutality  of  speech 
which  would  not  be  forgiven  while  the  Seine  and  Rhine 
should  flow.  In  regard  to  his  own  resignation,  he  intimated 
that  it  had  been  offered  as  a  protest  against  the  timorous1 
policy  of  Ministers,  who  believed  England  had  fallen  so  low 
that,  even  in  conjunction  with  Italy  and  Austria,  she  would 
be  held  of  no  account.2 

At  Manchester,  Mr.  Jacob  Bright  told  his  electors  that  no 
pretext  should  induce  England  to  adopt  a  policy  of  inter- 
meddling. Whatever  might  occur,  he,  for  one,  would  not 
be  tempted,  whether  in  defense  of  treaties  or  anything  else, 
to  depart  from  the  course  which  the  Cabinet  was  now  pur- 
suing. Men  might  say  what  they  would  of  this  policy,  as 
being  mean  and  selfish,  but  he  defied  them  to  show  that  any 
benefit  for  the  world  had  ever  come  from  a  contrary  course.. 
The  Member  for  Leeds,  Mr.  Baines,  confined  his  recommen- 
dations of  pacifism  more  strictly  to  the  matter  in  hand. 
He  hoped  that  the  Government  would  use  all  friendly  means 

1  Gwynn  and  Tuckwell,  Life  of  Sir  Chcs.  Dilke,  vol.  ii,  p.  121. 
*  Spectator,  Jan.  21,  1871. 


307]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  307 

of  bringing  the  war  to  a  close,  but  would,  on  no  account, 
suffer  England  to  be  drawn  into  it.1  Mr.  Samuel  Morley, 
who  had  been  selected  to  second  the  Address  to  the  Throne, 
was  another  of  those  who  favoured  their  constituents  with 
soft,  pacific  utterance.  He  went  so  far  as  to  commend  the 
German  demand  for  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  on  the  ground 
that  the  annexation  would  be  a  guarantee  for  peace.  His 
colleague  for  Bristol,  who  disagreed  with  this  opinion,  was 
at  one  with  him  in  approving  the  policy  of  non-intervention. 
While  these  speeches  were  being  made  in  the  provinces, 
negotiations  were  carried  on  for  the  representation  of 
France  at  the  next  meeting  of  the  Conference.  The  French 
Government  was  insistent  that  the  question  of  the  war  and 
the  position  of  their  .country  should  be  discussed  at  the 
Council  Board.  Granville  opposed  their  insistence  very 
firmly.  He  seemed  more  than  ever  fearful  of  offending  the 
new  Imperator.  For  whereas,  in  the  previous  month  he 
had  shown  himself  eager  to  secure  the  presence  of  the 
French,  he  gave  no  vigorous  support  to  Favre's  request  for 
a  safe  conduct.3  This  complaisance  was  agreeable,  indeed, 
to  Bismarck.  If  his  memoirs  can  be  trusted,  the  Chan- 
cellor was  fearful  that  a  delegate  from  France  might  suc- 
ceed, after  the  manner  of  Talleyrand,  in  grafting  extraneous 
and  troublesome  questions  upon  the  official  programme  of 
discussions.*  Undoubtedly,  Bismarck's  manipulations  to 
prevent  this  were  suspected  in  London.  A  leader  of  the 
Globe  on  the  twenty-third  had  this  to  say : 

But  one  judgment  can  be  pronounced  on  the  refusal  of  Count 
Bismarck  to  grant  the  French  Minister  a  safe  conduct  to  England. 

1  Spectator,  Jan.  21,  1871. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Annual  Register  for  1871,  vol.  cxii,  p.  7 ;  cf.  Morley,  Life  of  Glad- 
stone, vol.  ii,  p.  356. 

4  Bismarck's  Souvenirs,  vol.  ii,  p.  374;  Invasion  of  France,  Quarterly 
Review,  Jan.,  1871,  pp.  122  et  seq. 


308      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [308 

Anything  mare  absurd  than  the  argument  by  which  Bismarck 
supports  his  decision  could  not  easily  be  found  among  the  eccen- 
tricities of  sophistry.  ...  If  Count  Bismarck  holds  that  the 
Committee  of  National  Defense  is  sufficiently  empowered  to  sur- 
render national  territory  into  his  hands,  on  what  principle  does  he 
refuse  to  allow  the  admitted  representative  of  that  body — the  very 
man  with  whom  he  has  previously  treated — the  facilities  necessary 
for  his  appearance  as  the  representative  of  France  at  a  Conference 
where  it  is  conceded  France  must  be  represented  ? 

The  men  who  had  planned  the  rather  spectacular  recep- 
tion for  Jules  Favre  had  to  content  themselves  with  a  pro- 
test meeting  in  Trafalgar  Square  the  night  before  the  recon- 
vening of  the  Conference.  As  the  reporter  of  the  Times 
saw  it,  a  very  large  crowd  stood  for  two  hours  in  a  storm  of 
wind  and  rain,  listening  to  bitter  denunciations  of  the  gov- 
erning class  of  Prussia  and  Great  Britain.  Costermongers' 
"  flamers "  struggled  with  the  wet  darkness,  and  the  flags 
of  fifteen  nations  flapped  dankly  against  their  standard  poles. 
From  the  foot  of  Nelson's  monument,  Odger  protested  that, 
though  the  English  working  class  had  held  meeting  after 
meeting,  and  had  called  upon  the  Government  time  after 
time  to  intervene,  they  had  been  as  little  heeded  as  if  they 
had  inhabited  the  antipodes.  He  named  again  the  reasons 
that  appeared  so  potent  for  British  interference,  and,  when 
he  had  concluded,  the  crowd  voted  resolutions  of  sympathy 
and  indignation.  The  motion  embodying  them  was  pro- 
posed by  an  Irishman  and  seconded  by  a  German.1 

With  that  strange  inconsistence  which  often  appears  in 
reputable  journals  between  editorial  and  reportorial  state- 
ments, the  British  public  was  reassured  on  another  page  of 
the  Times  as  to  the  meeting's  little  importance.  Some  few 
hundred  people  "  clustered  loosely  "  at  Nelson's  monument, 
it  was  admitted,  but  only  the  deceptive  darkness  made  it  ap- 
pear that  they  were  in  unanimity  with  the  speakers.     "  The 

1  Times,  Jan.  24,  1871,  p.  5. 


309]  "PEACE  AT  ANY  PRICE"  309 

only  thing  grand  in  the  demonstration  was  the  attitude  of 
Sir  Edwin  Landseer's  lions,  in  no  inept  representation  of  the 
feelings  of  the  British  lion  himself  towards  those  who  were 
usurping  his  name  and  authority."  1  In  the  Saturday  Re- 
view, the  affair  was  described  as  a  mob  meeting,  promoted 
by  the  organizers  of  half  a  dozen  revolutionary  clubs  which 
occupied  themselves  with  schemes  for  the  overthrow  of 
the  monarchy  and  for  the  general  division  of  property. 
Very  frankly  it  acknowledged  that  England  would  have 
welcomed  the  loss  of  all  the  speakers  at  Trafalgar  Square 
and  nine  tenths  of  their  audience.2 

Foreign  diplomats,  by  these  editorial  utterances,  were 
given  to  understand  that  there  existed  in  England  only 
sweet  concord,  and  that  any  raucous  shoutings  which  might 
have  disturbed  their  slumber  came  only  from  such 
professional  malcontents  as  cumber  all  great  capitals. 
The  Conference  reassembled  on  the  day  following  this 
mooted  demonstration,  and  with  much  peace  and  amity  re- 
cognized the  King  of  Prussia's  new  title  of  German  Em- 
peror. This  service  rendered,  the  diplomats  adjourned  to 
reconvene  in  February,  when  it  was  hoped  Providence 
might  so  order  it  that  an  appropriate  representative  from 
France  be  added  to  their  number.3 

Providence,  that  portion  of  it  which  is  German,  was 
doing  the  very  best  it  could  in  this  regard.  Continued 
French  defeats  and  the  discontent  in  the  capital,  which  had 
broken  out  in  a  radical  disturbance  a  day  or  two  before,  had 
so  worked  upon  the  Paris  Government  that  the  twenty- 
fourth  of  January  found  Favre,  not  in  London,  but  at 
Versailles.  He  was  negotiating  there  for  such  an  armistice 
as  would  permit  the  constitution  of  a  Government  whose  re- 
presentatives could  go  forth  freely  in  the  odor  of  legal 
sanctity. 

1  Ibid.,  Jan.  24,  1871,  p.  9. 

2  Saturday  Review,  Jan.  28,  1871. 


CHAPTER  XV 
The  Armistice 

While  the  British  awaited  the  capitulation  of  Paris,  they 
speculated  with  much  anxiety  on  the  terms  that  might  be 
won  from  Bismarck.  For  it  was  recognized  with  distinct 
misgivings  that  their  determination  would  rest,  not  with 
the  Emperor,  but  with  his  Chancellor.  In  England  a  card 
game  was  in  vogue  called  "  Benedetti," — the  rules  of  which 
amusingly  indicate  the  estimation  then  current  of  the  great 
Prussian's  diplomatic  value.  He  was  represented  by  the 
knave  of  clubs,  and,  in  scoring,  it  was  declared  "  Bismarck  " 
could  take  any  card  at  any  time.  Moreover,  if  the  dealer  had 
the  good  fortune  to  turn  "  Bismarck  "  as  a  trump,  he  was 
privileged  to  score  himself  a  generous  number  of  points.1 

This  belief  that  it  was  the  Chancellor  who  would  shape 
conditions  at  Versailles  and  influence  them  thereafter, 
caused  the  British  to  couple  with  their  fear  for  France  a 
corresponding  discontent  with  their  own  inactivity.  A  very 
clear  index  of  their  feelings  appeared  in  the  tremendous 
vogue  of  a  little  pamphlet  called  The  Fight  at  Dame  Euro- 
pa's  School.  It  was  written  by  William  Henry  Pullen,  a 
Minor  Canon  of  Salisbury,  and  published  by  him,  after  it 
had  been  rejected  by  several  publishers.  So  great  was  its 
popularity  that,  late  in  February,  its  sales  had  totalled  two 
hundred  thousand  copies.  The  reason  that  the  Minor 
Canon  was  so  generously  reimbursed  was  that  he  had  given 
expression  clearly  and  exactly  to  the  public  feeling  of  the 
moment.     "  There   is   nothing,"    says   Goethe,    "  in  which 

1  Colburn's  New  Monthly  Magazine,  Dec,  1870,  vol.  cxlvii,  pp.  714 
et  seq. 

310  [310 


211i  THE  ARMISTICE  3II 

people  more  betray  their  character  than  in  what  they  find 
to  laugh  at."  The  amusement  that  this  slim  pamphlet  ex- 
cited appears  to  have  been  a  sort  of  Freudian  disguise  for  an 
inhibited  pugnacity. 

Dame  Europa's  school  is  described  as  being  made  up  of 
boys  of  every  size  and  character.     The  Five  Great  Powers 
have  been  appointed  by  the  Dame  to  assist  her  as  monitors. 
Of  these,  two,  Louis  and  John,  appear  as  close   friends. 
Louis  had  made  himself  a  garden  and  a  little  arbour,  in 
which  John  sometimes  took  his  pleasure,  when  he  had  tired 
of  the  dirt  and  litter  of  his  workshop.     William,  another  of 
the  Monitors,  is  jealous  of  their  happiness,  and  plans  to  steal 
two  flower-beds  from  the  garden.     He  is  encouraged  by 
his  fag,  one  Mark,  who  tells  him  John  will  not  help  Louis, 
because  he  cares  only  for  making  things  to  sell  the  other 
boys.     William  is  a  bit  of  a  humbug  who  reads  the  Testa- 
ment and  sings  psalms,  while  he  lets  Mark  provoke  Louis 
into  a  quarrel.     After  the  first  bout,  he  writes  home  on  a 
postcard  that,  aided  by  Providence,  he  has  hit  the  little 
French  boy  in  the  eyes  and  is  marvellously  satisfied  with  the 
events  Heaven  has  thus  brought  about. 

Billy,  John's  head  fag,  and  Bobby,  who  keeps  his  ac- 
counts, persuade  him  into  being  a  neutral,  though  he  says 
he  hates  the  word.  So  he  contents  himself  with  binding 
little  Louis'  wounds  between  the  rounds.  Dame  Europa, 
when  she  hears  the  fight  has  been  continued  because  John 
chose  to  be  a  neutral,  is  very  angry.  She  says  neutrality  is 
cowardice,  and  that  one  must  take  sides.  The  other  boys 
tell  her  John  did  take  sides, — that  he  "  sucked  up  to  both." 
In  the  end  the  Dame  lets  him  keep  his  office,  but  she  gives 
him  a  sound  wigging.  If  Ben  and  Hugh  had  been  his  fags, 
she  thinks  the  disgraceful  affair  would  never  have  taken 
place.  She  reminds  him  that  there  was  a  time  when  he  had 
only  to  hold  up  his  finger  to  make  the  whole  school  tremble, 


312      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [t,I2 

and  regrets  that  he  has  grown  a  sloven  and  a  screw.  "  Take 
care,"  she  warns,  "  that  William  does  not  get  a  footing  in 
the  river  and  some  fine  morning  take  your  pretty  island  by 
surprise."  She  is  ashamed  that  John  has  boasted  of  bravery 
and  power,  and  when  the  time  came  for  exercising  them,  has 
whined  out  that  he  didn't  exactly  see  how  it  could  be  done. 
Louis'  wounds,  for  a  long  time,  will  bear  witness  to  the 
futility  of  having  had  a  neutral  friend,  who  would  do 
nothing  to  stay  a  storm  of  cruel,  savage  blows.1 

The  brochure  was  not  in  the  class  of  the  political  satires 
of  Swift  and  Thackeray,  but  it  hit  the  nail  on  the  head  with 
a  good  sound  blow.  One  is  not  surprised  that  it  called  forth 
a  host  of  imitators.  By  March  the  scholastic  allegory  seems 
to  have  pushed  its  popularity  too  far.  Dame  Europa,  ac- 
cording to  the  Graphic,  had  brought  forth  such  a  multitudi- 
nous progeny  that  England  had  grown  weary  of  them.2 
But  the  initial  sale  of  the  original  pamphlet  gives  justifica- 
tion to  Frederic  Harrison's  claim  that,  could  the  war  have 
been  continued  some  months  longer,  public  opinion  would 
have  forced  Gladstone  to  abandon  his  policy  of  "  hesitating 
impotence."  3 

The  Ministry  was  being  scored  for  its  creeping  paralysis 
and  dubbed  a  company  of  lotos-eaters,  but  its  detractors 
found  it  difficult  to  change  the  unanimity  of  abuse  into  un- 
animous approval  of  any  single  course  of  action.  Through- 
out January,  the  Times  had  urged  intervention.  But  at  the 
end  of  the  month,  when  Favre  was  already  at  Versailles 
and  England  had  fallen  to  the  greatest  depth  of  unpopularity 
with  both  belligerents,  nothing  less  than  forcible  interven- 

1  Dame  Europa s  School  ('London,  1871),  passim;  Once  a  Week, 
Feb.  11,  1871 ;  Daily  News,  Feb.  4,  1871 ;  Tablet,  Feb.  25,  1871 ;  Notes 
and  Queries,  1871,  vol.  vii,  p.  181. 

1  Graphic,  Feb.  18,  1871. 

3  Harrison,  Autobiographic  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  p.  15. 


3Io]  THE  ARMISTICE  313 

tion  could  have  given  promise  of  success.  In  republican 
Paris,  the  English  were  so  hated  that,  Felix  Whitehurst 
wrote,  they  were  advised  not  to  appear  in  certain  districts' 
for  fear  they  would  be  insulted.1  At  Versailles,  where  Odo 
Russell  said  all  diplomats  were  treated  as  school  boys,2  an 
especial  amount  of  disrespect  seems  to  have  been  meted  out 
to  England.  On  one  occasion,  Bismarck's  attention  was 
momentarily  diverted  from  his  interviews  with  Favre  by 
the  British  request  that  he  permit  a  gunboat  to  go  up  the 
Seine  to  carry  away  from  Paris  the  English  families  there. 
He  chose  to  distrust  the  petitioners :  "  They  merely  want  to 
ascertain  if  we  have  laid  down  torpedoes  and  then  let  the 
French  ships  follow  them.  What  swine!  They  are  full 
cf  vexation  and  envy  because  we  have  fought  great  battles 
here  and  won  them.  They  cannot  bear  to  think  that  little 
Prussia  should  prosper  so."  3  And  when  at  dinner  he  was 
interrupted  by  a  telegram  from  Queen  Victoria,  he  re- 
marked sarcastically,  "  I  know  what  that  is.  We  always 
listen  to  what  she  says."  4 

Guizot,  withdrawn  as  he  was  from  the  centre  of  things, 
could  not  know  how  singularly  untimely  was  the  letter  he 
was  sending  Gladstone  to  urge  on  him  mediation.  He 
would  have  had  England,  jointly  with  the  other  Neutrals, 
ascertain  the  Prussian  terms  and  then  represent  to  the 
Delegate  Government  the  justice  of  convoking  a  National 
Assembly  to  speak  for  all  of  France.5 

1  Whitehurst,  My  Private  Diary,  etc.,  vol,  ii,  pp.  231-232. 
'Letter  from  Taine,  May  23,  1871,  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France, 
vol.  ii,  p.  392. 
8  The  Empress  Frederick,  pp.  242-243. 

*  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edward  Blount,  p.  232. 

*  Illustrated  London  News,  Jan.  28,  187 1 ;  a  previous  appeal  of  Gui- 
zot's,  addressed  to  France  itself,  was  quoted  in  Macmillan's  Magazine, 
Jan.,  1871,  Provisional  Government  and  the  French  Nation,  vol.  xxiii, 
pp.  173  et  seq. 


314      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [^4 

The  English  observed  that  the  only  objection  to  his  two 
wishes  was  that  they  were  impossible.  No  cooperation 
could  be  expected  from  Russia  and  Austria.  The  Italian 
Government  had  declared  to  its  interpolators  that  it  would 
not  mediate,  save  in  conjunction  with  the  other  Powers. 
A  request  backed  simply  by  Great  Britain  and  Italy  would 
serve  only  to  exhibit  the  breach  that  had  been  made  in  the 
League  of  Neutrals.  As  for  the  National  Assembly,  it  could 
not  be  convened  upon  a  wish.  Such  time  as  was  necessary 
for  its  election  and  convocation  would  have  to  be  bought 
by  at  least  a  tacit  acceptance  of  the  principal  terms  on  which 
it  was  to  deliberate.  With  one  third  of  France  occupied  by 
German  armies,  that  free  discussion,  which  Guizot  seemed 
to  anticipate,  was  out  of  the  question.1 

There  remained  for  England  the  choice  of  quietly  admit- 
ting the  impotence  of  her  isolation  or  vigorously  declaring 
herself  as  to  the  terms  to  be  proposed.  There  remained,  too, 
a  compromise  course,  and  Granville  took  it.  Early  in 
January,  he  had  informed  von  Bernstorff  that  blame  would 
attach  to  Prussia,  should  she  allow  France  to  become  totally 
disorganized.2  On  January  the  twentieth,  he  seems  to  have 
come  to  regard  even  this  mild  warning  as  presumptuous,  for 
he  wrote  urging  that  Germany,  in  the  full  tide  of  her  vic- 
tories, should  not  misconstrue  his  simple  efforts  to  end  the 
war.3  Bismarck,  it  may  be  conjectured,  felt  no  need  of 
the  reassurance  of  the  second  note,  because  the  dire  threat 
of  the  first  had  not  alarmed  him.  He  was  thinking  of  many 
things  at  this  time,  but  the  judgment  of  history  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  one  of  them.  He  received  Favre  at 
Versailles  and  listened  to  his  representations   in  the  full 

1  Weekly  Scotsman,  Dec.  30,  1870;  Daily  Telegraph,  Jan.  28,  1871. 

a  Annual  Register  for  1871,  vol.  cxii,  p.  254. 

'Granville  to  Loftus,  Jam  20,  1871,  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxxi. 


315]  THE  ARMISTICE  315 

confidence  that  France  had  still  to  fight  her  fight  alone. 
The  respectful  despatches  of  Granville  seemed  only  to  con- 
firm his  power. 

Several  days  after  the  Versailles  negotiations,  amusing 
details  of  the  interviews  reached  London  in  private  letters. 
Lyons  wrote  that  Favre,  at  one  time,  had  explained  that  his 
position  in  Paris  was  very  critical,  whereupon  Bismarck  sug- 
gested the  expedient  of  organizing  a  rising  so  as  to  be  able 
to  suppress  it  while  the  army  was  still  at  his  disposal. 
That  was  the  only  right  way  to  manage  a  mob,  he  had  ex- 
plained obligingly.  M.  Favre  was  rather  dazed  at  the  ad- 
vice.1 

On  the  occasion  of  his  second  visit,  he  took  General 
Beaufort  and  three  staff  officers  to  bear  him  company  and 
arrange  the  military  details  of  the  capitulation.  Some  hot 
punch  was  given  them  at  the  outpost,  which,  Odo  Russell 
wrote,  was  generously  passed  from  the  empty  stomachs  of 
the  poor  fellows  to  their  empty  heads.  In  this  plight  they 
misunderstood  one  of  their  hosts,  when  he  expressed  the  hope 
that  the  negotiations  would  lead  to  peace,  and,  taking  all  for 
granted,  "  set  to  and  danced  the  cancan."  Favre  had  the 
wit  to  apologize  for  their  ebullition  as  being  the  effect  of 
Prussian  punch  on  Parisian  hunger.  He  dined  with  Bis- 
marck while  his  companions  were  being  put  in  a  condition 
to  discuss  affairs  with  less  emotion.  Bismarck  had  the 
poor  taste  to  say  that  Favre,  too,  testified  to  the  severity  of 
Parisian  hunger,  by  popping  a  beef  steak  into  his  pocket  to 
take  home  to  his  wife.* 

Whatever  laughter  diplomatists  indulged  in  at  these 
episodes  was  brief  and  secret.  In  England  there  was  a  very 
sympathetic  appreciation  of  the  difficulties  with  which  the 

1  Newton,  Life  of  Lord  Lyons,  vol.  i,  p.  353. 

1  Lytton  to  Morley,  Feb.  6,  1871,  Balfour,  Personal  and  Literary 
Letters  of  Robert,  first  Earl  of  Lytton. 


316      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [3^ 

French  negotiators  had  contended.  The  Times  of  January 
the  twenty-fifth  alarmed  its  readers  by  asserting  that  Bis- 
marck, in  the  event  that  Favre  proved  obdurate,  was  pre- 
pared to  show  him  Eugenie's  acceptance  of  the  terms  and 
threaten  a  restoration.  Three  days  later, —  the  day  of  the 
capitulation, — the  story  was  denied  by  the  Telegraph  on 
Eugenie's  own  authority.  Denial  was  made,  also,  that  the 
Chancellor  had  ever  tried  to  possess  himself  of  such  a 
document. 

Bismarck,  however,  in  a  subsequent  account  of  his  in- 
terviews, admitted  that  he,  at  least,  used  the  restoration  as 
a  bogey  for  frightening  the  French.1  He  claimed  to  have 
told  Favre  that  behind  the  door  there  waited  a  delegate  of 
Napoleon,  and  to  have  made  a  pretense  of  being  about  to 
open  it.  This  was  the  use  to  which  the  News  had  said  he 
would  put  the  project.  The  general  opinion  was  that  he 
was  too  astute  to  intend  seriously  to  treat  for  a  government 
so  unpopular  as  the  French  Emperor's  The  negotiation 
however,  which  had  been  carried  on  at  Chislehurst,  and 
Wilhelmshohe,  and  his  avowed  contempt  for  the  "  Gentle- 
men of  the  Pavement,"  induced  several  prominent  English- 
men to  believe  that  Bismarck's  wish  for  a  restoration  was 
sincere.  Of  these  perhaps  the  best  informed,  but  not  the 
least  prejudiced,  were  Sir  Robert  Morier  and  Felix  White- 
hurst.  ' 

The  plan  was  very  unpopular  in  England, — more  for  its 
suspected  ramifications  than  for  itself.  Russell  wrote  that 
Bismarck  could  not  attempt  to  effect  the  Emperor's  return 
without  attempting  to  placate  France  by  some  very  sub- 
stantial  concession.     Either   Belgium  or  Holland,   he  be- 

1  Loftus,  Diplomatic  Reminiscences  (London,  1894),  vol.  i,  pp.  324- 
326;  Conversations  with  Prince  Bismarck  (edited  by  Sidney  Whitman, 
London,  1900),  p.  44. 

2  Daily  News,  Jan.  26,  1871. 


3I7]  THE  ARMISTICE  317 

lieved,  was  threatened  by  the  project.  He  advised  England 
not  to  consider  the  danger  so  chimerical  as  to  fail  to  provide 
against  it.  Morier,  in  a  letter  written  late  in  January, 
claimed  to  have  very  good  Prussian  authority  for  the  be- 
lief that  the  plan  had  long  been  under  consideration.  In 
its  early  phase  it  had  proposed  that  the  Emperor  should  an- 
nex Belgium  in  exchange  for  the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine. But  the  completeness  of  the  Imperial  debacle  and 
the  setting  up  of  a  Republic  had  occasioned  unforeseen  dif- 
ficulties. Morier  believed  in  the  accuracy  of  his  informant's 
knowledge.  It  is  not  easy,  however,  to  share  his  belief, 
when  it  is  recalled  how  completely  Bismarck  had  put  Eng- 
land on  her  guard  by  publishing  the  Draft  Treaty.  It 
seems  more  credible  that  the  plan  was  of  later  origin, — that 
it  developed  out  of  Bismarck's  wish  to  supplant  the  Repub- 
lican Government  at  a  time  when  he  thought  he  might  safely 
disregard  Great  Britain.1 

Mrs.  George  Cornwallis  West  has  in  her  possession  an 
autograph  letter  of  the  Emperor's,  which  shows  that  Bis- 
marck, in  January,  was  listening  with  interest  to  an  un- 
authorized scheme  for  the  advancement  of  the  Prince  Im- 
perial. The  letter  fails  to  show,  however,  whether  Bel- 
gium was  in  any  way  involved  in  the  proposals.8  Nothing 
more  is  certain  than  that,  thus  late,  attempts  were  still 
being  made  by  the  Imperialists  at  negotiation. 

An  alternative  scheme,  that  may  have  been  considered  by 
Bismarck,  was  the  elevation  to  the  French  throne  of  King 
Leopold  of  Belgium — a  project,  Bismarck  told  Russell,  that 
had  been  proposed  by  Thiers.3     This,  too,  was  unpopular  in 

■Morier  to  Stockmar,  Jan.  27,  28,  1871,  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robt.  Morier, 
p.  240;  see,  also,  Whitehurst,  My  Private  Diary,  etc.,  vol.  ft,  p.  300. 

2  Napoleon  III  to  Persigny,  Jan.  7,  1871,  West,  Reminiscences  of 
Lady  Randolph  Churchill,  p.  27. 

11  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Granville,  vol.  ii,  p.  74- 


3 1 8      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [318 

England,  for  it  would  change,  perforce,  the  neutral  status 
of  Belgium,  and  give  Antwerp  into  the  control  of  a  stronger 
nation.  The  Spectator  reported  that  Germany  herself 
would  not  consent  to  it.  The  Government's  propaganda  and 
the  persistence  of  the  French  in  giving  battle  long  after  they 
were  considered  defeated,  had  made  Germany  unwilling  to 
see  France  placated  by  any  acquisition  whatsoever.1  "  You 
don't  keep  men  in  the  field  for  some  eight  months  and  win 
ever  so  many  battles  without  making  professional  fighting 
animals  of  at  least  some  of  them,"  observed  Archibald  For- 
bes.2 The  officers  in  command  were  rather  willing,  than 
not,  that  the  terms  offered  France  should  breed  a  spirit  of 
revenge. 

It  is  perhaps  probable  that  neither  the  British  nor  Prus- 
sian distaste  for  the  schemes  involving  Belgium  influenced 
Bismarck  to  abandon  them.  They  may  have  been  talked  of 
only  to  alarm  England,  so  that,  when  the  true  terms  were 
made  known,  she  would  regard  them  with  less  disfavour. 
An  analogy  is  the  subterfuge  of  a  blustering  attorney  who 
overestimates  his  client's  damages  that  he  may  influence  the 
jury  to  grant  a  lesser  figure  that  is  still  exorbitant.  France, 
too,  the  Chancellor  may  have  hoped,  might  regard  his  terms 
with  more  equanimity  when  she  considered  how  nearly  she 
had  escaped  the  imposition  of  a  disowned  Emperor  or  a 
foreign  king. 

Certain  it  is,  that  Bismarck  did  not  appear  in  the  least  cast 
down  when  he  had  granted  an  armistice  that  would  enable 
the  French  themselves  to  determine  their  future  government. 
It  was  recorded  that  he  even  whistled  the  Prussian  hallali, — 
the  hunter's  death  blast, — at  the  conclusion  of  the  interviews. 
"  Like  all  powerful  men,"  said  the  Telegraph,  musing  on  the 

1  Spectator,  Feb.  4,  1871. 

*  Forbes,  My  Experiences  of  the  War  between  France  and  Germany, 
vol.  ii,  p.  479. 


3I9]  THE  ARMISTICE  319 

gaiety  of  heart  shown  by  this  incident,  "  he  lives  too  near 
the  speed  and  splendour  of  cosmic  forces  to  be  dull."  l  The 
Spectator  received  the  information  as  to  the  Count's  usual 
place  of  residence  with  delightful  sarcasm.  It  supposed  that 
the  Telegraph  meant,  in  plain  English,  that  the  whistling 
of  the  death  blast  at  the  moment  of  the  surrender  of  Paris 
was  a  proof  of  the  Chancellor's  sympathy  with  the  course 
and  progress  of  history  at  its  mightiest  flood,  and  that  one 
should  marvel  at  the  understanding  of  this  bouyant  soul, 
that  had  recognized  the  analogy  between  killing  a  boar  and 
being  in  at  the  death  of  a  great  nation.2 

On  January  the  twenty-eighth,  Paris  capitulated.  The  next 
day  the  forts  were  occupied  by  German  soldiers.  It  had  been 
considered  the  great  card  with  which  the  struggle  would  be 
lost  or  won.  For  those  who  had  been  infected  with  the 
contagion  of  Gambetta's  hopefulness,  the  defeat  of  Bour- 
baki,  occurring  almost  at  the  same  time,  was  proof  that 
even  the  efforts  of  the  provinces  must  fail.  The  contest  had 
lasted  twenty-one  weeks  since  the  overthrow  of  the  em- 
pire. In  that  time,  wrote  Vizetelly,  the  country  had  be- 
come very  weary  of  the  struggle.  Only  Faidherbe  and 
Chanzy,  Freycinet,  and  a  few  others  shared  Gambetta's  wish 
further  to  prolong  it.3  "  Gambetta's  war  is  now  murder," 
said  von  Moltke.  England  believed  that  he  was  right. 
She  was  chary  of  showing  such  sympathy  as  would  en- 
courage the  war's  continuance;  but  she  was  very  generous 
in  showing  a  practical  sympathy  for  French  suffering. 

On  the  second  day  after  the  capitulation,  the  Lord 
Mayor's  Committee,  through  Alfred  Rothschild,  succeeded 
in  getting  into  Paris  its  first  consignment  of  supplies.  The 
next  day,  the  British  Government  generously  offered  all  the 

1  Daily  Telegraph,  Feb.,  1871. 

*  Spectator,  Feb.  4,  1871. 

3  Vizetelly,  My  Days  of  Adventure,  pp.  322-323. 


320      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [320 

stores  of  the  Administration  for  the  capital's  relief.  No 
less  than  £52,000  worth  of  food,  it  is  said,  was  sent  in  in  the 
first  despatch.  In  February,  the  English  Committee  took 
the  distribution  into  its  own  hands  to  such  effect  that  Bri- 
tishers were  gratified  at  hearing  themselves  called  ccs  bons 
Anglais  in  a  city  that  recently  had  hated  them.  John  Bull 
was  proving  himself  the  exception  to  the  rule  that  no  fat 
man  is  popular  at  the  end  of  a  siege.1 

The  Commissioner  of  the  Mansion  House  Relief  Fund 
recorded  in  his  diary  that  for  five  months  there  had  been 
no  milk  nor  fat  to  be  had,  save  for  fabulous  prices.  The 
very  old  and  very  young  had  suffered,  not  only  from  mal- 
nutrition, but  from  the  depression  caused  by  lack  of  light 
and  heat.  They  had  died  in  great  numbers.  Do  what  the 
British  could,  the  Prussians  had  done  their  work  so  well 
that  suffering  continued  far  into  February.  At  one  of  the 
warehouses  kept  exclusively  to  provision  women,  the  Com- 
missioner watched  a  long  queue  waiting  all  night  long 
through  sleet  and  rain,  and  into  the  next  day.  "  I  have  seen 
more  tears  shed  by  men  and  women,"  he  said,  "  than  I  hope 
I  shall  ever  see  again." 2  With  something  of  the  old 
French  flair,  the  Provisional  Government  returned  the 
pheasants  and  other  delicacies  that  made  a  little  part  of  the 
tons  of  provisions  sent  for  distribution.3  It  was  not  for 
lack  of  luxuries  France  had  surrendered. 

Perhaps  statistics  on  the  contributions  and  a  discussion 
of  the  means  of  distribution  would  give  no  clearer  index  of 
British  sympathy  than  the  letter  of  a  poet  to  his  publisher : 

I  want  to  give  something  to  the  people  in  Paris,  and  can  afford 

1  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edward  Blount,  pp.  218  et  seq.;  Times,  Feb.  I,  4,  6, 
1871 ;  Graphic,  Feb.  18,  1871. 

J  George    Moore,    The   London   Deputation   in   Paris,    Good    Words, 
Feb.,  1871,  pp.  402  et  seq. 
*  Memoirs  of  Sir  Edward  Blount,  p.  219. 


32 j]  THE  ARMISTICE  32 1 

so  very  little  just  now  that  I  am  forced  upon  an  expedient.  Will 
you  buy  of  me  that  poem  .  .  .  which  I  like  better  than  most 
things  I  have  done  of  late?  .  .  .  Would — for  the  love  of  France 
— that  this  were  the  "  Song  of  a  Wren  " — then  should  the  guineas 
equal  the  lines ;  as  it  is,  do  what  you  safely  may  for  the  sake  of  a 
Robin — Browning.1 

The  poem  was  Heme  Riel, — one  of  the  very  few  that  he 
ever  allowed  to  appear  in  a  maga2ine. 

While  the  British  were  busily  engaged  in  preparing  ship- 
ments for  Paris,  they  were  startled  by  a  very  extraordinary 
telegram  that  was  published  in  the  Times  on  the  last  day 
of  January.  It  was  the  announcement,  by  that  paper's 
Berlin  correspondent,  of  the  terms  Bismarck  was  alleged  to 
have  outlined  to  Favre  during  their  recent  interviews.  They 
provided  for  the  annexation  of  both  Alsace  and  Lorraine; 
the  payment  by  France  of  an  indemnity  of  £400,000,000; 
the  cession  of  Pondicherry  in  India;  and  the  surrender  of 
twenty  first-class  men-of-war.  Had  such  terms  appeared 
in  any  other  paper  they  would  have  been  dismissed  as  too 
exorbitant  to  merit  consideration.  But  the  Times,  it  was 
observed,  had  so  often  anticipated  even  the  German  press  in 
publishing  the  Chancellor's  intentions,  that  it  could  not  be 
disregarded.2 

The  stock  market  at  once  registered  the  British  uneasi- 
ness. The  prospect  of  £400,000,000  being  withdrawn  to 
Germany  caused  the  value  of  money  to  shoot  upwards  like 
a  sky  rocket  and  prices  to  tumble  like  its  tail.3  Men  had  be- 
lieved the  capitulation  was  a  prelude  to  peace.  This  stagger- 
ing news  made  them  fear  it  was  only  an  interim  between  a 
duel  and  a  general  conflict.     Even  if  Favre  had  heard  these 

1  Browning  to  Mr.  Smith  of  Cornhill  Magazine,  Feb.  4,  1871 ;  Orr, 
Robt.  Browning,  Life  and  Letters,  p.  45 ;  Griffith  and  Minchin,  Life  of 
Robt.  Browning,  p.  243. 

*  Standard,  Feb.  2,  1871. 

3  Illustrated  London  News,  Feb.  4,  1871. 


322      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [322 

terms,  as  the  correspondent  claimed,  Gambetta  had  not.  It 
was  believed  he  would  not  submit  to  them,  and  that  Favre 
would  approve  him  and  fight  on.  To  do  so,  said  the 
Standard,  would  be  to  lose  nothing  materially  and  to  gain 
much  morally.1  France  would  be  endowed,  thought  the 
Graphic,  with  the  energy  of  despair.2  Both  the  Economist 
and  the  Times 3  declared  the  payment  of  the  tremendous 
indemnity  impossible.  The  demand  for  Lorraine  was  re^ 
garded  as  equally  extravagant.  Metz  was  not  only  essen- 
tially and  emphatically  a  part  of  France,  but  was  necessary 
for  her  safety.  As  the  Spectator  phrased  it,  the  cession  of 
Metz  would  make  France  a  political  dependency  of  Ger- 
many.* 

Loud  as  were  the  protests  excited  by  each  of  the  articles, 
the  one  that  provoked  the  greatest  remonstrance  was  that 
concerning  India.  The  Times,  it  is  true,  at  first  pretended 
to  regard  the  cession  of  Pondicherry  as  of  relative  unim- 
portance. Its  judgment  was  derided  by  all  the  British 
press.  The  matter  was  regarded  as  one  that  concerned 
England  very  nearly.  With  a  German  garrison  once  en- 
sconced in  Pondicherry,  said  the  Standard,  Bismarck  could 
boast  he  had  set  his  boot  heel  in  a  corner  of  the  British 
Empire.5  It  was  recalled  that  France  had  kept  her  hold 
on  India  somewhat  on  sufferance.  After  the  Napoleonic  wars' 
she  had  accepted  England's  restriction  on  the  number  of  her 
forces  there.  It  could  not  be  expected  that  Germany  would 
acknowledge  any  such  obligation.  The  Spectator  and  John 
Bull 6  believed  that,  by  the  provisionsof  the  Treaty  of  181 5r 

1  Standard,  Feb.  2,  1871. 


11  Graphic,  Feb.  4,  1871. 

3  Issues  of  Feb.  4,  2,  1871,  respectively. 

*  Spectator,  Feb.  4,  1871. 

5  Standard,  Feb.  2,  1871. 

'Issues  of  Feb.  4,  1871. 


323]  THE  ARMISTICE  323 

Prussia  was  precluded  not  only  from  sending  troops  to 
Pondicherry  but  from  demanding  its  cession.  It  had  not 
been  restored  to  France  in  fee  simple.  Every  possible 
argument  was  adduced  against  its  change  of  ownership,  for 
it  was  acknowledged  that  in  the  event  of  a  German  raid  into 
the  interior  and  a  partial  British  defeat,  southern  India 
might  be  roused  to  insurrection.  England  was  urged  forth- 
with to  occupy  the  place  herself,  even  at  the  risk  of  war. 

Moderate  papers,  like  Saunders' ',  believed  that,  since  Great 
Britain's  affairs  were  so  trenched  on  by  the  peace  terms, 
she  should,  at  last,  induce  the  Neutrals  to  intervene.1  The 
time  had  come,  said  the  Standard,  for  the  Government  to  de- 
termine whether  it  would  persist  to  the  end  "  in  that  pitiable 
affectation  which  by  a  euphemism  it  dubbed  non-interven- 
tion." 2  The  editor  strove  to  persuade  the  Ministry  that,  if 
they  would  abandon  its  policy  of  no  policy,  other  Neutrals 
would  join  with  them  so  that  Bismarck  would  be  forced  to 
heed  their  wishes. 

In  the  Fortnightly,  Frederic  Harrison  was  no  less  insis- 
tent.    "  It  will  be  the  knell  of  peace  and  liberty,"  he  said, 

when  the  triumphant  Emperor  of  Germany  bestrides  the  Conti- 
nent without  an  equal.  If  he  succeed  in  doing  so,  it  will  be  the 
act  of  England,  who  stands  by  trading  and  sermonising,  selling 
arms  but  using  none  .  .  .  droning  out  homilies  and  betraying 
every  duty  of  a  nation.3 

He  begged  that  his  countrymen  abandon  that  course  "  which 
the  new  Emperor  of  the  West  told  them  with  a  gibe,  as) 
they  came  bowing  to  his  court,  was  the  only  policy  that  re- 
mained for  them — the  policy  of  self-effacement."     In  Ire- 

1  Saunders',  Feb.  3,  1871. 
*  Standard,  Feb.  3,  1871. 

'Harrison,  Effacetnent  of  England,  Fortnightly,  Feb.  1,  1871,  pp.  145 
et  seq. 


324      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [324 

land,  the  Freeman  warned  England  that  if  she  remained 
quiescent  during  the  armistice,  the  vociferous  sympathy  she 
had  avowed  would  be  proved  hypocrisy.1  Robert  Buchanan 
tried  the  expedient  of  poetic  declamation  on  the  sluggish 
British  lion,  in  this  wise : 

"  England,  awake !    or  the  tomb  may  cover  thee  ! 
Awake,  awake,  for  the  shroud  is  over  thee! 
England,  awake,  if  thou  be  not  dead ! 
The  seas  are  crying,  the  clouds  are  flying, 
Fair  France  is  dying; — her  blood  flows  red; 
Europe  in  thunder  is  rent  asunder,"  etc.2 

And  then  word  came  that  the  correspondent  of  the  Times 
had  been  inaccurate  in  his  report  of  the  peace  terms.  As- 
surance was  specially  given  that  Prussia  had  no  designs  on 
Pondicherry.  Whether  Bismarck  had  allowed  the  rumour 
to  stand  for  four  days  uncorrected  through  sheer  disregard 
of  British  opinion,  or  whether  he  had  been  brought  to 
moderate  his  intentions  by  the  popular  clamour,  it  is  difficult 
to  say.3  Many  did  not  inquire  into  the  circumstances  of 
the  denial  but  received  it  thankfully,  as  affording  escape 
from  war.  Others  were  regretful  at  having  lost  a  chance  to 
wreck  the  Governmental  policy.  It  was  recognized  that 
the  Ministry  could  not  be  forced  to  action  now  until  Parlia- 
ment should  be  convoked. 

Prussian  credit,  however,  remained  at  low  ebb.  Alarm 
as  to  the  punitive  character  that  the  peace  might  take,  had 
been  heightened  by  a  vision  of  disaster  to  England.  It 
would  appear  that  even  Granville's  composure  had  been 
shaken.  His  attitude  on  the  expediency  of  bringing  the 
situation  of  France  before  the  Conference  had  undergone  a 
change.     On  the  fourth  of  February,  he  notified  Lyons  that 

1  Weekly  Freeman,  Feb.  4,  1871. 

1  Buchanan,  England  Awake.',  Spectator,  Feb.  4,  1871. 

1  Standard,  Feb.  7,  1871. 


325]  THE  ARMISTICE  325 

if  the  French  plenipotentiary  should  come  to  London  and, 
at  the  end  of  one  of  the  sittings  or  at  the  end  of  the  Con- 
ference, lay  before  that  body  questions  of  vital  interest  to 
France  he,  as  chairman,  would  not  interfere  but  would  at- 
tend with  interest  whatever  might  be  said.1  It  was  an  in- 
vitation, in  diplomatic  kind,  for  Favre  to  attempt  the  part 
Cavour  had  played,  in  1856,  at  Paris.  Whether  the  French- 
man could  have  argued  a  finer  cause  with  equal  eloquence 
is  matter  for  conjecture.  The  Conference  reconvened,  on 
the  seventh,  with  France  still  absent. 

Another  reaction  to  the  enterprise  of  the  Berlin  corres- 
pondent of  the  Times  was  an  increase  in  the  clamour  for 
military  preparedness.  Men  believed  more  readily  that  the 
influence  of  an  entente  that  could  have  allied  the  French 
army  with  the  British  navy  should  be  maintained  by  Eng- 
land alone  through  an  increase  of  armament.  Those  citi- 
zens of  Manchester  and  Leeds  who  had  put  their  trust  in  a 
"  Mill — ennium "  were  admonished  to  visit  subjugated 
France.  They  would  find  that  vast  tracts  of  its  richest  and 
most  industrious  districts  had  been  deliberately  stripped  and 
plunged  into  famine.  Cities  had  been  bombarded  and 
burned, — not  once  but  many  times;  women  and  children 
slaughtered  by  invaders,  who  had  been  prepared  even  to  the 
point  of  a  philosophy  to  justify  their  havoc.  London  was 
urged  to  gird  herself  with  walls  so  that,  when  need  arose, 
she  could  be  defended  as  gallantly  as  had  been  Paris.2 

Archibald  Forbes  wrote  that  a  young  Prussian  guards- 
man, to  the  delight  of  his  companions,  had  impudently  an- 
nounced that  before  two  years  had  gone  the  Queen  Elizabeth 
Regiment  would  be  besieging  Windsor  Castle.     At  the  bat- 

1  Deschanel,  Gambetta,  pp.  115-116. 

2  Cf.  Feb.  letters  to  Times;  J.  S.  Russell,  Into  Versailles  and  Out, 
Macmillan's  Magazine,  Jan.,  1871,  vol.  xxiii,  pp.  255  et  seq.;  London 
For  Med,  ibid.,  Feb.,  1871. 


326      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [326 

teries  and  on  the  outposts,  the  men  Forbes  talked  with  longed 
for  peace,  but  they  would  go  where  they  were  led, — even 
though  some  of  their  young  leaders  might  be  so  ignorant 
as  to  think  that  Windsor  Castle  was  England's  strongest  for- 
tress. 'Charles  Ryan,  who  was  serving  with  an  ambulance 
corps,  was  another  who  heard  much  boasting.  He  reported 
that  stripling  officers  vowed  they  would  shadow  all  the 
nations  of  Europe  with  the  wings  of  the  Imperial  Eagle. 
England,  they  admitted,  would  come  last,  but  time  could  be 
trusted  to  provide  an  opportunity  even  for  its  conquest.2 

Other  days  must  bring  other  policies.  England  could 
not  afford  to  devote  herself  to  trade  when,  as  George  Eliot 
said,  barbarism  had  arisen  from  that  historic  tomb  where 
it  had  been  supposed  to  lie  with  Barbarossa.  Sir  Robert 
Morier,  who  had  lived  long  in  Germany,  was  fearful  of  the 
effect  of  the  unparalleled  success.  No  good,  he  knew, 
would  come  from  the  ascendancy  of  the  Junkers  and  their 
Militar  Cabinet.3  Who  could  foretell  what  they  might  do? 
Frederic  Harrison  described  them  as  a  class,  knit  close  by 
all  the  ties  of  pride  and  interest,  possessed  of  high  educa- 
tion, able  to  wield  power  alike  in  town  and  country,  and  yet 
so  weak  as  to  depend  on  the  Emperor,  and,  above  all,  de- 
voted passionately  to  war.  Was  England  to  be  content  to 
watch  their  conquests,  and  in  the  future  cry  out  as  she  did 
now,  "  My  friends,  keep  clear  of  these  wicked  men!  Wicked 
men,  shake  hands  and  be  friends  ? "  4 

There  existed,  none  the  less,  a  small  group  who  believed 
it  illogical  that  a  nation  should  buckle  on  its  armour  in  order 

1  Forbes,  My  Experiences  of  the  War  between  France  and  Germany, 
vol.  ii,  pp.  480-481. 

*  Ryan,  With  an  Ambulance  in  the  Franco-German  War,  p.  276. 

*  Morier  to  Stockmar,  Jant.  22,   1871,  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robt.  Morier, 
p.  241. 

*  Harrison,  Effacement  of  England,  Fortnightly,  Feb.  1,  1871. 


327]  THE  ARMISTICE  327 

to  woo  peace.  Morley  and  IS  I  ill 1  were  of  these.  Sir 
Wilfred  Lawson  was  another.  He  advocated,  however, 
such  preparation  as  would  consist  in  chartering  a  ship 
and  manning  it  with  diplomats,  warlike  editors,  and  fire- 
eating  bishops  under  the  command  of  Lord  John  Russell. 
Should  this  redoubtable  bark  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  he  held  himself  ready  to  sing  Te  Deums  for  its 
loss.2  Some  in  the  group  believed  that  Prussia  would  re- 
pent of  its  triumphs  and  demand  a  return  of  the  power  that 
the  military  faction  had  usurped.  Her  youth  had  been 
crippled  by  the  war,  her  family  life  afflicted,  the  Treasury 
burdened  with  a  great  debt.  Already,  they  claimed,  the  more 
advanced  of  her  citizens  saw  war's  futility.  The  newly 
made  Emperor  was  not  immortal  and,  at  his  death,  a  prince 
would  reign,  who  would  strive  valiantly  for  peace.  Much 
should  be  looked  for  from  him  and  from  his  wife,  who  was 
a  British  princess.  Bismarck,  they  argued,  might  even 
come  to  help  him.  For  the  Chancellor  was  too  practical 
to  be  influenced  by  those  who  preached  pan-Teutonism.  In 
due  time,  he  might  bend  to  the  sense  of  justice  that  was 
popular  in  Germany  and  inaugurate  that  policy  of  peace  and 
freedom  which  now  he  opposed.3 

Not  many  cherished  such  roseate  hopes  for  the  Minister 
of  blood  and  iron.  But  even  among  those  who  feared  him, 
there  was  objection  to  the  adoption  of  his  methods.  In- 
stead of  plunging  into  warlike  preparations  and  through 
alarm  creating  more  alarm,  there  was  a  minority  which  hoped 
that  England  would  do  all  she  could  to  strengthen  the 
moderate  element  in  every  nation.     They  believed  that  free- 

1  Mill  to  Pasquale  Villari,  Feb.  16,  1871,  and1  to  Cliffe  Leslie,  Letters 
of  J.  S.  Mill,  vol.  ii,  pp.  304,  305. 

'Graphic,  Feb.  18,  1871. 

s  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Feb.  4,  1871  ;  C.  E.  Maurice,  Count  Bismarck, 
Contemporary  Review,  Jan.,  1871. 


328      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [32$ 

dom  could  foe  arrived  at  only  through  observing  the  restric- 
tions of  international  law.  J.  M.  Ludlow  advocated  with 
skill  and  much  earnestness  the  formation  of  an  Imperial 
Federation  which,  backed  by  arms,  should  restore  to  the 
conventions  made  by  nations  that  respect  they  seemed  to 
have  lost.  He  would  have  attempted  to  arrive  at  peace  and 
justice  by  the  establishing  of  a  system  of  international 
police  and  by  the  adoption  of  the  principle  of  compulsory 
arbitration.1 

Men  who  talked  in  this  wise  could  not  get  themselves 
heard.  The  world's  acoustics  are  better  adapted  to  the 
sound  of  artillery  fire  than  to  the  voice  of  the  peacemaker. 
But  what  has  been  said  for  war  lingers  through  all  the 
halls  of  memory,  and,  when  men  speak  for  it  anew,  rever- 
berates to  amplify  their  utterance.  And  echo  plays  such 
pranks  with  truth  that  splendid  thoughts  seem  made  to 
march  in  quick  step.  The  Edinburgh  quoted  Lord  Bacon: 
"  Let  it  suffice,  that  no  estate  expects  to  be  great,  that  is 
not  awake  upon  any  just  occasion  of  arming."  2  In  Mao- 
millan's,  England  was  urged  in  Milton's  mighty  lines  to 
rouse  herself  from  slumber  and  renew  her  mighty  youth.* 
Audience  was  given  to  Mr.  Vernon  Harcourt  when  he  urged 
the  argument  of  history  to  condemn  "  the  new  phase  of 
that  dark  eclipse  called  foreign  policy,"  and  when  he  beg- 
ged that  British  patriotism  demand  such  armament  as  could 
defend  the  Empire.4  It  was  yielded  willingly  to  Frederic 
Harrison   when   he   inveighed   against   the   effacement   of 

1  J.   M.   Ludlow,   Re  constitution  of  Europe,   Contemporary  Review, 
Feb.,  1871,  pp.  499  et  seq. 

*  Military  Forces  of  the  Crown,  Edinburgh  Review,  Jan.,   1871,  pp. 
207  et  seq. 

* "  Military  Contributor,"  England's  Place  among  the  Nations,  Mac- 
millan's  Magazine,  Feb.,  1871,  pp.  358  et  seq. 

*  Speech  to  his  constituents  at  Oxford. 


329]  THE  ARMISTICE  329 

Great  Britain.  But  the  fine  philosophy  of  John  Stuart  Mill 
and  the  warm  humanity  of  Morley  could  win  no  approval 
for  their  support  of  pacifism. 

The  British  were  shamed  and  fearful,  but  they  were  im- 
patient of  accepting  anything  that  promised  comfort  for 
their  distress.  They  seem  to  have  derived  almost  a  Spanish 
delight  from  self-inflicted  flagellation.  No  one  so  vigor- 
ously applied  the  lash  as  Judy.  Under  the  seal  of  the 
British  Empire,  John  Bull  was  made  to  inform  the  public, 
heads  of  families  and  teachers  in  infant  schools,  that  he 
had  ready  for  exhibition  on  very  reasonable  terms  his  cele- 
brated British  lion.  The  awe-inspiring  and  terrific  roar 
of  the  noble  animal  combined  with  its  perfect  harmlessness 
were  too  well  known,  he  thought,  to  need  description.  Any- 
one could  with  the  greatest  impunity,  kick  or  spit  upon  it, 
or  pull  it  by  the  tail,  and  derive  much  fun  from  ferocious 
demonstrations  that  portended  nothing.  It  had  been  re- 
cently exhibited  at  all  the  courts  of  Europe  and  had  roused 
screams  of  laughter.1 

Though  British  opinion,  during  the  time  of  the  armistice, 
was  very  largely  occupied  with  self-denunciation,  a  glossary 
of  comment  still  had  to  do  with  France.  It  was  used  to  il- 
luminate the  arguments  for  preparedness  that  formed  the 
text.  Readers  were  told  how  long  it  would  be  before  the  de- 
feated country  could  become  again  a  useful  ally.  During  the 
struggle  with  Prussia,  she  had  appeared  unified,  but  the  pro- 
spect of  peace  loosened  the  bond  that  had  united  factions. 
Felix  Whitehurst,  who  had  no  sympathy  with  amateur  sol- 
diers and  volunteer  diplomats,  believed  their  Government 
would  soon  be  overthrown.  Dissension  was  already  weak- 
ening the  Republic.2     Gambetta  was   disgruntled  because 

1  Judy,  Feb.  8,  1871. 

'Whitehurst,    Year  One  of  the  Republic,   Belgravia,  Jan.,   1871,   pp. 
342  et  seq. 


330      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [330 

Favre  had  not  informed  him  of  the  details  of  the  armistice. 
He  felt  chagrin  that  he,  who  had  had  the  direction  of  the 
war,  had  been  so  signally  slighted  when  the  time  approached 
for  its  conclusion.  He  feared  the  Government  at  Paris,  in 
its  eagerness  for  peace,  might  slight,  also,  the  claims  of  the 
Republic.1 

On  the  thirty-first  of  January,  he  gave  forceful  expres- 
sion to  his  discontent  by  a  proclamation  designed  to  ex- 
clude from  the  Assembly  all  Bonapartists  and  members  of 
families  that  once  had  ruled  in  France.  Bismarck  at  once 
objected  that  such  exclusion  would  violate  the  terms  of  the 
armistice,  which  had  provided  for  the  convocation  of  an  As- 
sembly freely  elected.  His  objection  was  regarded  by 
Gambetta  as  an  unwarranted  intrusion  into  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  France.  The  Paris  Government  chose  to  uphold  it. 
The  issue  was  clearly  drawn  and  Gambetta  resigned.2 

It  cannot  be  said  that  in  England  his  withdrawal  was 
regarded  with  regret.  It  was  believed  that,  had  he  retained 
his  power,  he  might  have  won  France  to  a  continuance  of  the 
war.  He  was  a  man,  the  British  said,  of  1792,  born  out 
of  his  time  and  doomed  to  create  only  unrest  in  his  frantic 
efforts  to  galvanize  a  past  tradition.  "  His  resignation 
takes  a  nightmare  off  the  breast  of  France,"  said  the  Globe, 
and  the  rest  of  the  press  nodded  approval.3  But  though  the 
British  were  in  agreement  as  to  his  resignation,  they  made 
no  effort  to  belittle  the  manifest  service  he  had  rendered 
France.  A  single  Gambetta  might  only  push  her  into  civil 
war,  but  could  he  have  been  multiplied  by  six  he  might  have 
freed  her  from  invasion.  "Of  course,"  said  the  Examiner, 
"clear  sighted  statesmen  are  best;  but  there  is  something 

1  Spectator,  Feb.  4,  1871. 

2  Standard,  Feb.  3,  4.  16,  1871 ;  Daily  Telegraph,  Feb.  6,  1871. 

3  Globe,   Times,  Record,  Standard,  issues  of  Feb.  4,    1871  ;   Graphic, 
Feb.  11,  1871. 


33I]  THE  ARMISTICE  331 

very  noble  in  the  blind  zeal  of  this  determined  man  and 
something  very  pathetic  in  that  view  of  him  weeping  in  the 
streets  of  Bordeaux  when  the  bitter  news  of  the  surrender 
of  Paris  gave  the  lie  to  his  long  cherished  hopes."  He 
could  have  the  consolation  of  knowing,  it  was  thought,  that 
his  efforts  had  proven  to  Alsace  and  Lorraine  that  they 
were,  as  least,  not  to  be  relinquished  tamely  to  Germany.1 

And  Alsace  and  Lorraine  proved  grateful.  For  though 
France,  as  a  whole,  gave  approval  to  the  moderate  element 
in  the  Government  of  National  Defense  by  electing  such 
delegates  as  would  approve  the  peace,  these  two  provinces 
elected  ultra  Radicals.  Paris,  too,  chose  this  way  of  plac- 
ing herself  in  the  minority.  The  British  regarded  the  re- 
turns with  wonderment.  No  single  member  of  the  de  facto 
Government,  save  Gambetta,  was  returned  by  the  capital. 
In  sober,  orderly  manner  the  citizens  had  gone  to  the  polls 
and  elected  the  partisans  of  war  at  any  price.'  Archibald 
Forbes  frankly  admitted  that  he  did  not  know  what  to  make 
of  it.  He  had  an  inclination  to  pull  off  his  hat  to  these 
cadaverous  men,  who  voted  for  more  war,  when  it  was 
quite  apparent  that  what  they  were  really  in  need  of  was 
good  beef  extract. J 

The  country  districts,  however,  gave  hope  for  peace  by 
returning  Conservatives.  It  was  noticed  with  relief  that 
they  no  longer  supported  Napoleon.  The  proclamation  he 
had  issued  from  Hohenlohe  'before  the  day  of  the  election 
fell  completely  flat.  Even  his  support  by  the  Rothschilds 
was  unavailing.  4 

Men  wondered  how  the  Republicans  of  Paris  would  co- 
operate with  the  representatives  of  the  provinces.     Paris 

1  Examiner,  and  Spectator,  Feb.  II,  1871. 

'Daily  Telegraph,  Feb.  14;  Spectator,  Feb.  18;  Times.  Feb.  16,  1871. 

3  Forbes,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  425-427. 

4  Weekly  Scotsman,  Feb.  18,  1871. 


332      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [332 

had  played  too  prominent  a  part  to  submit  to  seeing  her 
delegates  ignored.  It  was  rumoured  the  Government 
meant  to  weaken  their  power  by  convoking  the  Assembly  at 
a  distance  from  the  capital.  This,  the  Spectator  thought, 
would  be  tantamount  to  a  declaration  of  civil  war  by  the 
Departments,  The  great  cities  of  France  might  be  ex- 
pected to  support  the  cause  of  Paris.1 

John  Richard  Green  hoped,  but  not  confidently,  that  for 
the  sake  of  its  influence  on  Italy  and  Spain,  France  might  be- 
come decentralized  and  so  find  freedom.2  But  England, 
as  a  whole,  was  not  averse  to  having  her  slip  back  quite 
unobtrusively  into  the  governmental  grooves  to  which  she 
had  been  accustomed.  Capital  and  provinces  had  always  had 
their  differences.  It  had  seemed  many  times  that  France 
was  a  monarchy  with  a  republic  for  its  capital, — that  it  held 
itself  together  only  by  a  beautifully  articulated  system  of 
wheels  within  wheels.  Gambetta  had  resigned.  If  the 
Parisian  delegates  would  refrain  from  over-emphasis,  the 
abnormal  might  prove  again  the  normal. 

1  Spectator,  March  4,  1871. 

2  Green  to  E.  A.  Freeman,  Feb.  6,  1871,  Letters  of  J.  R.  Green,  pp. 
283-284. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
The  Negotiation  of  the  Preliminaries 

"  Fortunately,"  Disraeli  once  said  of  his  native  land, 
"  this  country  is  not  governed  by  logic.  It  is  a  Parliamen- 
tary Government,  and  it  is  governed  by  rhetoric." 

There  had  been  critics  a  plenty  to  point  out,  during  the 
interim  between  the  sessions,  that  the  Ministry  had  in  no 
wise  subjected  the  country  to  a  new  experience  in  this  re- 
gard. To  be  sure,  the  flow  of  eloquence  had,  perforce,  been 
attenuated.  But  it  was  felt  that  Gladstone  and  his  col- 
leagues had  shown  that  England  could  be  governed  just  as 
illogically  by  the  Cabinet  alone  as  by  two  conscientiously 
officious  Houses.  By  awkward  and  obscure  means,  they 
had  maintained  a  comfortable  peace.  It  was  feared  that 
certain  fiery  Parliamentarians  might,  with  great  comfort  to 
themselves,  plunge  the  country  into  the  discomforts  of  war. 

The  illogic  of  the  course  was  certainly  alluring.  Those 
"  muscular  peacemakers,"  1  who  most  eagerly  favored  inter- 
vention, had  disclosed,  with  the  utmost  candour,  England's 
unpreparedness.  The  time  had  arrived  when  she  could,  at 
last,  be  certain  of  entering  the  lists  without  allies,  and  of  re- 
viving hope  in  France  when  Gambetta  himself  had  bowed 
his  head  to  circumstances.  There  was,  also,  that  agfe-old 
temptation  to  try  to  arrive  at  a  durable  peace  through  war. 
But  there  is  this  difference  between  the  Briton  and  the  Celt. 

1  Pseudonym  of  a  bellicose  correspondent  of  the  Times.  Lord  John 
Russell  was  another  of  those  who,  as  Disraeli  phrased  it,  raised 
armies  by  a  stroke  of  the  pen. 

333]  333 


034      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [334 

The  first  cautiously  mixes  common  sense  in  his  illogic,  while 
the  second  prefers  his  in  its  native  purity.  It  was  most 
probable  that  the  Government  would  hear  its  method  voci- 
ferously attacked  and  the  peaceful  end  it  had  achieved 
unanimously  welcomed. 

Matthew  Arnold,  writing  in  Pall  Mall  under  the  pseu- 
donym of  "  von  Thundersten-Tronck,"  was  impatient  of 
the  forthcoming  babble  of  the  "  young  men  from  the 
country  "  to  which  England  was  about  to  be  subjected.1 
The  Telegraph  rejoiced  that  at  least  during*  the  progress  of 
the  war  Parliament  had  not  been  sitting.  The  speeches  of 
individual  members  would  have  reechoed  painfully  abroad. 
Foreigners  were  stupid  about  understanding  that  in  Par- 
liamentary England  the  menaces  of  representatives  signified 
little  unless  the  speakers  were  in  office.  Something,  even 
at  this  late  time,  was  to  be  feared  and  nothing  to  be  ex- 
pected when,  on  February  the  eighth,  the  Honourable  Mem- 
bers and  Noble  Lords  resumed  their  sessions.3 

Amidst  general  disappointment  the  Queen  allowed  her 
speech  to  be  read  by  the  Chancellor,  while  she  sat  with  head 
bowed  and  toyed  almost  imperceptibly  with  her  fan. 
Royalty  was  under  attack  from  the  Republicans  and  it  was 
regretted  that  Victoria  did  not  choose  more  actively  to  ful- 
fil her  duties.  However,  the  speech  was  hardly  one  to  tempt 
a  widowed  Queen  to  break  her  silence. 

The  Standard  characterized  it  as  bald,  jejune,  and  vapid, — 
at  once  barren  and  unctuous.  It  saw  in  it  the  same  crowd- 
ing of  ill-fitting  words  into  meaningless  phrases  that  had 
disfigured  the  Edinburgh  article  on  "  Happy  England."  3  It 
was  a  speech  with  the  placidity  of  a  May  morning,  but 

1  Cf.  Blanchard'  Jerrold,  At  Home  in  Paris,  vol.  ii,  pp.  231-237. 

2  Daily  Telegraph,  Jan.  3,  1871. 
'  Standard,  Feb.  19,  1871. 


335]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES       335 

without  its  freshness.     Journalists  set  themselves  to  trick- 
ing it  out  with  interpretations  to  their  liking. 

"  I  greatly  regret,"  Her  Majesty  had  said,  "  that  my  ear- 
nest endeavours  have  failed  to  procure  the  presence  at  the 
Conference  of  any  representative  of  France,  which  was  one 
of  the  chief  parties  to  the  Treaty  of  1856,  and  which  must 
ever  be  regarded  as  a  principal  and  indispensable  Member  of 
the  great  Commonwealth  of  Europe." 

This,  according  to  the  Spectator,  was  intended  to  mean 
that  any  exactions  which  would  permanently  cripple  France 
or  dispose  of  her  rank  as  a  first-class  Power  would  en- 
counter determined  resistance  from  Great  Britain.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  congratulations  that  the  Queen  ex- 
tended to  Germany  on  the  election  of  her  Emperor,  and  the 
hope  expressed  that  the  forthcoming  peace  would  comport 
with  the  security  and  honour  of  the  countries  involved,  was! 
taken  to  mean  that  Germany  was  to  be  allowed  a  mountain 
barrier,  but  must  not  aspire  to  Metz.1  John  Bull  wa3 
another  that  was  able  so  to  read  the  speech  as  to  find  it 
strong  and  heartening.  Its  editor  was  very  certain  that  the 
Queen  had  indicated  a  desire  for  a  notable  increase  of 
armament.     Such  interpretations  were  assuredly  liberal.2 

In  the  Standard,  Her  Majesty's  words  were  reported  more 
exactly  and  less  favourably.  "  The  chief  points,"  it  said, 
"  on  which  the  Government  seem  to  take  credit  to  them- 
selves are  that  the  sphere  of  war  has  not  been  extended  be- 
yond the  two  countries  originally  engaged,  and  that  they 
have  '  cherished  with  care  the  cordiality  of  their  relations 
with  each  belligerent.'  This  careful  cherishing  of  a  double 
cordiality  would  appear,  however,  to  have  yielded  but 
small   fruit  ....  When  these  cautious  Neutrals  did   in- 

1  Spectator,  Feb.  II,  1871. 
J  John  Bull,  Feb.  11,  1871. 


336      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [336 

terfere,  they  were  enabled  to  do  so  with  tremendous  effect. 
They  actually  succeeded,  the  Speech  declares,  in  '  placing  the 
representatives  of  the  two  contracting  countries  in  confiden- 
tial communication.'  We  can  imagine  the  gentleman  who 
performed  this  alliterative  feat  regarding  his  success  as  al- 
most a  triumph  of  diplomacy.  Hereafter  when  the  history 
of  the  war  comes  to  be  written,  let  it  never  be  forgotten  that 
the  Gladstone  Government  spared  no  effort  to  cherish  the 
cordiality  of  their  foreign  relations,  and  to  contribute  to- 
wards the  communications,  etc."  1 

The  Queen's  address  was  listened  to  thus  critically  be- 
cause it  was  supposed  to  indicate  the  attitude  of  the  Min- 
istry. If  a  somewhat  verbose  speech  may  be  regarded  as 
an  intercession  for  silence,  this  one  should  be  so  considered. 
When  Gladstone,  who,  it  was  presumed,  had  written  it, 
wished  to  say  little,  he  said  much.  When  his  way  ap- 
peared obscure,  he  unfailingly  saw  before  him  "  three 
courses."  "  The  English  Parliament,"  said  the  Spectator, 
"  has  opened  with  its  finger  in  its  lips.  ...  It  is  hardly  a 
noble  attitude,  but  in  these  days  the  United  Kingdoms  do 
not  go  in  for  nobility,  but  for  safety."  2 

It  immediately  became  evident  that  the  Government  was 
not  to  be  allowed  to  maintain  its  reticence.  In  the  House 
of  Lords,  the  leader  of  the  Opposition  scored  the  Ministry 
for  having  allowed  the  remonstrance  at  the  Russian  abroga- 
tion to  "  collapse  into  a  Conference."  He  criticised  the 
Home  Secretary,  Mr.  Bruce,  for  having  blatantly  failed 
during  the  Recess  to  observe  that  cordial  sympathy,  which 
it  was  the  Queen's  boast  had  been  extended  to  both  belliger- 
ents.3    He  manifested  lively  doubt  as  to  whether  a  Gov- 

1  Standard,  Feb.  10,  1871. 
3  Spectator,  Feb.  11,  1871. 
3  Supra,  chap,  xii,  p.  240,  note. 


337]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES       337 

eminent,  whose  watchword  had  been  retrenchment,  could 
be  trusted  to  strengthen  adequately  the  national  armaments.1 

In  the  House,  a  critic  even  more  aggressive  was  encount- 
ered in  Disraeli.  It  could  not  be  expected  that,  at  a  time  so 
momentous,  he  would  have  placed  himself  among  the  silent 
Members.  He  spoke  at  length  and  at  large.  "  This  war," 
he  said,  "  represents  the  German  revolution, — a  greater 
political  event  than  the  French  revolution  of  the  last  century 
....  Not  a  single  principle  in  the  management  of  our 
foreign  affairs,  accepted  by  all  statesmen  for  guidance  up  to 
six  months  ago,  any  longer  exists.  There  is  not  a  diplo- 
matic tradition  which  has  not  been  swept  away.  You  have 
a  new  world,  new  influences  at  work,  new  and  unknown 
objects  and  dangers  with  which  to  cope,  at  present  in- 
volved in  that  obscurity  incident  to  novelty  in  such  affairs 
....  The  balance  of  power  has  been  entirely  destroyed 
and  the  country  which  suffers  most,  and  feels  the  effects  of 
the  great  change  most,  is  England." 

He  reviewed  with  discontent  the  Government's  conduct 
from  the  inception  of  the  dispute  over  the  Hohenzollern 
candidature.  He  revived  the  claim  he  had  made  in  July 
as  to  England's  competence  to  threaten  intervention  on  the 
ground  of  the  Treaty  of  181 5,  which  had  guaranteed  Prus- 
sia in  the  possession  of  the  Saxon  province.  The  treaty 
cited  had  already  been  disregarded  by  England  when  she 
accorded  recognition  to  Napoleon  III.  So  signally  had  it 
fallen  into  disuse  that  it  might  have  served  Mill  admirably 
for  his  thesis  on  the  instability  of  international  engage- 
ments. 

He  was  more  successful  in  criticising  Odo  Russell's  mis- 
sion on  the  Russian  matter.  Her  Majesty's  Government 
had  chosen,  after  receiving  Gortschakoff's  note,  to  consult 

1  Duke  of  Richmond,  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  Feb.  9,  1871, 
vol.  cciv,  pp.  30  et  seq. 


038      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [338 

Count  Bismarck,  "  a  most  eminent  man,  one  whose  opinion 
in  a  difficult  question  he  believed  to  be  most  valuable — but 
a  man  who  was  the  Minister  of  Prussia — a  country  whose 
conduct  during  the  Crimean  War  had  been  ambiguous  and 
equivocal."  He  was  fearful  that  the  Conference,  which 
Bismarck  had  suggested  with  such  cynical  cordiality,  would 
do  no  more  than  register  a  foregone  conclusion.  He  was 
of  the  opinion,  further,  that  the  tolerance  which  the  Gov- 
ernment had  shown  in  agreeing  to  discuss  the  Russian  abro- 
gation had  induced  Prussia  to  try  their  amiability  by  de- 
nouncing the  treaty  guaranteeing  Luxemburg. 

Here  Gladstone  was  able  to  correct  him.  On  the  last  day 
of  the  Recess,  the  Government  had  been  strengthened  by  a 
communication  from  Bernstorff.  In  it  assurance  was  given 
that  the  objection  Germany  had  taken  to  the  proceedings  of 
Luxemburg  was  one  with  respect  only  to  military  purposes 
and  military  necessities,  and  that  she  still  gave  recognition 
to  the  treaty  of  guarantee.1 

The  Departments  of  the  Army  and  the  Admiralty  were 
treated  no  less  cavalierly  than  the  Foreign  Office.  Dis- 
raeli scoffed  at  the  "  attenuated  armaments  "  that  had  made 
impossible  the  prestige  of  an  "  armed  neutrality."  He  ren- 
dered sarcastic  tribute  to  'Mr.  Cardwell  and  Mr.  Childers. 
Those  gentlemen,  he  said,  had  been  entrusted  with  office  be- 
cause it  was  generally  understood  that  they  were,  on  the 
whole,  the  administrators  most  competent  to  reduce  the 
naval  and  military  strength  of  the  country;  and  the 
country,  which  was  always  just  to  public  men,  had  unani- 
mously agreed  that  the  right  honourable  gentlemen  had 
entirely  justified  its  confidence.2 

1  Annual  Register,  1871,  N.  S.,  p.  269.  Diplomatic  papers  on  Luxem- 
burg. 

'Hansard,  op.  cit.,  Feb.  9,  1871,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  70  et  seq.;  Buckle, 
Life  of  Disraeli,  vol.  v,  pp.  I33-I34;  Spectator,  Feb.  n,  1871 ;  Graphic, 
Feb.  18,  1871 ;  Illustrated  London  News,  Feb.  18,  1871. 


339]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES       339 

On  the  next  day,  Mr.  Baillie  Cochrane  and  Mr.  W.  M. 
Torrens  urged  that  the  Government  make  outspoken  repre- 
sentations on  the  terms  of  peace  about  to  be  negotiated.* 
They  did  not  speak  to  an  audience  that  was  unsympathetic 
to  the  sorrow  of  France.  But  the  Government  had  pro- 
mised that  in  a  few  days  the  official  documents  would  be 
laid  before  both  Houses.  Honourable  Members  preferred 
to  consider  these  before  indulging  in  further  debate  on  the 
foreign  policy.  Further,  it  was  known  that  within  a  day  or 
two  the  Government  of  France  would  be  formally  consti- 
tuted. England  was  desirous  of  discovering  what  manner 
of  state  it  was  to  which  she  was  urged  to  give  support. 

Outside  Parliament,  the  sympathy  for  France  was  mani- 
festing itself  in  a  way  that  hindered  rather  than  helped  its) 
friends  within.  It  was  being  increasingly  merged,  by  those 
who  gave  it  active  expression,  into  agitation  for  a  republic. 
The  Address  from  the  Throne  had  announced  the  engage- 
ment of  Victoria's  daughter,  Louise,  to  the  Marquis  of 
Lome.  On  the  following  day  the  Queen  requested  that  a 
suitable  dowry  be  presented  to  the  young  Princess.2  She 
was  very  popular,  and  her  choice  of  a  Scottish,  rather  than 
a  German  bridegroom,  had  made  her  more  so.3  But,  in 
spite  of  this,  her  claims  on  England  as  a  princess  royal  were 
loudly  contested.  At  Nottingham  the  grant  of  a  settlement 
was  condemned  by  a  mass  meeting,  which  separated  with 
shouts  for  the  English  Republic.  At  Birmingham  those 
who  attempted  to  defend  it  were  cried  down,  and  the  entire 
Civil  List  was  brought  to  condemnation.  Not  a  tenth  of 
the  meetings  held  to  protest  the  matter  were  mentioned  in 

1  Spectator,  Feb.  11,  1871 ;  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  125-129,  138- 
144,  respectively. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  cciv,  p.  146. 

3  Punch,  Oct.  29,  1870;  J.  M.  Ludlow,  Europe  and  the  War,  Contem- 
porary Review,  Nov.,  1870,  vol.  xv,  pp.  649  et  seq.;  Spectator,  Jan.  28, 
1871. 


340      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [340 

the  papers,  said  the  Spectator }  but  quite  enough  appeared  to 
alarm  the  friends  of  monarchy.1 

It  was  earnestly  hoped  that  no  fresh  impetus  to  the  move- 
ment would  come  from  France.  Englishmen  were  eager 
to  see  that  country  represented  at  the  Conference.  They  felt 
that  Gladstone's  admission  of  Bismarck's  quibble  over 
Favre's  safe-conduct  was  humiliating.  But  some  among 
them  were  glad  that  a  firebrand  had  been  kept  away  from 
the  tinder.  They  hoped  eagerly  for  a  government  whose 
influence  would  not  be  revolutionary.  The  complete  failure 
of  the  Napoleonic  Manifesto  to  arouse  any  response  during 
the  elections  had  ended  the  fear  that  Bismarck  might  suc- 
ceed in  elevating  to  the  throne  some  puppet  ruler  of  his 
own  devising.2  Very  shortly  after  this  rebuff,  the  Berlin 
Post  recorded  that  orders  had  been  given  for  the  Imperial 
prisoner  to  be  watched  more  closely.  The  correspondent  of 
the  Graphic,  in  reporting  this,  added  that  Napoleon  had  re- 
ceived an  intimation  that  he  must  abstain  from  all  inter- 
ference in  politics.  It  was  evident  that  Bismarck's  schemes 
for  determining  the  government  of  France,  whether  they 
had  been  sincere  or  merely  a  method  of  weakening  the  Gov- 
ernment of  National  Defence,  were  definitely  abandoned.* 

On  February  the  thirteenth,  the  Assembly  convened  at 
Bordeaux.  It  contained  a  majority  of  Monarchists.  But 
France  had  entertained  so  many  dynasties  since  the  Revo- 
lution that  it  was  a  majority  sadly  divided.  Since  none  of 
the  factions  was  strong  enough  to  prevail  alone,  and  since 
the  Republicans  were  too  strong  to  be  openly  flouted,  the 
ingenious  idea  was  evolved  of  electing  as  "  head  of  the  Ex- 

1  Spectator,  Feb.  4,  11,  1871. 

*  Daily  News,  Times,  Birmingham  Daily  Gazette,  Dublin  Evening 
Mail,  issues  of  Feb.  13,  1871 ;  for  a  favourable  criticism,  cf.  Standard, 
Feb.  14,  1871. 

*  Graphic,  Feb.  25,  1871. 


34i  ]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES      341 

ecutive"  someone  who  could  combine  in  his  own  proper 
person  the  elements  of  all  the  several  parties.  There  was 
only  one  logical  candidate  for  such  a  position.  It  was  M. 
Thiers,  and  he  was  forthwith  elected.1 

"  No  living  man,"  said  the  Times,  "  could  pretend  to  a 
greater  experience  in  the  formation  of  a  new  Government. 
His  name,  either  as  historian  or  actor,  was  connected  with 
every  chapter  of  the  great  French  Revolution  from  1789  to 
the  present  day."  2  The  chameleon  quality  of  M.  Thiers, 
combined,  as  it  was,  with  a  dignity  and  patriotism  that  were 
unquestioned,  was  very  appealing.  Each  party,  saving  only 
the  Red  Republicans,  thought  he  might  be  tinted  with  its 
color.  The  Orleanists,  according  to  a  Lombard  telegram 
from  Lyons,  had  confidently  assigned  him  a  place  in  their 
Cabinet.3  France,  said  the  News,  would  soon  cease  to  be  a 
Republic  and  would  welcome,  again,  the  House  of  Orleans.* 
M.  Thiers  would  be  invaluable  in  bridging  the  way  to  such 
a  consummation. 

But  M.  Thiers  had  recently  declared  he  was  no  longer 
an  Orleanist  and  the  Legitimists  were  hopeful  of  his  sincer- 
ity. To  those  Frenchmen  who  concerned  themselves  more 
with  the  establishment  of  peace  than  with  the  fate  of  a  party, 
his  election  was  equally  agreeable.  They  were  weary  of  the 
call  to  die  for  their  country.  Thiers,  they  thought,  better 
than  any  other,  could  negotiate  the  ultimate  treaty  and 
recommend  its  acceptance  with  such  dignity  that  it  would 
be  least  hurtful  to  French  vanity.  If  he  could  not  revive 
France,  after  the  manner  of  Gambetta,  he  could  afford  her 
mm  enterrement  de  premiere  classe.5 

1  Atkins,  Life  of  Sir  W.  H.  Russell,  vol.  ii,  p.  235. 

*  Times,  Feb.  27,  1871. 
i  Tablet,  Feb.  18,  1871. 

*  Daily  News,  Feb.,  passim. 
*Ibid.,  Feb.  13,  1871. 


342      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [342 

An  amazing  proof  of  his  versatility  was  that  he  was  able 
to  please  not  only  his  countrymen,  but  the  invaders.  Bis- 
marck was  well  content  with  the  head  of  the  Government 
with  which  he  was  about  to  treat.  "  There  is  scarcely  a 
trace  of  the  diplomatist  about  him,"  he  told  his  secretary, 
"  he  is  far  too  sentimental  for  that  trade.  He  is  not  fit  to 
be  a  negotiator;  he  allows  himself  to  be  bluffed  too  easily; 
he  betrays  his  feelings  and  allows  himself  to  be  pumped."  * 

Garibaldi  departed.  Gambetta  pled  physical  exhaustion 
and  went  into  temporary  retirement.2  No  one  knew  which 
royal  road  France  was  about  to  take.  But  it  seemed  certain, 
at  last,  that  she  was  safe  from  Red  Republicanism.  "  And 
so,"  wrote  the  head  of  the  Executive,  concluding  the  happy 
story  of  his  election,  "  in  less  than  an  hour  after  the  vote 
that  placed  me  in  power,  the  Ambassadors  of  England, 
Austria,  and  Italy  came  to  inform  me  of  the  official  re- 
cognition of  the  new  Government  by  their  Cabinets." 

In  the  British  press  his  election  was  greeted  by  comments 
so  divergent  that  one  might  almost  have  believed  France  had 
chosen  as  her  leader  a  sort  of  Jekyll-Hyde  combination 
unique  in  history.  In  the  Guardian's  opinion  "  M.  Thiers 
would  by  foreigners,  as  well  as  by  natives,  be  almost  in- 
variably selected  as  the  representative  Frenchman  of  the 
age."  He  was  praised  as  having  kept  unsullied  his  char- 
acter for  political  foresight  and  sagacity.  He  had  con- 
demned the  war  and  refused  to  accept  responsibility  for  its 
continuance.     But  by  pleading  the  cause  of  France  abroad 

1  Julian  Kune,  Reminiscences  of  an  Octogenarian  Hungarian  Exile, 
p.  187. 

2  J.  M.  Ludlow,  Re  constitution  of  England,  Contemporary  Review, 
Feb.,  1871,  pp.  499  et  seq. 

8  Memoirs  of  Thiers,  1870-1873,  p.  119;  see  also  Hanotaux,  Contem- 
porary France,  vol.  i,  p.  83. 


343]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES       343 

and  by  negotiating  with  the  victors,  he  had  given  practical 
proof  of  his  sympathy  with  her  hard  pressed  Government.1 
The  Mail  viewed  him  less  benignantly.     "  Of  all  French- 
men," said  one  of  its  leaders, 

he  would  be,  in  ordinary  times  and  under  different  circumstances, 
the  last  towards  whom  foreign  nations  would  feel  called  upon  to 
evince  consideration  or  forbearance ;  for  his  patriotism  was  at  all 
times  selfish,  jealous  and  aggressive,  and  his  policy  aimed  singly  at 
French  preponderance  founded  on  the  division  and  degradation  of 
all  neighbouring  nations.2 

The  Standard  condemned  him  for  being  personally  re- 
sponsible for  the  present  calamities.  He  had  voted  against 
the  war  only  because  he  believed  it  inopportune.  "  Whatever 
is  bad  in  Napoleonism,  whatever  pernicious  fruit  it  has 
yielded  during  the  last  twenty  years,  is  the  growth  of  the 
spirit  first  planted  by  M.  Thiers  in  those  wild  romances 
which  he  calls  '  Histories  of  the  Consulate  and  Empire.'  " 3 

In  the  Times,  France  was  advised  that  stability  was  the 
first  thing  to  be  attained,  stability,  the  second  thing,  stability; 
the  third,  and  that  Thiers  was  the  leader,  above  all,  who* 
could  give  it  to  her.4  The  Spectator,  on  the  other  hand, 
could,  by  no  means,  see  that  France  had  found  a  rock  of 
Gibraltar  on  which  to  cling. 

Never  was  any  forlorn  sufferer  content  to  find  shelter  under  a 
more  diminutive  fragment  of  rock  in  a  weary  land  than  France 
under  the  leadership  of  M.  Thiers, — a  man  with  no  political  faith, 
hope,  or  charity.  ...  If  France  is  to  have  a  future,  and  grow 
into  a  firmer  texture  of  restraint  and  resolve,  her  first  necessity, 
after  the  exigency  of  the  moment  is  satisfied,  will  be  to  put  at  the 
head  of  affairs  some  statesman  of  deeper  faith  and  character,  of 
steadier  purpose,  and  of  less  twinkling  intelligence  than  M. 
Thiers.5 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  Feb.  20,  1871. 

1  Mail,  Feb.  21,  1871. 

1  Standard,  Feb.  20,  1871. 

*  Times,  Feb.  20,  21,  1871. 

5  Spectator,  Feb.  25,  1871. 


344      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [344 

Even  Punch,  that  declared  exuberant  delight  at  the  eleva- 
tion of  a  fellow  author,  showed  uncertainty  as  to  what  title 
should  be  used  in  greeting  him. 

Whether  the  new  Sovereign  is  to  be  the  President,  Vice  Consul 
or  Emperor,  Mr.  Punch  respectfully  salutes  him,  and  hastens  to 
recognize  the  Dynasty.  His  Majesty  has  waited  long  for  the 
Crown — but  "  the  world  is  to  him  who  knows  how  to  wait  " — and 
to  work.  The  new  sovereign's  health  in  a  bottle  —  aye  of  Bor- 
deaux !  x 

It  was  a  hearty  greeting,  but  a  sure  and  safe  one.  It  was, 
withal,  appropriate.  The  new  head  of  the  Executive  opened 
his  career  by  stating  that  all  constitutional  questions  mu3t 
await  the  peace  for  their  solution.  The  words,  la  Repub^ 
lique,  were  struck  out  of  all  public  acts.  Foreign  ambas- 
sadors were  accredited  simply  to  la  France.2 

On  the  day  that  this  somewhat  equivocal  Government  was 
inaugurated,  the  diplomatic  correspondence, — or  that  por- 
tion of  it  which  Granville  considered  harmless, — was  laid 
before  Parliament.  The  papers  were  those  referring  to  the 
Black  Sea  matter  and  to  the  conduct  of  the  Government  to- 
ward the  belligerents. 

It  afforded  to  the  Times  and  the  Nezvsz  another  oppor- 
tunity for  commending  the  Foreign  Office  for  its  sagacity. 
Lord  Granville's  despatch  of  January  the  twentieth,  suggest- 
ing to  Germany  the  propriety  of  declaring  its  terms  of  peace, 
seemed  to  these  papers,  to  show  that  the  Government  was 
possessed  of  boldness  in  a  comfortably  sufficient  quantity. 
The  Saturday  Review  was  equally  laudatory.  It  thought 
the  British  attitude  contrasted  very  favourably  with  the 
illogic  shown  by  the  French  and  the  harshness  shown  by  the 

1  Punch,  Feb.  25,  1871. 

*  Manchester  Guardian,  Feb.  23,  1871. 

'Issues  of  Feb.  14,  1871. 


345]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES      345 

Germans.1  The  Government  had,  also,  the  suffrage  of  the 
Economist,  which  praised  it  as  having  done  all  that  logically 
was  possible.  Statesmen,  it  argued,  should  not  favour  in- 
tervention, unless  there  was  certainty  that  it  could  be  effec- 
tive. The  leaders  of  the  belligerent  nations  had  been  intent 
on  a  quarrel, — and  designedly  had  precipitated  war  by  a 
"  false  report  of  a  fabricated  insult."  The  struggle  had 
been  one  of  national  jealousy,  and  an  intrusive  attempt  at 
mediation  would  have  only  widened  its  scope  and  increased 
its  intensity.2 

Pall  Mall,  after  studying  the  Blue  Book,  was  able  to  con- 
cede only  a  "  regretful  acquiescence  "  to  the  Government' 3 
policy.3  The  Graphic,  though  restraining  itself  from  con- 
demnation, showed  even  less  enthusiasm.  England,  it 
noticed,  in  spite  of  repeated  urging  by  other  Neutrals  to 
agree  on  a  joint  policy  in  the  interests  of  peace,  had  re- 
fused to  do  more  than  facilitate  the  meeting  of  the  negotia- 
tors. When  Bismarck  had  declared  Germany's  intention 
of  annexing  certain  border  districts,  Granville  had  kept 
silence.  In  October,  he  had  censured  France  for  expressing 
her  determination  to  refuse  the  victors  a  stone  of  fortress 
or  an  inch  of  territory.  Not  until  January  had  he  made  the 
notable  declaration  that  "  if  the  war  continued,  if  France  be- 
came totally  disorganized,  a  curse  to  herself  and  Europe, 
and  Germany  had  no  recourse  but  to  seize  and  occupy  vast 
territories  filled  with  unwilling  inhabitants,  blame  would  at- 
tach to  her  for  having  refused,  not  the  intervention,  but  the 
good  offices  of  the  neutral  Powers." 

The  Graphic  doubted  whether  this,  and  later  intimations 
that  the  treaty  was  a  matter  of  legitimate  European  in- 
terest, had  not  been  made  too  late.4 

1  Saturday  Review,  Feb.  18,  1871. 
1  Economist,  Feb.  18,  1871. 
3  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Feb.  15,  1871. 
*  Graphic,  Feb.  18,  1871. 


346      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [346 

A  similar  opinion  was  advanced  with  much  more  em- 
phasis by  the  Guardian.  "What  Lord  Granville  asked 
from  Germany  in  the  third  week  of  January,  when  France 
in  her  despair  was  already  resolved  on  negotiating  without 
the  aid  of  neutrality,  might  have  been  asked  in  the  middle 
of  last  September  with  advantage.  .  .  .  Peace  will  now 
probably  be  arranged  between  France  and  Germany  without 
England  having  a  word  to  say  in  the  matter."  * 

The  Spectator,  after  its  manner  of  saying  its  say  boldly, 
squarely  condemned  Lord  Granville's  policy  from  first  to 
last.  His  neutrality  had  been  not  frank  and  fearless  but 
timid  and  ostentatious.  He  should  have  recognized  the 
Government  of  National  Defence.  He  should  have  pro- 
tested against  the  principle  of  the  annexations.2  The 
Standard,  though  equally  displeased  with  this  phase  of  the 
Government's  policy,  reserved  its  strongest  denunciation  for 
the  despatches  dealing  with  the  Black  Sea  matter.  No  Eng- 
lishman of  honour,  it  declared,  could  read  this  correspon- 
dence without  feelings  of  mingled  shame  and  indignation.3 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  debate  on  the  Blue  Book 
could  be  confined  to  the  Fourth  Estate.  Early  in  the 
session  of  February  the  seventeenth,  the  Government  was 
questioned  as  to  whether  it  had  made  any  efforts  to  dissuade 
the  German  authorities  from  the  projected  march  of  their 
army  through  Paris.4  It  was  asked  whether  it  had  been  ap- 
prised by  its  foreign  representatives  of  a  treaty  between 
Russia  and  Prussia.5  When  these  questions  were  dexter- 
ously parried,  enquiry  was  made  of  the  truth  of  a  report 
that  French  districts  had  been  pillaged  as  a  punishment  for 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  Feb.  15,  1871. 

*  Spectator,  Feb.  18,  187 1. 
8  Standard,  Feb.  16,  1871. 

*  Interpellates  was  Baillie  Cochrane,  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  cciv,  p.  378. 
5  Interpellates  was  Sir  Chas.  Dilke,  ibid.,  vol.  cciv,  p.  379. 


347]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES       347 

the  non-payment  of  fines  to  the  invaders.1  But  the  debate 
of  the  day  was  initiated  when  young  Auberon  Herbert  rose 
to  call  the  attention  of  his  colleagues  to  the  papers  relating 
to  the  Franco-German  War  and  to  move  a  resolution  for  a 
direct  change  in  Governmental  policy.2 

This  son  of  the  third  Earl  of  Carnarvon  was  regarded  as 
a  visionary  and  something  of  a  dangerous  radical  in  poli- 
tics. But  it  was  admitted  that  he  possessed  whatever  virtue 
there  might  be  in  sincerity.  The  veteran  political  journal- 
ist, Sir  Henry  Lucy,  describes  his  honesty  as  having  been 
equalled  only  by  his  undaunted  pluck  and  almost  womanly 
gentleness  of  manner.  If  he  did  not  actually  serve  as  the 
model  for  Mrs.  Browning's  hero  in  Aurora  Leigh,  the  coin- 
cidence of  likeness,  Sir  Henry  thinks,  was  most  remarkable.3 
During  the  early  part  of  the  war  he  had  been  attached,  with 
Sir  Charles  Dilke,  to  an  ambulance  of  the  Crown  Prince's 
Army.*  But  after  the  battles  of  Worth  and  Gravelotte  he 
had  given  his  sympathy  to  France.  The  speech  he  rose  to 
deliver  was  a  condemnation  of  inactive  neutrality,  but  it 
was  made  without  bitterness  and  with  the  hope  of  effecting 
a  change,  not  of  party,  but  of  policy.  It  was  his  belief  that 
the  other  Neutrals  had  been  discouraged  from  intervention 
by  the  stoical  attitude  of  England.  He  repeated  the  charge 
that  she  had  played  toward  France  the  part  of  a  detrimental. 
He  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  Italy,  on  August  the 
twenty-seventh,  had  for  the  second  time  expressed  a  desire 
to  unite  with  her  in  action;  that  in  the  next  month  the 
French  representative  in  London  had  informed  the  For- 
eign Minister  that  various  Governments  sympathised  with 

1  Interpellates-  was  Mr.  Goldsmid,  ibid.,  vol.  cciv,  p.  379. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  387-396;  Annual  Register,  1871,  vol.  lxxii,  p.  29. 
8  Sir  Henry  Lucy,  Men  and  Manner  in  Pai  liament   (London,   1919), 

pp.  247  et  seq.;  biographical  sketch  in  Graphic,  March  4,  1871. 
*  Gwynn  and  Tuckwell,  Life  of  Sir  Chas.  Dilke,  vol.  i,  p.  104. 


348      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [348 

his  country's  desire  for  an  honourable  peace;  that  Austria 
had  repeatedly  signified  her  wish  for  a  stronger  policy;  that, 
late  in  October,  Italy  had  again  come  forward  in  the  belief 
that  the  time  was  ripe  for  Neutrals  to  draw  up  terms  which 
they  thought  should  prove  acceptable;  that  efforts  to  rouse 
England  had  been  continued  by  her,  jointly  with  Austria, 
through  December;  and  that  these  efforts  had  been  eagerly 
watched  by  France.  Her  Majesty's  Government  had  con- 
tented itself  with  performing  certain  small  offices  for  the 
belligerents.  It  had  passed  on  communications  verbatim. 
It  had  performed  the  office  of  a  whispering  tube.  He  re- 
gretted that  England  had  not  sought  to  exercise  a  moral  in- 
fluence over  the  two  nations,  that  she  had  not  evoked  the 
united  voice  of  Europe  for  reconciliation.  There  was  an 
international  obligation,  he  believed,  which  no  great  Power 
could  escape,  and  which  none  should  try  to  escape.  It  wa3 
a  thing  wrong  and  inexpedient  that  Europe  should  stand 
apart  in  distrust  and  derision,  and  say  no  single  word  when 
a  conquering  nation  was  about  to  determine  the  fate  of 
the  conquered.  He  recommended  the  immediate  moment 
as  the  latest  opportunity  for  action.  When  Germany  made 
known  to  Europe  the  terms  of  peace,  it  would  become  a 
matter  of  pride  to  her  to  sustain  them.  If  the  Neutrals 
were  to  do  anything  to  moderate  or  soften  the  conditions, 
their  efforts  should  be  made  at  once.  He  moved,  accord- 
ingly "  that  this  House  is  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  act  in  concert  with  other 
neutral  Powers  to  obtain  moderate  terms  of  peace,  and  to 
withhold  all  acquiescence  in  terms  which  might  impair  the 
independence  of  France  or  threaten  the  future  tranquility  of 
Europe." 

The  motion,  and  the  debate  which  followed  it,  occupy 
something  like  one  hundred  and  seventy  columns  in  the 
official  reports,  and  brought  to  the  floor  fourteen  Honour- 


349]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES       349 

able  Members.  It  cannot  be  said,  however,  that  any  new 
argument  of  consequence  was  added,  nor  that  the  original 
arguments  were  refuted. 

The  second  speech  was  made  by  another  of  the  Liberals, 
Sir  Robert  Peel.  Sir  Robert,  in  phrases  made  pungent  with 
the  spice  of  sarcasm,  denounced  the  Government  for  hav- 
ing reduced  England  to  a  policy  of  obliteration.  His  sallies 
at  the  Ministry's  expense  won  laughter  and  applause,  but 
they  introduced  an  animus  which  Auberon  Herbert  had 
avoided.  Sir  Robert  had  recently  visited  in  France,  Ger- 
many, Italy,  Switzerland,  and  Belgium.  His  desire  to 
range  afield  was  not  exhausted.  He  now  made  verbal  ex- 
cursions into  new  matters,  which  provided  subjects  for  fresh 
debates.1  Unfortunately,  he  was  imitated  by  others,  and 
the  House  found  itself  listening  to  a  discussion  of  the 
Russian  abrogation  of  the  Black  Sea  clauses;  a  review  of 
British  policy  in  the  affair  of  Schleswig-Holstein ;  a  com- 
parison of  the  diplomacy  of  Russell,  Palmerston,  Clarendon, 
Wellington,  Fox,  and  Pitt ;  and  an  appreciation  of  Cavour's 
work  for  Italy.  Even  the  Alabama  Claims  were  considered 
in  some  way  to  be  germane  to  the  motion. 

Sir  Henry  Hoare,  and  one  or  two  others  of  the  friendly, 
did  what  they  could  to  remove  the  original  contentions  from 
the  obfuscations  of  verbosity.2  They  believed  the  motion 
moderate,  and  one  that  represented  the  wishes  of  the  nation. 

Its  opponents,  —  and  several  who  professed  to  be  in 
complete  sympathy  with  the  spirit  it  expressed, — urged  its 
withdrawal  on  the  ground  that  it  was  inexpedient  and  un- 
necessary. Germany,  they  said,  would  not  demand  such 
terms  as  would  endanger  France  and  Europe.     England 

1  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  396-408. 

1  Ibid.,  vol.  cciv,  for  Hoare,  pp.  429-431;  for  Corrance,  pp.  437-440; 
for  Torrens,  pp.  439-445- 


350      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [350 

should  not,  at  this  late  day,  and  in  an  inadequate  condition 
of  armament,  abandon  neutrality.  It  was  amicably  sug- 
gested that  if  the  Government  make  such  an  expression  of 
their  desire  for  a  just  peace,  Herbert  would  be  induced  not 
to  ask  for  a  division.1 

Gladstone  rose  upon  the  hint.  He  answered  the  charges 
of  Sir  Robert  Peel,  and  informed  Herbert  that  his  motion 
was  inopportune,  since,  at  that  time,  neither  of  the  belliger- 
ents had  expressed  a  desire  for  England's  intervention. 
After  referring  to  the  hopes  already  expressed  in  Her 
Majesty's  speech  regarding  the  peace  terms,  he  so  far  un- 
leashed himself  from  ministerial  restraint  as  to  make  the 
following  involved  and  satesmanlike  declaration: 

Watchful  I  think  we  ought  to  be  and  should  continue  to  be ;  and 
it  would  be  a  gTeat  and  noble  distinction  for  this  country  if,  with- 
out allowing  her  sense  of  humanity  to  betray  her  into  proceedings 
beyond  her  right,  she  could  inscribe  on  the  roll  of  her  great  deeds 
having  been  able  to  make  some  contribution,  should  the  need  arise, 
towards  the  mitigation  of  conditions,  necessarily  heavy  and  severe, 
which  must  be  imposed  on  the  termination  of  the  war  on  one  of 
the  noblest  countries  of  Europe.2 

Debate  had  shown  that,  though  there  was  much  sympathy 
for  France,  the  motion  would  be  lost.  Auberon  Herbert 
contented  himself  with  Gladstone's  declaration,  and  did 
not  press  to  a  division. 

Even  in  Liberal  papers,  pleasure  was  shown  that  the  dis- 
cussion had  not  been  closed  before  gaining  from  the  Gov- 
ernment the  admission  that  the  terms  of  peace  were  a  mat- 
ter for  England's  watchful  concern.  Next  morning's 
Times  declared  that  the  country,  from  motives  of  humanity, 
as   well   as    from   consideration    for   the   future   peace   of 

1  Mr.  M.  T.  Bass,  ibid.,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  445-446. 
*  Ibid.,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  447-455. 


35i  ]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES       351 

Europe,  should  leave  no  pains  unspared  to  bring  about  such 
a  settlement  as  would  be  permanently  respected.1 

For  a  long  time,  the  British  had  had  under  discussion 
Germany's  intentions  toward  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  Glad- 
stone, in  the  last  days  of  January,  had  declared  unofficially 
that  he  favoured  their  military  neutralization.2  Morier 
wrote  that  he  was  fearful  that  outright  annexation  would 
afford  a  permanent  platform  to  the  chauvinists  of  France.3 
Frederic  Harrison  pled  eloquently  that,  in  the  interests  of 
civilisation,  France  should  not  be  dismembered  by  Ger- 
many.4 Yet  it  must  be  conceded  that  time  had  somewhat 
dulled  the  dislike  of  the  average  Britisher  for  the  annexation. 
The  bravery  and  patriotism  that  the  provinces  had  shown  in 
the  late  elections  for  the  Assembly  revived  somewhat  of 
sympathy.5  But  England  regarded  their  vote  as  hardly 
more  than  a  beau  geste. 

Discussion  concerned  itself  more  and  more  with  the 
amount  of  the  indemnity.  It  was  the  opinion  of  the  Times 
that  Germany  would  have  done  well  to  have  regarded  the 
gain  of  territory  as  so  sufficient  that  she  could  be  sparing  of 
her  demands  on  the  French  treasury.6  Such  temperance 
would  have  been  welcome  in  England  for  more  than  altruis- 
tic reasons.  Conditions  in  Lombard  Street  were  unsettled, 
and  would  continue  so  until  the  terms  were  known.     France 

1  Cf.  Standard,  Daily  Telegraph,  Illustrated  News,  issues  of  Feb.  18; 
Spectator,  Feb.  25,  1871. 

1  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  vol.  ii,  pp.  357-358. 

3  Morier  to  Lady  Derby,  Jan.  5,  1871,  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robt.  Morier, 
pp.  222-223. 

*  Harrison,  Effacement  of  England,  Fortnightly  Review,  Feb.,  1871, 
vol.  iii,  pp.  145  et  seq. 

6  Ludlow,  Reconstitution  of  England,  Contemporary  Review,  Feb., 
1871,  vol.  xvi,  pp.  499  et  seq. 

8  Times,  Feb.  8,  1871. 


352      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [352 

had  been  a  heavy  borrower  in  England  during  the  war  and 
her  creditors  desired  that  she  remain  solvent.1  Pall  Mall 
feared  that  the  imposition  of  a  great  indemnity  would  not 
only  diminish  the  security  of  neutral  lenders,  but  might  push 
France  into  revolution.2 

Not  only  in  the  matter  of  the  indemnity,  but  in  the  pro- 
jected march  of  the  German  troops  through  Paris,  did  the 
red  spectre  of  revolution  induce  denunciation  of  the  rum- 
oured terms.  For  the  pleasure  of  a  promenade,  it  was 
feared,  Prussia  might  provoke  such  tumult  and  slaughter  as 
would  make  all  Europe  shudder.  The  News,  the  Guardian, 
the  Standard  and  the  Telegraph  joined  voices  in  its  denun- 
ciation.3 The  Spectator,  alone,  professed  indifference.  It 
saw  something  incongruous  in  regarding  the  Rue  de  Rivoli 
as  a  Holy  of  Holies.4 

A  French  actor,  in  London  at  the  time,  has  recorded  in 
his  diary  how  intense  was  the  interest  England  was  mani- 
festing in  the  matter  of  the  peace.  One  heard  expressions 
of  sympathy  for  France  on  every  corner,  and  rumour  had 
it  that  the  Ministry  was  about  to  fall  because  of  its  inaction.5 

The  representative  of  the  Government  of  Thiers  arrived 
in  London  shortly  after  the  debate  Auberon  Herbert  had 
inaugurated  on  the  foreign  policy.  He  was  the  Due  de 
Broglie,  grandson  of  Mme.  de  Stael,  better  known  as  a  lit- 
terateur than  a  politician, — not  the  sort  of  a  man  to  elicit 
or  enjoy  the  welcome  of  a  Republican  Demonstration  Com- 
mittee.6    Lord  Granville  received  him  cordially,  and  within 

1  Economist,  Feb.  11,  1871. 

8  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Feb.  9,  1871. 

3  News  and  Guardian,  Feb.  18;  Standard,  Feb.  20;  Telegraph,  Feb. 
23,  1871. 

4  Spectator,  Feb.  25,  1871. 

'  Ernest  Blum,  Journal  d'un  vaudevilliste  (Paris,  1894),  pp.  252-253. 
•  Cf.  Daily  News,  Feb.  25,  1871. 


353]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES       353 

the  week  granted  him  substantial  proof  of  the  Government's 
sympathy.  De  Broglie  informed  the  British  Foreign  Min- 
ister almost  immediately  that  Germany  was  demanding  an 
indemnity  of  £240,000,000  and  that  France,  in  despair, 
desired  England  to  ask  for  a  reduction,  and  for  a  prolonga- 
tion of  the  armistice,  and  a  more  open  diplomacy  in  the 
manner  of  conducting  negotiations.  Granville  summoned 
the  Cabinet.  It  was  decided  that  representations  be  made  in 
regard  to  the  indemnity.  On  the  twenty-fourth  of  Feb- 
ruary, Berlin  and  Versailles  were  advised  of  Great  Britain's 
opinion  that  in  German,  as  well  as  in  French  interests,  the 
amount  demanded  should  be  no  larger  than  that  which  it 
was  reasonable  to  suppose  could  be  paid.1 

M.  Gavard,  of  the  staff  of  the  French  Embassy,  has 
written  rather  contemptuously  of  the  aid,  which,  at  the 
eleventh  hour,  the  "  economic  conscience  of  Gladstone"  was 
induced  to  render  France.2 

It  was  a  matter,  however,  of  much  satisfaction  to  the 
Ministry  itself  that  when  news  of  the  preliminary  treaty 
reached  London,  on  the  twenty-fifth,  it  was  found  that  the 
indemnity  had  been  reduced  by  £40,000,000.  Gladstone, 
the  day  before,  had  sustained  with  little  glory  a  very  severe 
attack  of  Disraeli's  in  regard  to  the  Russian  abrogation. 
So  sorely  was  he  pressed  that  he  had  even  pretended  a 
belief  that  Odo  Russell  had  been  quoting  Bismarck  when  he 
reported  the  famous  conversation  in  which  it  was  declared 
England  stood  ready  to  go  to  war  with  or  without  allies. 
The  House  had  been  vastly  amused  at  his  strategem.  When 
he  insisted  that  the  Conference  had  been  called  to  register 
a  protest  against  the  manner  of  the  abrogation  rather  than 
to  determine  whether  it  should  take  effect,  his  colleagues  had 

1  Brit.  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi,  pp.  192  et  seq. 

1  Gavard,  Un  diplomate  a  Londres  (Paris,  1895),  p.  3. 


354      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [3^4 

shown  themselves  dubious.1  The  Government  was  in  need 
of  comfort  and  elected  to  find  it  in  the  reduction  of  the  in- 
demnity. 

Viewed  in  their  entirety,  the  Preliminaries  could  be  ex- 
pected to  please  only  a  most  amiable  Cabinet.  Nothing1 
better  might  be  said  for  them  than  that  they  were  not  so 
harsh  as  the  false  terms  with  which  the  Times  had  created 
such  a  furore  previously.  The  document  which  had  obtained 
the  signature  of  Favre  and  Thiers  provided  for  the  cession 
of  all  of  Alsace  with  the  exception  of  Belfort,  and  of  a 
large  part  of  Lorraine,  including  Metz ;  the  payment  of  an 
indemnity  of  £200,000,000;  and  as  guarantee  of  its  pay- 
ment a  German  occupation  of  the  conquered  territory.  As 
a  final  buffet  to  French  pride,  Paris  itself  was  to  be  occupied 
from  the  first  of  March  to  the  ratification  of  the  Prelimin- 
aries by  the  Assembly.2 

It  was  impossible  to  believe,  in  considering  such  terms, 
that  Germany  had  had  regard  for  the  British  desire  for 
moderation.  In  the  press,  it  was  said  that  Bismarck  had 
offered  the  choice  of  the  cup  or  the  dagger.  His  demands 
were  condemned  as  monstrous,  barbaric,  and  diabolically 
provocative  of  war.  England's  laughter  was  gargantuan 
when  she  learned  that  the  Emperor  William,  "  with  a  deeply 
moved  heart  and  with  gratitude  to  the  grace  of  God,"  had 
informed  his  Consort  of  their  signature.  He  was  rudely  ad- 
vised to  modify  his  thanksgiving,  since  the  two  provinces 
he  annexed  would  not  long  enrich  the  German  Empire.* 
Journals,  that  during  the  course  of  the  war  had  expressed 
the  most  diverse  opinions,  agreed  in  regarding  the  Pre- 
liminaries as  only  marking  the  inception  of  a  troubled  truce. 

1  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  854-865 ;  Buckle,  Life  of  Disraeli,  pp. 
134-136. 
*  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  iii. 
3  Daily  News,  Manchester  Guardian,  Feb.  28,  1871. 


355]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES      355 

The  Times,  the  Telegraph,  John  Bull,  the  Standard,  Pall 
Mall,  the  Guardian  and  Saunders'  made  themselves  into  a 
Cassandra  chorus  whose  prophecies  have,  too  unhappily, 
been  all  fulfilled.1 

Foreseeing  such  disaster,  it  is  not  surprising  that,  even 
with  midnight  striking  for  France,  there  were  those  who 
still  urged  the  Government  to  forswear  its  lethargy.  The 
Times  reminded  Gladstone  that  twice  within  the  fortnight 
he  had  declared  the  terms  of  peace  to  be  a  legitimate  subject 
of  interest  to  Neutrals.  It  pled  that  the  time  had  come  when 
British  envoys  should  be  instructed  to  take  action.2 

The  Telegraph  prophesied  that  the  world  would  unite  in 
protest  against  so  unmerciful  an  exercise  of  force.3  A 
famous  stronghold  of  pacifism,  the  Cobden  Club  of  Edin- 
burgh, so  far  modified  its  tenets  as  to  declare  that  under 
certain  circumstances  intervention  was,  not  only  excusable, 
but  expedient  in  the  interests  of  civilization.4 

Several  German  papers  feared  that  British  indignation 
would  be  expressed  so  forcibly  that  France  might  be  en- 
couraged to  renew  the  war.5  The  Record  claimed  that 
Bismarck  had  so  dreaded  intervention  that  he  had  done  all 
possible  to  shroud  the  terms  in  uncertainty.6  So  far  as 
England  was  concerned,  the  Standard  assured  the  world, 
alarm  was  quite  unnecessary.  Liberal  policy  had  reduced 
her  to  such  a  state  of  impotence  that  she  dared  not  make 
remonstrance.  She  could  only  try,  drearily,  to  look  into 
the  future.7 

1  Issues  of  last  week  of  Feb.,  1871. 

*  Times,  Feb.  25,  1871. 

s  Daily  Telegraph,  Feb.  27,  1871. 

*  Manchester  Guardian,  Feb.  28,  1871. 

5  Cross  Gazette;  Globe  and  Traveller,  Feb.  27,  1871. 

*  Record,  Feb.  27,  1871.  France  also  was  reticent.  Thiers,  on  in- 
structing de  Broglie  to  ask  for  England's  mediation,  informed  him  only 
as  to  the  amount  of  the  indemnity. 

''Standard,  Feb.  28,  1871. 


356      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [356 

Of  those  that  prophesied,  perhaps,  Pall  Mall  was  the 
journal  that  saw  events  most  clearly.  The  main  object  of 
the  French  home  policy,  it  said,  would  be  to  raise  up  an 
army  competent  to  cope  with  Germany's;  the  main  object 
of  its  foreign  policy  would  be  to  secure  allies  which  would 
help  the  army  to  do  its  appointed  work.  All  thought  of 
lasting  peace  in  Europe  should  be  dismissed  until  the  re- 
sults of  the  war  had  been  undone,  or  human  nature  had 
changed  its  character.  Count  Bismarck  had  said  that 
France  would  certainly  fight  Germany  again,  and  he  had  de- 
terminedly made  the  conditions  of  the  future  conflict  as 
favourable  as  possible  for  his  own  country.  It  was  his 
wish  that  he  had  spoken,  as  surely  as  it  was  his  conviction. 
For  the  supremacy  of  Prussia  in  Germany  depended  on  the 
political  atmosphere  being  kept  constantly  charged  with 
war.  He  had  had  his  will,  and  Europe  was  reduced  once 
more  to  a  condition  of  political  anarchy.  Every  state  would 
do  what  seemed  to  it  right  and  would  exert  its  utmost  en- 
deavour to  secure  the  protection  that  comes  from  strength.1 

But  it  is  not  good  for  a  chapter  to  close  in  black  despair. 
Search  discloses  opinion  of  a  more  hopeful  tenour.  The 
Examiner,  which  of  all  the  London  papers  was  the  most 
constant  in  its  praise  of  peace,  hoped,  perhaps  from  the  very 
enormity  of  the  peace  terms,  that  Liberalism  would  be 
strengthened  both  in  France  and  Germany, — that  the  people 
in  both  countries  would  become  stronger  than  their  rulers, 
and  discover  a  common  bond  of  interest.  It  was  a  very 
radical  hope  the  Examiner  indulged  in.  In  spite  of  its  tem- 
pered phrasing,  it  was  a  wish  that  the  treaty  be  annulled  by 
social  revolution.2 

But  if  the  editor  of  the  Examiner  appears  to  have  tinted 
his  glasses  to  rose  colour,  by  looking  eagerly  toward  Red 

1  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Feb.  27,  1871. 
1  Examiner,  Feb.  25,  1871. 


357]       THE  NEGOTIATION  OF  THE  PRELIMINARIES       357 

revolution,  no  such  outlook  was  responsible  for  the  content 
of  the  "  Sage  of  Chelsea."  Carlyle  rejoiced  that  vain  and 
querulous  France  had  come  to  ruinous  defeat.  "  No  event 
has  taken  place  in  Europe,"  he  wrote  of  the  signing  of  the 
Preliminaries,  "  that  has  pleased  me  better,  and,  for  my  own 
part,  I  expect  that  the  results,  which  are  certain  to  be  mani- 
fold and  are  much  dreaded  by  the  ignorant  English,  will  be 
salutary  and  of  benefit  to  all  the  world." x 

1  Carlyle  to  Alex.  Carlyle,  Feb.  28,  1871,  Alex.  Carlyle,  New  Letters 
of  Thos.  Carlyle,  vol.  ii,  p.  277. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
Lenten  Meditations 

On  Monday,  the  first  of  March,  1871,  the  German  army 
entered  Paris.  An  Englishman,  who  witnessed  the  trium- 
phal march  and  left  a  record  of  his  impressions,  has  des- 
cribed it,  so  far  as  the  Germans  were  concerned,  as  having 
been  most  humiliating.  The  soldiers,  he  said,  were  like 
animals  in  a  Zoological  Garden,  to  be  stared  and  jeered  at 
by  a  Paris  mob.  They  were  hemmed  in  by  artificial  bar- 
riers, and  by  armed  sentries,  who  looked  on  all  their  move- 
ments with  suspicion.  Behind  these  guardians  of  the  con- 
quering army,  a  curious  crowd  watched,  hour  by  hour,  from 
all  the  streets  that  opened  on  the  Champs  Elysees  and  the 
Place  de  la  Concorde.  But  no  French  person  of  self-re- 
spect, unless  he  had  business  in  that  district,  let  himself 
be  seen  there.  It  seemed  that  Paris  had  surrounded  and 
besieged  the  Prussians.  Either  the  Germans,  thought  this 
Englishman,  should  have  gone  through  Paris,  coute  qui 
coute,  or  they  should  never  have  entered  it.  Their  sober 
faces  showed  they  took  no  pleasure  in  this  semi-triumph. 
They  seemed  homesick  for  the  lands  beyond  the  Rhine.1 

In  London,  Fun  represented  them  as  marching  down  the 
boulevards  hilariously,  loaded  with  looted  clocks  and 
watches,  while  war  correspondents  followed  in  their  wake, 
furiously  scribbling;  there  was  a  caged  eagle  that  wearily 

1  John  Farley,  Struggles  and  Experiences  of  a  Neutral  Volunteer 
(London,  1872),  pp.  365-366. 

358  [358 


359]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  359 

veiled  its  eyes  to  its  captors'  triumph ;  and  in  the  van  walked 
"  Otto  von  Roses,"  leading  a  donkey  on  which  the  pious 
William  was  seated,  crowned  with  a  shiny  new  crown 
and  carrying  Metz  and  Strasburg  in  his  bulging  pockets.1" 

But  cartoonists,  like  poets,  must  have  their  license.  And 
while  there  may  have  been  some  unseemly  dancing  about  the 
statue  of  Strasburg,  as  the  News  reported, 2  it  seems  that, 
in  reality,  great  care  was  taken  to  make  the  entry  as  little 
humiliating  to  the  Parisians  as  was  possible.  Apparently, 
it  had  been  designed  for  a  practical  purpose, — to  hasten  the 
acceptance  of  the  Preliminaries,  rather  than  to  gratify  a 
desire  of  the  army's. 

Viewed  in  this  way,  the  affair  was  completely  successful.1 
On  the  first  day  of  the  occupation,  the  National  Assembly 
ratified  the  Preliminaries.  Two  days  later  their  ratifica- 
tions and  those  of  Germany  were  exchanged  at  Versailles. 
The  German  army  had  eaten  its  plum  cake, — from  which 
all  the  plums  had  been  extracted — and  soberly  departed, 
passing  out  under  the  Arc  de  Triomphe  with  less  of  verve 
in  all  its  ranks  than  animated  the  gestures  of  some  Paris 
gamin  of  the  gutters.  Stockmar  wrote  to  Morier  that  the 
whole  affair  was  ridiculous.  "I  should  not  have  had  the 
courage  to  subject  the  army  to  such  a  trial,"  he  added.4  He 
had  not  realized  the  magnificent  discipline  of  the  German 
troops. 

Something  less  than  a  sixth  of  the  delegates  at  Bordeaux 
failed  to  feel  the  sobering  influence  of  the  occupation  and 

lFun,  March  II,  1871. 

*  This  account  influenced  Edward  Dowden  in  writing  France  and 
Prussia,  Contemporary  Review,  March,  1871 ;  cf.  Letters  of  Edward 
Dowden  and  his  Correspondents  (New  York,  1914),  PP-  49"50. 

3  Record,  March  6,  1871 ;  Times,  March  4,  1871. 

*  Stockmar  to  Morier,  March,  1871,  Memoirs  of  Sir  Robt.  Morier, 
p.  246. 


360      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [360 

refused  assent  to  the  ratification.  Victor  Hugo  and  Louis 
Blanc  were  of  these.  The  former  chose  to  regard  it  as 
the  execution  of  France,1  and,  it  was  reported,  both  had 
sworn  to  devote  themselves  to  eternal  vengeance.  The 
Times  recommended  that  eternal  vengeance  be  indefinitely 
postponed.2  There  was  a  very  general  feeling  in  England 
that  the  hour  for  heroics  was  past.  Victor  Hugo  and 
Louis  Blanc,  said  the  Weekly  Freeman,  had  done  nothing- 
better  than  to  lend  the  lustre  of  their  names  to  dangerous 
designs  of  the  rabble.3 

It  was  M.  Thiers  whom  London  chose  to  regard  as  the 
true  hero.  He  had  been  overcome  with  grief  when  he  had 
announced  the  terms  of  the  Preliminaries  to  the  Assembly, 
but  he  had  shown  the  utmost  determination  in  urging  their 
ratification.  It  was  believed  that,  by  his  energy,  the  im- 
possible might  be  made  possible  and  the  terms  fulfilled.4 

In  the  interval  of  their  discussion,  they  had  not  grown 
in  British  favour.  Indeed,  analysis  had  shown  them  even 
more  disquieting.  "  It  will  always  ba  a  distinguishing 
feature  in  the  history  of  this  struggle,"  said  the  Graphic, 

that  even  peace  and  the  exhaustion  of  one  of  the  parties  has 
brought  no  relief  to  men's  minds,  but  rather  deeper  apprehension 
and  a  degree  of  uncertainty  about  the  future  which  must  seriously 
affect  the  welfare,  not  only  of  France,  but  of  surrounding  nations.5 

All  Europe  would  suffer,  warned  the  Anglo-American 
Times.  For  France  would  become  a  conspirator  with  a 
strong  incentive  to  a  vicious  act,  and  Germany  would  be  the 

1  Memoirs  of  Victor  Hugo   (New  York,  1899).     Translated  by  J.  W. 
Harding. 
8  Times,  March  1,  1871. 
*  Weekly  Freeman,  March  4,  1871. 
1  Daily  Telegraph,  March  2,  1871. 
5  Issue  of  March  4,  1871. 


361]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  361 

slave  of  triumphant  militarism.1  Very  especially  was  the 
demand  for  Metz  condemned.  Its  possession  by  another, 
said  the  Economist,  was  a  menace  to  France.  Where 
Alsace  would  be  only  regretted,  Metz  would  be  feared. 
"  And  we  hate  those  we  fear,"  it  added  sagely.2 

From  the  increasing  animosity  shown  toward  the  German 
Emperor  and  his  Chancellor  in  British  leaders  and  cartoons, 
it  might  be  argued  that  fear  was  felt  in  the  United  Kingdom 
itself.  "Vae  Victisl"  thought  the  Spectator,  might  very 
easily  be  changed  to  "  Vae  Victorious! " 3  And  the  Sunday 
Magazine  violated  a  sabbatical  calm  by  exclaiming,  "  What 
if  next  New  Year's  day  should  find  us  as  this  has  found 
France!"4  Alarm  came,  not  only  from  the  terms  of  the 
Preliminaries,  but  from  a  telegram  of  the  new  Emperor's 
announcing  their  signature  to  his  nephew,  the  Tsar :  "  We 
have  thus  arrived  at  the  end  of  a  glorious  and  bloody  war 
which  has  been  forced  upon  us  by  the  frivolity  of  France. 
Prussia  will  never  forget  that  she  owes  it  to  you  that  the 
war  did  not  enter  upon  extreme  dimensions.  May  God 
bless  you  for  it ! "  The  Tsar,  forthwith,  had  assured  him 
of  the  happiness  it  had  afforded  him  to  give  proof  of  a 
friendship  that  he  hoped  would  be  of  long  duration.5 

In  the  first  week  of  March,  Lord  Granville  was  recom- 
mended by  the  press  to  take  note  of  this  interchange  of 
courtesies.  There  was  need  for  wary  walking  at  the  For- 
eign  Office.     "  It  is  probable,"   speculated  the   Guardian, 

that  the  gratitude  of  the  Emperor  William  was  evoked  by  Prince 
Gortchakoff's  refusal  to  cooperate  with  Lord  Granville.     If,  then, 

1  Issue  of  March  4,  1871. 

'  Ibid. 

3  Spectator,  March  11,  1871. 

*  Sunday  Magazine,  March  1,  1871. 

*  Weekly  Scotsman,  March  4,  1871  ;  Court  Journal,  March  4,  1871. 


362      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [362 

there  was  a  secret  understanding  between  the  two  great  Powers 
that  Russia  should  play  this  part  of  holding  the  Neutrals  back, 
and  that  in  return  Germany  should  help  her  to  destroy  the  Treaty 
of  Paris,  it  is  evident  that  Count  Bismarck  mocked  us  when  he 
suggested  a  Conference  for  the  decision  of  the  Black  Sea  question.1 

This  was  exactly  the  supposition  that  Disraeli  had  placed 
before  the  House.  It  added  nothing  to  the  prestige  of  the 
Government  nor  the  comfort  of  the  nation  to  find  it  im- 
plicitly confirmed.  People  were  laughing  somewhat  un- 
easily at  a  cartoon  in  Judy  that  showed  William  with  out- 
stretched hands  blessing  the  Russian  bear, — a  bear  that 
had  already  possessed  himself  of  the  Black  Sea  trick.2 

In  Punch,  the  new  Emperor  was  everywhere.  The 
Heavenly  Father  was  represented  as  placing  the  crown  atop 
the  Imperial  helmet,  setting  his  pudding  before  him  at 
dinner,  lighting  his  pipe,  shooing  away  the  flies  during  his 
nap,  shaving  him,  and  even  offering  to  make  his  hair  grow 
again  in  order  to  make  him  "  truly  thankful."  Those  who 
did  not  believe  he  was  a  pious  hypocrite  thought  him  a  sin- 
cere fanatic,  capable  of  causing  hideous  mischief  in  his 
attempt  to  carry  on  the  mission  of  Prussia.  The  sick  and 
wounded  in  France,  and  the  impoverished  peasantry  bene- 
fited from  increased  subscriptions  made  to  societies  organ- 
ised for  their  aid.8 

Politicians,  looking  ahead  to  tomorrow,  urged  on  their 
Government  an  increase  of  armament  and  alarmed  themselves 
over  the  indemnity;  statesmen,  whose  vision  extended  to 
years  to  come,  concerned  themselves  with  plans  for  new  and 
stronger  alliances;  idealists,  planning  for  an  age  they  did 
not  hope  to  see,  evolved  projects  for  the  abolition  of  war 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  March  2,  3,  8,  1871. 

3  Judy,  March  8,  1871. 

*  Punch,  Jan.,  Feb.,  1871,  passim;  Weekly  Scotsman.  March  11,  1871. 


363]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  363 

and  the  founding  of  an  international  federation.  It  is  a 
human  habit  making  for  survival,  that  even  in  the  darkest 
periods  there  are  always  men  who  plan  for  a  time  of  in- 
effable brightness.  While  Lecky  was  wailing  that  the 
world  had  been  thrown  generations  back  and  there  was 
no  comfort,  save  in  the  "  monkey  theory,"  *  and  while  the 
Standard  disconsolately  believed  that  the  promise  of  the 
Golden  Year  had  again  receded  into  the  distance,2  the  in- 
conspicuous Society  of  Friends  was  recommending,  in  modest 
pamphlets,  the  beauty  and  expediency  of  tenets  that  it  had 
long  been  following.3  It  cannot  be  said  that  it  made  many 
converts.  England  was  impatient  of  the  principles  of  John 
Bright. 

In  the  early  part  of  March,  however,  much  interest  was 
shown  in  a  lecture  delivered  by  Professor  Seeley,  which 
garbed  somewhat  the  same  beliefs  in  the  phrases  of  poli- 
tics, and  suggested  means  for  their  attainment.  It  was  the 
belief  of  this  Cambridge  historian  that  the  abolition  of  war 
was  not  only  desirable,  but  feasible.  He  did  not  insist 
that  war  was  in  all  cases  unwarranted,  as  was  believed  by 
the  Society  of  Friends.  Under  the  conditions  then  ex- 
istent, he  thought  nations,  at  times,  should  resort  to  arms 
rather  than  submit  to  wrong.  But  he  argued  for  the  crea- 
tion of  a  system  which  would  render  war  unnecessary.  Such 
an  international  federation,  as  was  needed  for  this,  would 
have  to  be  essentially  different  from  the  system  by  which 
European  affairs  were  settled  by  congresses  of  the  Great 
Powers.  It  should  consist  of  every  nation  that  it  was  ex- 
pected to  benefit.  It  would  need  a  complete  apparatus  for 
its  own  functioning,  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial,  so 

1  El.  Lecky,  Memoirs  of  W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  pp.  90-91. 

*  Standard,  March  2,  1871. 

1  Cf.  Sunday  Magazine,  March  1,  1871,  pp.  21-22. 


364      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [364 

that  it  might  be  raised  above  all  dependence  upon  state 
governments.  It,  alone,  should  have  the  right  of  levying 
troops.  For  individual  states  were  as  feudal  lords.  So 
long  as  they  were  allowed  to  keep  armed  retainers,  anarchy 
was  to  be  expected.1 

At  about  this  time,  there  was  published  Dame  Europa's 
Apology,  one  of  the  pamphlets  written  in  imitation  of  the 
more  famous  parable  by  Pullen.  It  was  distinguished  from 
its  fellows  by  a  plan  for  the  prevention  of  war.  The  Dame 
was  made  to  propose  that  her  school  hold  a  meeting  and  elect 
five,  six,  or  ten  representatives  to  form  a  board  of  arbitra- 
tion for  the  adjustment  of  future  quarrels.  This  was  to 
hear  the  evidence  on  all  sides,  calmly  to  weigh  it,  and  give 
its  decisions,  from  which  there  could  be  no  appeal.  If  any 
refused  to  comply  with  its  decisions,  she  advised  that  the 
school  was  to  use  all  moral  means  to  compel  submission. 
These  failing,  the  others  should  entirely  isolate  themselves 
from  the  transgressor, — refuse  to  communicate  or  buy  and 
sell  with  him,  in  short,  send  him  to  Coventry.  It  would  be 
only  seldom,  she  said,  that  strong  measures  would  have  to 
be  used,  for  the  fact  of  bringing  the  case  before  the  board 
would  gain  time  for  the  cooling  of  passions,  for  calmer 
thoughts  to  rise.  Finally,  she  advised  that  they  make  war 
a  thing  of  the  past,  to  be  abhorred,  not  praised.2 

There  was  a  nucleus  of  men  across  the  Rhine  to  whom 
these  ideas  would  not  have  seemed  pure  moonshine.  Vic- 
torious Germany,  however,  was  in  no  mood  to  listen  to  them- 
When  Dr.  Jacoby  published  an  article,  condemning  the 
Preliminaries  as  exorbitant,  he  was  sentenced,  at  once, 
to  two  months'  imprisonment.3'  In  Berlin,  there  was 
regret  that  the  indemnity  demanded  had  not  been  greater. 


1  Illustrated  London  News,  March  4,  1871. 
1  Pamphlet  published  anonymously. 
3  Manchester  Guardian,  March  2,  1871. 


365]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  365 

The  Germans  would  not  have  been  so  jubilant,  thought  the 
Spectator,  had  they  realized  they  had  lost  the  means  of  con- 
trolling the  Government.  "  How  much  of  the  indemnity 
do  they  think  they  will  get?  "  it  questioned — "  or  anybody 
else,  except,  perhaps  Herr  Krupp,  and  other  great  makers  of 
munitions  for  killing  people?"1 

The  matter  was  still  proving  of  great  concern  to  the  prac- 
tical politicians  of  the  Ministry.  Gladstone  and  Granville3 
did  not  believe  that  France  would  be  able  to  bear  the  burden 
laid  upon  her.  As  for  England,  according  to  the  Econ- 
omist, whether  its  financiers  subscribed  to  the  French  loan 
or  not,  there  would  be  a  great  diminution  in  London  of  bul- 
lion. Great  capitalists,  like  the  Rothschilds,  might  be  ex- 
pected to  subscribe  and  would  remove  such  sums  as  would 
suffice  to  raise  the  rate  of  interest.  What  they  re- 
moved would  be  retained  by  Germany,  it  was  presumed,  for 
military  purposes.     For  a  long  time  money  would  be  tight.3 

News  of  a  curious  project  for  a  financial  alliance  between 
France  and  Great  Britain  has  been  brought  to  light  by  the 
publication  of  the  correspondence  that  took  place  between 
Thiers  and  de  Broglie  in  the  early  days  of  March.  England, 
the  envoy  wrote  his  chief,  was  greatly  disturbed  over  the 
amount  Germany  had  demanded.  She  was  disquieted  be- 
cause the  capital,  called  in  from  London  and  other  financial 
centres,  would  go  to  swell  the  war  chests  of  Berlin.  On  the 
day  after  his  arrival,  he  had  been  visited  by  a  high  official 
of  the  Government,  who  had  laid  before  him  a  plan  so 
carefully  elaborated  that  he  believed  it  must  have  emanated 
originally  from  a  member  of  the  Cabinet.     According  to  its 

1  Spectator,  March  4,  1871. 

2  Granville  to  Lyons,  March  1,  1871,  Newton,  Life  of  Lord  Lyons, 
vol.  i,  p.  373. 

5  Economist,  March  4,  1871 ;  Illustrated  London  News,  March  18, 
1871. 


366      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [366 

provisions,  the  British  Government  would  itself  borrow  a 
part  of  the  sum  agreed  on  as  the  first  payment,  and  would 
lend  it  to  France  on  the  same  terms  on  which  it  had  been 
borrowed.  This  not  only  would  ensure  to  France  a  lower 
interest  than  she  could  expect  to  negotiate  of  herself,  but 
would  increase  her  prestige  by  showing  that  England  stood 
ready  to  associate  herself,  to  this  extent,  in  her  engage- 
ments. 

After  the  agreeable  plan  had  been  outlined,  it  was  in-i 
timated  to  de  Broglie  that  the  recently  selected  French 
Minister  of  Finance,  because  of  his  ardour  for  protection 
and  his  opposition  in  former  times  to  the  Treaty  of  Com- 
merce, could  not  be  considered  an  appropriate  Minister  for  a 
State,  sensible  to  the  benefits  of  an  alliance  that  might  be 
founded  on  the  basis  of  finance.  This  conversation  was 
reported  at  once  to  Thiers,  together  with  deBroglie's  reasons 
for  believing  his  visitor  had  been  the  intermediary  of  Glad- 
stone. But  the  envoy  observed  that  Gladstone  was  a  strong 
mixture  of  common  sense  and  ardent  imagination,  and  was 
very  changeable.  His  desires  of  yesterday  might  not 
remain  his  desires  for  the  morrow. 

Thiers  gave  the  plan  the  approval  to  have  been  expected 
from  a  good  financier.  He  did  not  intimate,  however,  that 
he  would  replace  his  Minister  of  Finance  by  one  more 
favourable  to  the  creed  of  Cobden.  He  informed  de  Broglie 
that  he  had  no  wish  to  renounce  the  Treaty  of  Commerce, 
but  that,  with  the  agreement  of  the  British  Cabinet,  he  in- 
tended to  effect  a  slight  raise  of  the  tariff.  Whether  this 
answer  was  not  sufficiently  reassuring,  or  whether  de  Bro- 
glie's  visitor  had  really  been  without  authority,  this  inter- 
esting plan  was  not  carried  out.1  Individual  subscriptions 
to  the  French  Loan  were  made  in  plenty,  but  England  did 

1  La  correspondence  de  M.   Thiers  pendant  la  guerre  de   1870-1871, 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  vol.  xxxiv,  pp.  56  et  seq. 


267]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  367 

not  herself   go  into  the  market  to  give  the   French  the 
benefit  of  her  credit. 

The  Government  was  busy,  at  this  time,  with  its  im- 
mediate concerns.  On  the  third  of  March,  Sir  Robert  Peel 
had  a  second  time  raised  the  question  in  the  House  of  the 
absence  of  a  British  representative  from  Paris  during  the 
siege.1  By  limiting  his  attack  almost  exclusively  to  the 
"  flight  of  Lord  Lyons,"  which  he  described  as  unmanly 
and  ungenerous,  he  had  weakened  his  case  against  the  Gov- 
ernment. For  culpability  lay  not  in  the  Ambassador's 
absence  so  much  as  the  lack,  for  over  a  month,  of  a  consul 
or  any  other  accredited  representative  to  whom  the  British 
might  have  gone  for  aid.  Gladstone  found  his  arguments, 
if  not  judicious,  at  least  spirited  and  provocative  of  irritat- 
ing criticism  from  the  press.  The  Standard  reminded  its 
readers  that  when  the  Diplomatic  Corps  in  Paris  had  re- 
monstrated against  the  bombardment,  England  had  not  been 
represented  in  the  protest  because  there  had  remained  no  one 
to  sign  it  but  the  Embassy's  German  porter.  In  commenting 
on  Lord  Lyons'  consideration  in  having  allowed  the  consul 
to  rejoin  his  family,  the  paper  remarked  that  the  transaction 
would  have  been  less  gross  had  there  been  appointed  some- 
one to  fill  his  place.  For  the  matrimonial  ease  of  that 
uxorious  gentleman  had  been  consulted  with  the  most 
complete  disregard  of  the  residents,  who  were  his  peculiar 
care.2  * 

A  few  days  later,  the  House  of  Lords  was  enlivened  by  a 
motion  of  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury,  calling  for  the  re- 
printing of  the  guarantees  that  had  been  published  in  1859 
and  the  addition  of  those  that  had  been  contracted  more 
recently.  The  Marquis  was  of  the  opinion  that  England 
could  not  emulate  the  isolation  of  America  since  the  "  streak 

1  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  1296  e t  seq. 
1  Standard,  March  4,  1871. 


368      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [368 

of  silver  sea  "  was  somewhat  narrower  than  the  Atlantic.  He 
conceded,  however,  that  he  was  amazed  at  how  much  had 
been  done  in  that  regard ;  for  he  had  seen  his  country  kept 
aloof  while  a  former  ally  was  crushed  on  the  Continent. 
With  the  nations  assembled  in  London  to  take  council  as  to 
the  political  aspect  Europe  was  to  assume,  he  urged  that  it 
was  timely  for  England  to  remember  the  guarantees  she  had 
been  contracting  for  the  past  four  hundred  years,  and  to 
make  adequate  provision  for  sustaining  them.     The  motion 
was  unopposed  by  the  Government.1     It  was  not  desirable 
that  England  should  publicly  declare  political  bankruptcy.  It 
was  a  time,  said  the  Guardian,  when  the  old  cry  of  "  Perish 
Savoy!"    should   not  be  distorted   by  echo  into  "Perish 
Alsace  and  Lorraine !  Perish  Turkey !   Perish  Belgium."  a 
England  was  distinctly  nervous.     She  had  no  wish  to 
increase  the  European  anarchy  by  renouncing  any  of  her 
obligations.     She  was  very  eager  for  information  as  to  how 
it  came  about  that  other  nations  had  been  emboldened  to 
abrogate  theirs.     During  the  session  of  the  seventh,  Disraeli 
questioned  the  Government  as  to  whether  it  was  aware  that 
a  secret  treaty  had  been  contracted  between  Russia  and 
Prussia  before  the  beginning  of  the  war.     Gladstone  briefly 
declared  that  the  Government  had  not  been  informed  of 
such  a  treaty.3      Two  days  later  it  received  unofficial  but  de- 
tailed information  on  the  subject  from  the  Morning  Post. 
In  that  paper  the  long  suspected  treaty  was  described  as 
consisting  of  three  articles,  the  last  of  which  provided  for 
the  immediate  entrance  of  Russia  into  the  war  should  France 

1  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  1360  et  seq.;  Manchester  Guardian, 
March  8,  1871  ;  Court  Journal,  March  11,  1871 ;  F.  S.  Pulling,  Life  and 
Speeches  of  Marquis  of  Salisbury  (London,  1885),  pp.  I55-*57. 

3  Manchester  Guardian,  March  17,  1871. 

8  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  1501  et  seq.;  Standard,  March  8, 
1871  ;  Spectator,  March  11,  1871. 


369]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  369 

acquire  an  active  ally.  When  the  solemn  Lord  Carnarvon 
interrogated  Granville  on  the  subject,  England's  Foreign 
Minister  denied  any  knowledge  of  such  an  agreement  as  that 
referred  to  in  the  Post.1  But  this  was  not  the  first  docu- 
ment that  within  the  year  had  been  brought  to  public  notice 
by  the  press.  There  was  a  suspicion  that  the  information 
given  out  by  the  aristocratic  Post  was  correct.  The  Gov- 
ernment's affirmation  of  ignorance  on  the  matter  caused 
many  to  question  the  state  of  efficiency  existing  at  the  For- 
eign Ofhce. 

In  the  House,  Sir  Charles  Dilke  was  annoying  Gladstone 
bv  persistent  efforts  to  obtain  a  place  on  the  calendar  for  a 
motion  condemning  the  Government's  conduct  in  having 
accepted  the  London  Conference.  Only  Gladstone's  in- 
sistence that  he  was  unable  to  discuss  the  subject  while  the 
diplomats  were  in  session,  finally  obtained  the  debate's  post- 
ponement. De  Broglie  wrote  his  chief  that  the  little  assem- 
blage known  as  the  London  Conference  was  never  spoken 
of  without  a  smile.  Granville,  he  reported,  was  uncom- 
fortably aware  of  the  ridiculous  role  he  was  playing  and 
more  than  eager  for  the  thing  to  be  over.  Thiers  instructed 
his  envoy  that,  under  the  circumstances,  it  would  not  be  wise 
to  make  any  representations  to  the  Conference  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  impending  treaty.  The  British  Government  had 
evinced  such  respect  for  a  fait  accompli  that  nothing  more 
could  be  expected  of  it,  by  France,  than  some  futile  form  of 
remonstrance.  Bismarck,  he  wrote,  was  already  in  a  very  ill 
humour  because  of  the  suggestions  made  as  to  the  indem- 
nity. He  was  saying  ugly  things  of  England  and  showing 
great  irritation  towards  the  French.  To  raise  the  question 
of  the  treaty  in  its  entirety  would  give  him  the  opportunity 
of  claiming'  that  France  had  negotiated  in  bad  faith.     He 


*& 


1  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  cciv,  pp.  1603  et  seq. 


370      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [37a 

might  see  fit  to  suspend  indefinitely  the  evacuation  of  his 
armies.1 

Theirs' s  account  of  the  Chancellor's  anger  was  confirmed 
by  certain  declarations  that  Bismarck  caused  to  be  inserted 
in  his  official  organ,  the  Correspondent.  England,  he 
charged,  was  hankering  after  a  diplomatic  defeat  that  she 
had  every  reason  to  avoid.  She  was  treating  Europe  as  a 
theatre  for  the  advancement  of  her  interests.  Her  states- 
men were  amazingly  inflated  with  self-made  illusions,  and 
they  would  show  wisdom  in  not  subjecting  themselves  to 
contact  with  solid  realities.  He  was  angered  at  proposals 
and  motions  that  sounded  like  insults  from  her  Parliamen- 
tarians. He  believed  that  the  mildness  with  which  Glad- 
stone rejected  them  afforded  matter  for  consideration.2 
Evidently,  Bismarck  was  not  in  the  mood  to  receive  further 
representations.  Equally  evident  was  it  that  he  desired  that 
England  know  of  his  ill  temper. 

On  the  thirteenth,  the  Conference  adjourned  without  hav- 
ing added  fuel  to  the  advertised  Bismarkian  fire.  England's 
prestige  had  been  in  no  way  heightened  by  the  presence  of 
the  long-expected  envoy  from  France.  Rather,  Lord  Gran- 
ville must  have  felt  shame  at  the  contrast  that  was  afforded 
to  his  own  acquiescence  in  Russia's  wishes.  For  de  Broglie, 
though  able  to  participate  only  at  the  last  meeting, — and 
then  as  the  representative  of  a  defeated  Power, — had  made 
bold  to  say  that  the  French  Government  saw  no  sufficient 
reason  for  a  moderation  of  the  Treaty  of  1856  and  would 
have  preferred  its  maintenance.3 

The  unclimatic  conclusion  of  the  Conference  was  very 
harshly  condemned  by  the  press.     Russia,   it  was  noted, 

1  La  Correspondance  de  M.  Thiers,  etc.,  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes, 
vol.  xxxiv,  pp.  59-78. 

2  Reported  in  Standard,  March  4,  1871. 

1  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  iii,  p.  1919- 


371]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  37 1 

had  gained  the  consent  of  the  Powers  to  the  changes  she  had 
so  violently  demanded.  The  fact  that  she  had  agreed  to  the 
principle  that  no  Power  could  withdraw  from  definite  and 
valid  obligations  at  her  own  arbitrary  discretion  seemed 
somewhat  of  a  mockery.  The  Government  was  not  allowed 
to  take  comfort  from  it. 

"  It  is  too  ridiculous,"  said  Pall  Mali, 

to  boast  of  what  was  a  technical  expedient  of  absolute  submission. 
A  child  who  rebelled  against  physic  might  as  well  brag,  with  the 
spoon  in  his  mouth  and  while  the  rod  was  held  over  him,  that  he 
had  wrested  from  his  tyrant  an  admission  that  'twas  only  jam.  If 
we  must  swallow  the  dose,  let  us  take  it  in  silence,  in  a  manner 
more  English  and  less  French.1 

The  Globe  regretted  that  England  had  simply  formulated 
a  way  for  legalizing  national  unscrupulousness  and  interna- 
tional fraud.2  In  the  Standard,  the  greatest  scorn  was 
expressed  for  the  manner  in  which  the  Government  had 
eaten  its  big  words  of  the  preceding  November.3  Even  a 
journal  so  sympathetic  to  the  conclusions  of  the  Conference 
as  was  the  Economist,  believed  that  England  should  have 
dignified  her  policy  and  contributed  to  future  peace  by  hav- 
ing made  some  suggestion  as  to  the  periodical  revision  of 
treaties.4 

It  was  not  surprising  that,  during  this  clamorous  criti- 
cism, Sir  Charles  Dilke  should  again  have  asked  for  a  place 
for  his  motion.  Gladstone  resorted  to  a  last  means  of 
silencing  the  persistent  young  Member  from  Chelsea.  He 
told  him  that  the  proposed  motion  was  nothing  less  than  a 
vote  of  censure,  the  carrying  of  which  would  involve  the? 

1  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  March  14,  1871. 
1  Globe,  March  15,  1871. 
1  Standard,  March  14,  20,  1871. 
*  Economist,  March  18,  1871. 


372      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [372 

retirement  of  the  Government.  He  asked  if  it  was  Dilke's 
intention  to  propose  such  a  motion.  The  young  Liberal 
accepted  the  Government's  interpretation  and  still  refused 
to  give  way.1 

If  the  Conference  had  proven  so  unpleasant  an  affair 
for  England,  it  was  recognized  that  discomfort  came  because 
her  former  ally  had  been,  not  so  much  a  participant,  as  a 
sort  of  haunting  shadow  that  could  not  presume  to  ask  a 
crumb  of  comfort.  It  was  increasingly  urged  that  France 
must  speedily  be  reconstituted,  so  that  she  could  make  her 
presence  felt.  England  was  glad  when,  on  the  sixteenth  of 
March,  a  convention  was  signed  for  a  progressive  delivery 
to  the  French  authorities  of  the  districts  under  invasion.2 
A  few  days  later  hope  receded.  For  it  was  learned  that 
Paris  had  declared  the  Commune.  As  a  consequence,  the 
withdrawal  of  any  German  forces  was  countermanded.  It 
seemed  even  probable  that  the  invading  army  might  come  to 
be  used  by  the  Thiers  Government  in  its  own  defence.3 

There  were  not  wanting  in  England  men  who  could  ap- 
preciate the  reasons,  economic  and  political,  that  led  to  the 
Commune.  The  dissolution  of  the  National  Guard;  fear 
of  having  to  meet  the  liabilities  that  had  accrued  during  the 
war;  the  humiliation  of  the  German  occupation;  distrust 
of  Thiers  and  the  absent  Assembly,  combined  with  the  in- 
evitable misery  that  follows  a  siege,  had  induced  a  despair 
that  braved  disaster  to  seek  relief.  John  Richard  Green 
was  one  of  those  who  believed  that  Paris,  in  her  first  de- 
mands, had  been  reasonable, — she  had  asked  only  for  the 
self-government  possessed  by  every  English  town.4 

But  it  must  be  admitted  that,  for  the  most  part,  England's 

1  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ccv,  pp.  53  et  seq. 

2  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  1927. 

*  Daily  Nezvs,  March  22,  1871. 

*  Letters  of  J.  R.  Green,  p.  288. 


373]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  373 

attitude  was  one  of  impatience.  She  felt  somewhat  as 
though  she  had  bound  up  the  wounds  of  a  badly  battered 
belligerent  and  provided  him  a  crutch  for  support,  only  to 
see  him  straighten  up  and  make  a  melodramatic  attempt  at 
suicide.  She  was  divided  between  disappointment  at  Thiers 
(who,  evidently,  was  not  the  stout  prop  she  had  supposed) 
and  anger  at  the  whole  nation.  Matthew  Arnold  believed 
there  could  be  no  hope  until  a  new  generation  of  Frenchmen 
had  replaced  the  trouble  makers.1  The  historian,  Lecky, 
wrote  in  a  private  letter  that  the  character  of  the  people 
seemed  corroded  to  the  core  and  that  all  Burke's  prophecies 
were  about  to  be  fulfilled.2 

Thiers  was  looked  to  as  the  only  one  who  could  exert  him- 
self as  saviour,  and  was  exhorted  and  abused  because  he 
was  not  showing  himself  more  heroic.  A  correspondent  of 
the  Scotsman  wrote  that,  in  Paris,  they  said  his  title  was 
most  appropriate.  He  had  been  appointed  Head  of  the  Ex- 
ecutive Power  in  order  that  he  might  execute  the  Republic.31 
When  he  showed  hesitation  in  laying  siege  to  Paris,  there 
were  those  in  England  that  believed  he  was  trying  to  dis- 
credit the  new  Government  in  order  to  bring  back  the  Orlean- 
ists.  Others  there  were,  who  said  that  his  hesitation  was 
due  only  to  weakness.  Felix  Whitehurst  thought  him  too 
much  of  a  weathercock  to  guide  the  destinies  of  France. 
He  had  had  so  many  quarrels  with  himself,  and  had  so  often 
disputed  with  himself  about  his  own  political  views,  giving1 
away  often,  holding  out  now  and  again,  and  changing  like  a 
chameleon  that,  thus  late  in  life,  he  should  not  have  been  ex- 
pected to  pursue  a  steady  policy.4     In  Once  a  Week,  the 

1  Letters  of  Matthew  Arnold,  vol.  ii,  p.  6b. 
1  El.  Lecky,  Memoirs  of  IV.  E.  H.  Lecky,  p.  91. 
1  Dr.  Rose  Cormack,  Scotsman,  March  4,  1871. 

*  Whitehurst,  Paris  under  the  Armistice,  Belgrazna,  March,  1871,  vol. 
xiv,  pp.  89  et  seg. 


374      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [374 

opinion  was  expressed  as  strongly  as  by  the  correspondent 
of  the  Telegraph.  "  M.  Thiers,"  it  said,  "  is  probably  the 
most  time-serving  politician  that  ever  lived.  Whichever 
way  the  power  of  circumstance  pointed  it  has  always  been 
the  manner  of  M.  Thiers  to  bend  to  the  breeze  .... 
clever,  eloquent,  equal  to  any  immediate  emergency,  he  has 
never  had  a  principle."  1 

In  Germany,  affairs  were  going  more  to  British  liking. 
The  reports  that  such  generals  as  Manteuffel  and  von  Moltke 
had  failed  of  election  to  the  Federal  Parliament  were  taken 
to  indicate  that  there  existed  jealousy  of  the  supremacy  of 
the  army.  It  was  found  that  the  moderate  Liberals  had 
returned  a  reliable  majority.  England,  while  wishing 
the  path  of  Thiers  to  be  velvet  smooth,  was  well  content 
that  Bismarck  should  find  his  way  blocked  by  the  friends 
of  constitutional  government.     Said  the  Guardian: 

The  Liberal  triumph  of  the  elections  are  only  a  premonitory  sign 
that  when  they  (the  Germans)  consider  their  position  they  will  be 
dissatisfied  with  it,  and  resolve  to  free  themselves  from  the  over- 
bearing supremacy  which  the  military  successes  of  Prussia  have 
established.2 

William's  opening  Address  was  variously  praised  as  a 
model  of  dignity  and  moderation  and  derided  as  a  pre- 
sumptuous announcement  that  his  great  authority  would 
regenerate  mankind.3  But  the  speech  of  the  Emperor  was 
not  so  much  of  interest  as  was  the  fact  that  the  people  had 
indicated  a  distrust  of  militarism  in  the  elections,  and  that 
in  their  celebration  of  the  peace  they  were  showing  them- 
selves calm  and  self-restrained.4     The  British  were  hope- 

1  Issue  of  March  18,  1871. 

1  Ibid. 

3  Cf.  Spectator,  March  25,  1871 ;  Guardian,  March  28,  1871. 

*  Daily  Nezvs,  March  23,  1871. 


37e]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  375 

ful  of  the  people  in  Germany  as  surely  as  they  were  hopeful 
of  the  rulers  in  France.  The  more  the  Germans  exerted 
their  influence  on  the  Government,  the  more  would  it  tend 
to  follow  the  lines  of  orderly  constitutionalism.  But  the 
more  the  French  asserted  themselves  politically,  the  greater 
would  be  the  danger  that  their  Government  would  deviate 
from  the  ways  beloved  by  Britain. 

Her  interest  in  the  regeneration  of  France  was  very  near. 
The  wish  for  a  strong  ally  was  scarcely  greater  than  the 
dread  of  the  effect  of  a  France  bent  on  experimentation. 
Pall  Mall  pointed  out  that  Louis  Blanc's  residence  in  Eng- 
land had  not  been  unproductive.     His  opinions  appeared  in 
many   of   the   ideas  most  cherished   by  the   workingmen. 
There  was  already  a  savour  of  the  Commune  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  every  trade  union.1     The  growth  of  Republicanism, 
manifested  by  so  many  of  the  meetings  held  during  the  war, 
had  lately  exhibited  itself  in  agitation  over  the  grant  to 
Princess  Louise  of  a  dowry.  It  was  very  generally  admitted 
that  the  single  vote  cast  against  the  grant  in  the  House  was 
no  adequate  indication  of  the  opposition  that  was  being 
expressed  without.     The  Queen  had  weakened  her  position 
by  an  over  long  retirement.2  On  the  occasions  when  she  had 
emerged,  it  had  been  to  offer  unpopular  congratulations  to  the 
new  Emperor  and  to  make  this  unpopular  request  on  behalf 
of  her  daughter.     Sir  Arthur  Helps,  in  a  letter  written  on 
March  the  twenty-third,  records  that  of  all  the  great  people 
he  saw  assembled  to  go  to  the  Royal  marriage,  Disraeli  was 
the  only  one  cheered  by  the  immense  crowd  that  gathered 
to  see  them  off.3     The  English  were  losing  something  of 
their  love  for  a  lord. 

lPall  Mall  Gazette,  March  23,  1871. 
1  Spectator,  Feb.  4,  1871 ;  Evening  Mail,  March  28,  1871. 
s  Correspondence  of  Sir  Arthur  Helps,  K.C.B.   (edited  by  his  son 
(London,  1917).  PP-  3<>5-3o6- 


376      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [376 

During  the  week  a  meeting  of  upwards  of  fifteen  hundred 
was  held  in  the  Hall  of  Science,  St.  Luke's.  Stormy  speeches 
were  made,  and  reports  were  read  from  Republican  clubs  in 
Birmingham,  Nottingham,  and  other  large  towns.  Mr. 
Bradlaugh  was  the  speaker  of  the  evening  and  carried  al- 
most unanimously  his  motion  to  form  similar  clubs  in  Lon- 
don. The  last  edition  of  his  paper,  the  National  Reformer, 
had  been  sold  out.  Another  journal  of  similar  tenour,  the 
Republican,  had  greatly  increased  its  circulation.  An  even- 
ing or  so  later,  in  pursuance  of  the  project  of  this  meeting, 
a  body  of  delegates  from  the  Radical  Associations  of  Lon- 
don met  at  the  Wellington  Music  Hall.  It  was  resolved 
that  an  organization  to  encourage  Republicanism  be  formed, 
and  that  an  address  be  prepared  to  the  country.1  On 
March  the  twenty-fourth,  Gladstone  was  asked  in  the  House 
whether  this  meeting  had  not  been  of  a  treasonable  character 
and  what  course  the  Government  intended  to  take  in  regard 
to  the  offenders.  He  replied  that  there  was  no  intention  to 
take  any  steps  in  the  matter.  He  had  confidence  that  the 
"  wrong  and  foolish  opinions  "  embodied  in  the  resolutions 
might  be  left  to  sink  into  appropriate  oblivion.2  Other  re- 
publican meetings  were  held  and  various  associations  were 
formed,  but  the  Government  was  not  induced  to  deviate 
from  its  policy  of  indifference. 

Evidence  that  it  had  no  cause  for  alarm  on  the  score  of 
Republicanism,  was  deduced  by  the  hopeful  from  the  cor- 
diality of  the  reception  that  was  being  accorded  to  an  ex- 
Emperor.  On  March  the  twentieth,  Louis  Napoleon  had  ar- 
rived at  Dover  on  the  way  to  the  Empress'  retreat  at  Chisle- 
hurst.     A  great  mob  had  greeted  him  and  their  shouting  did 

1  Tablet,  Apr.  1,  1871,  English  Republicanism;  Fraser's  Magazine, 
June,  1871,  N.  S.  iii,  pp.  751  et  seq. 

2  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  civ,  pp.  574  et  seq. 


2~7]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  377 

not  cease  until  he  had  reached  his  hotel.1  But  though  the 
mayor  had  addressed  him  as  "  your  Majesty  "  and  many  had 
shouted  vivas  for  the  Emperor,  the  warmth  of  his  reception 
was  due,  not  so  much  to  respect  for  his  former  high  estate,  as 
to  sorrow  for  an  old  friend  of  England's,  who  was  thought 
to  have  been  unjustly  treated  by  his  own  country.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Tablet,  the  cordial,  boisterous  welcome  was  a  sort 
of  John  Bull  protest  against  kicking  a  man  when  he  was 
down, — a  rough  way  of  declaring  that  in  England  it  was 
thought  sneaking  to  turn  on  a  man  when  his  luck  had 
deserted  him.2  Napoleon  was  quite  sensible  of  the  char- 
acter of  his  reception, — too  clever  not  to  know  that  it  was 
due,  in  part,  to  a  reaction  against  the  success  and  severity  of 
Prussia.  When,  a  day  or  two  later,  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury 
journeyed  down  to  Chislehurst,  he  found  him  calm  and 
dignified, — grateful  for  friendly  good  wishes,  but  reconciled 
to  the  fortunes  of  war.  There  were  to  be  no  more  intrigues 
on  his  account  in  England.3 

It  was  wished  by  many  Parliamentarians,  who  were  weary 
of  the  group  that  interested  themselves  in  Britain's  foreign 
policy,  that  Sir  Charles  Dilke  might  have  learned  from  the 
distinguished  exile  a  lesson  in  submission.  More  than  two 
weeks  had  elapsed  since  the  adjournment  of  the  Congress 
when,  at  last,  he  succeeded  in  putting  before  the  House  the 
motion  so  long  postponed  by  the  Government.4  The  occa- 
sion was  remarkable  in  being  the  first  proposal  of  a  want  of 
confidence  that  had  occurred  since  1864.  Moreover,  the 
vote  of  censure  was  being  asked  by  one  of  the  Government's; 
own  party.     Sir  Charles  Dilke  was  very  young  to  put  a 

1  Standard,  March  21,  1871 ;  Spectator,  March  25,  1871. 

2  Tablet,  March  25,  1871. 

*  Malmesbury,  Memoirs  of  an  ex-Minister,  vol.  ii,  p.  417. 
4  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ccv,  p.  894. 


378      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [378 

motion  of  such  importance.  But  it  was  agreed  that  the 
speech  in  which  he  urged  it  was  worthy  of  a  mature  states- 
man. 

His  purpose  was  not  to  discuss  either  the  methods  or  the 
results  of  the  Conference,  but  to  deplore  the  Government's 
action  in  having  entered  it  at  all.  This  undue  circumscribing 
of  the  issue  enabled  those  Liberals  who  were  discontented 
at  the  part  played  by  Granville  during  the  Conference  to 
withhold  support  that,  otherwise,  might  have  been  granted. 
But  if  the  confines  of  his  argument  were  narrow,  the  at- 
tack was,  at  least,  forceful  and  direct.     He  showed  con- 
clusively that,   though   Gortchakoff  had  been   induced  by 
British  requests  to  say  that  the  Conference  would  not  con- 
vene upon  foregone  conclusions,  he  had  never  withdrawn  his 
original  Circular,  and  had  come  to  London  secure  in  the 
knowledge  that,  with  Prussia's  aid,  he  could  convert  his 
unilateral  declaration  into  an  act  of  international  obligation, 
— that  he  even  would  make  it  a  point  of  International  Law. 
Russia  had  accomplished  her  purpose,  as  her  press  pro- 
claimed.    She  could  have  her  fleets  and  arsenals  on  the 
Black  Sea.     The  results  of  the  last  year  of  warfare  in  the 
Crimea  had  been  done  away  with.     The  indecent  haste  with 
which   England   had  assisted  her  in  her  endeavours,   Sir 
'Charles   Dilke   thought,   was   most   culpable.     Before   his 
country  had  even  ascertained  the  views  of  France  in  regard 
to  the  matter,  it  had  instructed  Odo  Russell  to  accept  Bis- 
marck's  proposition.     This   had   been   done  although  the 
Government  knew  that  the  proposal  of  a  Conference  had 
come  from  Russia  via  Berlin.     By  reference  to  the  telltale 
index  of  the  Blue  Book,  he  showed  that  the  Ministry  had 
garbled  the  despatches  with  which  it  sought  to  justify  its1 
policy.  In  short,  his  argument  was  that  through  an  exagger- 
ated timidity,  the  Government  had  permitted  the  obligations 
of  treaties  to  be  publicly  released.     He  pled  that  there  could 


™]  LENTEN  MEDITATIONS  379 

never  be  peace  until  there  was  an  adequate  sanction  to  en- 
force international  agreements,  and  that  such  a  sanction 
could  not  be  found  except  in  the  binding  force  of  treaties. 

One  of  the  reporters  has  described  his  speech  as  a  chain  of 
reasoning  from  beginning  to  end, — "  not  the  sort  of  speech 
likely  to  be  efficacious  in  the  House  of  Commons  ....  It 
was  too  closely  and  too  subtly  argumentative."  l  Honour- 
able Members  grew  weary  and  sought  amusement  in  watch- 
ing the  orator's  movements.  They  were  not  impressive. 
He  turned  his  body  monotonously  from  left  to  right  as  if  he 
were  fixed  on  a  pivot.  The  impression  left  was  that  the  re- 
servoir of  his  speech  was  ingeniously  located  in  his  boots  and 
that  he  had,  somehow,  to  pump  it  up.2 

It  was  thought  that  there  could  be  no  benefit  to  France 
in  declaring,  thus  late,  that  the  Government  had  done  wrong 
in  negotiating  at  a  time  when  Paris  was  beleaguered  and  was 
unable  to  be  represented.  It  could  only  be  an  acknowledge- 
ment to  Russia  and  Prussia  of  their  triumph,  were 
Parliament  to  record  that  Great  Britain  had  knowingly 
consented  to  negotiate  upon  a  foregone  conclusion.  To  ex- 
pend energy  in  condemning  the  Government  for  a  Con- 
ference, whose  protocols  England  stood  pledged  to  support, 
seemed  futile.  As  Bernal  Osborne  said,  it  was  like  flogging 
a  dead  horse.  His  speech,  and  that  of  the  Under  Secretary, 
won  the  complete  approval  of  the  House.  Though  the  de- 
bate was  long, — more  than  a  dozen  Members  participating  in 
it, — Gladstone  did  not  need  to  defend  himself.  However, 
according  to  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  the  Prime  Minister  had  ex- 
erted himself  very  efficaciously  before  the  speech-making 
began.  By  presenting  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  with  a  peerage,  he 
had  robbed  the  motion  of  most  able  support.3 

1  W.  White,  Inner  Life  of  the  House  of  Commons  (London,  1898), 
pp.  187  et  seq. 
1  Sir  Henry  Lucy,  Men  and  Mariners  in  Parliament,  p. 
*  Gwynn  and  Tuckwell,  Life  of  Sir  Chas.  Dilke,  vol.  i,  p.  122. 


380      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [380 

Another  of  those  who  had  accustomed  the  House  to  ex- 
pect from  him  sharp  criticism  of  the  Government,  surprised 
it  on  this  occasion  with  a  defense  of  the  Ministerial  policy. 
Sir  Robert  Peel  delivered  such  a  speech  as  the  Members 
liked.  He  ranged  afield,  as  he  had  done  on  a  former  recent 
occasion,  quoted  some  "touching  words"  o>f  Longfellow, 
and  concluded  with  a  sky  rocket  of  praise  for  the  Govern- 
ment's ability,  discretion,  forbearance,  and  good  feeling. 
Disraeli,  it  was  said,  had  come  down  with  a  great  speech, 
for  a  first-class  debate  had  been  expected.  But  when  he 
saw  that  it  was  dwindling  away  and  would  go  out  like  a 
farthing  rush-light,  he  refrained  from  adding  anything  of 
illumination  by  way  of  his  famous  verbal  pyrotechnics.  It 
is  not  surprising  that,  deprived  of  brilliant  support  and  meet- 
ing opposition  from  unexpected  quarters,  the  motion,  which 
Gladstone  would  not  allow  to  be  withdrawn,  was  negatived. 

The  News  described  Sir  Charles  Dilke  as  an  "  unprofitable 
crotchetist."  There  was  rather  a  general  attempt  by  Par- 
liamentarians to  snub  him  as  a  presumptuous  young  man 
who  had  called  Members  down  to  the  House  on  the  eve  of 
the  Easter  holidays  to  hear  him  express  opinions  on  a  matter 
of  irrelevance.1  No  such  objection  could  be  raised  to  a 
resolution  which  was  put  forward  the  following  night  by 
Mr.  Baillie  Cochrane.2  And  yet  the  Guardian  reported  that 
there  was  general  indifference  and  inattention  when  Mr. 
Cochrane  rose  to  put  his  motion.3  Its  object  was  to  per- 
suade the  House  to  express  a  desire  that  the  terms  of  the 
Preliminaries  be  modified  through  the  exercise  of  British 
influence.  But  the  speaker,  whatever  the  initial  indifference 
the  prospect  of  a  debate  on  foreign  affairs  produced,  had  a 
personality  and  presence  that  never  failed  to  gain  attention 

1  Cf.  Bernal  Osborne,  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ccv,  pp.  973  et  seq. 
'  Manchester  Guardian,  Apr.  3,  1871. 
3  Hansard,  vol.  ccv,  pp.  980  et  seq. 


-3 1  ]  LENTEN  M  EDIT  A  TIONS  38 1 

and  sympathy.     Furthermore,  it  was  known  that  he  was  not 
ambitious  for  office.     There  was  a  belief  in  his  sincerity.1 
On  that  Friday  night  he  reviewed  unfavourably  the  Gov- 
ernment's policy  in  the  exertions  it  had  made  to  prevent 
other  nations  from  allying  with  France.     As  a  sort  of  pal- 
liation for  a  neutrality  that  had  o'erleaped  itself,  he  wished 
the  Government  to  exert  its  offices  for  moderation  while  the 
negotiations  were  still  in  progress.     England  was  in  need 
of  an  ally  that  was  strong  and  genuinely  friendly.     The 
impending  terms  left  France  miserably  weak.     As  for  her 
esteem,  he  reminded  his  colleagues  that  the  vote  of  thanks 
for  England,  proposed  in  the  Parliament  of  Bordeaux,  had 
been  carried  amid  shouts  of  disapproval  by  a  majority  of 
only  two.     He  saw  danger  in  the  telegram  in  which  the 
German  Emperor  had  communicated  his  recent  triumph  to 
the  Tzar  and  had  thanked  him  for  his  great  assistance.     He 
did  not  like  the  Tsar's  assurance  of  the  pleasure  with  which 
he  had  rendered  aid,  nor  his  wish  for  further  opportunity  to 
prove    his    sympathies.     An    understanding    was    implicit. 
England  was  isolated.     He  denied  that  the  alleged  policy  of 
peace  had  been  either  peaceful  or  safe.     "  It  may  be,"  he 
said,  "  a  policy  for  a  time  cheap  but  it  is  not  a  truly  pacific 
policy,  if  it  is  neither  calculated  to  maintain  the  present 
dignity  of  this  country  nor  the  security  of  any  in  the  future." 
The  motion  was  ably  and  briefly  seconded  by  that  friend 
of  France,  Sir  Henry  Hoare.2     Gladstone,  himself,  replied.3 
He  rested  his  objection  to  the  course  proposed   on  two 
reasons:  if  England  should  endeavour  to  obtain  some  modi- 
fication of  the  terms,  she  would  gain  no  concession  of  con- 
sequence and  would  be  placed  by  her  efforts  in  the  position 
of  debtor  of  the  dominant  Power;  second,  her  interposition 

1  Vanity  Fair,  Dec.  2,  1871. 

*  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ccv,  pp.  1000  et  seq. 

3  Ibid.,  vol.  ccv,  pp.  1001  et  seq. 


382      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [382 

would  forfeit  somewhat  of  the  independence  of  the  Power 
on  whose  behalf  she  mediated.  In  the  course  of  his  speech,  he 
surprised  the  House  by  admitting  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment had  known  all  through  the  war  that  if  Austria  helped 
France,  Russia  would  come  to  the  aid  of  Germany.  It  was 
a  matter  on  which  the  Ministers  had  repeatedly  denied  having 
had  information.  He  admitted,  also,  the  existence  of  that 
isolation,  which,  it  had  been  charged,  was  the  fruit  of  Eng- 
land's pacific  policy.  Since  February,  he  told  the  House, 
Granville  had  known  that,  in  any  effort  to  obtain  a  mitiga- 
tion of  the  German  terms,  England  would  have  had  to 
depend  on  isolated  action. 

Here  was  ■  something  for  Honourable  Members  to  take 
home  with  them  and  ponder  on  through  Holy  Week, — ad- 
missions from  the  Prime  Minister  himself  that  Great 
Britain,  for  all  her  fine  phrases,  had  held  aloof  because  she 
had  known  of  a  secret  understanding  between  Russia  and 
Prussia  and,  at  the  end,  because  the  initiator  of  the  League 
of  Neutrals  had  learned  that  matters  had  so  been  manipu- 
lated that,  should  she  have  attempted  to  mediate,  no  single 
Power  would  have  borne  her  company.  Sack  cloth  and 
ashes  and  Good  Friday  prayers  for  Merry  England!  It 
seemed  she  had  sacrificed  her  power,  and  vainly,  on  the 
crucifix  of  neutrality.1 

The  first  day  of  March  had  seen  the  ratification  speeded 
by  the  occupation  of  Paris  by  a  German  army.  By  the 
withdrawal,  on  the  thirty-first,  of  the  motion  which  had 
elicited  Gladstone's  Lenten  confessions,  it  was  evident  that, 
so  far  as  England  was  concerned,  the  Preliminaries  might 
be  embodied  intact  in  the  final  treaty. 

1  Cf.  Spectator,  Apr.  8,  1871. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Treaty  of  Frankfort 

During  the  Easter  recess  of  Parliament  there  was  much 
discussion  of  the  methods  Thiers  was  employing  against  the 
Commune  and  of  the  disasters  that  might  be  expected, 
should  they  not  meet  with  success.  Whatever  game  Thiers 
held  cards  in  was  sure  to  be  interesting,  but  it  was  com- 
plained that  he  was  so  secretive  that  spectators  could  make 
no  guess  at  his  intentions.  In  the  matter  of  circulars,  to 
ibe  sure,  he  was  as  prolific  as  Gambetta.  But  when  they  had 
been  discounted  for  their  native  amour  de  la  phrase,  there 
remained  to  them  nothing.  Splendid  words  were  expended 
on  the  glory  and  honour  of  France,  the  valour  of  the  Army, 
and  the  confidence  the  Executive  had  that  in  a  few  days — 
always  in  a  few  days — Paris  would  be  brought  to  submis- 
sion. 

England  believed  that  it  could  be  reduced,  and  very 
speedily, — that  the  hesitation  of  Thiers  was  due,  not  so 
much  to  the  difficulty  of  the  situation,  as  to  care  for  his 
own  interests.  A  company  of  London  Police,  the  corres- 
pondent of  the  Times  has  said,  could  have  broken  up  the 
Communists  easily  on  that  famous  day  when  Thiers  de- 
parted from  Paris.1  The  Economist  believed  the  Chief  of 
the  Executive,  by  doing  nothing,  was  doing  what  he  wished 
in  preserving  a  meticulous  balance  of  power  between  the 
Army  and  the  Assembly.     He  did  not  desire  either  of  them 

i  Atkins,  Life  of  Sir  W.  H.  Russell,  vol.  ii,  p.  235. 
383]  383 


384      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [384 

to  be  strong  enough  to  shorten  the  tenure  of  his  office  by 
accomplishing  an  Imperial  or  a  Royal  restoration.  The 
Spectator  and  the  Scotsman  both  pronounced  him  an  intri- 
guer, who  postponed  the  work  of  crushing  Paris  until  he 
could  make  France  believe  that  he,  himself,  was  indispen- 
sable.1 

Meanwhile  the  world  was  informed  by  Thiers  of  the  dis- 
sension that  existed  amongst  the  members  of  the  Commune, 
of  their  pillaging,  and  the  eagerness  with  which  Paris  awaited 
her  delivery.  The  Assembly,  he  reported,  was  sitting  tran- 
quilly at  Versailles,  surrounded  by  the  best  army  France 
had  ever  possessed.  The  News  could  not  resist  comparing 
those  two  perfect  but  somewhat  static  institutions  to  a  pair 
of  English  commanders,  who  showed  a  similar  valorous 
hesitation. 

"  Lord  Chatham,  with  his  sword  undrawn 
Was  waiting  for  Sir  Richard  Strachan ; 
iSir  Richard,  longing  to  be  at  'em, 
Was  waiting  for  the  Earl  of  Chatham."  2 

Sir  Charles  Dilke,  who  had  returned  to  France  immed- 
iately after  his  Black  Sea  speech,  made  a  visit  to  Versailles 
early  in  April,  and  was  able  to  see  those  reasons  for  inaction 
which  the  Circulars  had  obscured.  He  found  that  M. 
Thiers's  reserves  consisted  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  guns, 
parked  in  the  Place  d'Armes  with  no  artillerymen  to  work 
them,  and  a  Paris  regiment,  locked  up  in  the  park  to  prevent 
its  joining  the  insurrection.3  On  the  second  of  April,  and 
again  on  the  eighth  and  ninth,  the  generals  of  the  Versailles 
Government  managed  to  attack  certain  outlying  barricades 
by  using  battalions  of  the  National  Guard.    They  succeeded 

1  Economist,  Spectator,  and  Scotsman,  Apr.  8,  1871. 

1  Daily  News,  Apr.  3,  1871. 

s  Gwynn  and  Tuckwell,  Life  of  Sir  Chas.  Dilke,  vol.  i,  pp.  125-127. 


385]  THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  385 

in  occupying  important  positions,  but  news  of  their  opera- 
tions left  the  British  cold.  What  was  wished  was  complete 
success. 

"  Why  in  the  name  of  humanity  and  common  sense," 
asked  the  News,  "  was  this  tentative  and  worthless  warfare 
indulged  in,  if  the  authorities  were  still  looking  forward  to 
the  time  when  they  could  act  with  some  chance  of  suc- 
cess? " *  A  riot  that  could  have  been  quelled  with  a  small 
force  had  developed  into  an  insurrection  that  skirmishes 
could  only  serve  to  aggravate.  The  Examiner  complained 
that  Thiers's  half-hearted  attacks  were  clearing  the  way  for 
a  terrible  civil  war  that  could  not  be  staved  off  unless  some 
faction  should  save  France  by  executing  a  brilliant  coup  de 
main.2  The  Economist  frankly  favoured  the  elevation  of 
the  Due  d'Aumale.3  Certain  religious  papers,  disdaining 
Thiers  as  too  much  of  an  agnostic  to  save  France,  divided 
their  sympathies  among  the  Prince  Pretenders.  White- 
hurst,  of  course,  in  Belgravia  and  the  Telegraph  maintained 
his  old  loyalty  for  the  Emperor. 

Napoleon  III  had  visited  the  Queen  at  Windsor  shortly 
after  his  arrival,  and  on  the  third  of  April  she  had  gone  to 
Chislehurst  to  return  his  visit.4  Gavard,  from  his  place  at 
the  Embassy,  noticed  jealously  that  the  Prince  of  Wales  and 
the  Diplomatic  Corps  vied  with  one  another  in  their  testimo- 
nials of  respect  and  deference  to  the  Emperor,  while  the  Am- 
bassador of  Thiers  and  his  entourage  were  ignored.5  So 
closely  was  the  residence  at  Chislehurst  surrounded  that 
police  had  to  be  stationed  at  the  gates  to  prevent  the 
crowds  from  battering  them  in.     When  the  Emperor  at- 

1  Daily  News,  Apr.  4,  187 1. 

*  Examiner,  Apr.  15,  1871. 

•  Economist,  Apr.  8,  1871. 
*John  Bull,  Apr.  1,  1871. 

5  Gavard,  Un  Diplotnate  a  Londres,  pp.  27-29. 


386      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [386 

tended  Mass,  it  was  found  necessary  to  charge  a  fee  of  ad- 
mission in  order  to  bring  the  number  of  the  devout  to  reas- 
onable proportions.1  Associations  of  the  Conservative 
Working-men  of  Deal,  Sandwich  and  Walmer  sent  to  him 
messages  of  sympathy,  and  expressed  a  hope  that  the  breach 
between  himself  and  France  would  soon  be  healed.2  The 
excesses  attributed  to  the  Commune,  distaste  for  Thiers  and 
fear  of  him  as  a  Protectionist,  combined  to  vivify  the 
memory  of  whatever  good  had  come  from  the  Emperor. 
John  Bull  whole-heartedly  advocated  his  restoration  and  de- 
clared it  was  the  only  way  of  putting  an  end  to  anarchy  and 
bloodshed.3  In  Temple  Bar,  it  was  said  that  such  an  event 
would  be  most  welcome  to  Bismarck,  for  the  Chancellor  was 
fearful  of  the  influence  the  republic  might  have  on  his 
scarce  made  Empire.4 

But  it  was  admitted  by  all,  except  those  most  timorous 
of  Republicanism,  that  the  astute  Bismarck  had  nothing  to 
fear  from  Thiers.  Under  his  guidance,  said  the  Spectator ', 
there  would  be  established  only  a  narrow-minded,  reaction- 
ary, and  very  stupid  Republic;  one  that  would  be  as  cen- 
tralized as  the  Empire  and  possibly  as  corrupt.  There 
could  be  no  motive  for  the  Chancellor  to-  intervene  except 
the  rise  of  a  new  and  most  attractive  Republic,  which  might 
exert  a  solvent  influence  on  Germany  itself.  Thiers  would 
see  to  it  that  his  would  be  neither  new  nor  attractive.5 
Whatever  might  be  said  of  the  hesitation  he  was  showing  in 
attack,  it  was  evident  that  he  was  determined  to  make  no  at- 
tempt to  placate  the  Radicals  by  concessions.     The  Evening 

1  Saturday  Review,  Apr.  1,  1871. 

i  Daily  News,  Apr.  29,  1871. 

lIohn  Bull,  Apr.  1,  1871. 

4  Aspects  of  Paris  after  the  War,  Temple  Bar,  Apr.,  1871,  vol.  xxxii, 
pp.  91  et  seq. 

1  Spectator,  May  6,  1871. 


387]         THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  387 

Mail,  in  commenting  on  the  answer  he  had  made  to  the  mis- 
sion of  Parisian  delegates,  said  that  he  evidently  had  de- 
clared war,  not  only  against  the  Communists,  but  against 
their  principles, — that  he  was  incapable  of  seeing  that  there 
was  in  their  demands  a  germ  of  truth  that  would  serve  to  be 
cherished  in  the  future.1 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  news  from  Paris  was  scant  and 
reached  London  only  after  it  had  been  filtered  through  the 
censorship  of  Versailles,  the  attempts  at  negotiation  made 
by  this  delegation  and  by  the  Republican  League,  and  the 
Freemasons,  succeeded  in  making  known  the  minimum  de- 
mands of  the  capital.  It  appeared  that  Paris  was  urging, 
with  a  reckless  abandon  due  to  her  recent  sufferings,  no  more 
than  the  right  of  local  self-government.  But  it  was  ap- 
parent also  that,  could  she  establish  that  right,  she  would 
rule  herself  according  to  very  radical  principles  that  might 
prove  contagious  to  her  neighbours. 

With  the  wish  to  break  down,  to  some  extent,  the  over 
centralization  that  was  characteristic  of  France,  England 
was  in  sympathy.  It  seemed  right  that  Paris  should  lead 
the  way  in  this.  For  it  was  recognized  that  it  was  peculiarly 
distinct  from  the  provinces.  Helen  Taylor  in  an  article  in 
the  Fortnightly,  maintained  that  because  of  its  cosmopoli- 
tanism, its  extravagance,  its  disregard  of  morality,  its 
abounding  fascination  for  youth,  it  had  become  abhorrent  to 
the  provinces  and,  itself,  was  indifferent  to  their  hatred.21 
Others  viewed  Paris  only  as  a  type  of  all  cities,  that  in. 
their  restless  feverish  life  must  be  antithetic  to  the  slow 
conservatism  of  the  country.  The  Economist  described  the 
struggle  for  supremacy  as  a  combat  between  two'  different 

1  Evening  Mail,  Apr.  14,  1871. 

'Taylor,  Paris  and  France,  Fortnightly  Review,  April,  1871,  vol.  xv, 
pp.  451  et  seq. 


388      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [388 

ages  of  the  world, — a  feudal  and  a  commercial  period,  each 
insistent  011  dominating  the  other.  It  prescribed  a  genera- 
tion or  so  of  evaluated  education  as  the  only  solvent  of  the 
difficulty.1  In  the  opinion  of  the  Graphic  centralization 
multiplied  bureaucrats  but  diminished  the  number  of  men 
who  were  capable  of  dealing  wisely  with  public  affairs. 
The  plans  of  the  Commune,  it  thought  with  the  News,  might 
enable  France  to  adjust  her  ancient  quarrel  with  the  cities 
and,  at  the  same  time,  gain  for  herself  a  greater  richness 
and  security.2  In  an  attempt  to  bring  the  problem  home,  the 
Evening  Mail  reminded  London  of  the  rights  in  its  own 
possession.     "  Paris,"  it  said, 

asks  to  be  governed  by  a  municipal  Council.  Is  not  this  the 
principle  of  the  Government  of  London?  It  asks  for  power  to 
regulate  its  own  finances.  Could  any  municipality  pursue  the  way 
to  bankruptcy  more  steadily  than  Baron  Haussmann?  It  claims 
its  right  to  regulate  its  own  police.  The  city  police  is  with  us  an 
institution  carefully  guarded  by  the  city.  It  desires  to  manage 
the  education  within  its  walls.     London  has  its  school-board.3 

These  demands  did  not  seem  so  atrocious  that  Thiers  was 
justified  in  refusing  to  consider  them.  The  Telegraph  ad- 
vised the  Commune  to  lay  down  its  arms,  for  its  desires  were 
reasonable  and  Thiers  was  so  just  that  they  could  easily 
come  to  agreement.4 

John  Richard  Green,  though  he  had  confidence  in  the 
cause  of  the  petitioners,  was  less  optimistic  of  their  suc- 
cess. Thiers,  he  thought,  had  always  been  the  ruin  of 
France.  He  had  always  hated  municipal  freedom  and  had 
recently  given  new  proof  of  this  hatred  by  coercing  the  As- 

1  Economist,  Apr.  1,  1871. 

1  Graphic,  April  15,  Daily  News,  May  8,  1871. 

3  Evening  Mail,  Apr.  14,  187 1. 

*  Daily  Telegraph,  May  4,  1871. 


3g9]  THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  389 

sembly  to  refuse  free  election  of  mayors  to  all  towns  of 
considerable  size.  The  fault  of  the  Communal  demands 
was  not,  as  the  Times  said,  that  they  were  medieval  and  ob- 
solete, but  that  they  were  before  their  day.1  When  a  com- 
monwealth of  nations  was  once  securely  established,  separate 
divisions  within  the  nations  could  enjoy  such  freedom  as 
was  being  fought  for  now.  M.  Thiers,  Protectionist  and 
nationalist,  was  not  the  man  to  anticipate  the  concessions 
that  must  be  made  in  that  larger  day. 

It  was  the  temerity  of  the  Communists  in  thus  planning 
for  a  new  order,  when  England  thought  they  should  have 
been  setting  themselves  to  the  work  of  reconstruction,  that 
lost  them  such  esteem  as  the  municipal  demands,  alone, 
would  have  gained.  The  Examiner  might  praise  them  for 
their  championship  of  the  rights  of  workers,  their  efforts  to 
weaken  the  tie  of  nationality,  to  denounce  sham  and 
tyranny,  and  to  oppose  the  militarism  which  Thiers  was 
fostering,2  but  these  endeavours  lost  them  friends  in  Eng- 
land. Conservative  British  were  alarmed  that  the  chief 
offices  of  the  Government  had  been  assumed  by  workmen. 
They  were  fearful  that  the  leaders  of  the  urban  artisans 
might  attempt  to  impose  their  ideas  on  all  France.  Frederic 
Harrison,  who  was  defending  the  Commune  very  vigor- 
ously, offended  them  by  that  asperity  which  admirers  of 
other  nations  sometimes  show  to  their  own.  The  Graphic 
advised  him  that  he  was  impractical,  when  he  failed  to  see 
that  his  friends  had  shown  themselves  unpatriotic  and 
selfish  in  attempting  to  make  trial  of  their  theories  when 
their  country  was  under  invasion,  and  greatly  needed  peace.3 
In  the  Illustrated  News  it  was  declared  that  by  her  reckless 
passion  for  experiment,  France  was  supplying  the  vindica- 

1  Greeru  to  E.  A.  Freeman,  Apr.  14,  1871,  Letters  of  J.  R.  Green,  p.  295. 
'Examiner,  Apr.  1,  May  6,  1871. 
8  Graphic,  May  13,  1871. 


390      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [390 

tion  of  Germany.  The  frivolity  that  the  Emperor-King 
had  claimed  was  excuse  for  his  exactions,  was  now  made 
manifest.1 

It  cannot  be  doubtful  that  some  part  of  the  anger  shown 
to  the  Communists  at  retarding  the  peace  of  France  was 
caused  by  impatience  at  their  disturbance  of  British  calm. 
Blame  for  the  impetus  to  Republicanism,  which  had  pre- 
viously been  meted  out  to  the  Government  of  National  De- 
fence, became  a  legacy,  not  of  Thiers,  but  of  the  Parisians. 
Indications  of  its  growth  were  all  too  evident.  During  the 
Parliamentary  recess,  Auberon  Herbert,  in  a  speech  at  Not- 
tingham, had  the  audacity  to  advocate  that  the  elective 
principle  be  applied  to  the  head  of  the  British  state.2  At  a 
meeting  summoned  to  protest  because  that  unhappy  can- 
didate for  matrimony,  the  deceased  wife's  sister,  had  suf- 
fered a  fresh  rebuff  in  the  House  of  Lords,  there  was  waved 
from  the  gallery  a  red  flag  inscribed  with  that  mystic 
shibboleth,  the  word  "  Republic."  3  It  was  supposed  to  be  an 
intimation  that  there  was  yet  a  way  to  attain  to  long  defer- 
red desires.  Mr.  Bradlaugh  was  active  and  jubilant.  He 
was  as  constant  as  a  missionary  bishop,  in  his  visits  to  out- 
lying Republican  clubs.  In  his  paper,  he  rejoiced  that  the  en- 
franchised British  workers  had  come  to  "  a  judicious  re- 
solve to  prepare  for  an  entire  reconstruction  of  the  basis  of 
the  British  Constitution." 4  Mr.  George  Odger  was  evolving 
a  system  of  education  for  his  countrymen  that  would  enable 
those  who  still  postponed  this  judicious  resolve  to  hasten 
their  decision.5 

1  Illustrated  London  News,  Apr.  22,  1871. 

2  Economist,  Apr.  15,  1871. 

3  Spectator,  Apr.  8,  1871. 

*  National  Reformer,  Apr.  2,  1871. 
^Manchester  Guardian,  Apr.  10,  1871. 


39 1 ]        THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  391 

On  the  morning  of  April  the  seventeenth,  the  London 
papers  were  filled  with  news  of  a  meeting  of  the  Interna- 
tional Democratic  Association,  which  had  been  held  in  Hyde 
Park  on  the  Sunday  afternoon  before.  It  was  a  very  un- 
important meeting,  as  the  journals  agreed,  but  it  achieved 
the  feat  of  provoking  criticism  out  of  all  proportion  to  its 
size.  The  organ  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church  told 
its  readers  that  the  meeting  had  been  a  miserable  failure. 
It  rejoiced  that  the  spectacle  afforded  by  the  Parisians'  out- 
burst of  atheism  with  its  attending  consequences  of  im- 
morality and  social  disorder  had  acted  as  a  deterrent  to  the 
respectable  British.1  The  News  confirmed  this  churchly 
judgment  by  declaring  that  the  social  forces  which  pro- 
duced the  display  in  Hyde  Park  had  been  not  sufficiently 
deep  or  powerful  to  cause  the  most  apprehensive  of  clergy- 
men alarm.2  The  half-dozen  red  flags  that  gave  colour  to 
the  parade,  the  Phrygian  caps,  and  the  band  which  played 
the  Marseillaise  "  in  a  tune  resembling  the  music  drawn  from 
a  comb  and  a  piece  of  tissue  paper,"  all  came  in  for  ridicule. 
Hope  was  expressed  by  the  Telegraph  that  when  the  French 
received  the  address  which  had  been  voted,  they  would  un- 
derstand that  it  had  been  drawn  up  by  men  unknown  in 
London  and  applauded  by  a  crowd  on  a  par  with  the  throngs 
that  stop  to  see  the  combats  of  Punch  and  Judy.3  The 
Scotsman  viewed  the  meeting  somewhat  more  seriously. 
It  was  thought  madness,  but  madness  with  a  method  in  it. 
The  pity  was,  it  said,  that  there  were  certain  men  of  char- 
acter, intellect,  and  ability,  who  with  pen,  like  Mr.  Frederic 
Harrison,  or  tongue,  like  Mr.  Auberon  Herbert,  were  argu- 
ing, in  spite  of  all  deterring  facts,  in  favour  of  France,  Re- 
publicanism, and  against  the  British  monarchy.4 

1  Issue  of  Apr.  17,  1871. 

'  Ibid. 
1  Ibid. 
*  Weekly  Scotsman,  Apr.  15,  1871. 


392      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [392 

About  two  weeks  after  the  event,  the  Graphic  reviewed 
the  comments  of  its  contemporaries  and  added  its  own  opin- 
ion of  the  significance  of  the  meeting : 

It  will  always  be  an  open  question  whether  the  difficulty  of  know- 
ing what's  what  has  been  increased  or  diminished  by  the  circu- 
lating of  newspapers.  .  .  .  What  is  the  International  Democratic 
Association,  and  what  did  it  go  to  Hyde  Park  to  do  some  Sundays 
ago?  It  was  an  assemblage  of  ruffians,  said  one  reporter;  while 
another,  who  referred  with  peculiar  emphasis  to  the  purifying 
effects  of  a  certain  shower  of  rain,  hinted,  also,  that  it  was  an 
assemblage  of  sweeps.  Some  gave  us  to  understand  that  the 
meeting  had  been  called  mainly  in  the  great  pocket-picking  in- 
dustry, others  that  it  was  a  mere  compound  of  noodles  and 
knaves.  ...  Its  members  may  be  all  that  they  have  been  said  to 
be,  but  beyond  doubt  they  are  essentially  earnest  rebels  against 
society  in  its  present  form.  It  is  the  war  of  the  penny  against 
the  pound — the  penny  declaring  that,  for  all  his  individual  mean- 
ness, two  hundred  and  forty  of  him  are  as  good  as  one  of  his- 
master  any  day.  It  is  pain  so  desperately  pushed  for  a  remedy 
that  it  finds  medicine  in  a  quack's  mere  promise  of  a  cure.  It  is 
poverty  called  together  in  a  permanent  sub-committee  to  "  sit  on  " 
wealth,  with  three  pence  to  form  a  quorum.  It  is  ignorance  defy- 
ing knowledge  to  try  a  fall.1 

An  old  M.  P.,  who  wrote  for  the  Oxford  monthly,  the  Dark 
Blue,  observed  this,  and  other  meetings  with  satisfaction : 
"  We  cannot  talk  sufficiently  "  was  his  belief.  "  Talk  is  bet- 
ter than  suppressed  passion,  and  talk  brings  our  great  men 
in  direct  contact  with  large  masses,  and  maintains  a  contin- 
uous thread  of  mutual  confidence."  A  Frenchman  had  asked 
him,  in  the  past  fall,  what  the  British  Government  intended 
to  do  about  the  revolutionary  ideas  evoked  by  the  proclama- 
tion of  the  Republic.  He  had  answered  that  the  Govern- 
ment would  do  enough  by  doing  nothing :  it  would  allow  the 
people  to  talk.2 

1  Graphic,  Apr.  29,  1871. 

*  France  Rejuvenescent,  Dark  Blue,  May,  1871,  vol.  i,  pp.  353  et  seq~ 


393]  THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  393 

The  Members  of  the  House  of  Commons,  when  they  re- 
convened the  day  after  the  Hyde  Park  meeting,  showed 
their  sympathy  with  the  Ministry's  policy  of  ignoring  such 
utterances  by  forbearing  to  make  mention  of  it.     On  April 
the  twenty-first,  Mr.  Cavendish  Bentick  succeeded  in  put- 
tins-  a  motion  that  recommended  the  withdrawal  of  Great 
Britain  from  certain  obligations  she  had  subscribed  to  by  the 
Declaration  of  Paris.1     He  had  hoped  to  have  brought  his 
resolution  forward  during  the  sessions  of  the  Conference, 
but  the  Government  had  contrived  to  delay  him,  as  it  had 
Sir  Charles  Dilke.     His  motion  was  foredoomed  to  failure, 
— the  British  had  no  wish  to  rival  Russia  in  the  manner  of 
abrogations.     But  it  gave  Disraeli  an  opportunity  of  stating 
again  his  disapproval  of  the  Government's  policy.     It  may 
be  that  the  speech  he  made  on  this  occasion  was  the  one  that 
he  had  prepared   for   delivery  when   Sir  Charles   Dilke'a 
motion  was  received  so  shabbily  as  to  have  induced  his 
silence.     He  stated,  now,  a  very  keen  regret  that  the  Con- 
ference had  been  held.     "  In  the  course  of  its  proceedings," 
he  said  in  large  Parliamentary  utterance,  "  we  have  regis- 
tered the  disgrace  and   recorded   the  humiliation   of   this 
country."  He  would  ever  consider  the  event  of  the  Congress 
as  "  a  dark  page  in  the  history  of  England." 

For  the  populace  of  London,  it  was  a  page  long  since 
turned.  Whatever  interest  they  had  in  foreign  affairs  cen- 
tred in  the  struggle  of  Paris  and  Thiers.  Bradlaugh,  as 
President  of  the  London  Republican  Association,  was  at  this 
time  in  France,  attempting  the  arduous  role  of  peace  maker. 
He  was  arrested  by  the  Versailles  Government,  and  de- 
ported from  Calais.  In  the  Times  of  April  the  twenty- 
fifth,  he  published  the  terms  which  he  claimed  the  leaders  in 

1  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  vol.  ccv,  pp.  1469  et  seq. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  1406  et  seq. 


394      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR      [394 

Paris  were  disposed  to  accept.  They  asked  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  Republican  Government  be  accepted;  that  an  am- 
nesty be  extended  to  all  political  offenders;  and  that  an  elec- 
tion be  held  in  two  weeks'  time  for  the  office  of  Chief  of  the 
Excutive.1  Such  terms  seemed  singularly  mild  in  view  of 
what  rumour  said  the  Communists  demanded.  It  was  not 
believed  that  Mr.  Bradlaugh's  statement  of  the  case  was 
correct.  The  News  told  its  readers  that  the  Radicals  had 
issued  a  new  version  of  the  Rights  of  Man  which  sought 
to  disrupt  the  French  nation  by  erecting  a  series  of  little  city 
republics.2  They  had  announced,  too,  their  intention  of 
destroying  the  Vendome  Column.  This  contemplated  de- 
molition of  a  monument  erected  to  the  glory  of  England's 
greatest  enemy,  strangely  enough,  aroused  a  furore  of  pro- 
test in  the  British  press.  It  was  zealously  desired  that  Thiers 
would  be  able  to  capture  the  city  in  time  to  forestall  such 
disaster.3 

Early  in  May,  news  came  that  Paris  had  elected  a  Com- 
mittee of  Public  Safety.4  To  the  English  the  name  evoked 
sinister  memories.  They  grew  fearful  for  the  safety  of  the 
Archbishop  Darboy  whom  the  Communists  were  holding  as 
a  hostage.  They  believed  rumours  that  the  Madeleine  had 
been  plundered, — that  pillage  and  assassination  were  the 
rule. 

Two  Episcopal  clergymen  who  were  in  Paris,  wrote  to 
the  Spectator5  and  to  Preiser's*  reports  that  directly  con- 
tradicted the  prevalent  impression.  The  article  of  one  was 
not  published  until  the  first  of  the  Eight  Days  that  saw  the 

1  Times,  Apr.  25;  National  Reformer,  Apr.  30,  1871. 

*  Daily  News,  Apr.  22,  1871. 
3  Era,  May  7,  1871. 

*  Daily  News,  May  4,  1871. 

1  At  Paris  just  Before  the  End,  Fraser's  Magazine,  Aug.,  1871,  N.  S„ 
vol.  iv,  pp.  230  et  seq. 


395]  THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  395 

Commune's  extinction.  The  article  of  the  other  was  held 
over  until  August.  Both  accounts  are  free  from  horrors. 
The  Commune,  these  clergymen  said,  kept  Paris  clean  and 
morally  wholesome.  It  managed  its  police,  its  schools,  and 
hospitals  remarkably  well,  and  it  so  restrained  the  power  of 
the  generals  that  there  could  be  no  danger  of  a  coup.  Even 
had  their  testimony  been  immediately  published,  it  would 
have  had  little  effect  on  public  opinion.  To  their  discom- 
fort, the  two  Anglican  clergymen  would,  doubtless,  have 
found  themselves  classed  with  Mr.  Bradlaugh  as  partisan 
witnesses. 

The  British  saw  no  hope  for  France  save  in  the  success  of 
Thiers.  In  April,  he  had  entrusted  his  forces  to  the  com- 
mand of  Marshal  MacMahon.  It  was  reported  that  they 
had  been  allowed  to  occupy  the  positions  north  and  east 
of  Paris  between  the  forts  held  by  the  Germans  and  the 
city's  walls.  Due  to  this  concession  of  the  enemy,  Thiers 
enjoyed  an  important  strategical  advantage.  For  though 
for  him  the  way  of  attack  was  cleared,  if  the  insurgents' 
had  attempted  an  advance  they  would  have  been  fired  on  as 
soon  as  they  approached  the  German  limits.  During  good 
behaviour,  he  could  expect,  too,  to  see  his  ranks  filled  by 
prisoners,  who  had  been  returned  in  accordance  with  the 
Convention  of  Ferrieres.1  But  even  with  the  odds  against 
her,  Paris,  like  Charles  II,  was  an  unconscionable  time  a- 
dying.  The  British  were  very  impatient  of  the  prolonga- 
tion of  the  agony. 

While  the  conquest  of  the  French  capital  was  being  thus 
impatiently  awaited,  the  Germans  diverted  London  by  a 
great  peace  festival,  held  there  on  the  first  of  May.  The 
orator  of  the  occasion  was  Professor  Max  Miiller.  In  the 
course  of  his  address,  he  admitted  that  a  slight  cloud  rested 

1  Supra,  chap,  xvii,  p.  2>72 


396      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [396 

on  the  triumph  of  his  countrymen  because  there  had  been 
found  in  England  a  party  that  hated  everything  German. 
There  were  even  liberal  and  rational  people  who  had  griev- 
ously misjudged  her.  But  he  believed  that  the  better  part 
of  England  was  friendly, — that  the  true  aristocracy  was 
hopeful  of  German  success.1 

Professor  Miiller  was  to  receive,  very  shortly,  a  severe 
test  of  the  confidence  he  avowed  in  this  sympathy  for  his 
country.  Somewhat  later  in  the  month,  due  largely  to  his 
urging,  Hippolyte  Taine  came  to  Oxford  to  lecture  on 
Corneille  and  Racine.  Townspeople  and  students  could  not 
do  enough  to  show  their  sympathy  for  the  distinguished 
Frenchman.  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward,  who  watched  them 
crowding  to  his  lectures,  has  written  that  they  strove,  by 
honouring  him,  to  honour  France.2  There  was  no  reason 
that  the  Germans  should  take  comfort  from  the  harsh 
epithets  that  were  used  to  describe  the  Commune  or  from 
the  criticism  leveled  at  the  hesitating  Thiers.  Both  came 
only  from  impatience  at  whatever  seemed  to  hinder  the 
French  recovery. 

In  the  book  stalls,  there  was  displayed  a  new  map,  show- 
ing the  future  frontier  that  was  to  divide  France  and  Ger- 
many. Its  original  was  said  to  have  been  prepared  by  the 
General  Staff  so  far  back  as  the  succeeding  September. 
The  territory  cut  from  France  was  in  the  shape  of  a 
widespreading,  thick-legged  V,  placed  sideways  so  that  its 
point  was  toward  the  east.3  Men  regarded  it  with  the 
curious  horror  which  they  might  have  shown  an  amputated 
limb  that  had  been  placed  in  alcohol.  From  the  provisions 
of  a  bill,  then  under  discussion  by  the  Federal  Council,  they 

1  German  Peace  Festival  in  London,  Good  Words,  May  1,  1871,  pp. 
489  et  seq. 
9  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward,  A  Writer's  Recollections,  pp.  153-155. 
3  Art  Journal,  Apr.,  1871,  p.  127. 


397]  THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  397 

learned  that  Alsace  and  Lorraine  were  to  be  subjected  to  an 
absolute  dictatorship  for  three  years,  and  as  much  longer  as 
Germany  might  deem  advisable.  Even  the  inferior  offices 
in  the  annexed  districts  were  to  be  filled  by  the  soldiers  that 
once  had  invaded  them.1 

The  second  of  May,  Bismarck  spoke  to  the  Reichstag  on 
the  subject  of  the  Brussels  negotiations.  Only  in  the 
Telegraph  was  he  reported  in  extenso,  though  his  state- 
ments were  certainly  interesting.  One  of  them,  made 
with  ostentatious  indifference,  was  that  there  were  said  to 
be  ten  thousand  English  fighting  in  France  on  the  side 
of  the  insurgents.  The  Era  observed,  apologetically,  that 
they  were  really  Irish,  and  Fenians  at  that,  and  England 
hoped  the  number  would  be  materially  reduced  before  the 
siege  was  over.2  The  revelations,  regarded  with  most  in- 
terest, were  in  regard  to  the  progress  of  the  treaty.  The 
Versailles  Government,  Bismarck  believed,  was  protracting 
the  negotiations  in  the  belief  that  delay  would  increase  its 
strength  and  enable  it  to  get  better  terms.  In  a  voice, 
meant  to  carry  somewhat  further  than  the  Reichstag,  he  as- 
sured the  Deputies  that  the  French  negotiators  were  mis- 
taken.3 He  had  an  excellent  card  to  play  gainst  Thiers  in 
his  power  of  regulating  the  size  of  the  Versailles  forces  by 
the  return  of  the  prisoners.  At  the  moment,  it  pleased  him 
to  retard  their  return  and  to  increase  the  army  of  occupa- 
tion. 

To  justify  his  policy  of  incorporation,  he  admitted  that 
Alsace  was  so  thoroughly  French  that  neutralization  was 
impossible.4     Besides  this  negative  reason,   there  was  the 

1  Examiner,  Apr.  22,  1871. 
1  Era,  May  7,  1871. 

3  Standard,  May  4,  1871. 

4  Spectator,  May  6,  1871. 


398      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [398 

positive  one  of  the  strategical  importance  of  Alsace.  He 
regarded  Strasburg  as  the  very  gate  of  Germany.  The 
King  of  Wiirttemberg  had  warned  that  so  long  as  it  re- 
mained a  part  of  France  his  little  state  must  be  at  peace 
with  her.1  Bismarck  resorted,  further,  to  a  tu  quo  que  ar- 
gument of  the  type  for  which  he  had  most  fondness.  He 
claimed  that,  in  1866,  Napoleon  had  offered  him  the  alterna- 
tive of  ceding  Mainz  or  accepting  war.  When  he  had 
virtuously  chosen  war,  the  Emperor  had  retracted  his  de- 
mand, changed  his  Foreign  Minister,  and  made  a  public  de- 
claration that  it  was  to  the  interest  of  France  to  be  friendly 
to  Germany.2 

If  Bismarck  expected  that  this  musty  revelation  of  Im- 
perial iniquity  would  in  any  way  mollify  the  British  in  the 
matter  of  the  annexations,  he  must  have  been  disappointed. 
His  statements  received  scant  discussion  in  the  press.  In 
Parliament,  the  usual  negative  result  was  obtained  when  an 
inquisitive  member  tried  to  gain  further  information  from 
the  Foreign  Office.3  There  was  some  curiosity,  but  no  in- 
dignation. France  was  under  a  new  government,  and  the 
futile  threat  attributed  to  her  deposed  Emperor  had  an  in- 
terest only  historical. 

On  the  ninth  of  May,  Lord  Granville  was  gratified  by 
von  BernstorfFs  concurrence  in  the  amount  oi  damages  due 
the  Duclair  sufferers.*  The  estimates  had  been  submitted 
to  the  Prussian  Ambassador  almost  a  month  before.  His 
acquiescence  was  timed  with  more  consideration  for  his 
Government's  interests  than  for  promptness.     It  preceded 

1  Spectator,  May  6,  1871.     Cf.  C.  D.  Hazen,  Alsace-Lorraine  under 
German  Rule  (N.  Y.,  1917),  p.  91. 

2  Saturday  Review,  May  13,  1871 ;  Spectator,  May  6,  1871. 

3  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ccvi,  p.  269. 

*  Bernstorff  to  Granville,  May  10,  1871,  British  State  Papers,  vol.  lxxi. 


399]  THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  399 

by  a  day  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.1  In  a 
single  respect,  the  Treaty  was  more  lenient  than  had  been 
the  Preliminaries.  A  concession  was  made  in  the  matter 
of  the  indemnity, — the  only  article  in  which  Great  Britain 
had  attempted  mediation.  A  sum  of  thirteen  million  pounds 
was  deducted  from  the  two  hundred  million,  in  considera- 
tion for  the  transfer  of  French  rights  in  the  Alsatian  rail- 
ways. An  agreement  as  to*  the  first  payment  stipulated  that 
twenty  million  pounds  should  be  paid  within  a  month  after 
the  capture  of  Paris,  and  that  Germany  would  begin  her 
evacuation  then  by  withdrawing  the  troops  in  Normandy. 
The  signature  of  a  final  treaty  was  surety  that  the  Versailles 
forces  would  be  speedily  increased  by  the  return  of  French 
prisoners,  and  that  the  fall  of  the  Commune  would  be  has- 
tened. 

In  London,  it  was  rumoured  that  Germany  had  asked  for 
a  commercial  treaty,  but  that  the  Protectionist  principles  of 
Thiers  and  his  Minister  of  Finance  would  not  allow  them  to 
consent  to  it.  The  Spectator  regretted  that,  by  the  aban- 
donment of  free  trade,  the  French  people  would  have  to  pay, 
not  only  the  indemnity,  but  a  bounty  to  their  own  manufac- 
turers as  well.  In  Germany,  as  in  England,  there  was  fear 
that  the  burden  would  prove  too  great.  But  Bismarck  as- 
sured the  Reichstag  that,  were  the  payments  not  made,  he 
would  levy  the  taxes  in  a  third  of  France,  collect  the  cus- 
toms duties  on  her  Eastern  frontiers,  and  requisition  the 
people  for  the  maintenance  of  his  army.2 

In  view  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  and  of  the  spirit  which 
dictated  them,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  News  found  in- 
congruity in  that  article  which  pledged  Germany  and 
France   to   everlasting   friendship.3     The   Communists,   of 

1  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  Hi,  pp.  1954-1965. 

2  Issue  of  May  13,  1871. 
*  Ibid. 


4oo      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [400 

course,  accepted  the  transaction  with  no  such  demonstration 
of  Christian  amity.  On  the  day  after  the  signature,  they 
repaired  to  the  respectable  residence  of  M.  Thiers  and 
burned  it  to  the  ground.  Within  the  week  the  Vendome 
Column  was  laid  low.1 

The  Government  of  Versailles  possessed  itself  of  two 
barricades  at  Bourg  La  Reine,  refused  to  receive  the  Dele- 
gates from  the  Republican  Union  who  came  to  make  a 
last  attempt  at  mediation,  and  proceeded  with  its  discussion 
of  the  Treaty  negotiated  by  the  Chief  of  the  Executive. 
The  debate  turned,  chiefly,  on  whether  it  was  expedient  to 
exchange  some  cantons  near  Luxemburg  for  others  near 
Bel  fort.  It  was  decided  that  Thiers  was  right  in  his  con- 
tention that  the  strengthening  of  Belfort  was  more  impor- 
tant than  the  retention  of  districts  that  Bismarck  desired  for 
their  coal.2  On  May  the  twentieth,  the  Treaty  was  ac- 
cepted. On  the  following  day,  ratifications  were  exchanged 
with  Germany.3 

Peace  was  signed.  But  there  was  no  peace, — not  in 
France  where  Paris  suffered  under  the  horrors  of  the  first  of 
those  Eight  Days  that  were  to  end  in  the  triumph  of  Thiers 
and  whatever  he  might  stand  for;  not  in  Germany,  where 
pride  of  arms  had  tarnished  those  fine  ideals  that  can  most 
surely  give  a  nation  happiness.  There  was  no  peace  even  in 
neutral  England. 

It  is,  and  has  long  been,  Great  Britain's  boast  that  on  her 
little  islands  freedom  of  expression  is  far  less  confined  than 
on  the  Continent.  The  grave  forbodings  that  were  felt  in 
England  were  felt  also  in  other  lands,  but  England  was  the 
spokesman  of  them  all.     She  does  not  seem  to  have  been 

1  Issue  of  May  20,  1871. 
'Ibid. 

'  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  vol.  i,  p.  302. 


4Oi]  THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  401 

jealous  of  German  unity,  but  rather  to  liave  feared  that 
German  unity  had  been  made  a  stalking  horse  for  the  de- 
signs of  Prussia.  The  traditions  of  the  Hohenzollerns  and 
of  the  nobility,  who  rendered  them  a  feudal  fealty,  were  not 
those,  it  was  believed,  that  should  shape  the  policy  of  the 
foremost  Power  of  Europe.  Pall  Mall  regretted  that  there 
was  little  hope  that  these  would  be  modified  by  the  Liberals. 
In  the  Reichstag,  that  party  was  showing  the  same  acquies- 
cence in  the  duty  of  implicit  obedience  that  the  Junkers  held 
as  virtuous.  "  They  have  yielded  themselves  such  willing 
instruments  to  Prince  Bismarck."  said  that  journal,  "  they 
have  clamoured  so  loudly  for  union  and  unanimity  as  vir- 
tually to  resign  the  right  of  opposition  altogether.  The 
boasted  unification  is  not,  it  seems,  to  be  union,  but  subor- 
dination." *  Labouchere,  in  his  Dairy  of  the  "Besieged 
Resident,  related  an  anecdote  to  show  the  sort  of  blind  de- 
votion a  German  was  expected  to  feel  for  his  King.  When 
Jules  Favre,  he  said,  was  negotiating  with  Bismarck,  the 
latter  spoke  of  Bourbaki  as  a  traitor  because  he  had  been 
untrue  to  his  oath  to  Napoleon.  "  And  was  his  country  to 
count  for  nothing?"  questioned  Favre.  "In  Germany," 
Bismarck  had  answered  him,  "  King  and  country  are  the 
same." 2 

As  for  this  Royal  Family  that  was  supposed  in  a  mystic 
way  to  embody  the  ideal  of  the  nation,  it  had  shown  itself 
neither  peaceable  nor  trustworthy.  It  had  established  a 
wonderful  system  of  education  but  it  had  preserved,  as  best 
it  could,  an  ignorance  of  politics.  The  present  King,  said 
the  Westminister  Review,  had  no  more  than  a  drill-ser- 
geant's view  of  the  concerns  of  his  kingdom.  He  had 
given  over  the  leadership  to  his  Junker  Chancellor,  a  man  as 

'Pa//  Mall  Gazette,  Apr.  14,  1871. 

1  The  Prussian  Character  and  Germany's  Future,  Chambers'  Journal, 
Apr.  29,  pp.  264  et  seq. 


402      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR      [4o2 

able  as  he  was  unscrupulous.  If  the  heroic  Army  would 
but  remember  the  history  of  their  country,  they  would  know 
that  they  should  not  put  their  trust  in  princes.1  For  the 
Heir  Apparent,  to  be  sure,  only  admiration  was  expressed. 
He  had  managed,  somehow,  to  keep  his  halo,  even  when  his 
head  was  helmeted.  But  he  would  have  to  prove  himself 
a  saint,  indeed,  were  he  to  withstand  the  traditions  of  Prus- 
sian leadership,  once  he  had  come  to  power. 

The  Quarterly  believed  that  till  the  whole  of  Germany, 
yet  unannexed,  should  be  absorbed  into  the  German  Empire, 
one  and  indivisible,  Prussia  would  remain  insatiate  and  pro- 
fess fear  for  her  security.2  In  the  Diplomatic  Review, 
Urquhart  warned  that  she  would  attempt  to  reestablish  the 
Roman  Empire,  and  that  if  the  ransom  of  France  proved 
insufficient  to  finance  her  armies,  she  would  exact  ransom  of 
England,  too.3  At  Cambridge,  Lord  Acton  told  his  classes 
that  Prussian  dominance  was  the  greatest  danger  that  re- 
mained to  be  encountered  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.* 
"  Who  will  be  surety  for  Germany?"  was  asked  in  Black- 
woods.  "  Who  will  say  that  greater  and  longer  wars  will 
not  grow  out  of  the  war  that  has  just  ended,  and  involve  the 
whole  Continent  in  quarrels  ?  " 5  One  of  the  correspondents 
who  had  followed  her  armies  and  had  high  admiration  for 
their  valour  and  noble  qualities,  believed  that  the  dangerous 
impetus  to  aggression  came  solely  from  a  passion  for  nation- 
ality.    So  far  as  Belgium  or  Poland  were  concerned,  he 

1  Westminster  Review,  Jan.-Apr.,  1871,  vol.  xcv,  pp.  160  et  seq. 

2  Third  Republic  and  the  Second  German  Empire,  Quarterly  Review, 
Apr.,  1871,  pp.  351  et  seq. 

3  Third  Roman  Empire,  Diplomatic  Review,  Apr.,  1871. 

*  Selections  from  the  Correspondence  of  the  first  Lord  Acton  (edited 
by  J.  N.  Figgis,  London,  1917),  vol.  i,  p.  11. 

9  The  End  of  th-e  War,  Blackwood's  Magazine,  Apr.,  1871,  vol.  cix, 
p.  506. 


403]         THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  403 

declared  that  Germany  would  not  molest  them,  were  Europe 
totally  disarmed;  but  where  she  believed  the  territory  was 
inhabited  by  Teutons,  conquest  would  seem  to  her  a  religious 
duty.1 

Hope  was  expressed  in  the  Edinburgh,  that  Germany,  in  a 
generation  or  two,  might  become  a  republic  and  adopt  ideals 
that  would  be  less  disquieting  to  her  neighbours,  but  of  its 
own  generation  it  expressed  a  distrust  that  was  pathetic. 

We  are  at  a  loss  whom  we  can  trust  and  with  whom  we  can  act, 
because,  in  a  word,  the  system  of  European  policy  has  been  de- 
stroyed, and  as  yet  we  see  no  approach  to  a  reconstitution  of  it. 
.  .  .  Without  mutual  confidence,  regulated  and  protected  by 
public  law,  there  is  no  security  and  no  peace ;  and  the  most  fright- 
ful and  alarming  symptom  of  the  present  state  of  the  world  ap- 
pears to  be  that  force  rather  than  law,  at  this  moment,  governs 
the  most  civilized  nations  of  the  earth,  that  all  alliances  are 
shaken,  and  there  are  no  longer  any  standards  or  principles  of 
political  action. 

And  all  this,  it  believed,  was  the  result  of  the  policy  of 
which  Count  Bismarck  was  the  prime  originator.2 

The  immediate  reaction  of  England  was  a  determination 
to  increase  her  armament.  What  was  done  in  this  respect, 
how  Gladstone  succeeded  in  diverting  something  of  the 
zeal  for  universal  service  into  the  carrying  out  of  his  pro- 
ject for  the  purchase  of  the  Army  from  its  officers,  is  a 
matter  of  military  history  that  we  must  not  stop  for.  But 
public  opinion  on  the  war  cannot  be  mirrored  without 
mention  of  a  little  pamphlet  that  was  written  to  increase  this 
desire  for  armament.  The  Fall  of  England  or  The  Battle 
of  Dorking  had  appeared,  at  first,  in  the  April  number  of 
Btockzi'ood's.     Published  separately,  at  the  time  the  Treaty 

1  A.  I.  Shand,  On  the  Trail  of  the  War,  pp.  199-203. 
3  The  German  Empire,  Edinburgh  Review,  Apr.,   1871,  vol.  cxxxiii, 
pp.  459  et  seq. 


404      BRITISH  POLICY  IN  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR       [404 

was  signed,  it  had  a  tremendous  vogue.  By  the  next  De- 
cember, its  sale  had  totalled  two  hundred  thousand  copies. 
It  was  supposed  to  be  the  narrative  of  a  British  volunteer, 
who,  some  fifty  years  later,  is  telling  his  grandchildren  the 
story  of  his  country's  great  disaster.  It  is  a  very  rambling- 
narrative  that  is  contained  in  the  little  pamphlet.  Many  re- 
petitions have  taken  passion  from  the  old  gentleman's  story, 
but  his  memory  has  retained  all  the  vivid  details  of  the  days 
when  England  was  invaded  by  the  Germans.  The  trouble 
came,  he  says,  from  her  failure  to  prepare  for  war.  The 
Ministry  had  come  in  on  a  policy  of  retrenchment  and  hoped 
to  keep  the  vote  of  those  who  decried  military  estimates  be- 
cause they  were  eager  to  reduce  the  power  of  the  Crown  and 
the  aristocracy.  With  a  precision  of  detail  equal  to  Defoe, 
he  tells  why  the  greater  part  of  the  Army  and  Navy  were 
absent  from  England  at  a  time  when  Germany  seized  Den- 
mark and  Holland.  How  England  ventured  to  oppose,  and 
how  she  saw  her  fleet  defeated  and  her  territory  invaded,  is 
told  in  a  style  that  is  painfully  realistic.  Even  at  this  late 
day,  it  is  easy  to  understand  how  men  could  have  shaken 
their  heads  over  the  story  and  been  convinced  that  the  fan- 
cied events  might  very  easily  have  taken  place. 

England  believed  that  she  was  entering  on  a  new  era. 
She  was  fearful  of  what  it  might  bring  forth.  She  had  no 
confidence  in  her  power  to  stop  events.  She  distrusted  the 
influence  of  a  militant  Germany  and  a  resentful  France.  If 
we  may  be  permitted  to  change  the  perspective  and  look 
from  the  present  to  the  past,  it  will  be  seen  that  modern  his- 
orians  find,  unhappily,  a  justification  for  her  forebodings. 

Charles  Downer  Hazen,  in  his  recently  published  Fifty 
Years  of  Europe,  discerns  in  the  intervening  period  between 
the  Franco-Prussian  war  and  the  world  war,  a  certain  tragic 
unity,  born  of  the  shadow  of  the  past  and  the  phantom  of 
the  future.     "  All  the  various  streams  of  activity,"  he  says, 


405]         THE  TREATY  OF  FRANKFORT  405 

all  the  different  movements,  national  and  internatienal,  social  and 
economic,  intellectual  and  spiritual,  all  the  complex  and  diverse 
phenomena  of  the  life  of  Europe  during  that  crowded  half-century 
took  their  form  and  colour  largely  from  the  memory  of  war,  the 
feax  of  war,  the  preparation  for  war.1 

Carlton  Hayes,  in  tracing  the  results  of  the  struggle  of 
1870,  has  said, 

The  war  fanned,  rather  than  banked,  the  fire  of  mutually  vindic- 
tive patriotism  on  either  side  of  the  Franco-German  frontier. 
And  it  was  this  war  more  than  any  other  single  event  which 
throughout  the  next  forty  years  gave  complexion  to  international 
politics,  saddled  Europe  with  enormous  crushing  armaments,  and 
constituted  the  first  link  in  that  causal  chain  of  circumstances  that 
led  straight  on  to  another  and  vaster  European  war.2 

Guglielmo  Ferrero,  more  recently,  has  stated  an  opinion 
almost  coincident,  save  that  he  extends  even  further  the 
scope  of  consequence: 

The  war  declared  on  July  18,  1870,  really  continued  without  in- 
termission. .  .  .  From  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  sprang  the  un- 
limited rivalry  in  armaments,  and  the  diplomatic  contest  for  alli- 
ance which  resulted  in  the  world  war ;  both  were  simply  desperate 
efforts  to  preserve  by  force  a  situation  which  force  had  created  by 
imposing  that  treaty  upon  the  vanquished. 

And  the  tragedy  has  not  come  to  an  end  with  the  world  war — 
far  from  it.3 

1  C.  D.  Hazen,  Fifty  Years  of  Europe,  New  York,  1919,  p.  1. 

'Carlton  J.  H.  Hayes,  A  Political  and  Social  History  of  Modern 
Europe  (New  York,  1916),  vol.  ii,  p.  203. 

*  G.  Ferrero,  The  Crisis  of  Western  Civilisation,  Atlantic  Monthly, 
May,  1920,  vol.  cxxv,  pp.  705-706. 


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INDEX 


About,  Edniond,  129 

Acton,  Sir  John,  16,  85,  402 

A  dare,  Lord,  114 

Advertiser,  Morning,  London,  81, 
138,  150,  233,  265 

Agricultural  Hall,  London,  196 

Alabama  claims,  270,  285,  349 

Albert,  Prince  Consort,  28 

Alexander  II,  Tsar  of  Russia,  19, 
36,  59,  226,  235,  242,  361,  382 

Alexandra,  Princess  of  Wales,  1,30 

Algiers,  159 

Arhanrbra,  music-hall,  London,  16, 
148,  201,  236 

Allgemeine  Zeitung,  266 

Alps,  26,  100 

Alsace,  Times  advice  on,  18,  144, 
169;  Prussian  desire  for,  74, 
206,  264,  345,  351 ;  Prussian 
governor  appointed,  144 ;  neu- 
tralization suggested,  145,  216; 
British  opposition  to  annexa- 
tion, 145,  191,  216,  233,  268; 
German  opinion  on  annexation, 
160,  259,  233 ;  Gladstone  on, 
171,  221,  239,  268,  351 ;  Morier 
on,  174;  Fitzmaurice  on,  200; 
Garibaldi  on,  205 ;  in  Bazaine 
intrigue,  210,  212;  commissioner 
of,  212;  Graphic  on,  216,  217; 
alleged  German  sympathy,  217; 
British  M.  P.  on,  218;  Times 
proposal,  220;  Garlyle  on,  251; 
German  administration  of,  260, 
397;  Pere  Hyacinthe  on,  279; 
arguments  against  transfer,  295 ; 
in  cartoon,  305 ;  S.  Morley  on, 
307 ;  in  Imperial  intrigue,  317 ; 
in  false  peace  terms,  321 ;  af- 
fected by  Gambetta's  struggle. 
33*,  35i  ;  ceded  to  Germany, 
354,  361  ;  British  interest  in, 
368;  transfer  of  railway  rights 
in,  339 

Alsatians,   198,  260 

America,  199,  222,  284,  367 

Ammergau,  116 

Anglo-American  Times,  85,  238, 
360 

413] 


Anglo-French  Intervention  Com- 
mittee, 219 

Annual  Register,  London,  99 

Anthony,  Prince,  of  Hobeuzollern- 
Sigmaringen,  58 

Antwerp,  87,  318 

Arc  de  Triomphe,  Paris,  359 

Army  and  Navy  Gazette,  112 

Army  of  the  Loire,  209 

Army  of  the  Rhine,  119 

Arnold,  Matthew,  239,  334,  273 

Art  Journal,  London,  196 

Arthenay,  195 

Arundel  Hall,  London,  166 

Association  of  Conservative  Work- 
ing-men, 386 

Athenccum,  London,  198,  274 

Atlantic,  222,  270,  368 

Aubigny,  C.-F.  d'.  2&) 

Augusta,  German  Empress,  33, 
164,  197,  239.  354 

Aumale,  Due  d',  385 

Austin,  Chas.,  113 

Austria,  19;  in  Schleswig-Holstein 
dispute,  20;  Bismarck's  plot, 
against,  29 ;  Seven  Weeks'  War, 
31,  98,  100;  Gramont's  friend- 
ship for,  45 ;  Prussia's  conduct 
towards,  81,  303;  declines  guar- 
antee of  Belgium,  104 ;  treaty 
with  Prussia,  108;  possible  ally 
of  France,  108,  123 ;  military 
equipment,  118;  agreement  with 
Italy,  124;  efforts  at  peace-mak- 
ing, 175,  348;  supports  Favre, 
190;  Times  proposal  for  alli- 
ance, 220;  response  to  British 
proposals,  227 ;  Thiers's  hopes 
of,  241  ;  project  for  interven- 
tion, 267:  negotiates  with  Bis- 
marck, 209 ;  fears  Hungary,  269 ; 
represented  at  London  Confer- 
ence, 302;  as  possible  ally  of 
England,  306 ;  refuses  coopera- 
tion, 314;  recognizes  French 
Government,  342 :  prevented 
from  alliance  with   France,  382 

Avenir  National,  48 

4r3 


414 


INDEX 


[4H 


Baden,  24,  26,  28,  36,  109,  118,  254 

Baden-Baden,  18 

Baines,  M.  P.  for  Leeds,  306 

Balmoral,  residence  of  Victoria,  11 

Baltic,  30,  109,  235 

Bank  of  England,  147 

Bank  of  France,  147 

Bankers'  Magazine.  London,  131 

Battle  of  Dorking,  see  Fall  of 
England 

Bavaria,  21.  254 

Bavarians,  293 

Bazaine,  Francois  -  Achille,  Mar- 
shal of  France,  139;  Imperialist 
sympathies,  163 ;  surrenders 
Metz,  208,  230;  accused  by 
Gambetta,  208;  attempts  in- 
trigue with  Eugenie,  210-214; 
rumoured  treaty  of,  211  ;  pub- 
lishes defence,  213 ;  at  Cassel, 
232 

Bazeilles,  197,  287 

Beales,  Edmund,  131 

Beaufort,  Gen.,  315 

Beaumont,  139,  150 

Beaury,  conspiracy  against  Napo- 
leon, 42,  46 

Bebel,  August,  259,  260 

Beesly,  Prof.,  15,  168,  297 

Belfast  Examiner,  245,  305 

Belfort,  354,  400 

(Belgium,  British  care  for,  20,  65, 
1  87,  101,  103,  105,  135,  368;  fear 
of  France.  21,  25,  87;  measures 
against  France,  26;  Prussia's 
attitude  towards,  34,  91,  1751 
French  assurance  to,  65,  92 ; 
treaties  of  guarantee,  87,  91, 
103,  123 ;  in  Draft  Treaty,  88, 
00,  92,  94.  99;  rumours  from, 
211;  Morier's  news  of,  265;  in 
Bismarck's  plans,  316-318 ;  vis- 
ited by  Peel,  349;  Germany's 
relations  with,  402 
Belgraina,  London,  275.  385 

Belleville,  Paris,  39,  215,  230 

Benedetti,  Count  Vincent,  52 ; 
avoided  by  Bismarck,  56 ;  inter- 
view with  King  William,  57,  61- 
64,  71,  74,  76,  78,  80,  153,  246; 
negotiations  in  1869,  80,  84 ; 
Russell  on,  82 ;  book  of,  85 ; 
connection  with  Draft  Treaty, 
88,  96;  negotiations  of  1866,  91; 
hated  by  Germans,  137;  visits 
Granville,  141,  142,  144 


"  Benedetti,"  card-game,  310 

Benefit  Societies,  London,  301 

Bentick,  Cavendish,  393 

Berlin,  British  representative  at, 
*4>  35,  53.  215,  227;  conversation 
of  ambassadors  at,  23 ;  Prince 
Napoleon  at,  24;  French  repre- 
sentative at,  49;  von  Thile  at, 
51,  189;  information  from,  54, 
59,  67,  76,  123 ;  Bismarck  at,  61  ; 
French  agent  at,  66;  opinion  of 
Hohenzollern  candidacy,  69,  70 ; 
war  feeling  in,  72 ;  visited  by 
Ranees,  84;  informed  of  Draft 
Treaty,  90;  French  goal,  109, 
in;  Stoffel  in,  11 1;  Russell  in, 
112;  Walker  in,  114;  Queen's 
messenger  in,  142 ;  receives  ar- 
mistice despatch,  227 ;  Russian 
representative  at,  227;  measures 
against  press,  259;  attempted 
uprising,  260;  press  attacks  on 
England,  285 ;  correspondent  of 
Times  in,  321,  325;  receives  ad- 
vice on  indemnity,  353 ;  opinion 
on  Preliminaries,  364 ;  effect  of 
indemnity,  365 ;  influenced  by 
Russell,  378 

Berlin  Post,  340 

Berne,  Convention  of,  26 

Bernhardi,  von,  Prussian  diplo- 
mat, 85 

Bernstorff,  Count  von,  25 ;  on 
Hohenzollern  candidacy,  55 ; 
Granville's  memorandum  to,  83  ; 
alarm  at  British  criticism,  no; 
communicates  Draft  Treaty,  88, 
96;  alleges  breaches  of  neutral- 
ity. 135,  208,  238;  Standard  on, 
138;  meets  Benedetti,  141;  on 
French  Republic,  176;  inter- 
views Eugenie,  211;  informa- 
tion on,  Luxemburg,  263 ;  com- 
munication to  Granville,  267; 
refuses  request  of,  269;  receives 
warning  from,  314;  reassures 
England  as  to  Luxemburg,  338; 
settles  British  claims,  398 

Beust,  Count  Friedrich  von,  60, 
108,  124,  267 

Birmingham,  15,  142,  167,  339,  376 

Birmingham  Daily  Post,  142 

Bismarck,  Prince  Otto  von,  14; 
praised  by  Carlyle,  16,  234;  in 
waxworks,  16;  policy  towards 
Belgium,  25 ;   French  suspicious 


4i5] 


INDEX 


415 


of,    26;    leadership    of    Prussia, 
28,  76,    197 ;  policy  during  Cri- 
mea, 29 ;  assurance  of,  29 ;  con- 
versation with  Disraeli,  29;   re- 
fuses mediation,  31 ;  blamed  by 
Victoria,  32 ;   conversation   with 
Napoleon,  34;  letter  to  Claren- 
don, 34 ;  opposition  to  disarma- 
ment, 35 ;  on  Clarendon's  death, 
36;    intrigues    for   war,    41,    46, 
84 ;  boast  of,  42 ;  absence  from 
Berlin,   51,  57,  80,   189;   respon- 
sibility for  Hohenzollern  candi- 
dacy, 55,  58,  69,  81,  84,  85;  con- 
versation  with   Loftus,  60,    96; 
assigns  dual   role   to   King,  61 ; 
demands  on  France,  61,  62,  217, 
234 :    rebuffs    England,    62,    83 ; 
precipitates  war,  66,  70,  85,  86; 
Irish    opinion    of,    76;    alleged 
plot    of,    78;    Napoleon    suspic- 
ious  of,   80;   diplomacy  of,   81, 
97,  403 ;  interviewed  by  Ranees, 
84;    ensures    support  of    South, 
86;      connection      with      Draft 
Treaty,    88,    91-99;    accusations 
of,  09 ;  triumph  of,  104 ;  British 
measures  against,  106;  Austria's 
attitude  towards,   108;  peasants' 
fear  of,  130;  criticisms  of  Eng- 
land, 133-136,  228;  Circulars  of, 
135,   T95.  203,  226;   balks   peace 
move,   142;  critics  of,   146,   165, 
259,    261,   401 ;    arranges    Napo- 
leon's  surrender,   150,    151,   164; 
manages  opposition,  161 ;  desires 
Alsace    and    Lorraine,    162;   ar- 
rests Jacoby,  162 ;  attitude  tow- 
ards    Provisional     Government, 
163,  168,  184,  316;  intrigues  for 
Imperial    restoration,    164,    165, 
210,  266,  316-318,  340,  386;  letter 
from  Motley,  175 ;  interview  re- 
quested by  France,  181 ;  Malet's 
interview,   183 ;    Ferrieres  nego- 
tiations, 184,  190,  210,  226;  terri- 
torial demands,   184,  345 ;  inter- 
view   in    Standard,    185 ;    mani- 
festo on  mission  of  Thiers,  185 ; 
terms  rejected,  187;  portraits  of, 
195 ;  in  caricature,  196,  249,  284, 
359.    361  ;    grants    privileges    to 
Napoleon,   209;  discourteous  to 
Dr.      Russell,      209;      intrigues 
against    French    Republic,    210- 


214,  233;   interviewed  by  Lloyd 
Lindsay,    217;    Gortchakoff    on 
demands     of,     226;     negotiates 
with    Thiers,    228-232 ;    affected 
by   Paris  insurrection,   229;   re- 
fuses   to    permit    revictualling, 
231 ;  influence  on  Germany,  234, 
401 ;  Court  Ga-ctte  on,  235  ;  fails 
to    inervene    for    Russell,    242 ; 
inconvenienced  by  Russia.   242 ; 
Odo    Russell's    mission   to,   246- 
248,  338,  353,  362,  378;  accused 
by  Renouf,  253;  refuses  tripar- 
tite agreement,  256 ;  German  op- 
position to,  259;  Luxemburg  in- 
trigue, 263-266;  negotiates  with 
Austria,     269 ;     receives     Chau- 
dordy's  proposals,  270;  favours 
Washburne,     271  ;     condtict     in 
Duclair    affair,    273,    283,    204 ; 
siege    dishes    named    for,    274 ; 
despatch    to    Washburne,    277 ; 
accused  of  bribing  Times,  277 : 
decides  to  bombard  Paris,  281- 
283 ;   receives  protest  of   Diplo- 
matic Corps,  286;  on  Red  Cross 
violations,  291  ;  conduct  towards 
Versailles,  292 ;  booed  at  British 
meetings,  300 :  prevents  Favre's 
presence    in    London,    302,    307, 
340 ;  homage  to  King,  304,  401 ; 
condemned  byOtway,  306;  fear- 
ful of  London  Conference,  307; 
in     card'-game,     310;     armistice 
negotiations,   310,   314-319,   401 ; 
in  Dame  Europa's  School,  311 ; 
refuses  to  relieve  besieged  Brit- 
ish, 313 ;  disrespect  for  Victoria, 
313;  plans  for  Leopold  of  Bel- 
gium,   317 ;     alleged    terms     of 
peace,      321  :      speculations      on 
future  policy,  322,  327 ;  contra- 
dicts   false    rumours,    324;    op- 
poses Gambetta,  330;  opinion  of 
Thiers,    342 ;   blamed    for  peace 
terms,    354:    fears    intervention, 
355 ;    foresees    future  war   with 
France,  356 :  annoyed'  at  indem- 
nity suggestions,   369;   criticizes 
England    and    Gladstone,    369 ; 
on  Brussels  negotiations,  397 
Bisinarckism.  article  by  F.  Harri- 
son, 237,  261,  207 
Black  Sea,  2.12,  246,  256,  300,  344,. 
346,  349,  362 


4i6 


INDEX 


[416 


Blackwood's    Magazine,     London, 
84,  402,  403 

Blanc,  Louis,  360,  375 

Blind,  Karl,  294 

Bloomfield,   Ladv   Georgiana,  234 

Blount,  Sir  Edward,  157,  173,  182, 
273,  286,  287 

Blue  Books,  British,  82,  83,  86,  95, 
221,  344-346.  378 

Blumenthal,  Field  Marshal  Count 
von,  183 

Blurrtschli.  Johann  Kaspar,  135 

Board  of  Trade,  286 

Bonaparte,  Prince  Pierre,  38 

Bonapartes,  39,  317 

Bonapartists.  209-214,  229,  232,  330 

Bookworm,  London,  198 

Bordeaux,  254,  302,  331,  340 

Bordeaux    Government,    302,    340, 
354,  359.  382 

Bbrsenhalle,  Hamburg,  136 

Boulogne,  130 

Bourbaki,  Gen.  Charles  Denis,  210- 
213.  319,  401 

Bourbon,  Charles  de,  84 

Bourdons.  139 

Bourg  la  Reine,  400 

Bourse,  Paris,  113,  129 

Bower,    correspondent  for  Stand- 
ard, 113 

Bowles,  Thos.  Gibson,  114 

Boyer,  Gen.,  212,  213 

Bradford,  299 

Bradlaugh,    Chas.,     15,     158,     168, 
288,  297,  300,  376,  390,  393.  395 

Bremen,  262 

Brie.  254 

Bright,  Jacob,  101,  306 

Bright,  John,  character  and  policy, 
13;  relations  with  Disraeli,  13; 
urges  naval  reductions,  19:  on 
Belgium,  101 ;  on  Times,  113; 
sympathetic  to  Minghetti,  124 : 
opposed  by  Thiers,  178:  letter 
from  Gladstone,  191  ;  Russian 
opinion  of.  245 ;  attitude  on 
Treaty  of  1856,  245 :  press  criti- 
cisms of,  245,  258;  letter  to 
Gladstone,  246 :  resignation  ac- 
cepted, 248,  286:  unpopularity 
of,  363 
Bristol,  307 
British  Channel,   12,   80,    130,   146, 

1  $2,  178.  271 
British  Constitution,  300 


British  Legation,  Paris,  182 

Brittany,  209,  213 

Broglie,  Jacques  Victor,  Due  de, 
352,  353.  365.  369.  37o 

Brooke,  Dr.  Stopford,  79 

Browning,  Robt.,  16,  114,  320 

Bruce,  H.  A.,  Home  Secretary, 
336 

Brunswick,  259 

Brussels,  211,  232,  397 

Buchanan,  Sir  A.,  British  Ambas- 
sador to  Russia,  14,  55,  225 

Buchanan,  Robt.,  16,   148,  237,  324 

Bulwer,  Edward,  299 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry,  13,  14,  102,  107, 
187-189,  192,  379 

Bund;  28 

Bunsen,  Baron  de,  109 

Bunsen,  Baroness  de,  109 

Burdett-Coutts,  Angela  Georgina, 
289 

Burnside,  Gen.  Ambrose  Everett. 
225 

Busch,  Dr.  Moritz,  56,  342 

Cabinet,  British,  opposes  Palmer- 
ston  and  Russell,  31  ;  policy  on 
Belgium,  103 ;  unpopularity  of, 
103,  286,  299.  312,  324,  352;  in- 
fluence of  Manchester  school, 
172,  224;  holidays  of,  172,  187, 
257;  early  session  of,  190;  Glad- 
stone's wishes  for,  191,  269;  in 
agreement  with  Lowe,  224 ;  at- 
tempt to  procure  armistice,  226- 
228;  neutral  role.  240;  illogic  of. 
240.  255,  333  ;  affected  by  Gort- 
chakoff  circular,  243;  effect  of 
Bright  on,  245  :  pacifism  of,  256. 
286;  distrusted,  264;  Granville 
claims  approval  for,  268 :  policy 
of  retrenchment,  285 :  press  on, 
285,  323 ;  commended  by  Jacob 
Bright,  306 :  recognizes  France, 
342;  criticized  in  Parliament. 
349.  377-3&2'<  acts  on  indemnity, 
3527354:  attitude  towards  Pre- 
liminaries, 354.  365 ;  financial 
scheme  of.  365 ;  attitude  tow- 
ards French  protectionism,  ^66 ; 
edits  Blue  Book,  378 ;  see,  also. 
Government,  British 

"  Cabinet    of     Reform     and     Re- 
trenchment," 13 

Cadore,  Duke  of.  109 


417] 


INDEX 


417 


Cairns,  Lord,  104 
Calais,  141,  393 
Cambridge,  Duke  of,  165 
Cambridge  University,  363,  402 

Canning,  Stratford,  14.  132,  174 
Cannon  St.  Hall,  London,  288 
Canrobert,  Marshal,  45 
Canterbury,  Archbishop  of,  79 
Caprera,  205 

Cardwell,    Edward,    Secretary    ot 
War,   13,  87,  88,   172,   240,   290, 

338 
Carlsbad,  51 
Carlton  Club,  251 
Carlyle,   Thos.,    15.   234,  236,  251, 
/  261,  262,  295,  357 
*   Carnarvon,    fourth    Earl    of,    192. 

347-  369 
Cassel,  229,  232,  266 
Catechism  for  Intervention,  300 
Cavour,  Count  Camillo  di,  325.  349 
Chablis,  18 
Chalons,   115 

Chambord,  Comte  de,  266 
Champigny,  254 
Champs  Elysees,  358 
Chandernagore.  262 
Changarni  er,Nicolas-A.-T.,  French 

general,  332 
Chant  du  depart,  129 
Chanzy,    Antoine  -  E.  -  A.,    French 

general.  319 
Charenton,  in 
Chateaudon,  195 
Chatham,  261,  306 
Chaudordy,    Comte    de,    225:    on 

German  atrocities,  253,  291 
Chavannes,  Puvis  de,  289 
Chelsea,  299,  371 
"Chelsea,    Sage  of,"   see   Carlyle, 

Thos. 
Chenery,  Thos.,  220 
Cherizy,  108 
Childers,  Hugh  C.  E.,  First  Lord 

of  Admiralty,  13.  299,  338 
Chislehurst,  residence  of  Eugenie, 
165,  210,  212-214,  316,  376,  377. 

385 
Christian,  King  of  Denmark,  no 
Church  of  England,  139 
Churchill,    Lady    'Randolph,    201, 

317 
Civil  List,  British,  339 
Claremont,  Col.,  273 


Clarendon,  Earl  of,  conversation 
with  Bernstorff,  25;  with  Bis- 
marck, 25;  efforts  at  disarma- 
ment, 32-34;  opinion  of  Bis- 
marck, 35;  of  William,  35; 
blames  Prussia  for  armaments, 
35 ;  reports  meeting  of  Tsar  and 
William,  36;  Bismarck's  pleas- 
ure at  death,  36;  regret  for,  41, 
109;  alleged  loan,  48;  succeeded 
by  Granville,  52;  discussed  by 
Peel,  349 

Cobden,  Richard,  176,  258,  366 

Cobd«n  Club,  355 

Cobden  Commemoration,  107 

Coblentz,  115 

Coburg,  Duke  of,  134,  242 

Cochin  China,  262,  263 

Cochrane,  Baillie,  M.  P.,  339.  380 

Coleridge,  Lord  John,  Chief  Jus- 
tice of  England,  140 

Cologne  Gazette,  162 

Commercial  Treaty,  links  England 
and  France,  13;  Gladstone's 
approval  of,  18;  renewal  of,  38, 
47;  Figaro's  account  of,  48;  op- 
posed in  France,  366 

Committee  of  National  Defense, 
241,  308 

Committee  of  Public  Safety,  156, 

394 

Commune,  372;  Thiers's  struggle 
against,  383,  386,  393"396;  the 
Eight  Days,  394!  fall  of,  399; 
see,  also,  Paris 

Compagnie  Irlandaise,  208,  215 

Comte,  Auguste,  15 

Comtists,  15,  168,  206,  288,  296 

Confederates,  Southern,  19,  80 

Conservatives,  British,  distrust 
Disraeli,  13:  sympathy  for 
France,  107 ;  on  French  change 
of  government,  155;  press  of, 
177,  3°° ;  oppose  intervention, 
241 :  fearful  of  French  republi- 
canism, 206,  301  ;  opinion  of 
Frederic  Harrison,  262;  on  na- 
tional armaments,  290 

Constantinople,  22 

Constitutionnel,  71 
Contemporary  Reznezv,  237 
Copenhagen,  109 
Cork,  121,  122 

Corps  Legislatif,  26;  Ollivier's 
relations   with,    37;   inaugurates 


4i8 


INDEX 


[418 


Ministry,  38;  constitution  of, 
39 ;  President  of,  41 ;  estimates 
for,  45,  49;  summer  sessions, 
50,  51 ;  anger  at  Hohenzollern 
candidacy,  57 ;  Ministry's  state- 
ments to,  59,  64,  72;  news  with- 
held from,  63 ;  declares  for 
war,  70 ;  Palikao's  announce- 
ment, 136;  visited  by  mob,  154 

Cortes,  Spanish,  67,  85 

Cosmopolitan,  London.   156 

Courbet,  Gustave,  289 

Court  Gazette,  London,  235,  258 

Court  Journal,  London,  97,  140, 
162,  204,  212,  285 

Crawford,  correspondent  for  Daily 
News,  113 

Creil,  202 

Crete,  22 

Creuzot,  41 

Crimean  War,  17,  29,  107,  118, 
243,  251,  200,  338,  378 

Crystal  Palace,  London,  236 

Customs  Consolidation  Act,  135 

Dallas,  Geo.,  113 

Dame  Europa's  Apology,  364 

Darboy,  Georges,  Archbishop  of 
Paris,  394 

Dark  Blue,  $92 

Darmstadt,  14 

Daru,  Comte  Napoleon,  French 
Foreign  Minister,  measures  for 
disarmament,  35,  49 ;  answers 
Favre,  40 ;  on  papal-  infallibil- 
ity, 40;  on  foreign  policy,  40: 
resignation,  41 ;   pacifism  of,  46 

Dasent,  A.  I.,  220 

Deal,  386 

Delane,  Thadeus,  88-90,  194,  202, 
211,  220,  231,  250,  282 

Delegate  Government,  French,  313, 
see,  also,  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, French,  Tours,  and  Bor- 
deaux Government 

Democrats,  British,   167,   168,  206 

Denmark,  British  interest  in  royal 
family,  20,  30,  32 ;  independence 
guaranteed,  20;  dispute  over 
Schleswig-Holstein,  20,  30,  no; 
promised  aid  of  England,  31  ; 
Prussia's  conduct  towards,  81  ; 
as  possible  ally  of  France,  T09, 
no,  123;  in  Battle  of  Dorking, 
404 


Deptford,  299 

Derby,  M.  P.,  for,  219 

Derby,  fifteenth  Earl  of,  on  Brit- 
ish policy,  31,  192;  letter  from 
Disraeli,  245 ;  on  Luxemburg, 
264 ;  military  calculations,  290 

Diary  of  the  Besieged  Resident, 
401 

Dieppe,  271 

Dilke,  Sir  Chas.,  95,  120,  154,  199, 
299.  306,  347,  369,  371,  377,  384, 
393 

Diplomatic  Corps,  Paris,  286,  287 

Diploma-tic  Reiiew,  14,  85,  224, 
235,  402 

Disraeli,  Benjamin,  leader  of  Op- 
position, 13;  distrusts  Napoleon 
III,  21 ;  conversation  with  Bis- 
marck, 29;  author,  68;  on  re- 
sponsibility for  war,  72,  73,  117; 
advocates  armed  neutrality,  101  ; 
favours  understanding  with 
Russia,  102  ;  on  Palmerston,  133  ; 
confers  with  Conservatives,  192; 
on  Government,  245 ;  on  Lowe, 
248  ;  against  anti-German  policy, 
290;  in  Dame  Europa's  School, 
311;  on  Parliament,  333;  de- 
bates of,  337,  353,  362,  368,  393 ; 
cheered  by  crowd,  375 ;  with- 
holds support  from  Dilke,  380 

Dore,  Gustave,  196,  289 

Dorking,  Battle  of,  see  Fall  of 
England 

Dover,  144,  167,  208,  376 

Dover,  Strait  of,  142 

Downing  Street,  Number  10,  16, 
55-  56,  257;  see,  also,  Foreign 
Office,  British 

Draft  Treaty,  Franco-Prussian, 
88-101,  in,  145,  317 

Dublin,  77,  122,  207 

Dublin  Evening  Mail,  94,  122,  128, 
143,  178,  188,  195,  245,  284,  343. 
386:  388 

Dublin  Revietv,  181,  204 

Duclair.  British  vessels  sunk  off, 
272,  283  ;  Prussia  makes  amends, 
294,  398;  alleged  insult  to  flag, 
398 

Ducrot,  Gen.,  in 

Dufour  Aries,  225 

Dunraven,  Earl  of,  114 

Dupanloup,  Mgr.,  Bishop  of  Or- 
leans, 122 


419] 


INDEX 


419 


Diisseldorf,  84 

Echo,  London,  135,  222,  262 

Economist,    London,    74,   98,    134, 

135.  145,  *73,  I9ii  206,  2I7,  259. 

285,  298,  305,  322,  345,  361,  371, 

383,  385,  387 
Edinburgh,  220,  246,  285,  328,  334, 

403 
Edward,  Prince  of  Wales,  1,  385 
Egypt,  11  _ 
Elbe  duchies,  30 
Elgin,  187 
Eliot,  George,   131,   236,  289,   296, 

326 
Empire,  French,  sec  France 
Ems,  interview  of   King  William 

and  Benedetti  at,  36,  51,  57,  60, 

61,  70,  71,  73,  78,  82,  153,  246 
Ems  despatch,  62,  63,  70,  72,  85, 

345 
Tingland,  compared  to  Victoria, 
11;  affected  by  Franco- Prussian 
War,  12;  relations  with  France 
before  1870,  13,  17-27;  Turkish 
bath  introduced  into,  15;  wish 
for  German  unification,  18,  27, 
146;  interest  in  Schleswig-Hol- 
stein,  20;  isolated,  20,  222,  243, 
270,  271,  283,  306,  314,  355,  367, 
382;  at  London  Conference,  23; 
refuses  to  advise  Prussia,  24; 
alarmed  over  Belgium,  25,  65, 
101,  105,  318;  relations  with 
Prussia  before  1870,  27-36;  atti- 
tude towards  Savoy,  28;  gains 
nothing  in  Seven  Weeks'  War, 
31 ;  France  grateful  to,  32 ; 
opinion  of  Ollivier,  37;  renews 
Commercial  Treaty,  38 ;  France 
represented  in,  53 ;  urged  to 
mediate,  60;  opinion  of  Hohcn- 
zollern  candidacy,  67 ;  ignorant 
on  Ems  despatch,  70;  visited 
by  de  Lesseps,  76 ;  Napoleon's 
friendship  for,  76;  neutrality 
of,  79,  345,  349;  French  circular 
to,  80;  caricatured,  80,  182,  207; 
guarantor  of  Belgium,  87,  104, 
123  ;  influenced  by  Draft  Treaty, 
93 ;  disregarded,  93,  102,  106, 
136,  176,  255,  265,  290,  306,  349; 
diplomacy  of,  98 ;  opinion  on 
increase  of  armaments,  99,  101, 
223,  272,  285,  290,  325-328,  333, 
335,   338;    advised  to   ally  with 


Russia,  102 ;  opinion  of  Den- 
marck,  109;  French  rumours  of, 
114;  misinformed  on  Prince 
Imperial,  119;  approached  by 
France  and  Italy,  124 ;  France 
sensitive  towards,  130;  German 
hostility  to,  133-136,  244,  246, 
271,  289,  301,  325,  402;  exports 
of,  133,  238;  opinion  of  French 
foreign  policy,  138,  159;  press 
of,  139;  Benedetti's  visit  to,  141 ; 
urged  to  intervene,  141- 144,  166, 
175,  178-180,  189,  219,  225,  237, 
241,  244,  297,  313,  323,  347-349, 
355 ;  disapproves  demand  for 
Alsace  and  Lorraine,  145,  191, 
268 ;  interest  in  Sedan,  147 ; 
opinion  of  Bismarck's  domestic 
policy,  161 ;  attitude  towards 
French  sympathizers,  168;  atti- 
tude towards  French  Republic, 
165-172,  176,  181,  184,  186,  193, 
215,  289,  315,  332,  339, .  372 ; 
policy  towards  Louis  Philippe, 
170;  U.  S.  Minister  to,  175; 
King  William's  opinion  of,  176; 
visited  by  Thiers,  177,  179-181 ; 
disregards  balance  of  power, 
192;  alarmed  by  terrorism,  108; 
Fitzmaurice  returns  to,  200; 
refugees  in,  201  ;  startled  by 
Gambetta,  202-204;  opinion  on 
Garibaldi,  204;  navy  of,  207, 
308;  read's  Bazaine's  report,  213; 
ignorant  of  French  political 
conditions,  215;  Tunes  suggests 
policy  to,  220;  foreign  opinion 
of,  222,  312;  appealed  to  by  Du- 
four,  225 ;  international  duties 
of,  225,  240,  262,  327,  337,  348, 
368,  379;  wishes  alliance  with 
Russia,  226;  solicited  by  Tissot, 
226 ;  criticized  by  Bismarck,  228, 
369;  maritime  position  of,  235; 
affected  by  Russian  abrogation, 
242-251,  269;  policy  in  1856,  247 ; 
Odo  Russell's  threat  of  bellig- 
erency, 247,  353 ;  Mill's  advice 
to,  250;  imperial  duties  of,  250, 
258 ;  wishes  France  at  Confer- 
ence, 252-255,  372 ;  Indian  in- 
terests, 252,  262;  news  from 
Prussia,  260;  interest  in  Lux- 
emburg, 263-265,  267;  attitude 
towards     Imperial     restoration, 


420 


INDEX 


[420 


266,  316;  Beust's  promise  of  co- 
operation with,  267 ;  on  Paris, 
281 ;  ceases  to  admonish  France, 
286;  not  represented  in  protest 
against  bombardment,  287 ;  vis- 
ited by  d'Aubigny,  289:  advised 
by  Moniteur,  290;  policy  disap- 
proved by  Army,  302 ;  affected 
by  German  supremacy,  303,  314, 
324,  337,  374;  displeased  with 
William's  coronation,  303-306 ; 
advised  against  intervention, 
306.  349-  3§i  ;  class  feeling  in, 
309;  tired  of  political  pamph- 
lets, 312;  warned  of  Bismarck, 
317;  alarmed  over  rumoured 
peace  terms,  321-323,  351  ;  party 
■to  Treaty  of  1815,  322;  distrusts 
Gambetta,  330;  policy  in  recog- 
nizing Napoleon  III,  237  '•  agita- 
tion over  royal  dowry,  339;  rec- 
ognizes French  Republic,  342; 
policy  reviewed  by  Auberon 
Herbert,  347 ;  opinion  of  French 
elections,  351  ;  impatient  of  paci- 
fism, 363 ;  disapproves  Prelimi- 
naries, 365 ;  affected  by  indem- 
nity, 365,  309;  reminded  of 
guarantees,  368 ;  policy  in  Cri- 
mea, 371 ;  policy  in  London 
Conference,  371 ;  attitude  tow- 
ard Commune,  372-383,  387,  393, 
397 ;  influenced  by  Louis  Blanc, 
375 ;  sees  end  of  Imperial  in- 
trigue, 377 ;  reasons  against  in- 
tervention, 382:  policy  reviewed 
by  Dilke,  378 ;  by  Disraeli,  393 ; 
Muller  on,  396;  reforms  army 
system,  403 ;  in  Battle  of  Dor- 
king, 404 ;  see,  also,  Great 
Britain 

Era,  397 

Estancelin,  M.,  48 

Eton,  223 

Eugenie,  Empress  of  France,  n, 
38,  56,  119,  127,  153,  164,  172, 
177,  200,  210,  211-213,  266,  316, 
376 

Eulenburg,  Marshal,  61 

Europe,  21  27,  31,  33,  50,  58,  59,  64, 
72,  74,  75,  76,  80,  86,  95,  96,  102, 
103,  131,  132,  146,  162,  163,  178, 
188,  191,  192,  202,  216,  218,  219, 
220,  224,  225,  228,  234,  237,  242, 
247,  257,  258,  269,  280,  285,  299, 
311,  326,  345.  348,  349,  352,  357, 


360,  361,  363,  370,  401,  403,  405 
Examiner,    London,   75,    215,    282, 
330,  356,  385,  389 

Faidherbe,  Louis  -  L.  -  C,  French 
general,  319 

Fall  of  England  or  the  Battle  of 
Dorking,  403 

Faucigny,  18 

Favre,  Jules,  interpellation  of,  39; 
British  press  on,  155,  156;  urban 
popularity  of,  157;  foreign  pol- 
icy, 158-160;  revolutionary  in- 
fluence of,  164;  circulars  of, 
166,  175,  185,  230;  British  sym- 
pathizers, 167 ;  despatch  from 
Thiers,  180;  Ferrieres  interview, 
184-187,  202,  210,  226,  268;  sup- 
ported by  Austria,  190 ;  follow- 
ers of,  228 ;  secretary's  mission, 
267;  warned  by  Granville,  268; 
delegate  to  London  Conference, 
301,  308 :  refused  passport,  302, 
307,  340;  negotiates  for  armis- 
tice, 309,  312-316,  321 ;  offered 
concessions  by  Granville,  325 ; 
displeases  Gambetta,  330;  signs 
Preliminaries,  354,  401 

Federal  Council,  396 
Federal  Parliament,  374 
Federals,  U.  S.,  19 
Fenians,  189,  391 
Ferrero,  Guglielmo,  405 
Ferrieres,    184-187,    190,    210,    226, 

268 
Ferrieres,  Convention  of,  395,  397 
Ferry,  Jules,  26 
Fifty  Years  of  Europe,  404 
Figaro,  Paris,  48 
Fight  at  Dame   Europa's  School, 

310-312,  364 
First  French  Empire,  74 
Second  French  Empire,  see  France 
Fish,  Hamilton,  U.  S.  Secretary  of 

State,  270 
Fitzgerald,  Edward,  280 
Fitzmaurice,  Lord  Edmund,  200 
Florence,  187,  227 
Forbach,  137 
Forbes,    Archibald,    113,    150,    182, 

281,  318.  325,  331 
Foreign  Englistment  Act,  135,  207 
Foreign  Legion,  208 
Foreign  Office,  British,  36,  52,  95, 

101,  256,  294,  338,  344,  361,  369, 

308 


421] 


INDEX 


421 


Forster,  British  M.  P.,  299 
Fort  Lichtenberg,  123,  139 
Fortestue,    Chichester,    President, 

Board  of  Trade,  286 
Fortnightly  Review,  146,  237,  261, 

296,  323,  387 

Fourchambault,  41 

France,  misunderstood  by  Glad- 
stone, 12;  Bright's  friendship 
for,  13;  praised  by  Swinburne, 
16;  foreign  relations,  chap,  i, 
passim;  policy  of  Empire,  37-39; 
attitude  on  papal  infallibility, 
40 ;  senatus  consultum  and  ple- 
biscite, 41-44;  relations  with 
Italy,  42 ;  Bismarck's  intrigue, 
42 ;  Orleans  petition,  47 ;  rad- 
icals of,  49;  prestige  of,  50;  U. 
S.  Minister  to,  51  ;  relations 
with  Prussia,  52 ;  sensitiveness 
of.  53-56,  84 ;  responsibility  for 
war,  56,  58-60,  66,  83,  128,  240- 
246 ;  defers  mobilization,  57 ; 
rumoured  attack,  59;  wishes  as- 
surance on  Hohenzollern  candi- 
dacy, 60,  68,  246;  Bismarck's 
demands  on,  61 ;  refuses  Eng- 
land's good  offices,  64:  respeccs 
Belgium's  neutrality,  65,  92 ;  de- 
clares war.  66,  243 ;  British 
press  on,  68,  70,  137,  169,  278: 
blamed  by  British,  69,  71-78,  87, 
93.  95.  98,  102 ;  war  aims,  74,  91  ; 
defenders  of,  76,  102,  107 ;  as- 
sured of  Irish  support,  76,  78, 
121;  Prussian  plans  against,  78; 
represented  by  Britain,  79,  133 ; 
circular  from,  80 ;  party  to 
Draft  Treaty,  88-90,  98 ;  British 
policy  towards,  94,  167,  215,  28S, 
379.  392;  asked  to  guarantee 
Belgium,  103 ;  chance  of  mili- 
tary success,  107-110,  123-125, 
143,  202;  camp  at  Chalons,  115; 
visited  by  Moltke,  116:  military 
operations,  116,  120,  127,  143, 
175.  195;  British  deter  allies. 
123,  130 ;  blockades  Germany. 
123;  under  Palikao,  124;  resents 
League  of  Neutrals,  125,  225, 
347;  desire  for  peace,  129;  ad- 
miration for  Napoleon  I,  129; 
response  to  war  loan,  130;  Brit- 
ish in,  130;  Morier  on,  131; 
German    opinion    of,    132;    im- 


ports from  England,  133,  238; 
British  sympathy  for,  142,  166, 
168,  192,  206,  219,  220,  223,  237, 
239,  241,  245,  252,  289,  294,  3IO, 
350,  362  ;  unwilling  to  yield  ter- 
ritory, 144-146,  186,  215,  224; 
defeat  of  Sedan,  147 ;  William's 
proclamation  concerning,  153; 
founding  of  Republic,  153-155; 
weakened  by  Algiers,  159;  dura- 
bility of  government,  164,  165, 
184,  193 ;  British  estimate  of, 
178;  Prussian  demands  on,  185, 
234;  Bulwer  on,  188:  Neutrals 
propose  armistice,  190;  sym- 
pathy of  Fitzmaurice  for,  200; 
refugees  from,  201  ;  pride  in 
Metz,  208;  Bazaine's  designs 
on,  210;  false  rumours  of,  213; 
isolated,  215,  228,  234,  315;  pro- 
jected peace  terms,  216-226,  231, 
271,  321;  Ruskin  on,  219:  post- 
war policy,  219,  220;  criticized 
by  Gladstone,  221  ;  extremity  of, 
224,  285,  320,  324,  333,  346,  355, 
361 ;  wishes  mediation,  225,  241, 
381:  Thiers  as  emissary,  228; 
armistice  negotiations,  228;  pop- 
ularity of  Changarnier,  232; 
policy  in  1856,  247 ;  England's 
need  of  alliance  with,  252,  255, 
257,  283-286,  307,  324,  335,  340; 
Carlyle  on,  252,  357 ;  effect  of 
successes,  254 ;  German  debates 
on,  259;  conduct  in  India,  262; 
endurance  of,  266 ;  Beust's  offer 
of  assistance,  267;  advised  by 
Granville,  268;  Prussian  inter- 
est in,  271  ;  on  Duclair  incident. 
272;  Father  Hyacinthe  on,  279; 
Bismarck's  impatience  at,  282 ; 
praised  by  Meredith,  296 ;  Brit- 
ish fears  for,  303 ;  advised  by 
Guizot,  313:  under  German  oc- 
cupation. 314.  325.  354;  Gran- 
ville on  future  of,  314,  344-346; 
attitude  towards  restoration, 
316:  seed  for  future  war,  318; 
need  of  Metz,  322,  361 ;  Indian 
policy,  322:  as  obje«t  lesson, 
329 ;  dynastic  history,  330 ;  in- 
fluence of  Gambetta,  330 ;  for- 
mal constitution  of  government, 
332,  340-343  :  Granville  on,  347  : 
question  of  British  intervention,. 


422 


INDEX 


[422 


347-350,  380-382;  Herbert's  mo- 
tion for  aid  of,  348,  380;  praised 
by  Peel,  349;  effect  of  peace 
terms,  351,  356,  360,  365,  382, 
404 ;  secures  mediation  on  in- 
demnity, 353 ;  ratifies  Prelimi- 
naries, 359;  attempts  financial 
alliance  with  England,  365 ;  pol- 
icy at  London  Conference,  369; 
Ferrieres  Convention,  372 ;  Com- 
mune, 383-388 ;  new  frontier, 
396;  Bismarck's  threat  against, 
399;  accepts  Treaty  of  Frank- 
fort, 308-400 

Franco-Prussian  War,  17,  347; 
see,  also,  France,  Prussia,  Eng- 
land 

Frankfort,  16,  161 

Frankfort,  Treaty  of,  353-357,  364, 
398-400,  404,  405 

Frankfort  Journal,  162 

Fraser's  Magazine,  83,  09,  151, 
217,  394 

Frederick  William,  Crown  Prince 
of  Prussia,  28,  33,  l2°<  T34.  T99> 
233,  247,  274,  281,  327,  347,  402 

Freeman,  E.  A.,  16,  251,  261 

Freeman,  Weekly  Irish,  140,  195, 
249.  273,  324,  360 

Freemasons,  French,  387 

French  Benevolent  Society,  278 

French  Chamber,  see  Corps  Legis- 
latif 

French  Council,  59 

Freycinet,  C.-L.-de  S.-de,  319 

Freyrag,  Gustav,  199 

Froude,  Jas.  A.,  151,  251 

Fun,  105,  j 49,  155,  236,  249,  287, 
294,  358 

Gal  way,  122 

Gambetta,  Leon,  eloquence  of,  12, 
158;  helps  found  Republic,  155; 
popularity  of,  157;  air  flight  to 
Tours,  202,  204 ;  proclamations, 
203,  383 ;  accuses  Bazaine,  208 ; 
followers  of,  228;  praised  by 
News,  252;  energy  of,  254,  341  ; 
success  of,  253 ;  uses  carrier 
pigeons,  276;  optimism  of,  319, 
333:  speculations  on  attitude 
towards  treaty,  322;  dissatisfied 
with  armistice,  329;  election 
proclamation,  330 ;  resignation, 
330,  332;  retirement,  342 


Garde  Mobile,  157 

Garde  National,  see  National 
Guard 

Garibaldi,  Giuseppe,  113,  204,  206, 
215,  237,  301,  342 

Caspar  in,  Count,  86,  219,  295 

Gastein  Convention,  31 

Gauthier,  Theophile,  2i2n 

Gavard,  Charles,  353 

Gendarmerie  of  the  Seine,  154 

General  Staff,  German,  396 

Geneva,  flag  of,  291 

Geneva  Conventions,  291 

Gentleman's  Magazine,  84,  258 

Germany,  soldiers  of,  16;  Times 
on,  18,  27,  137,  169;  Napoleon's 
attitude  towards,  21 ;  British  re- 
lations preceding  1870,  27-36; 
iDaru's  statement  on,  40 ;  atti- 
tude on  iHohenzollern  candidacy, 
58,  86;  probable  support  of 
Prussia,  64;  Spectator  on,  74; 
inception  of  war,  116-118;  ports 
blockaded,  123 ;  on  League  of 
Neutrals,  125;  war's  effect  on, 
131 ;  hostility  towards  England, 
133-136;  military  success,  143; 
demand  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, 144,  233,  295,  297,  307,  349, 
351 ;  territorial  ambitions,  145, 
200,  206,  234-236,  240,  247,  251, 
265,  401,  402;  receives  Favre's 
Circular,  159;  republicanism  in, 
161 ;  loss  of  British  sympathy, 
187,  199,  233,  239,  241,  259,  261, 
294;  war  news  in,  174,  195; 
attitude  of  Alsace  towards,  217, 
260;  policy  towards  France,  220; 
reviewed  by  Gladstone,  221 ; 
Liberals  of,  228 ;  military  bodies 
of,  234;  rumoured  aims  of,  235, 
262;  claims  war  as  inevitable, 
240 ;  feels  kinship  with  England, 
247;  Carlyle  on,  251;  as  pros- 
pective neighbour  in  India,  262, 
322 ;  publishes  St.  Cloud  des- 
patches, 265 ;  rumoured  attack 
on  England,  271 ;  Father  Hya- 
cinthe  on,  279 ;  interests  endan- 
gered, 282 ;  French  purchases 
in,  292 ;  influence  of  Kant,  295 ; 
becomes  Empire,  303 ;  William's 
desires  for,  303 ;  communication 
from  Granville,  314,  344-346; 
value  of  Metz  to,  322 ;  effect  of 


423] 


INDEX 


423 


victory  on,  323,  327,  356,  360, 
364 ;  iMorier's  stay  in,  326 ;  ter- 
ritorial gains,  331  ;  congratu- 
lated' by  Victoria,  335 ;  Disraeli 
on,  337 ;  Herbert's  motion  to 
modify  peace  terms,  348 ;  vis- 
ited by  Peel,  3J9 ;  indemnity  de- 
mand, 351,  365;  relations  with 
Russia,  361 ;  domestic  politics, 
374;  effect  of  French  Republic 
on,  386,  389;  new  frontier  of, 
396 ;  policy  in  Brussels  negotia- 
tions, 397-399;  Treaty  of  Frank- 
fort, 398-400;  future  of,  401- 
405 ;  in  Battle  of  Dorking,  404 
Germany,    France    and    England. 

220-224,  232,  246,  285,  334 
Girardin,  fimile,  129 
Giraud,  Victor,  289 
Gladstone,  Thos.  Ewart,  interest 
in  Ireland,  12 ;  lack  of  sympathy 
for  France,  12 ;  Bright's  influ- 
ence on,  13,  101  ;  negotiates 
treaty  with  France,  18 ;  conver- 
sation with  Bernstorff,  25 ; 
vexed  at  Bismarck,  35 ;  Roths- 
child's mission  to,  53  ;  on  French 
policy,  55,  72;  withholds  official 
correspondence,  73 ;  identified 
with  "  Scrutator,"  86 ;  care  for 
Belgium,  87;  informed  of  Draft 
Treaty,  88,  92  :  "  secure  neutral- 
ity," 101  ;  criticized,  101-103, 
132,  231,  258,  284,  298;  guar- 
antees Belgium,  103 ;  letters, 
107;  sympathetic  to  Minghetti, 
124;  waited  on  by  delegations. 
169,  189,  206;  on  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  171,  173,  191.  239,  268, 
351;  in  Judy,  172;  influence  on 
England,  178;  opposed  by 
Thiers,  178;  on  intervention, 
182;  caution  of,  188:  opposed 
by  Cabinet,  191 ;  at  German  em- 
bassy, 194;  resolutions  concern- 
ing. 206 ;  unsigned  article  in 
Edinburgh,  220-224.  232,  285. 
334;  Delane  on,  231;  at  Lord 
Mayors  banquet,  240;  dubious 
position  of,  246:  interviewed  by 
Reitlinger,  267-269;  rumours  of 
resignation,  276;  caricatured, 
284 ;  advised  on  Cabinet,  286 : 
condemned  at  St.  James  Hall. 
297;  dissatisfaction  of  constitu- 


ents, 208;  in  Dame  Europa's 
School,  311;  appealed  to  by 
Guizot,  313;  rhetoric  of,  336; 
reassured  as  to  Luxemburg, 
338;  evaded  by  Bismarck,  340; 
speech  on  Herbert's  motion, 
350;  Gavard  on,  353;  attacked 
by  Disraeli,  353 ;  advised  by 
Times,  355  ;  indemnity,  365  ;  in- 
termediary of,  366;  irritated'  by 
Peel,  367;  uninformed  of  Russo- 
German  treaty,  368 ;  delays 
Dilke's  motion,  369,  371 ;  criti- 
cized by  Bismarck,  370;  ques- 
tioned on  radical  meeting,  376; 
successful  over  Dilke,  379;  in 
debate  on  Cochrane's  motion, 
381  ;  army  reforms,  403 

Globe  and  Traveller,  69,  73,  81, 
104,  156,  157,  159,  163,  173,  174, 
191,  219,  251,  263,  297,  304,  307, 
.330,  371 

Goben,  Gen.  von,  292 

Gortchakoff,  Prince  Alexander, 
226,  242,  244,  249,  250,  252,  256, 
26S.  337,  361,  378 

Gottingen,  University  of,  282 

Government,  British,  semi-official 
organ  of,  12,  75,  138;  distrusts 
Morier,  14;  policy  in  Poland, 
19;  in  Schleswig-Holstein,  20, 
31 :  influence  of  Manchester 
School,  26,  101,  172,  274;  naval 
reductions,  35  ;  lack  of  informa- 
tion on  Hohenzollern  candidacy, 
53-55 :  attempts  mediation,  57, 
59.  62,  72,  145,  185,  225;  Bis- 
marck's request  to,  61  ;  with- 
holds documents,  73,  80;  repre- 
sents France  in  Germany,  79; 
retrenchments,  101  ;  vote  of 
credit,  101 ;  guarantees  Belgium, 
103,  123;  restrains  war  corres- 
pondents, 112;  forms  League  of 
Neutrals,  124,  146,  172;  sugges- 
tions as  to  policy,  135,  137,  141, 
339;  urged  to  recognize  French 
Republic,  167,  169-171,  193,  305, 
297,  308:  criticisms  of,  169,  172- 
174.  187,  207,  223,  256,  261,  285, 
297,  300,  334,  377-3^2;  urged  to 
intervene.  174,  308,  355;  refuses 
support  to  France,  193 ;  alleged 
breaches  of  neutrality,  208; 
policy   on    armament,   224,   238, 


424 


INDEX 


[424 


267;  proposes  negotiation  of 
armistice,  227 ;  lack  of  support 
for  intervention,  241  ;  affected 
by  Gortchakoff  Circular,  243- 
246 ;  attitude  on  Luxemburg 
question,  264;  freed  from  Du- 
clair  difficulty,  294 ;  addressed 
by  St.  Jas.  Hall  meeting,  297 ; 
Edward  Bulwer  on,  299;  loses 
support  of  Radicals,  300;  re- 
strains Volunteers,  302;  op- 
posed by  Otway,  306;  advised 
by  Baines,  306 ;  attacked  in  Par- 
liament, 334-336,  346-350,  362, 
367,  377,  393 ;  submits  Blue 
Book,  339,  344;  acts  to  reduce 
indemnity,  354 ;  on  Russo-Ger- 
man  agreement,  362,  368,  382 ; 
sounds  France  on  alliance,  365 ; 
supports  Salisbury's  motion, 
368 ;  questioned  by  Disraeli.  368, 
376 ;  de  Broglie  on,  369 ;  criti- 
cized for  results  of  London 
Conference,  371  ;  Dilke's  attack 
on,  377-38i 

Government,  Danish,  123 

Government,  French,  policy  to- 
ward Belgium,  25  ;  towards  Swit- 
zerland, 26;  British  approval 
of,  38;  pre-war  policy,  38-48; 
distrusted,  42  ;  sells  army  horses, 
45;  unpopular  measures,  46; 
critics  of,  47,  72,  222,  253  ;  pun- 
ishes newspapers,  49 ;  supported 
by  Thiers,  50 ;  policy  on  Hohen- 
zollern  candidacy,  55-57,  60-64, 
72 ;  reassures  Belgium,  65,  87 ; 
advised  by  Steele,  70;  pre-war 
negotiations,  73 ;  Granville^ 
representations  to,  83 :  Lava- 
lette's  despatch  to,  88;  connec- 
tion with  Draft  Treaty,  93 ; 
economy  of,  120;  resignation, 
123,  136:  informed  of  League 
of  Neutrals,  128 ;  removes  ban 
on  Marseillaise,  129;  asks  war 
loan,  130:  imports,  136;  ru- 
moured intervention  for,  142 ; 
embarrassed  by  Favre  and  Gam- 
betta,  155:  becomes  Republican, 
155 ;  British  attitude  towards, 
165-171;  Prussian  attitude  to- 
wards, 176;  status  of,  184;  com- 
bats radicals,  332;  formally 
constituted,  339;  represented  in 
London,  352 


Government,  Italian,  100,  314 
Government,   Prussian,  25 ;  liberal 
tendency,  27  ;  Bismarck's  leader- 
ship,   28 ;    Benedetti's    represen- 
tations   to,    52,    61  ;    policy    to- 
wards  Hohenzollern   candidacy, 
57,  68;   false  information  from, 
60 ;  on  Draft  Treaty,  97 ;  com- 
plaints   against    England,    244 ; 
opposition    to,    260;    declaration 
on    Luxemburg,   266;   disregard 
for  constitution,  304 ;  see,  also, 
Prussia 
Government,  Spanish,  60 
Government,   Wurttemberg,   59 
Gramont,  Due  de,  26,  27,  44-48,  50, 
53-64,  76,  80,  82,  84,  87,  06,  99, 

127,  137 

Grant,  Ulysses,  270 

Granville,  Geo.  Leveson  Gower, 
Earl  of,  12;  Bright's  influence 
on,  13 ;  opinion  of  Prussia,  30 ; 
Queen's  message  to,  31  ;  be- 
comes Secretary  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, 51  ;  statement  on  Hohen- 
zollern candidacy,  53 ;  pre-war 
negotiations,  53-59,  62,  65,  72; 
reticence  of,  73 ;  presents  Blue 
Book,  82,  92 ;  memorandum  to 
Bernstorff,  83:  informed  of 
Draft  Treaty,  88,  92 ;  statement 
to  Parliament  on,  92 ;  advocates 
guarantee  of  Belgium,  103,  123; 
despatch  to  Netherlands,  109 ; 
forms  League  of  Neutrals,  124, 
146;  informs  France  and  Prus- 
sia, 124,  125 ;  cold  to  Lavalette, 
129;  letter  from  Queen,  134; 
Circulars  of,  135 ;  French  visi- 
tors, 141  ;  criticized1  by  British, 
173;  efforts  at  peace-maki«g, 
175 ;  interview  with  Bernstorff, 
176 ;  on  Imperial  restoration, 
177;  estimate  of  France,  179; 
interview  with  Thiers,  179;  re- 
quests Franco-Prussian  inter- 
view, 181-183;  receives  Favre's 
Circular,  190;  influence  on 
Gladstone,  191 ;  despatch  to 
Lyons,  193  ;  at  German  embassy, 
194 ;  blames  Eugenie,  200 ;  hears 
peace  rumours,  211;  solicited  by 
Chaudordy,  225 ;  seeks  under- 
standing with  Russia,  225,  361  ; 
solicited  by  Tissot,  226 ;  conver- 
sation    with     Princess     Metter- 


425] 


INDEX 


425 


nich,  227 ;  suggestions  on  armis- 
tice, 227 ;  Delane  on,  231  ;  press 
criticism  of,  231,  284,  344-346; 
at  Lord  Mayor's,  240 ;  depart- 
ment of,  241  ;  despatches  to, 
241  ;  answers  Gortchakoff  Cir- 
cular, 243,  245,  247  ;  sends  envoy 
to  Bismarck,  247 ;  instructions 
exceeded,  248;  urges  French 
assent  to  Conference,  253 ;  re- 
ceives interpretation  of  Russian 
declaration,  267 ;  interview  with 
Reitlinger,  267-269;  letter  from 
Gladstone,  269;  presents  Bis- 
marck with  armistice  proposal, 
269;  conduct  in  Duclair  affair, 
273 ;  instructions  to  Paris  Em- 
bassy, 272,  J  unrepresented  in 
bombardment  protest,  286 ; 
warned  of  danger  to  British, 
287 ;  loses  secretary,  306 ;  policy 
at  London  Conference,  307,  324, 
369,  37°,  378;  on  German  re- 
sponsibility for  future  of 
France,  314,  344-346;  despatches 
to  Bismarck,  315 ;  presents  Blue 
Book,  344 ;  censors  France,  345  ; 
welcomes  de  Broglie,  352 ;  me- 
diates on  indemnity,  353,  365 ; 
warned  of  Russo-German  en- 
tente, 361  :  questioned  by  Car- 
narvon, 369:  knows  England  is 
isolated,  382 ;  gratified  at  Du- 
clair settlement,  398 

Graphic,  London,  48,  96,  116,  212, 
216,  236,  312,  322,  340,  345,  360, 
388,  389,  392 

Gravelotte,  139,  347 

Great  Britain,  12;  treaty  with 
France,  13 ;  retrenchments,  13, 
250 ;  served  by  Palmerston  and 
Russell,  14;  foreign  relations, 
1860-1870,  19-37:  Prussian  re- 
quest to,  61  ;  France  refuses 
good  offices  of,  64 ;  care  for 
small  states,  95 ;  sympathy  for 
Prussia,  95 ;  urged  to  arm,  08 ; 
guarantees  Belgium,  103,  318; 
resents  sympathy  for  Ireland, 
122 ;  forms  League  of  Neutrals, 
126;  hopes  for  stable  peace, 
145 ;  resolutions  on  intervention 
of,  193,  206,  381  ;  French  claims 
on,  225,  231  ;  unwilling  to  op- 
pose  Germany,  241,   382;   effect 


of  Gortchakoff  circular,  242-251 ; 
republicanism  in,  288,  308 ;  Queen 
of,  302;  effacement  of,  314,  317, 
328,  336,  382;  difficulty  of  me- 
diation, 314;  concerned  in  peace 
terms,  323,  335,  360;  requests 
lowering  of  demands,  353,  309; 
projects  alliance  with  France, 
365 ;  debates  on  foreign  policy, 
377,  393 ;  freedom  of  speech  in, 
400 ;  see,  also,  England 

Greece,  22 

Green,  John  R.,  16,  128,  129,  132, 
145,  170,  332,  372,  388 

Greenock,  219 

Greenwich,  298 

Grotius,  191 

Guildhall,  London,  241 

Guizot,  FraiiQois-P.-G.,  no,  128, 
224,  313,  3H 

Hamburg,  136 
Hammond,  Edmund,  52 
Hanover,  t,  32,  176 
Hanover  Square,  London,  279 
Happy  England,  222 
Harcourt,  Vernon,  219,  328 
Harrison    Frederick,   15,  237,   261, 

297,  312,  323,  326,  328,  389,  391 
Hartington,       Spencer       Compton 

Cavendish,  Marquis  of,  286 
Hastings,  210 

Haussmann,  Baron,  38,  46,  388 
Havelock,  Sir  Henry,  114 
Havre,  133,  208,  271 
Hawarden  Castle,  268 
Hayes,  Carlton  J.  H.,  405 
Hayward,  Abraham,  194 
Hazen.  Chas.  Downer,  404 
Heffter,  135 
Heligoland,  235 
Helps,  Sir  Arthur,  265.  375 
Herbert.  Auberon,  M.  P.,  200,  347- 

349.  352,  390 
Hertford,  Marquis  of,  278 
Hcri'e  Kiel,  321 
Hesse,  305 
Hesse-Cassel,  28 
Hesse-Darmstadt,  254 
Highbury  Barn,  201 
Histories    of    the    Consulate    and 

Empire,  343 
Hoare,    Sir  Henry,    168,   288,   300. 

349.  382 
Hoffman,  Wickham,  275 


426 


INDEX 


[426 


Hohenlohe,  331 

Hohenzollern  candidacy,  see  Leo- 
pold   of    Hohenzollern    Sigma- 
ringen 
Hohenzollerns,  22,  401 
Holland,  see  United  Provinces  of 

the  Netherlands 
Holstein,  20,  30,  305,  349 
Home,  Douglas,   114 
Hortense,    ex-Queen   of    Holland, 

129 
House  of  Commons,   British,    19, 
72,  101,  336,  349,  353,  362,  367- 
369,  375.  379,  382,  393 
House  of  Deputies,  French,  39 
House  of  iLords,    British,  73,   92, 

103,  105,  336,  367,  369,  390 
House  of   Representatives,  U.   S. 

A.,  270 
Hozier,  Capt.  H.  M.,  112 
Hudson,  Sir  Jas.,  255 
Hugo,  Victor,  360 
Hungary,  269 
Huxley,  Sir  Thos.,  16,  165 
Hyacinthe,  Pere,  278-280 
Hyde  Park,  16.  167-169,  276,  391- 
393 

Illustrated  London  Nezvs,  75,  98, 
114,  202,  236,  245,  389 

Imperial  Guard,  French,  214 

Imperial  Staff,  150 

Imperialists,  see  Bonapartists 

Independence  Beige,  263 

India,  235,  262,  321-323 

India  House,  263 

Interest  of  Europe  in  Conditions 
of  Peace,  217 

International  Democratic  Asso- 
ciation, 391 

International  League  for  Peace, 
225 

International  Society  of  Work- 
men, 46 

Ireland,  12,  76-78,  94,  104,  121, 
140,  141,  147,  156,  207,  245,  249, 
286,  301,  397 

Irish  Ambulance  Corps,  207 

Isabella  II,  Queen  of  Spain,  52,  56 

Italy,  17-19,  26,  42,  52,  124,  158, 
213,  216,  226,  241,  302,  306,  332, 
347.  349 

Jacoby,  Dr.  Johann,  162,  259,  364 
Jardin  des  Plantes,  274 


Jerrold  Blanchard,  114 

John  Bull,  London,  98,  99,  100. 
US,  195,  249,  271,  290,  311,  320, 
322,  335.  355,  377,  386 

Johnson,  Capt.,  Queen's  Messen- 
ger, 183 

Journal  Oflicicl,  83,  278 

Judy,  97,  98,  100,  115,  139,  141, 
143,  172,  222,  249,  284,  293,  305, 
329,  362 

Jules  Favre  Demonstration  Com- 
mittee, 301,  352 

Junkers,  326,  401 

"  Jupiter,"  sobriquet  of  Times,  145 

Kantuck,  121 

Keratry,  Gen.,  209 

Kiel,  30 

Kinglake,  British  historian,  81 

Kingston,  Beatty,  114 

Konigsberg,  162 

Krause,  Baron,  88,  89,  95 

Krupp,  Herr,  365 

Krupp  Munition  Works,  304 

Kursaal  Gardens,  70,  78,  80 

Labouchere,  Henry,  113,  154,  275, 
276,  277,  401 

Landtag,  29 

Landseer,  Sir  Edwin,  309 

Landsturm,  234 

Landwehr,  119 

Lansdowne,  Sir  Henry  Petty- 
Fitzmaurice,  third  Marquis  of, 
289 

Laon,  175 

Lassalle,  Ferdinand,  260 

Latour,  French  diplomat,  49 

Lauenburg,  31 

Lavalette,  Charles-J.-M.-F.,  Mar- 
quis de,  26,  53,  88,  92,  124,  129, 

175 
Lawley,  Frank,  113 
Lawson,  Sir  Wilfred,  327 
Layard,  Austin  Henry,  14,  54 
League  of  Neutrals,  123-126,   172, 

186,  228,  265,  314,  382 
Leather  Lane,  Republicans  of,  206 
Leboeuf,     Edmond,     Marshal    of 

France,  44,  45,  no,  127,  200 
Le  Breton,  Mme,  210 
Lebrun,  Gen.,  45 

Lecky,  W.  E.  H.,  145,  207,  363,  373 
Leeds,  15,  306,  325 
Leeds  Mercury,  200,  280 


427] 


INDEX 


427 


Legitimists,  French,  341 

Leopold  I,  King  of  Belgium,  I,  25, 

317 
Leopold,   of  Hohenzollern-Sigma- 

ringen,    candidacy    for    Spanish 

throne,   chap,  iii,  passim,  68-70, 

75-85,  91,  98,  246,  337 
Lesseps,  Ferdinand  de,  76 
Lever,  Chas.,  82,  84,  99,  120,  269 
Liberals,  British,  13,  138,  139,  168, 

178,  190,  241,  300,  301,  349.  350, 
378 

Liberals.    German,    162,    163,    199, 

228,  233,  374,  401 
Liberie,  La,  302 
Liebknecht,  Wilhelm,  259,  260 
Ligue  des  Neutres,  see  League  of 

Neutrals 
Limerick,  121 
Lindsay,   Col.    Lloyd    (later  Lord 

Wantage),  217,  278 
Lindsay,  Mrs.  Lloyd,  194 
Liverpool,  76 
Liverpool  Albion,  140 
Lloyd's  Weekly,  81 
Loftus,  Lord  Augustus,  14,  35,  53, 

60-62,  06,  215,  227,  242 
Loire,  Army  of  the,  209 
Loire,  Department  of  the,  41 
Lombard  St.,  351 
London,  16,  20,  25,  29,  32,  36,  46, 

51,  53.  55.  67,  69,  71,  78,  79,  90. 

92,   107,   in,  114,   124,   140,   143, 

147,  148,  155.   166-170,   173.   175. 

179,  181,  182,  189,  190,  192,  201, 
234,  235.  239.  241,  243,  249,  254, 
260,  266,  268-270,  275-278,  281, 
287,  288,  297,  299-301,  307,  308, 
315.  32i,  351-353,  356,  358,  365, 
376,  388,  391,  393,  395,  397 

London  Conference,  of  1864,  20, 
32;  of  1867,  23,  24,  32;  of  1871, 
254.  301,  302,  306-309,  325,  335, 
336,  353,  368-370,  372,  377 

London  Democracy,  167 

London  Graphic,  68,  70,  98 

London  Protocol,  20,  31 

London    Republican    Association, 

393 

London  Society,  104,  266 
London,  Treaty  of,  1867,  263 
Londonderry,  122 
Lord  Mayor's  Committee,  319 
Lord  Mayor's  Fund,  289 
Lome,  Marquis  of,  339 


Lorraine,  Times  advice  on,  18, 
144,  169,  220;  Prussian  desire 
for,  74,  206,  264,  345.  351  :  Prus- 
sian governor  appointed,  144 ; 
neutralization  suggested,  145, 
216;  German  attitude  on  annex- 
ation, 160,  233,  259;  Gladstone 
on,  171,  191,  221,  239,  268,  351 ; 
Morier  on,  174;  Garibaldi  on, 
205 ;  in  Bazaine  intrigue,  210, 
212,  317;  Graphic  on,  216;  Brit- 
ish M.  P.  on,  218;  opposition  to 
annexation,  233,  268,  269,  295 ; 
Carlyle  on,  251  ;  Pere  Hyacinthe 
on,  279 ;  in  cartoon,  305  ;  S.  Mor- 
ley  on,  307 ;  in  false  peace 
terms,  321 ;  affected  by  Gam- 
betta's  struggle,  331 ;  in  final 
treaty,  354 ;  British  interest  in, 
368 ;  German  government  of,  397 

Lothair,  68 

Louis  XIV,  145,  181 

Louis,  French  Prince  Imperial,  43, 
74,  119,  164,  210-213 

Louise,  Princess  of  England,  339, 

375 

Louvre,  Paris,  181 

Lowe,  iRobt,  Chancellor  of  Ex- 
chequer, 13,  186,  189,  224,  248. 
258,  311 

Lucca,  Duke  of,  84 

Lucy,  Sir  Henry,  347 

Ludlow,  Jas.  M.,  237,  238 

Liitzen,  161 

Luxemburg,  21,  22,  25,  90,  91,  263- 
267,  273,  338,  400 

Lyons,  225 

Lyons,  Lord  Richard.  B.  P.,  14,  25, 
36,  38,  47.  54-65,  82,  87,  92,  108, 
124,  160,  182,  183,  185,  190,  193, 
211,  225,  239,  241,  253,  260,  273. 

287,  315,  324.  341,  367 
Lytton,  Lord  Edward  Bulwer,  131, 

233 
Lytton,    British    representative    at 
Vienna,  255 

MacMahon.  Marie-E.-P.-M.,  Mar- 
shal  of   France,    in,    121,    139, 
151.  177,  395 
Macmillan's  Magazine,  117,  328 
Madeleine,  'Church  of  the,  394 
Madrid,  14,  52-54,  67,  85,  246 
Main,  24 
Mainz,  398 


428 


INDEX 


[428 


Mair,  Jos.,  116 
Malet,  Sir  Alex.,  16 

Malet,  Edward,  182 

Malmesbury,  Jas.  Howard  Harris, 
Earl  of,  44,  82,  377 

Manchester,  15,  20,  238,  306,  325 

Manchester  Examiner,  94,  179, 
203,  204,  249 

Manchester  Guardian,  68,  74,  94, 
97,  98,  no,  114,  121,  138,  141, 
142,  160,  162,  168,  169,  187,  204, 
213,  227,  228,  244,  249,  287,  303, 
342,  346,  355,  361,  308,  374,  380 

Manchester,  school  of  economists, 
11,  19,  26,  101,  123,  172,  176,  245, 
256,  274 

Mansion  House  Relief  Fund,  320 

Manteuffel,  Otto  von,  German 
general,  374 

Maori,  193 

Mario,  Jessie  White,  113 

Marriott,  Sir  William,  297 

Marseillaise,  French  anthem,  16, 
77,  1.29..  154,  168,  196,  236,  391 

Marseillaise,  newspaper,  48 

Marseilles,  186,  203 

Marx,  Karl,  14 

Maxse.  Capt.,  297 

Mayfair,  140 

Mayhew,  Henry,  114 

Mediterranean,   108,  179 

Meissonier,  Jean-L.-E.,  289 

Meredith,  George,  79,  107,  206,  297 

Merriman,  Jos.,  288,  302 

Metropolitan  Peace  Party,  300 

Metternich,  Prince,  Austrian  Am- 
bassador, 118 

Metternich,  Princess,  227 

Metz,  in,  114,  163,  169,  184,  185, 
195,  208,  210-218,  226,  230,  232, 
239,  242,  292,  322,  335,  354,  356, 
361 

Mexico,  19-21,  30 

Militar  Cabinet,  229,  326 

Mill,  John  Stuart.  16,  04,  95,  133. 
170,  216,  250,  263,  288,  323,  327. 
329,  337 

Minghetti,  Marco,  124 

"  Minister,"  carrier  pigeon,  276 

Ministry,  British,  see  Cabinet, 
Government 

Ministry,   French,  see  Government 

Mitchel,  John,  77 

Moltke,  Gen.  Hellmuth  von,  33, 
55,  85,  116,  117,  197,  216,  277, 
281,  290,  319,  374 


Mommsen,  German  historian,  295 

Monarchists,  French,  340 

Monitcur,  18,  290 

Monod,  Gabriel,  150 

Montauban,  Gen.,  see  Palikao 

Montpensier,  Antoine  -  M.  -  P.  -  L. 
d'Orleans,  Due  de,  68 

Morier,  Sir  Robt.,  14,  06.  104,  106, 
115,  118,  125,  131,  145,  174,  193, 
217,  255,  265,  316,  317,  326,  359 

Morley,  John,  16,  146,  169,  238, 
327,  329 

Morley,  Samuel,  307 

Morning  Advertiser,  see  Adver- 
tiser, Morning 

Morning  Post,  see  Post,  Morning 

Moselle,  184 

Motley,  John  Lothrop,  175 

Mount  Avron,  283 

Moustier,  Marquis  de,  29 

Murat,  Prince  Joachim,  142 

Mussct,  Alfred  de,   129 

Muller,  Max,  233,  295,  395 

Napoleon,  Prince,  24,  in 
Napoleon  I,  28,  129,  149,  322 
Napoleon  III,  friendship  for  Eng- 
land, 13,  22,  76,  139,  148,  377 ; 
subject  for  British  poets,  16: 
distrusted,  17-20,  32;  acquires 
Nice  and  Savoy,  17;  relations 
with  Russell,  17;  American 
policy,  19,  20;  Polish,  19;  pro- 
poses congress,  19,  20,  24 ;  atti- 
tude towards  Germany,  21  ;  fails 
to  get  Luxemburg,  22 ;  Roman 
policy,  22,  24;  reported  pacific, 
25  ;  feared  by  William,  33 ;  in- 
terviewed by  Clarendon,  33 ; 
conversation  with  Bismarck,  34; 
elevates  Ollivier,  34,  37 ;  effort 
for  disarmament,  34 :  speech  to 
Diplomatic  Body,  37  ;  friendship 
for  Haussmann,  38;  affected  by 
killing  of  Victor  Noir,  38;  ple- 
biscite, 41-44,  47,  128;  conspir- 
acy against,  42,  46;  reports  of, 
43.  44 :  letter  to  Canrobert,  45 ; 
irritated  by  criticism,  47,  48; 
claim  of  pacifism,  49,  151 ;  ill- 
ness, 49;  on  Hohenzollern  can- 
didacy, 52,  54,  64,  68 ;  News  on, 
68;  British  opinion  of,  69,  74, 
76,  79,  148-152;  culpability  of, 
72-74,  81,  84,  106,  127,  174,  180, 
181;  fears  for  dynasty,  74,  164; 


429] 


INDEX 


429 


traditions       of,       75;       military 
strength,     77 I     secret     negotia- 
tions,   80;     Kinglake's     concep- 
tion of,  81  ;  ridiculed  by  Lever, 
82,  84;   defeat   of,  84,   147-148; 
disliked  by   Times,  88;   connec- 
tion with   Draft  Treaty,  00,  94. 
98,    99;     interviewed    by    Tele- 
graph,   90,    Hi;    assurance    on 
Belgium,     103;     Italian     policy, 
108;    attitude    towards    corres- 
pondents,     112,      117;      military 
ability,  117-119.   *39;  contrasted 
with    William,     120;     sympathy 
for  Irish,  122;  resigns  command, 
127;    alleged   desire    for    peace, 
127;    scored    by    Paradol,    129: 
abdication     advised,      136 -141; 
caricatured,  140,  358;  surrender 
of,    147-153;    finances    of,    149'. 
loses  control  of   Paris,  IS3_I55; 
embarrassed     by     South,      157; 
status   of,    176,    177;    secret    of 
power,  178;  Wilhelshohe  Mani- 
festo, 195,  209;  visitors  of,  232; 
anonymous  defence  of,  232,  233  ; 
British    attitude   on   restoration, 
265 ;  St.  Cloud  revelations,  265 ; 
mentioned    in    News,     280;     in 
Dame     Europa's    School,     311; 
used   by    Bismarck,    316;    letter 
of,    317 ;    proclamation   of,    331, 
340;    under    close    surveillance, 
340:    as    refugee,    376,    385;    al- 
leged negotiations,  398 ;  deserted 
by  Bourbaki,  401 
Nation,  Irish,  69,  76,  105,  140,  156, 

208,  245,  249 
National    Assembly,    French,    313, 

359.  372,  382,  388 
National  Guard,  39,  154,  157,  230, 

372,  384  n      , 

National  Reformer,  158,  161,  370 
Nationalists,  Irish,  122,  168 
Nelson    Monument,     London,    16, 

3o8 
Netherland,   United   Provinces   of 

the,  22,  91,  94,  99,  105,  236,  263, 

265,  316,  404 
Nevill,  Dorothy,  248 
Newcastle  Chronicle,  304 
Neivs,  Daily,   London,  68,   74,  77, 

94,  113,  121,  135,  139.  141,  149. 
150,  159,  166,  174,  178,  179,  188, 
I90,    191,    192,    195,   196,    205,   217, 


234,    24O,  249,  252,  254,   263,    266, 
267,   277,   279,   280,   29I,    294,   303. 

316,  341,  344,  352,  359,  38o,  385, 

388,  391,  394,  ^09 
News  of  the  IV  or  Id,  81 
Nice,  17,  158,  205,  213,  216 
Nicholas,  Tsar  of  Russia,  245 
Noir,  Victor,  38 
Normandy,  213,  399 
North  German  Confederation,  24, 

36,  55.  84,  90,  133,  254,  270 
North  German  Gazette,  62,  63,  66, 

7T,  83.  303 
North  Sea,  235 
North  Woolwich,  196 
Northern  Whig,  76,  97,  244 
Norway,  30 
Nottingham,  339,  376,  390 

Observer,  155 

Odger,    George,    15,    166-168,    189, 

297,  300-302,  308,  390 
Old  St.,  288 
Ollivier,  fimile,  34,  37,  38,  41,  44, 

50,  Si,  54,  7i,  77,  78,  95,  06,  no, 

120,  123,  127,  136,  137 
Once  a  Week,  97,  149,  373 
Opera  Comique,  129 
Orangemen,  122 
Orleanists,  68,   139,   ISS,   156,  165, 

181,  230,  266,  341,  373 
Orleans,  195,  239,  242,  254,  290 
Orleans,  House  of,  47 
Osborne,  Bernal,  M.  P.,  101,  104, 

379 
O'Shea,  J.  Augustus,  113 
Otway,     British     under-secretary, 

241,  306 
Oxford,  15,  219,  396 

Palace  Yard,  206 

Paladin,    Gen.    Aurelles    de,    209, 

239-  254 
Palatinate,  18,  20 
Palikao,   Charles-G.-M.-A.,    Count 

de,  124,  136 
Pall  Mall  Gazette,  74,  93,  94,  135. 

136,  142,  172,  187,  191,  22°>  222, 

235,  244,  246,  249,  252,  262-264, 

334,  345,  352,  355.  356,  37h  375, 

401 
Palmerston,   Lord,   12,  14,   19,  20, 

30,  31,  132,  133,  T74,  349 
Paradol,  Prevost,  129 


43° 


INDEX 


[430 


Paris,  14,  23,  24,  32,  35,  36,  38-43, 
46,  52,  56,  63,  69,  70,  72,  75,  78, 
84,  90,  102,  in,  113,  114,  116, 
120,  128-130,  137,  138,  146,  151, 
I53-I5S,  157,  164,  166,  170,  172, 
173,  182-186,  200,  202,  203,  207, 
215,  226,  220-232,  241,  252,  254, 
261,  270-286,  289,  305,  306,  309, 
313,  315,  319-321,  330,  331,  346, 
351,  354,  367,  372,  382-385,  387- 
390,  393-395,  399,  4<» 

Paris,  Conference  of,  1856,  65 

Paris,  Declaration  of,  393 

Paris,  Treaty  of,  see  Treaty  of 
1856 

Paris,  Louis  -  P.  -  A.  -  d'Orleans, 
Comte  de,  266 

Parlement,  48 

Parliament,  British,  51  ;  debates 
on  war's  inception,  72,  92,  93, 
101,  107;  on  neutrality.  79;  re- 
views official  correspondence,  82, 
92,  93 ;  ignorant  of  League  of 
Neutrals,  125 ;  recess  of,  146, 
187,  192,  334,  338,  383,  390;  vote 
of  credit,  174 :  popular  demand 
for,  205,  206,  261 ;  vacation 
speeches,  219,  241,  296,  299;  ses- 
sions of,  286,  288,  334-340,  344; 
given  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence, '344;  debate  on  London 
Conference,  377-380 ;  on  Pre- 
liminaries, 380-382 ;  enquires  of 
1866  negotiations,  308;  see,  also. 
House  of  Commons,  House  of 
Lords 

Parliament,  North  German,  36, 
164,  254,  259,  262,  270,  273 

Parliamentarians.  British,  296,  333, 
370,  377,  380 

Parthenon.  287 

Passion  Play,  116 

Peace  Party,  207 

Peek  Sir  Robt..  349.  35o,  367,  380 

Persigny,   Jean-G.-V.-F.,   Due   de, 

43 
Phalsbourg,  185 
Picardy,  213 
Piedmont,  99 

Pietri,  Parisian  prefect,  128 
Pigeon  post,  275,  276 
Pilcoq,  Jules,  114 
Pitie  Hospital,  Paris,  287 
Pitt.  William.  176.  265,  349 
Place  d'Armes,  384 


Place  de  la  Concorde,  358 

Poland,  19,  30,  402 

Pondicherry,  262,  321-324 

Positivists,  see  Comtists 

Post,  Morning,  London,  80,  93, 
114,  121,  159,  167,  368 

Prague,  Peace  of,  32,  33,  50,  108 

Pre-Raphaelites,  289 

Prim,  Gen.  Juan,  Count  of  Reuss, 
Marquis  of  Los  Castillejos,  14, 
52,  58,  67,  76,  78,  84 

Printing  House  Square,  278 

Protestant  Episcopal  Church,  391 

Provisional  Government  of  Na- 
tional Defence,  154,  155,  166; 
anomalous  status,  176,  177,  184, 
206,  257,  288,  301 ;  accepts  ser- 
vice of  Thiers,  177,  228,  230; 
desire  for  peace,  181,  182 ;  rec- 
ognition of,  188,  254.  270,  288, 
299;  fails  to  get  armistice.  100 ; 
sympathy  for  British  workmen, 
205 :  dependence  on  Gambetta, 
205 ;  revolutionary  influence, 
205,  215,  294,  340,  390:  character 
of,  _  207 ;  embarrassed  by  Im- 
perial intrigue.  209-214,  340; 
policy  towards  Italy,  216:  quells 
insurrection,  230:  blamed  by 
Telegraph,  231  ;  encouraged  by 
British,  253 ;  affected  by  Black 
Sea  controversy,  253,  301-303, 
340;  blamed  for  failure  of 
negotiations,  268:  uses  Wash- 
burne,  271 ;  accused  by  Ger- 
mans, 291  ;  policy  on  London 
Conference,  307-300 ;  disliked  by 
Bismarck.  317;  policy  in  revic- 
tualling  Paris,  319;  weakness 
of,  329;  gives  way  to  formal 
government,  341 

Prussia,  praised  by  Carlyle,  16; 
foreign  relations  previous  to 
outbreak  of  war,  19-36 ;  effect 
of  _  French  reduction  of  con- 
scription, 35,  38,  49;  Gramont's 
attitude  towards.  45 ;  ambassa- 
dor of,  45 ;  military  power  of, 
49:  reigning  house  of,  52;  rela- 
tions with  France,  52 ;  Gran- 
ville's representations  to,  53,  54, 
62 ;  attitude  on  Hohenzollem 
Question,  55-58,  68,  69,  71,  84: 
French  demands  on,  56,  61,  66, 
69;    refuses    British    mediation, 


43i] 


INDEX 


431 


62,    65 ;    advertises    Ems    inter- 
view, 64,  66;  Manchester  Guar- 
dian  on,  68;    British    sympathy 
for,   71,  74,   95,   97;    war   aims, 
74,   156;  envied  by   France,  75; 
circulars  of,  80;  connection  with 
Draft  Treaty,  89-92,  95,  96,  145; 
wish   for   Holland,  91  ;   guaran- 
tees Belgium,   103,   104 ;    chance 
for    military    success,     107-110; 
policy  towards   military  corres- 
pondents,     112;      informed     of 
League  of    Neutrals,    125,    146; 
suffers    from     British     exports, 
135 ;     attitude     towards     Napo- 
leon,   137,    191 ;    contracts    loan, 
147;    attitude    towards    French 
Republic,  164,  176,  209;  demand 
for    guarantees,    176,    185,    190, 
217-219,    222  '<     Motley's     advice 
to,    176;    instructions    to    Bern- 
storff,   176;  unpopularity  of  de- 
mands,   182,    191,  200,   205,  219, 
223,  239,  245,  291,  308,  350,  277 ; 
Bulwer     on,      188;     claims     on 
Providence,  197,  252  ;  diplomatic 
victory,     228 ;     approached     by 
Changarnier,  232 ;  press  attacks 
on  England,  233,  289;  change  in 
character  of  war,  239;  relations 
with  Russia,  249,  252,  256,   290, 
346,    368,    379,   381,    382;    unop- 
posed   by     British,     241  ;     signs 
Treaty  of  Paris,  247,  263,  338 ; 
plans  conference,  247;  asks  Brit- 
ish good  offices,  253 ;  breaks  off 
November     negotiations,      254 ; 
future  of,  258,  261,  327,  362,  401, 
405 ;  suggests  peace  terms,  264 ; 
secures  Austrian  neutrality,  269 ; 
relations   with   U.    S.,    270;    ru- 
moured influence  on  Times,  277 ; 
represented  at  London   Confer- 
ence,   302 ;    militarism    of,    303, 
356;  bound  by  Treaty  of  1815, 
222,    237 ;    disclaims    wish    for 
Pondicherry,  324  ;  unifies  France, 
329;  demand   for  occupation  of 
Paris,  352 
Prussian  Annals,  233 
Puffendorf,  191 
Pullen,  W.  H.,  310,  364 
Punch,  99,  115,  119,  151,  197,  216, 
227,  344,  362 


Quai  d'Orsay,  63 

Quakers,  see  Society  of  Friends 

Quarterly    Reviezv,    97,    223,    224, 

285,  290,  402 
Quartier  Latin  274 
Queen,  London,  75,  148 
Queen   Elizabeth   Regiment,  325 
Queen's  Concert  Rooms,  279 

Rameau,  Mayor  of  Versailles,  292 
Ranees,  Spanish  diplomat,  84 
Ranke,  Leopold  von,  181 
Rappel,  48 
Record,  93,  94,  139,   179,  262,  222t 

262,  355 
Red  Cross,  278,  291 
Redesdale,  Lord  Algernon,  43 
Reform  Bill,  13 
Reform  Club,  251 
Regnault,  Henri,  289 
Regnier,  "  M  or  N,"  210,  229 
Reichstag,  397,  399.  401 
Reitlinger,  Frederic,  267 
Renan,  Ernest,  131 
Renouf,   French  publicist,  253 
Republic,  French,  see  France 
Republican,  London,  376 
Republicans,  British,  189,  206,  297, 

334,  339-  375 
Republicans,  French,  331,  340,  341,. 

387,  400 
Reuter  News  Agency,  71,  259 
Reveil,  48 
Rheims,  153 

Rhin,  Departments  of,  184 
Rhin,  Le,  129 
Rhine,  26,  III,   119,  3°4,  306,  358, 

364 
Rights  of  Man,  394 
Rivoli,  Rue  de,  352 
Robinson,  Geo.  T.,  114,  212-214 
Robinson's,     pleasure-ground    of 

Paris,  274 
Rochefort,  Henri,  38,  39,  154,  157, 

164 
Roman  Catholic  Church,  40,  200 
Rome,  18,  22,  24 
Roncourt,  150 

Roon,  Gen.  Albrecht  von,  85 
Rossetti,  Christina,  237 
Rossetti,  Dante  Gabriel,  201 
Rothschild,  Alfred,  319 
Rothschild,    Baron    Alphonse    der 

53,  56,  184 


432 


INDEX 


[432 


Rothschilds,  international  bankers, 

365 
Rouher,  Eugene,  77,  no,  211 
Rumania,  52 

Rumbold,  Sir  Horace,  191 
Ruskin,    John,    16,    198,   218,    219, 

285,  288 
Russell,  Lady  John,  131 
Russell,  Lord  John,  12,  14,  17,  20, 

31,  82,  103,  251,  327,  349 
Russell,  John  Scott,  116,  117,  241 
Russell,   Odo,   245,  248,   250,   294, 

313.  315-317.  337,  353,  378 
Russell,  Dr.  W.,  112,  182,  209,  229, 

242,  246,  247,  282,  292 

Russell  Square,  113 

Russia,  14,  19,  22,  27,  29,  30,  55, 
59,  102,  104,  106,  108,  134,  182, 
191,  226-228,  235,  242-251,  252, 
256,  257,  269,  270,  284,  290,  302, 

314,  336,  337,  346,  349,  353,  361, 
362,  368,  370,  378,  379,  381,  382, 
393 

Saarebriick,  119 

Sadowa,  53,  112,  129 

St.  Cloud,  64,  151,  265 

St.  Denis,  202 

Saint  Gothard  Pass,  26,  27,  50,  51, 

108 
St.  Honore,  Faubourg,  183 
St.  James  Chapel,  79 
St.  James's  Hall,  166-169,  178,  296, 

298 
St.  Luke's,  376 
St.    Petersburg,    14,    55,    181,    187, 

191,  225,  227,  250 
Sala,  G.  Augustus,  113,  118 
Salazar,  Sefior,  Spanish  diplomat, 

84 
Salisbury,  Cathedral  of.  310 
Salisbury,  third   Marquis  of,   285, 

367 
Sandwich,  386 
Sarsfield  Brigade,  78 
Saturday    Review,    81,    189,    221, 

235,  294,  303,  309,  344 
Saunders's   News   Letter,    76,    78, 

94,   132,   148,  179,  188,  205,  265, 

323,  355 
Savoy,    17,    18,   28,    158,  205,   213, 

216,  368 
Saxony,  305 
Scandinavia,  199 
Schelstadt,  195 


Schleswig,  20,  30,  150,  305,  349 
Schneider,     President     of     Corps 

Legislatif,  41,  42 
Scotsman,  Weekly,  75,  81,  91,  122, 

143,  188,  223,  243,  291,  373,  384, 

391 

"  Scrutator,"  pen  name  of  pam- 
phleteer, 86,  219,  295 

Sebastopol,  243 

Sedan,  147,  148,  153,  172,  174,  195. 
197,  209,  236 

Seeley,  Prof.  John  Robt.,  363 

Seine,  272,  306 

Senate,  French,  63 

Sergeant's  Inn,  88 

Seven  Weeks'  War,  31 

Shaftesbury,  Earl  of,  250 

Shand,  Alex.  I,  112,  115 

Steele,  48,  70 

Situation,  La,  164,  266 

Skinner,  Hilary,  113 

Socialist    Democratic    Party,    160, 

259 

Society  of  Friends,  13,  258,  363 

Soissons,  195 

Sophia,     Queen     of     Netherlands, 

109 
Spain,  19,  32,  52-85,   159,  175,  241, 

Spectator,  London,  69,  74,  77,  79, 
97.  105,  119,  121,  135,  136,  151, 
163,  166,  187,  203,  209,  211,  222, 
233,  251,  257,  260,  262,  286,  291, 
292,  294,  297,  301,  318,  319,  322, 
332,  335,  336,  340,  343,  346,  361, 
365.  384,  386,  394.  399 

Spicheren,  120 

Standard,  70,  80,  81,  88,  93,  113. 
120,  128,  138,  142,  155,  179,  185, 
190,  191,  192,  206,  220,  231,  232, 
243,  245,  249,  251,  256,  264,  271, 
272,  278,  200,  323,  334,  336,  343, 
346,  352,  355.  363,  367,  371 

Stanley,  Lord,  264 

Stock  Exchange,   London,  69,  92, 

147,  321 
Stockmar,  Baron,  359 
Stoffel,  Col.,  in 
Strand,  London,  166,  207 
Strasburg,   123,   139,  146,   154,  174, 

184,  186,  190,  198,  199,  217,  226, 

359,  398 
Strauss,  Dr.  Friednch,  131 
Stuttgart,  59 
Suffolk  St.  Galleries,  289 


433] 

Sullivan,  Sir  Edward,  222 

Sun,  138,  264 

Sunday  Magazine,  361 

Sweden,  30 

Swinburne,    Algernon    Chas.,    10, 

158 
Switzerland,  18,  26,  236 
Sybel,  Heinrich  von,  233,  294,  296 

Tablet,  75,  81,  207,  266,  303,  377 

Taine,  Hippolyte,  396 

Taylor,  Helen,  387 

Telegraph,  London,  69,  70,  71,  9°, 
91,  93,  97,  98,  106,  in,  113,  ii4, 
137,  138,  140,  144,  156,  158,  162, 
204,  216,  219,  231,  244,  252,  260, 
264,  279,  295,  316,  334,  352,  355, 
388,  391,  397 

Temple  Bar,  115,  386 

Tennyson,  Lord  Alfred,  17,  181 

Thiers,  Louis  Adolphe,  50;  on 
French  prospects,  no;  speeches, 
128;  fortification  of  Paris,  130; 
missions  for  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment, 177-182,  188,  202,  228. 
229,  250,  254;  policy  towards 
England,  178:  despatch  to  Favre, 
180:  responsibility  for  war,  228; 
distrusted  in  Paris,  230;  Times 
on,  231 ;  political  beliefs,  232, 
386,  389,  399;  British  sympathy, 
235,  241,  360:  desire  for  con- 
gress. 241 ;  pamphlet  of,  253 ; 
plan  for  Leopold,  317:  Head  of 
Executive,  341  ;  represented  at 
Conference,  352;  signs  Prelimi- 
naries, 354,  360:  correspondence 
with  de  Broglie,  365,  369 ;  J.  R. 
Green  on,  388;  struggle  against 
Commune,  372.  387,  393"397, 
400;  Circulars  of,  399:  residence 
burned,  400;  speech  on  Treaty 
of  Frankfort,  400 
Thile,  Ludwig  von,  52,  57,  80,  84, 

189,  190 
Times,  London,  12,  18,  27,  48,  67- 
78,  84,  88-91,  93,  95,  96,  99,  102, 
112,  113,  120-122,  124,  126,  128, 
135,  137-144,  149,  161-170,  179, 
186-192,  199,  205,  208,  211,  216, 
219,  220,  229,  231.  232,  240,  246, 
250,  253,  254,  265,  266,  275-278, 
280,  282,  285,  289,  290,  300,  308, 
312,  316,  321,  341,  343,  344,  350, 
351,  354,  355,  360,  383,  389,  393 


INDEX 


433 


Tissot,  French  Minister,  175,  226, 

241 
Torrens,  W.  M.,  339 
Toul,  186 

Tours,  202,  203,  227,  231,  254,  273 
Trades     Societies,     London,     169, 

170,  189 
Trades  Unions,  British,  301 
Trafalgar  Square,  171,  308 
Treaties  of  1831  and  1839,  87,  104, 

105 
Treaty  of  1815,  322,  327 
Treaty  of  1856,  72,  242,  243,  256, 

265,  325,  335,  362,  370 
Treaty  of  1867,  263,  265,  267,  338, 

362 
Treaty  of  Frankfort,  see  Frank- 
fort, Treaty  of 
Treaty    of    Prague,    see    Prague, 

Treaty  of 
Treaty  Stone,  Ireland,  121 
Treitschke,  von,  233 
Trieste,  260 

Trinity  College,  Dublin,  282 
Trochu,  Louis-Jules,  French  gen- 
eral, 156-159,  302 
Tuileries,  46,  63,  151.  *54 
Turcos,  118,  120,  154,  193 
Turkey,  22,  241,  302,  368 
Tussaud,  Mme,  16,  196 
Tweed,  143 
Tynan,  Katharine,  121 

Uhlans,  130,  305 
Ultramontane,  28,  41,  200 
Union,  Act  of,  76,  249 
Union  Jack,  272,  301 
United  States,  24,  134,  175,  270,  284 
Urquhart,  David,   14,  85,  86,  224, 
235,  243,  290,  402 

Val  Richer,  no,  128 

Vanity  Fair,  37,  199,  234,  304,  305 

Varzin,  60 

Vendome  Column,  394,  400 

Verite,  La,  278 

Vernon,  Lord,  278 

Versailles,  212,  214,  217,  228,  229, 
233,  241,  242,  246,  249,  266,  268, 
283,   290-292,   303,   305,   309-315, 

353,  359   „  _ 

Versailles    Government,    384,    387, 

393,  397-400 
Vichy,  51 


434 


INDEX 


[434 


Victoria,  Crown  Princess  of  Prus- 
sia, 1,28,  112,  134,  199,  327 

Victoria,  Queen  of  England,  pol- 
icy in  foreign  affairs,  1860-1870, 
11,  19,  25,  26,  28-32;  appealed 
to  by  Ministers,  57;  proclaims 
neutrality,  78;  letters  to,  136; 
messengers  of,  142 ;  criticism  of, 
173;  cousin's  loss,  176;  Prus- 
sia's attitude  towards,  176,  313; 
extra-territorial  power,  184; 
telegrams  to  King  William, 
185,  375 ;  rumours  of,  276 ;  con- 
gratulates German  Emperor, 
302;  opens  Parliament,  334,  336, 
350;  requests  dowry  for  Louise, 
339,   375 !    visited  'by   Napoleon, 

Vienna,  49,  60,  181,  187,  227,  255, 

267,  269 
Vizetelly,  George,  114,  183,  319 
Volkes  Zeitung,  161 
Volunteers,  British,  302,  404 

Wacht  am  Rheim,  Die,  148,  236 
Wagner,  Dr.,  236 
Walker,  Capt.,  114 
Wallace,  Richard,  278 
Walmer,  386 

Walmer  Castle,  141,  142,  173 
Ward,  Mrs.  Humphrey,  396 
Washburne,  Elihu  B.,  51,  270,  273, 

276 
Waterloo,  29,  95 
Weissembourg,  120,  196 
Wellington,      Arthur      Wellesley, 

Duke  of,  289,  305,  349 
Wellington  Music  Hall,  376 
Werder,  Gen.,  198 
Werther,   Baron   August  von,   45, 

53,  54,  63,  64 
West,  Mrs.  Geo.  Cornwallis  West, 

see  Churchill,  Lady  Randolph 
Westminster  Review,  401 
What  We  Demand  from  France, 

233 

Whitehurst,    Felix,   114,    184,   286, 

313,  3*6,  329.  385 
Wilberforce,  Bishop  Samuel,  128 
Wilhelmshohe,  Castle  of,  164,  184, 

195,  209,  211,  232,  316 
William     1,     German      Emperor, 
crowned    King   of    Prussia,   28; 
elevates     Bismarck,     29;     inter- 
viewed  by   Clarendon,   33;    dis- 


trusts Napoleon,  33;  Bismarck's 
attitude  towards,  34,  62,  83,  234, 
401 ;  on  disarmament,  35  ;  speech 
of,  36;  interview  with  Tsar,  36; 
at  Ems,  51 ;  sanction  of  Hohen- 
zollern  candidacy,  53,  57,  58,  61, 
81 ;  responsibility  of,  54"57,  7\> 
85 ;  interviewed  by  Benedetti, 
57,  7i,  73>  76,  78,  80,  82;  answer 
to  France,  57 ;  appealed  to  by 
Tsar,  ,59;  French  demands  on, 
60 ;  telegraphs  Bismarck,  61 ; 
visited  by  Eulenburg,  61 ;  as 
head  of  House,  61 ;  Kursaal  in- 
terview, 61-64,  85;  British  rep- 
resentations to,  62 ;  military 
strength,  75,  157 ;  British  opin- 
ion of,  76,  79,  172,  196,  199,  249, 
280,  300,  303-306,  359,  362;  kin- 
ship to  Leopold,  84 ;  connection 
with  Draft  Treaty,  90,  93 ;  as- 
surance to  Belgium,  103 ;  re- 
ceives Russell,  112,  283;  speech 
at  Saarebriick,  119,  153,  160; 
complains  to  Victoria,  134;  balks 
peace  move,  142 ;  methods  in 
Alsace,  144 ;  reply  to  Pope,  144 ; 
portrait,  148;  letter  to  Napo- 
leon, 152;  telegram  after  Sedan, 
152;  desires  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, 160,  200,  305 ;  fears  Re- 
public, 161,  165;  piety  of,  168, 
197,  221,  305,  362;  on  British 
apathy,  176;  disclaims  ambi- 
tion, 182 ;  replies  to  Victoria, 
185 ;  uses  terrorism,  198 ;  inter- 
view with  Napoleon,  209;  rela- 
tions with  Tsar,  227,  235,  361, 
382  ;  Christina  Rossetti  on,  237  ; 
on  loss  of  Orleans,  239;  fails 
to  intervene  for  Russell,  242 ; 
announcement  to  Parliament, 
254;  proposed  change  of  title, 
259,  270;  illiberal,  259;  peti- 
tioned by  Bremen,  262;  crowned 
Emperor,  302,  335,  375;  title 
recognized  by  London  Confer- 
ence, 309 ;  Bismarck  superior 
to,  310;  in  Dame  Europa's 
School,  311;  effect  on  Europe 
of  supremacy,  323,  327,  401 ;  ad- 
vice to  England,  323 ;  relations 
with  Junkers,  326,  401 ;  tele- 
gram on  treaty,  354 ;  address  to 


435] 


INDEX 


435 


Parliament,      374 ;      accusations 

against  France,  390 
Wimbledon,  68 
Wimpffen,    Emmanuel    Felix    de, 

French  general,  151 
Windsor  Castle,  173.  325,  385 
Wingfield,  Lewis,  114 
Winn,  C.  Allanson,  292 
Wodehouse,  Henry,  273 
Wolff  News  Agency,  260 


Workingmen's  Association,  128 
Workingmen's    International    Ex- 
hibition, 173 
Workingmen's      National      Peace 

Society,  288 
World  War,  404 

Worth,  120,  121,  137,  139,  236,  347 
Wurttemberg,  59,  254,  398 

Zouaves,  305 


VITA 

The  author  was  born  in  El  Paso,  Texas,  on  Dec.  19, 
1889.  After  receiving  her  preparatory  education  in  San 
Antonio,  she  attended  the  University  of  Texas  during  the 
sessions  of  1907-1910  and  1915-1918.  In  the  spring  of 
191 7  she  received  the  degrees  of  A.B.  and  A.M.  and  was 
awarded  the  University  Fellowship  in  History  for  the  suc- 
ceeding year.  During  the  session  of  1918-1919  she  held 
the  Schiff  Fellowship  in  Political  Science  at  Columbia 
University. 

437 


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